Tuesday, January 11, 2011

More Examples Of John Loftus' Irrationality

I've been participating in a thread at Victor Reppert's blog that was supposed to be about the textual transmission of the New Testament. John Loftus has ignored the large majority of what I've said there and has been posting on a lot of other topics. Blogger is being inconsistent in displaying my posts there, sometimes even removing ones that are short. It doesn't seem to be a problem with long posts. Blogger even changed my screen name while I was still logged on, for no apparent reason and without any notification. I've been deleting posts because of those problems. I think I've had more problems with posting at Victor's blog than anywhere else on the web. I've decided to post my response to John here, since I'm having so many problems posting at Victor's blog. If you want the larger context of the discussion, click the link above.

John Loftus,

You haven't addressed the evidence I've cited for my conclusions about the textual record. You've made some claims about my motives without providing any supporting evidence. And you've made some vague assertions about the alleged implications of the Donation of Constantine and other data that have little relevance to the earlier sources I cited. Since my posts here and the series I linked at Triablogue are primarily about the pre-manuscript evidence, why would you respond to me with comments about the lateness of the manuscripts, the Donation of Constantine, etc.? Your behavior here, as elsewhere, is irresponsible and reprehensible. You're making little effort to be reasonable.

On the issue of miracles in the modern world, you could begin by interacting with the evidence Steve Hays and I cited in The Infidel Delusion, namely the paranormal research of men like Stephen Braude and Michael Sudduth. (I've recently written more about the subject here.) You have to know what sort of arguments I would produce for modern miracles, from The Infidel Delusion at a minimum, yet your posts here make no effort to interact with my views. You ignore my arguments about the textual record, and you ignore my arguments about modern miracles.

Your appeal to Bart Ehrman doesn't make much sense, given that I've addressed his position in particular in the Triablogue series I linked and in many other places. As I've documented, Ehrman affirms that most ancient Christian scribes were honest in their textual transmission, which is one of the points I've been making, and Ehrman's view of the text is largely the same as that of a conservative Evangelical. You'll have to explain how your vague appeal to Ehrman supposedly refutes anything I said.

As for philosophy of history, tell me where I'm supposedly wrong and how the same sort of criticism couldn't be raised against your own historical claims. You've been making a lot of historical assertions in this thread, and you do the same at your blog, in books, and in other places. So do your co-contributors in those contexts. If people like you and Paul Tobin can claim to know so much about history, why can't I?

John saw some of my comments before I deleted them at Victor's blog, and he responded. Read those replies and ask yourself whether he actually interacts much with what I said.

Atheism is evil

Randal Rauser has posted a critique of a post by Dustin:

http://randalrauser.com/2011/01/is-biblical-christianity-the-only-rational-worldview-and-is-atheism-wicked/

Dustin can speak for himself (he left a comment at Randal’s blog, although he’s pressed for time), but I’ll venture some comments of my own.

Randal begins by quoting Dustin’s statement that “While atheism is wicked…”

Randal then says:

Yoiks! This is wrong on so many levels it is hard to know where to begin. The problems begin when we simply try to figure out what the claim actually is.

From what I can tell, Randal never gets around to directly addressing the charge of “wickedness.” However, that’s worth remarking on.

There should be nothing controversial about a Christian believing or stating that atheism is wicked. For that reflects the viewpoint of God’s revelation in Scripture.

Offhand, the only reason I think the why Randal might take umbrage at that statement is if Randal regards Christianity as just a hypothesis, more likely than not, but quite possibly wrong. Put another way, Randal may take the position that you can’t really know if God (specifically, the God of the Bible)  exists. Hence, denying the existence of God may be a morally and intellectually respectable option, from his standpoint. Since the truth of the matter is unknowable, there is nothing inherently culpable about atheism.

If that is his position, then it reflects a major dividing line in one’s view of infidelity. Some attribute the lack of faith to natural ignorance. We can’t help ourselves. We don’t know any better. Maybe God exists and maybe he doesn’t.

By contrast, the Bible attributes lack of faith to willful rebellion. Not ignorance of the truth, but fear and loathing of the unwelcome truth. To see the light, but love the darkness. To stare goodness in the face, but turn to evil. Sin as primordial apostasy.

Perhaps Randal is hedging his bets. He is genuinely sympathetic to the plight of the atheist because he sees himself in the same boat.

Moving along:

So what are the beliefs one must hold to have the worldview of “biblical Christianity”? Well there are two words here for our consideration: biblical, and Christianity. First off, the only rational worldview according to this author is a biblical one. What is that supposed to mean? It could mean holding the set of beliefs held by one of the authors of the Bible. Or maybe we should also extend it to the beliefs of one of the main characters in the Bible that plays for the home team. (Thus Herod the Great probably doesn’t get included. Neither does Jezebel. Although maybe they did have a biblical worldview and they just didn’t live according to their beliefs. It’s hard to say.)

