Talking to himself

Here is Loftus’ atheological argument from the problem of evil:

“1) If God exists, and if he is good, and if he wants us to believe he exists and that he is good, then he should have a morally acceptable reason for causing intense creaturely suffering that is remotely understandable from our perspective. “

i) As I’ve pointed out on several occasions now, in order for this objection to even get off the ground it needs to explain what a human being or lower animal is according to physicalism and/or naturalistic evolution, and then explain, on that reductive definition, how a “meat machine” or biochemical data-processing organism like a man or a dog is being wronged when it is made to suffer, further assuming that mentalistic states like “suffering” are even meaningful within a framework of physicalism and/or naturalistic evolution.

Loftus continues to doge this issue, but it’s an issue generated by his own worldview.

ii) From a Reformed perspective, God does not intend for everyone to be a Christian.

“2) There isn't a morally acceptable reason for an existing good God to cause intense creaturely suffering in our lives that is remotely understandable from our perspective.”

i) This denial is false on the face of it. Many Christians, as well as other theists, obviously believe that there are morally acceptable reasons for the problem of evil. What type of theodicy you find believable or compelling depends on your theology and other philosophical commitments. There are a variety of theodicies which appeal to a variety of theists and theological traditions.

ii) The unspoken assumption here is that a “morally acceptable reason” would be a reason that everyone agrees with. Why should we go along with that assumption? Persuasion is person-variable.

An Arminian will find the freewill defense morally acceptable, and a supralapsarian theodicy morally unacceptable whereas a Calvinist will find a supralapsarian theodicy acceptable, but the freewill defense unacceptable.

A universalist will find a soul-making theodicy acceptable, but either an Arminian or Reformed theodicy unacceptable.

Leibniz had a theodicy which was acceptable to him. So did Aquinas.

For that matter, so does Hinduism, or Buddhism.

We can take issue with one or another. But we do so as individuals. For Loftus to presume to speak on behalf of everyone concerned is egomaniacal.

“3) .: Either God doesn't exist, or he isn't good, or he doesn't care whether we believe he exists and is good.”

We’ve now seen what a simplistic conclusion this is. Loftus is talking to himself. He’s an audience of one.