Is Arminian theology irrational?

For purposes of this little essay I’m using “Arminian” as a generic label for any libertarian version of action theory.

What makes a particular belief and/or related behavior rational?

One way of answering that question is that such a belief is rational if we have a good reason for our belief.

We may lack the sophistication to give a good reason, but, in principle, it should be possible to explain ourselves.

And what constitutes a good explanation? I understand why you believe something or act accordingly if, given certain antecedent conditions, you could not very well believe or behave otherwise.

So rationality is bound up with explanatory power, which is, in turn, bound up with causality.

If certain necessary and sufficient conditions are met, a certain outcome is inevitable—like a chemical reaction. That is how we explicate the outcome.

Now, in Arminian theology, freedom is contracausal. I am free if I am able to do otherwise given the very same antecedent conditions.

So knowing all of the initial conditions does not explain the outcome.

Suppose we applied this principle of a homicide investigation. The victim was strangled to death. The murder took place in a company town, and the victim was the sole owner of the company.

He abused his position. He acted with impunity. He had the police paid off. He slept with the wives of his employees. He brought financial ruin on anyone who opposed him.

The challenge facing the detective is the wealth of potential suspects. Virtually everyone wanted the victim dead.

Our detective narrows the field by applying the old rule of motive, means, and opportunity.

Some of the townsfolk have alibis. They can account for their whereabouts. They were out of town or otherwise away from the scene of the crime when the murder occurred. So they had no opportunity to kill him.

The womenfolk can be eliminated because they would lack the physical strength to overpower and strangle the victim. They did not have the means to strangle him.

So although almost everyone had a motive to kill him, many were lacking the means or opportunity.

Of the remaining pool, there are conflicting motives to sort out. Although they all had reason to see him dead, his company was the only source of local employment. It would run counter to the financial self-interest of the killer to murder his employer.

However, the incentive of jealous retribution might override the financial disincentive. If he was sleeping with the killer’s wife, then the motive to exact revenge could well be stronger than the motive to keep one’s job.

Motives are also a necessary ingredient in assessing guilt or degrees of guilt. There’s a difference between accidentally killing someone and premeditated murder. There’s a difference between a sniper and a sharpshooter.

The outcome is the same, but the moral valuation of the outcome depends, in part, on the motive of the agent.

Let’s look at another example: bank robbers take a bank manager’s family hostage and threaten to kill his wife and kids unless he opens the safe and gives them time to make their escape.

Although he collaborated with the robbers, we consider the coercive situation an attenuating or exculpatory circumstance.

The Arminian may exclaim: “Ah, that proves our point. He didn’t have a choice!”

Actually, he did have a choice. He was free to refuse the robbers.

But we understand what the Arminian means. On a scale of values, the manager chose to sacrifice the money in order to save his own family. And we’re prepared to excuse his behavior on that account. Indeed, we might blame him if he had done otherwise.

But this is not a libertarian argument. He didn’t have a choice in the sense that his overriding motive was the safety of his own family. So this is only a mitigating factor if you assume that he was well-intentioned, and his motive was a compelling motive,—so causality is still the operative criterion. The only question is whether he was well-motivated or ill-intentioned.

The problem with Arminian theology is that it cuts the causal nerve. And by eschewing causality, it lacks explanatory power. And in the absence of explanatory power, it is irrational to the core. It cannot explain why agents act or refrain from acting.

If action is inexplicable, then we lose any firm footing for personal or social ethics, historical causation or jurisprudence.

Arminian theology is absurd because Arminian theology is surd—by introducing a surd dynamic into the world.

Remember, too, that human agents interact with a physical environment, so this undercuts scientific explanation as well.

As such, Calvinism and Arminianism are not epistemically on par with each other. For Calvinism enjoys explanatory power, while Arminian theology represents the abdication of rationality.

Arminian theology is worse than untrue—it could not even be true. It is unable to supply and satisfy certain truth-conditions without which the very possibility of an explanation is overruled. As Van Til would say, Arminian theology is disproven by the impossibility of the contrary, for it cannot acquit the preconditions of intelligibility.