Is this a sincere question? Is Randal that confused? Or is this facetious?

In general, we might say that Biblical Christianity represents the “narrative” viewpoint of Scripture. I’m using “narrative” somewhat broadly. We can extend the principle to other genres, such as the epistolary viewpoint of a letter writer like Paul. That sort of thing.

Put another way, Scripture has an “editorial” viewpoint. It doesn’t merely record speeches and events. Rather, it records Bible history in a way that reveals the writer’s assessment of what transpires. It directs the reader to identify with the moral and theological perspective of the writer. This can be done through parenthetical asides, but it can also employ more oblique literary techniques to guide the reader’s perception of events. And, of course, there are more explicitly didactic genres, where the writer openly states his position–or sets his own position in contrast to the opposing viewpoint.

A writer can also use certain speakers within the story to echo the editorial voice. Likewise, some (but not all) speakers within the Biblical narrative are inspired speakers in their own right. So they too, convey the evaluative aspect of Scripture.

Underlying this is the dual authorship of Scripture, with the inspired fusion of authorial intent. What Isaiah meant to convey is what God meant for Isaiah to convey (to take one example).

The reference to “Christianity” helps us narrow this down a bit. Perhaps then the only rational biblical worldview for us today is the one that was held by New Testament figures and characters post-Jesus in the fledgling Christian church. This would help us with the diversity problem because it would narrow us to Paul and Timothy and Mary. So the only rational worldview is that held by Paul and other New Testament, early church Christians. And that’s the worldview of biblical Christianity that we should hold as well.

No. The biblical viewpoint is ultimately the canonical viewpoint. The Bible has collective outlook. Each book contributes to a cumulative perspective.

I’m confused. What does this mean for many of the beliefs in our worldview? Science, for instance.

A Biblical worldview is an interpretive framework. Scripture itself points to events outside itself. But extrabiblical information is still evaluated from a Biblical perspective. The viewpoint of Scripture canonizes a God’s-eye viewpoint of reality. And that revelatory perspective is necessary to appreciate our place in the world.

This author apparently believes that there was not significant disagreement among New Testament Christians. But that is very far from obvious. Did Paul and James (brother of Jesus and leader of the Jerusalem church) see eye to eye on the role of the law in the church? There certainly is much rational room to doubt this. (And remember, all we need to throw a wrench into the author’s claim is to point out rational grounds for dissent.) But if they didn’t agree, or at least if we have reasonable grounds to think it possible that they didn’t agree, then which one was the biblical Christian?

i) Well, that’s far from self-evident. Acts and Galatians don’t say that Paul and James disagreed. Rather, the direct confrontation involves Paul and some anonymous second parties who presume to speak on behalf of James.

ii) Moreover, there’s no reason to assume that James had firsthand knowledge of what Paul was saying and doing on the mission field. Even if, let us say, James were to condemn a position which second parties attributed to Paul, that’s not the same thing as James condemning Paul, or James attributing a position to Paul.

It would only be on those occasions when Paul and James met face-to-face and talked specifics (or corresponded), that Paul and James would even be in the hypothetical position to disagree with each other’s theology.

iii) There is also a difference between doctrine and tactics. Even if, for the sake of argument, Paul and James differ on the best way to evangelize the Gentiles, that’s not a doctrinal agreement. Rather, that’s a tactical disagreement on missional strategies.

And that might also reflect certain inherent tradeoffs. If James is ministering primarily to Jews while Paul is ministering primarily to Gentiles, then they have different priorities.

What works best for Gentiles may be offensive to Jews, and vice versa. Therefore, one might have to settle for a tactical compromise. Indeed, that’s exactly what took place in Acts 15.

iv) But perhaps Randal is alluding to the fabled conflict between James and Paul on the doctrine of justification. If so, it’s not as if this hasn’t been dealt with in the exegetical literature.

Needless to say there are other possible areas of disagreement as well. For example, would James have agreed with the christology packed into the Gospel of John? Maybe, but possibly not. At the very least, it would surely be naive to deny that there is not development in the New Testament church’s theology. For instance, there is a pretty big gap between the tacit adoptionism of Peter’s preaching in Acts 2:36 (‘Therefore let all Israel be assured of this: God has made this Jesus, whom you crucified, both Lord and Messiah.’) and the lofty declaration of John 1:1 (In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.)

Here Randal’s is simply tipping his hand when it comes to his low view of Scripture.  That would take us deep into the inerrancy debate.  It also turns on how we interpret his prooftexts.

His next paragraph is a dismissive straw an argument.

Finally:

Sadly, the author of Triablogue appears to be doing nothing more than providing empty rhetorical bluster to perpetuate the delusion that only he, and those who agree with him, are rational.

