Monism, dualism, & freewill

Calvinism denies freewill, right? Everyone knows that Calvinism denies freewill. If they know nothing else about Calvinism, they know that much. Indeed, there’s nothing else to know, is there? That’s all there is to Calvinism, right? The denial of freewill? Nothing less and nothing more.

Of course, it’s not that simple. Historically, the question swirls around the Calvinist/Arminian debate, which, in turn, goes back to the Pelagian controversy.

But there’s another way of approaching this question. And that is in terms of the debate between monism and dualism. By “monism” I mean materialism. By “dualism” I mean Cartesian dualism.

Daniel Dennett is a militant monist and archenemy of dualism. He likes to talk about the Cartesian theater. His criticism is actually aimed at what he calls Cartesian materialism, which he regards as a remnant of Cartesian dualism.

In the Cartesian theater, the soul plays the role of a homunculus who scans sensory input projected onto a big screen, makes decisions on the basis of this input, and directs the body to act accordingly.

It’s like the scene in Men in Black where what looks like a human body is really a space ship piloted by miniature alien. The skull is the “bridge, the eyes the view screen, and so on.

Because these illustrations are humorous, they are meant to ridicule the very idea of dualism.

But let’s give this a second thought. On the one hand, traditional Christian anthropology is, indeed, dualistic.

The soul is the seat of personality. The soul does, indeed, process information coming in from the senses. The soul does, indeed, direct the body to do certain things in response to this sensory input.

And this is the real basis of freewill. It isn’t the freedom to do otherwise. Rather, it’s a faculty for moral and rational deliberation.

Choice does not involve freedom of opportunity, for, as a practical matter, we can only make one choice at a time.

But it does demand an ability to entertain various alternatives, whichever of these bare possibilities turns out to be a live option.

Due to dualism, a person is a self-conscious being. He is able to objectify his own awareness. To see himself apart from his surroundings. He has a capacity for imagining hypothetical scenarios.

In physicalism, by contrast, such detachment is impossible. The brain is it. There is no antecedent observer to inspect the input and choose the best course of action.

Rather, mind and brain are identical, and the brain is governed by the laws of physics. The person cannot step outside of his brain. He can’t step away from his neuroprocessing center to review the input with critical detachment, or direct the body accordingly.

He doesn’t have a body. He is a body. So he can’t put any distance between his mind and his brain.

There’s nothing behind the eyes except a data processing machine, mindlessly registering external stimuli—like a security camera, voice-activated tape recorder, or seismograph.

In place of a homunculus we have a zombie. If physicalism is true, then moral or rational deliberation is illusory.