Of course, that’s a demagogical falsification of what Dustin actually wrote. If you compare Dustin’s post, where he quotes verbatim from prominent unbelievers to document his claims, with Randal’s parting shot, there’s no resemblance between the two.

Like angels

I'm posting some correspondence I recently had.


********************
I was reading you statement on p368a of the Commentary on the New Testament Use of the Old Testament. It raises a question or two.
1. You apparently lift a translation straight from Samuel Lachs’ Rabbinical Commentary on the New Testament:
i) Did you go back and check the primary source, or did you rely on this popular secondary source?
ii) What is the date of the cited text?
iii) In n5, he refers the reader to “Montefiore’s criticism of SB’s citations of this subject ad loc., RLGT, p312.”
How might that affect your citation?
iv) The text says that in the world to come “there is not eating and drinking and, or procreation and childbearing…”
Do you think we should use that to interpret Jesus' statement in Lk 20:35? Do you think glorification eliminates the need for food and drink?
If so, it’s hard to see in what sense the glorified body is still a physical body. Yet the Lukan pericope centers on the resurrection of the body.
2. On Lk 20:36, you say that “as sons of the resurrection,” they are “like angels, and angels neither need food nor marry,” followed by citations from 1 En 15:6; 51:4; 104:4-6, Wis 5:5,15-16; 2 Bar 51:10, plus the DDS.
i) Did you go back and check the primary sources, or did you recopy this from stock citations in standards commentaries? I ask because I don’t see how the citations actually bear our your contention.
ii) Regarding 2 Baruch:
a) Wasn’t that composed sometime after the synoptic gospels? So how would that constitute background material for a discussion which is recorded in the synoptic gospels?
b) Even if we waive aside (a), this is how Charles renders 2 Bar 51:10: 

For in the heights of that world shall they dwell, And they shall be made like unto the angels, And be made equal to the stars, And they shall be changed into every form they desire, From beauty into loveliness, And from light into the splendor of glory.
How does that document the specific claim about food and marriage (or the absence thereof)?
iii) Regarding Wis 5:5,15-16, the New Jerusalem Bible renders this passage:
5 How has he come to be counted as one of the children of God and to have his lot among the holy ones?…15 But the upright live for ever, their recompense is with the Lord, and the Most High takes care of them. 16 So they will receive the glorious crown and the diadem of beauty from the Lord’s hand; for he will shelter them with his right hand and with his arm he will shield them.
How does that document the specific claim about food and marriage (or the absence thereof)?
iv) Regarding 1 En 104:4-6, this is how Charles renders that passage: 

4 rulers, and on all who helped those who plundered you. Be hopeful, and cast not away your hopes for ye shall have great joy as the angels of heaven. 5 What shall ye be obliged to do? Ye shall not have to hide on the day of the great judgement and ye shall not be found as sinners, and the eternal 6 judgement shall be far from you for all the generations of the world. And now fear not, ye righteous, when ye see the sinners growing strong and prospering in their ways: be not companions with them.
Nickelsburg, in his commentary (p512), has a similar rendering.
How does this document the specific claim about food and marriage (or the absence thereof)?
v) Regarding 1 En 51:4, this is how Charles renders that passage: 

4 And in those days shall the mountains leap like rams, And the hills also shall skip like lambs satisfied with milk, And the faces of [all].
How does that bear on your claim?
If we include v5a, there is a passing reference to angels: “the angels in heaven shall be lighted up with joy.”
But even that addition doesn’t seem germane.
vi) Regarding 1 En 15:6, here is the verse in context:
3 for you: Wherefore have ye left the high, holy, and eternal heaven, and lain with women, and defiled yourselves with the daughters of men and taken to yourselves wives, and done like the children 4 of earth, and begotten giants (as your) sons? And though ye were holy, spiritual, living the eternal life, you have defiled yourselves with the blood of women, and have begotten (children) with the blood of flesh, and, as the children of men, have lusted after flesh and blood as those also do who die 5 and perish. Therefore have I given them wives also that they might impregnate them, and beget 6 children by them, that thus nothing might be wanting to them on earth. But you were formerly 7 spiritual, living the eternal life, and immortal for all generations of the world. And therefore I have not appointed wives for you; for as for the spiritual ones of the heaven, in heaven is their dwelling.
Nickelsburg’s rendering is similar. This is the only citation thus far that approximates the details of your claim.
However, in the Enochian passage the naturally celibate state of the Watchers (i.e. angels) is set in direct contrast to human beings. And that is grounded in the incorporeal nature of the Watchers, in direct contrast to human beings.
Both Nickelsburg, in his commentary (p272), as well as David Jackson, in Enochic Judaism (p32-33), underscore that antithesis.
So how would that be analogous to the resurrection of the body, which is the point at issue in the dispute between Jesus and the Sadducees? Do you think a glorified body is essentially ethereal, like an astral body? How does that fit the Lukan depiction of the Risen Christ (Lk 24:37-43)?
vii) Was there something in the DDS to document the specific details of your contention?

********************

Steve:


Here is a brief answer.


The quotation of B Ber 17a is taken from Lachs, who took it from
Montefiore; other translations could have been used, which are not
substantially different. Lachs is handy, more so than Billerbeck, which
is German, and so for the convenience of English readers I used the
Lachs reference.


Of course there is a debate on the use of rabbinic text. There is no
time here to go into that. I do not claim that rabbinic texts "explain"
NT texts: I use them as comparable statements. While "no eating" may
speak against a physical body, "crowns on their heads" can be taken as
implying a physical body.


The main point of comparison was the "neither marry" statement in Luke
20:35.


And yes, I always check primary sources. I resent the suggestion that I
cite primary texts without reading them.  The point of the "angel"
references is the description of the resurrected as angels, without
implying that these text speak about eating etc. I do not claim what you
assume.


********************

Unfortunately for him, he made more specific claims than the evidence he cites seems to justify. 

Frankly, I think it's pretty shoddy scholarship to have him quoting Lachs, quoting Montefiore, quoting/translating the original. 

Why bother citing alleged parallels unless these help to explain the verse?

Actually, "crowns on their head" could well be stock figurative imagery.

Hubner’s Podcast Response

Paul Manata continues to reason with James Hubner, but Hubner appears unwilling to listen (to put it mildly).

Monday, January 10, 2011

When cops go bad


Whenever there’s some gun-related massacre or crime spree, you have the usual cries for tighter gun-control. One of the things this hysterical reaction overlooks is the fact that it’s not just civilians who sometimes go bad. The folks on the other side of law enforcement can also go bad.

For instance, those who work in narco units are susceptible to bribery. If a drug “kingpin” can pay you far more than you make as a policeman, then there’s a real temptation to sell your services to the highest bidder. We certainly see this in Latin America. “Serpico” is another case in point.

Due, moreover, to the “Blue Code of Silence,” if a kingpin can bribe a few policemen, that makes it easier to turn the others. Policemen need each other to watch their back. It’s dangerous to be the odd man out on the force.

Yet, when police go bad, you don’t hear the usual groups demand that we prohibit policemen for arming themselves–or impose other restrictions police powers.

To the liberal mindset, civilians are inherently untrustworthy, but gov’t is never untrustworthy–at least as long as Democrats remain in power.   

A Friendly Critique of One Man's Grappling with Postmodernism

INTRODUCTION: Below are a few informal definitions from an atheist Facebook friend that is finding certain aspects of postmodernism appealing. He was asked by another Facebook friend to give some definitions of his take on postmodernism. I reproduce these below with my critical commentary in-between:
1) a philosophy that does not dehumanize people by calling people irrational because they come to different conclusions.
Two caveats need to be made in order to be fair in my criticism: (1) my atheist, postmodern friend is still thinking through the implications and varieties of postmodernism and is not yet well-developed in his views. Thus, the critiques I offer below only interact with those undeveloped, informal views he has presented in an informal environment. He may change his views or abandon postmodernism altogether, thus, the critiques below are based only upon his current, informal definitions. (2) Some of my critiques below depend upon what it means to "dehumanize" people.
Regardless of what "dehumanize" means to him, to "de-" anything to a person shows that my postmodern atheist friend assumes that there is a moral obligation for people not to mistreat others. Now for my friendly criticism:
  • As it stands, the statement above is self-defeating because it itself suggests that there is something wrong or irrational with calling people irrational if they come to different conclusions about that conclusion. I.e., Why are you "dehumanizing" me for "dehumanizing" postmoderns? Also, assuming we are evolved pond-scum and assuming that this is a universal moral obligation, where does such an obligation come from and why shouldn't I do it? However, I'll return to this last question below in fuller detail.
  • It is arbitrary since assuming we're all mere molecules in motion, I could just as easily say that we should dehumanize irrational people. In other words, we have a moral obligation to punish people for being irrational. After all, isn't that what bad grades, prison sentences, and traffic tickets are all about to a certain extent? This is just another example of how secularist morality is arbitrary.
  • If this includes people who critique the various forms and facets of post-modernism from a Biblical perspective, then it is also a straw man. Christians do not think that people lose their essential God-given humanness if they adopt a non-Christian philosophy or disagree with certain aspects of orthodox Christian doctrine. On the contrary, those who affirm Biblical authority realize that all people are God's image-bearers and as such they continue to reflect this essential humanness regardless of their philosophical beliefs and this reflection is the essential point of contact with the unbeliever (Romans 1:18-32).
My atheist friend goes on to say that postmodernism is:
2) a philosophy that understands that we are not going to get everyone to come to the same conclusions . . . .
  • Fair enough, but assuming the conjunction of naturalism with postmodernism, lets ask some deeper questions :
1. Assuming the conjunction of naturalism and postmoderism, why do people come to "conclusions" about anything in the first place? Why are people inherently rational whereas animals are inherently instinctual? Why does reasoning exist in the first place? This smacks of teleology, but in an attempt to avoid this obvious implication, our naturalist, postmodern friend may try to argue that it is instinctual for humans to engage in higher-order reasoning via the end-result of neo-Darwinian mechanisms whereas this is not so much the case with "other" animals since they took a different evolutionary pathway. But that skirts the issue, which again, is compacted together into these two questions: Why assume that rationality is normal for people and how do you know what is normative versus non-normative rational behavior given the conjunction of postmodernism and naturalism?

2. Assuming the conjunction of naturalism and postmoderism, why should people come to "conclusions" about anything in the first place? It seems to me that assuming the aforementioned combination, all you are left with are statistical averages. Statistical averages don't necessarily tell us what we ought to do, they only tell us what is the case. As the skeptic David Hume beautifully demonstrated, you can't get an ought from an is. Why assume the need to be rational or ought to do so when no ultimate standards of truth exist in the first place to distinguish between rationality and irrationality? Why should we come to conclusions about anything and why should we expect that we should make conclusions about anything? Using words like "conclusion" assumes that there are fixed principles for determining correct reasoning from incorrect reasoning (i.e., laws of logic like the law of identity, law of non-contradiction, and the law of excluded middle) by which one can come to logical conclusions. But if multiple logical systems exist that are mutually exclusive and contradictory yet supposedly equally valid since no ultimate capital-"T" truth exists, how do you get ultimate "conclusions" to anything (including the conclusion that there is "no ultimate conclusion") since there is no overarching logical meta-narrative exists by which we can judge between competing and sometimes contradictory systems of logic? So, not only do we have the problem of the "why" question, but now we have the problem of the how question. Why should we seek to be rational when, according to the conjunction of postmodernism and naturalism, there is no ultimate criterion to determine rationality from irrationality? How can any type of rationality be possible in a system like that? The only consistent answer a postmodern naturalist can give is that there is no one system for determining "rationality" but that many different "rationalities" exist and that people reason from their different assumed and relative starting points to competing and contradictory conclusions about the nature, scope, and limits of reality. However, that still assumes that there are fixed, non-relative laws that determine correct reasoning from incorrect reasoning. Thus, it is self-defeating to say that there are no fixed, transcendent, immutable laws of logic since the very language that the postmodern uses to deny those laws uses those laws.

3. How can people be rational and responsible if they are merely stimulus-response mechanisms? In other words, rationality presupposes that a person had the ability to choose between two competing conditions and then use their cognitive faculties to reason to the most rational conclusion. Many non-Christians with conservative moral and social values informed by Western culture have expressed outrage with rulings from certain court cases. They wonder what sort of reasoning could have been used to result in such "unfair" decisions when "common sense" should have dictated otherwise.

But assuming postmodernism, "common sense" is only common when there is a commonality of thought between people. The Judeo-Christian foundations of Western countries have been seriously eroded, leaving behind a plethora of differing, mutually exclusive beliefs. This has resulted in the "culture wars" in the United States as well as the religious tension occurring with the Islamization of Europe. However, one common theme that is being taught to all who are subjected to public education in the west is this: the theory of evolution. How does their "creation story" story affect the reasoning processes that have lead to the changes in Western culture?

A recent online article from the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA, by evolutionist A.R. Cashmore, argued that the justice system is flawed because it assumes people have the ability to rationally deliberate and make a choice between two opposing actions, something he argues doesn’t exist at all if people are merely the products of time, chance, and natural processes. He wrote,

"In Anglo-American law, for a person to be found guilty of a crime, he must be aware of his wrongdoing at the time of the crime—he must display mens rea: that is, the mind must be guilty. In certain circumstances, a defendant can be found not guilty by reason of insanity.” [http://www.pnas.org/content/107/10/4499.full.pdf]

He then gives an example where such a defense was not successful;

“. . . the case of Jeffrey Dahmer, who was found guilty . . . for the death of seventeen young men from 1978 to 1991. Dahmer was a necrophiliac, performing gross sexual acts on the dead bodies, as well as performing frontal lobotomies and boiling their skulls in acid.” [Ibid.]
“The rationale for the guilty verdict was that it was claimed that he knew what he was doing was wrong, as evidenced by the fact that he lied to the police about his activities. I raise this case to illustrate two points: First, the legal system assumes a capacity for individuals not only to distinguish between right and wrong, but to act according to those distinctions—that is, an integral component of the legal system is a belief in free will. Furthermore, the legal system assumes that it is possible to distinguish those individuals who have this capacity of free will from those who lack it.” [Ibid.]

However, according to Cashmore,

“The reality is, not only do we have no more free will than a fly or a bacterium, in actuality we have no more free will than a bowl of sugar.” [Ibid.]

What is his and other like minded people’s conclusion?

“As noted by Lady Barbara Wootton, the British criminologist, ‘If mental health and ill health cannot be defined in objective scientific terms that are free of subjective moral judgments, it follows that we have no reliable criterion by which to distinguish the sick from the healthy mind. The road is then wide open . . . to dispense with the concept of responsibility altogether.’” [Ibid.]

In this atheistic evolutionary worldview, serial-killer Jeffrey Dahmer was not responsible for his actions. He simply reacted the way he did because he was biochemically determined to do so. It wasn’t right or wrong, good or evil, it just was. Consider what Dahmer himself said about the effects of one's belief about origins has upon one's behavior,

“If a person doesn’t think there is a God to be accountable to, then—then what’s—what’s the point of—of trying to modify your behaviour to keep it within acceptable ranges? That’s how I thought, anyway. I always believed the theory of evolution as truth, that we all just came from the slime. When we died, you know, that was it, there is nothing . . .” [Dahmer, J., in an interview with Stone Phillips on Dateline NBC, Nov. 29, 1994; creation.com/mass-murderers-testimony. See also here @ 2:25ff and 5:18ff: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IjW7bezdddE]

So, despite Cashmore’s claims that free moral agency is a myth, Dahmer stated he actually thought through his actions and logically decided on a course of action based on those beliefs. Not only do beliefs have consequences, but if one tries to be consistent (read = rational) with the starting assumptions of postmodernism and naturalism, the logical end result will be nihilism and hedonism. Regarding biochemical determinism, Cashmore admits,

“Darwin was aware of the implications of his theories concerning evolution in reference to free will as indicated in these notes: 'This view should teach one profound humility, one deserves no credit for anything. Nor ought one to blame others.'” [http://www.pnas.org/content/107/10/4499.full.pdf]

This view has several supporters. Consider this statement from atheist professor William Provine,

“Let me summarize my views on what modern evolutionary biology tells us loud and clear . . . There are no gods, no purposes, no goal-directed forces of any kind. There is no life after death. When I die, I am absolutely certain that I am going to be dead. That’s the end for me. There is no ultimate foundation for ethics, no ultimate meaning to life, and no free will for humans, either." [Provine, W. (prof., Cornell University), Origins Research, Vol. 16:1/2 (1994), p. 9.]

So according to atheistic evolutionists who have thought through the implications of their "creation" story, our actions are simply the result of a biochemically determined stimulus-response mechanism that we are not responsible for, and this outlook has deep roots back to Darwin himself. But perhaps this view is not simply a rational outlook based solely on the "facts". Aldous Huxley said,

“I had motive for not wanting the world to have a meaning; consequently assumed that it had none, and was able without any difficulty to find satisfying reasons for this assumption. The philosopher who finds no meaning in the world is not concerned exclusively with a problem in pure metaphysics, he is also concerned to prove that there is no valid reason why he personally should not do as he wants to do . . ." [Huxley, A., Ends and Means, London: Chatto & Windus, pp. 270 ff, 1937.]

Huxley clearly understood that the only way for existence to have inherent meaning was to believe in a Creator-God, but he didn’t want that to be true because he knew that with a Creator comes standards of right and wrong. So, Huxley willfully chose to suppress the idea of a Creator because it conflicted with his sinful desires. But how could he have chosen anything if he didn't have free moral agency?

After all, Cashmore said,

“A belief in free will is akin to religious beliefs. Indeed, I would argue that free will makes ‘logical sense,’ as long as one has the luxury of the ‘causal magic’ of religion. Neither religious beliefs, nor a belief in free will, comply with the laws of the physical world.” [http://www.pnas.org/content/107/10/4499.full.pdf]

So according to his own beliefs, Cashmore and his fellow atheists have no choice but to be atheists! Every decision he thinks he has made thinking atheism to be a rational, logical worldview is really nothing but biochemical predestination. As I said in my debate with the UNCG Atheists, Agnostics, and Skeptics in September 2010, if naturalism is true, then we are simply like two different soft drinks fizzing at different rates based upon our chemical composition; one person is "fizzing" Christian theism, the other is "fizzing" atheism. There is no true rationality or responsibility behind what we are doing, we are just dancing to the tune of our DNA.

The modern day champion of new atheism, Richard Dawkins agrees that there is no ultimate purpose to anything.

"Humans have always wondered about the meaning of life . . . life has no higher purpose than to perpetuate the survival of DNA . . . life has no design, no purpose, no evil and no good, nothing but blind pitiless indifference." [Dawkins, R., River out of Eden, Chapter 4.]
Given such a view of reality and human existence, it is impossible to ground moral responsibility and rationality, for we are simply biochemical machines dancing to the tune of our DNA.

Internet atheist P.Z. Myers put it this way:

“First, there is no moral law: the universe is a nasty, heartless place where most things wouldn’t mind killing you if you let them. No one is compelled to be nice; you or anyone could go on a murder spree, and all that is stopping you is your self-interest …

“There is nothing ‘out there’ that imposes morality on you, other than local, temporary conditions, a lot of social enculturation, and probably a bit of genetic hardwiring that you’ve inherited from ancestors who lived under similar conditions." [Myers, P.Z. (University of Minnesota–Morris professor), “Morality Doesn’t Equal God”, Pharyngula, August 24, 2009.]

All of these people believe the same ‘creation’ story: atheistic evolution. Even though they have no rational foundation for being rational or responsible, the image of God still pokes out in that (1) they defy the conclusions of their own philosophy by assuming that they can and should be intellectually consistent in some way even if it means consistency in their unbelief; namely, that they all believe there is no such thing as an absolute moral law, and (2) they still hold on to the idea that objective "truth" exists and is knowable. If they didn't believe this, they wouldn't argue the way they do.

Let's go back to our atheist naturalist postmodern friend's informal definitions:
3) [postmodernism is] a philosophy that has proper respect for how our language constructs our realities. . . . in the sense that by even by describing something we are limiting ourselves on what we can know of that thing. [bold mine for emphasis - DSS]
Again, this is self-refuting because if consistent, it ends up in form of linguistic solipsism where no statement about reality actually comports with reality, including any postmodern statements about reality. The idea that we can't really know anything is self-defeating. How does one know that proposition unless he can know something about reality?
4) [postmodernism is] a philosophy that is aware of who our culture and society works to construct our values and how we perceive the world, and a philosophy that rejects an objective "right" perspective to perceive it. [bold mine for emphasis - DSS]
Is the statement in bold itself true? If this is the claim, then postmodernism self-destructs because it cuts its own legs right out from under itself. It says on the one hand that there is no one true way to correctly perceive the world yet it claims to have the truth about how to correctly perceive the world!
5) [postmodernism is] a philosophy that does not however take the view that because there is no objective "right" ways that does not mean we must accept all ways as equally valued. All that statement really means is that we accept and are comfortable with and more willing to deal with the complexity in which we exist in the world. Instead of the positivist point of view that too often just naturalizes their cultural perspective as the objective right way without justification. Postmodernism succeeds in replacing the language of "objective" and "right" with "useful."
Again, this is self-defeating. To criticize the logical positivists because they arbitrarily asserted their views as objectively true without justification is hypocrisy since the postmodernist does the same thing when he asserts without justification that the correct way to perceive the world is to understand that there is no correct way to perceive the world. Also, is it absolutely, objectively, "right" or the "correct way to perceive the world" to say that we need to replace objectivity in language with mere utility? But postmodernism denies that there is one "right" way to perceive the world, thus this statement is self-refuting.

6) again drawing on Michael Lackey . . . postmodernism is the ultimate humanist philosophy. It square puts the human at the center of our knowledge construction and empowers us to change our world in ways others cannot.
I had a very wise and godly man tell me once, "If you reject God at the start of your thinking, you'll not only lose man but you'll lose the world too; but if you start with God, you'll redeem man and He'll also throw in the world for free." Michael Lackey is right. Postmodernism is the ultimate humanist philosophy. After all, when Satan tempted Eve in the garden the first question he asked her was "Did God really say . . .?" Postmodernism as defined by my atheist friend leaves us with no objective truth, meaning, morals, beauty, nor do we have any proper frame of reference by which to make sense out of reality. The only consistent thing is to embrace with all your heart, soul, mind, and strength a dark, cold, nihilism. But because of common grace, most people will not do this, however, some have. Such is the consistent fruit of a godless philosophy.

IN CONCLUSION, the above should sufficiently deal with my friend's understanding of postmodernism. However, he hasn't gone far enough in constructing his autonomous, humanistic philosophy. Recall what one atheist that goes by the nick "Azrienoch" said in an article from his now defunct blog:

Atheists, scientists, philosophers, and other thinking persons that spawn from the second kind of post-modern tradition: I am calling you out. This is your fault. It is this lack of rigor, effort, and sincerity of atheists, scientists, philosophers, and other thinking persons today that has created the monster of Christian presuppositionalism in non-academic philosophy. But mind you, it won’t be non-academic for long.

I’ve seen you fight presuppositionalism with every reasonable bone in your body. But as long as you continue to claim that there is truth, they will win. They have the upper hand against you in using the deconstructive techniques of the first kind of post-modernism. And as long as you insist that there is truth, they can just take you at your own word. Watching you collide with the presuppositionalists is like watching a mother fight with her own child; you want to beat them as hard as you can, but at the same time, you want pieces of them to survive the fight because their truth is your own.

I’ve read paper upon paper on how to defeat a presuppositionalist in debate, and each time I see one of those methods used, I’ve also seen them fail. So listen closely, because I’m about to tell you how to beat them: cut their feet off. Of course, you will only be able to do this by admitting and remembering that you also have no feet. Show them there is no logos and no truth, and they too will have nothing to stand on. This mutated child you’ve given us will die.

But this is a self-sacrificial mission. Your own flawed philosophy, based off of your hopes and desires instead of your honesty and rigor, will die too. That is the tradeoff. If you decide not to, and go about fighting them your way, you only lend them the time and practice to get stronger. [http://graceinthetriad.blogspot.com/2009/05/call-to-atheists-another-atheist-is.html]

Here’s what Azrienoch is saying: If you want to get rid of Christianity and construct a human philosophy that doesn't depend upon God at all, stop saying that any truth exists whatsoever to argue for in the first place and stop assuming that truth exists by even arguing for and defending the very humanistic philosophy that undermines it in the first place. To argue and debate assumes that truth is objective and knowable; but as our postmodern atheist friend has argued, there is no truth, so why debate?

Azrienoch did the Christian community a great service when he wrote that blog article back in 2006. While atheism is wicked, I truly appreciated Azrienoch's logical rigor and consistency. His analysis only confirms what I've been saying for years, which goes something like this: If you are logically consistent and want to have a worldview that can ground rationality and provide an indubitable moral basis to be rational, then there is only one worldview that you can adhere to in the end: Biblical Christianity.

"Where is the wise man? Where is the scribe? Where is the debater of this age? Has not God made foolish the wisdom of the world? 21 For since in the wisdom of God the world through its wisdom did not come to know God, God was well-pleased through the foolishness of the message preached to save those who believe." (1 Corinthians 1:20-21 NAU)

Self-foot-shooting scepticism

Take this counter-example in Robert Price's newest book The Case Against The Case for Christ:


[…] Since the 
autographa have not survived and nobody has laid eyes on them for 2,000 years, how could anybody possibly know what was in them – much less, which copies approximate most closely to them? Since there is nothing to which existing manuscripts can be compared, the very ideas of the original manuscripts and which manuscripts approximate most closely to them are useless ideas and should be abandoned. I can judge that a photo is a good likeness of you if and only if I have seen you and know what you look like. If I have not, then I am the last person on earth to ask. The situation is not improved by assuring me that there are thousands of photos of you. The fact is that I have never seen you, so tell million photos would not help. (98-99)


http://arizonaatheist.blogspot.com/2010/11/victor-reppert-and-john-loftus-outsider.html


Unfortunately for him, this tactic involves a tradeoff: if Price going to allege that our MSS of Scripture are unreliable, then he can't impute error to Scripture. For, according to him, our extant MSS don't correspond to the autographa. 

In addition, he can't indulge in his parallelomania about dying-and-rising savior gods, for even if that method was otherwise sound, he'd only be drawing parallels from untrustworthy MSS.  

Criminal Minds


In the wake of the Arizona massacre, we have the predictable, knee-jerk call for new gun-control laws. Notice how the liberal mind works (or doesn’t):

If, on the way to the scene of his premeditated mass murder, a hit-man or schoolyard sniper or crazed gunman suddenly remembers that’s illegal to carry a concealed weapon, he will say to himself, “Hey, on second thought, I can’t murder all these innocent people since that would break a law against concealed weapons!”

So, from the liberal standpoint, a law against murder has no deterrent effect, only a law against concealed weapons–even though laws against murder carry far harsher penalties than gun bans.

And, of course, there’s also the question of how many lives might have been spared at the Arizona event had another civilian been in a position to return fire. 

Defending liberalism

Glenn Peoples has done a post defending his liberal theology:


http://www.beretta-online.com/wordpress/2011/nuts-and-bolts-010-theological-liberalism/



I'll make a few quick comments:


1. He doesn't give any citations from Luther or Calvin.

2. The Luther/Calvin issue came up the last time evangelicalism had a "battle for the Bible" in the 70s. Luther's commitment to inerrancy was defended by Lutheran scholars like Robert Preus and John Warwick Montgomery, while Calvin's commitment to inerrancy was defended by Reformed scholars like Roger Nicole.

J.W. Montgomery:


R. Preus, "Luther and Biblical Infallibility," in Inerrancy and the Church. 
ed. John Hannah. Chicago: Moody Press, 1984, 99-142. 

Roger Nicole:


3. There's such a thing as the progress of dogma. Theological formulations are frequently sharpened in the face of controversy. Take Christology.

4. His statement about Warfield is just a blunder. 

i) He misattributes a statement to Warfield which was actually made by Chas Hodge.

ii) He misconstrues the statement which he misattributes to Warfield:


5. Maybe he's too young to remember and too ignorant to know, but Stott's position was quite controversial when it first surfaced. For instance:


As a matter of fact, this is a soft spot for a number of UK evangelicals.