The Jello Fellow

Before I begin this post in earnest, I must put forth a preliminary rule. Unfortunately, since the person this rule is directed toward does not listen very well at all, I will have to state this rule several times throughout. For normal readers, I apologize for the redundancies. It will be clear, however, why they are needed.

Thus far, just counting the post Steve did called “An offer he can’t refuse” there are 184 comments. Of those 184, by my count 92 are from Jason Streitfeld. As I pointed out in one of my comments on that post:

Well, Jason S. has proven he's nothing more than steamroller: make a bunch of wild assertions and the sheer number of errors will be too much for anyone to respond to. This gives the added bonus that when the steamroller runs away with tail between his legs, he can still say, "They didn't get me on these points!" and think he's actually won something.

Since Jason (and all references to Jason will be to Jason S., and not to our esteemed Jason Engwer) is a steamroller, and since this post is about him, it is necessary for me to implement a restriction on comments to this post. The restriction is for Jason only. That restriction is this: while he is free to respond in the comments, he is restricted from posting more than two (2) comments in a row.

If you wonder if there will be any grace from me at all, the answer is: the second post IS the grace post.

The intention is thus: Jason needs to be able to respond in a coherent manner rather than his typical drive-by “cherry pick a few sentences and make up whatever you want to make up about the meaning” approach. The only way to encourage this is for me to delete anything after his second comment in a row. (To be clear, he can comment again IF someone else responds after his first two (2) comments, at which point he will have an addition two (2) comments he can post; he just cannot exceed two (2) comments in a row ever in the comments on this post.)

If Jason posts more than two (2) comments in a row, every comment after the second one will be deleted unread by me. In short, Jason, this means if you want to have a dialogue you have to be able to focus. Write your response in one lump form, addressing what you consider the most important issues. Put them up front. And if you forgot something in your haste, too bad. Learn to think before you post. Organize and then write.

And note that this restriction is for my post only. Triabloggers have the right to enforce rules on our own posts. Any other poster can enforce whichever rules they see fit on their own posts too.

So with that in mind, let us move on to the meat of the discussion. In reality, I need not say anything more this first response to Jason (in its entirety):

Jason S. said:
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I never said every mathematical object corresponds to some physical property of the universe. I said mathematical truths are about the formal properties of patterns in the universe.
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I think it would help, Jason, if you paused for a second and asked yourself a simple question. Why? Why are there "formal properties of patterns in the universe"?

In other words, let's play your game for a bit. Let's say that there are these patterns. Why do the patterns exist as they do?

Note carefully the chain you have to build here. You are justifying logic by pointing to these patterns. Thus, you have patterns -> logic.

But why is it that these patterns behave "logically"? Is there a meta-pattern that keeps patterns in line? If not, why do they behave as they do? If so, is there a meta-meta-pattern? Etc.

Now you haven't convinced me that you're able to follow where arguments lead, so I'll show why it's important that you ponder this. At some point, everyone must stop. That is, it's not "turtles all the way down" because at some point you have to escape the redux. (This is because logic itself does not allow for infinite redux, and logic cannot very well be substantiated by that which is its negation.)

At whatever point you stop your redux, you have to deal with the nature of reality at that point. So we can skip through all that and simply ask:

What must be fundamentally true in order for logic to be justified?

As Steve's pointed out several times, you cannot have contingent logic that transcends that it is contingent upon. Thus, you cannot have logic that is contingent upon human minds before human minds existed.

You try to escape that by pointed to patterns of the universe, but does this mean that there is no logic before those patterns were formed (even if there was no mind to grasp the patterns)? If that is so, why did the patterns form in a way that would be grasped in the form of logic? Was it ad hoc, a mistake, a fluke? Or was there something more fundamental at work?

You can try to keep it surface level and pretend your materialism can account for all this, but at best all you can do with materialism is cut your own throat. At best, all you can say is, "The patterns are the way they are because they just happened to be the way they are." In which case, there is no impulse or imperative to follow the logic derrived from those patterns, in which case it is no great loss to be irrational. Why would it be problematic to violate THOSE rules of logic? And if our arguments violate them, as you claim, so what? It's not like they're meaningful rules of logic.

If you don't hold to objective logic, why do you care whether we are reasonable or rational people? It's not like that's a real standard or anything.

(For the record, I do hold to objective logic, which is why I do care that you're being irrational in your argument. But this is an internal critique of your position.)

The reason I need not say anything more is that for all his blustering, Jason has left the above unchallenged.

But for more clarity, I also pointed out:

Jason S. said:
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The patterns--the regularities within the universe--are as they are for whatever reasons. Yes, they just happened to be that way, for all I know. But that does not mean there is no impulse or imperative to use logic (the rules of inference), to use reason and evidence.

On the contrary, the fact that the universe exhibits regularities is exactly why we need to use logic, reason and evidence. If we abandoned all logic, we would abandon our ability to understand the world.
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In other words, what you are saying is:

1) The universe just happened to be the way it is for no reason whatsoever.

2) That's why we can understand the world.

Is anyone else puzzled by this?

You claim there are regularities in the universe. But absent something requiring them to be the way they are, you have no assurance they will continue to be the way they are now. For all the atheists talk about how if God can change reality on a whim, you're left in the same boat. You don't know why the universe behaves the way it does, yet you assert it will always continue to do so. And then you criticize theists as being naive and irrational. At best you're a pot mocking a kettle. At worst, you're flat out wrong.

And:

BTW,

Jason also needs to account for the fact that the human mind is very adept at finding patterns that aren't actually there.

You know, like seeing faces in clouds, the Virgin Mary in wallpaper stains, and logic in atheistic worldviews.

In which case, you have pattern-recognition that leads to logic based on false patterns that do not actually exist in the universe.

And finally:

Jason said:
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The point is, the universe does exhibit regularities, and this is why we are able to make accurate predictions and develop scientific theories.
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No, the point is that the universe exhibits regularities FOR NO REASON WHATSOEVER. You're on the horns of a dilemma. If the universe has a reason to behave the way it does, then that reason is the ultimate establishment of logic. But you cannot allow for anything more than the universe, so you have to assert that the universe just does this. Why? Because it does. That's all you've got. The universe acts this way for no reason at all. It just does it.

And if something just happens with no reason whatsoever, then you'd have to be a complete idiot to trust in that to form your concepts of logic. The universe isn't logical; it just happens to at this point behave in a way that approximates logic. But there's no logical reason why it should continue to be that way, because it's not that way due to a logical reason.

Jason has since moved away from the “patterns” to calling them “rules.” But my original argument still stands untouched. The reason I’m quoting the original response above is because I am going to reference it from now on to show that Jason has said much but gone nowhere.

Before we get there, some more groundwork must be done. When he switched to using “rules” instead of “patterns” as his basis, Jason used an analogy of a computer. I found this odd, given that Jason is a materialist, and a computer is most definitely designed (which would imply that his correlation to the rules governing the universe would mean he believes the universe is designed too). I pointed this out to Jason at the time too, and ended with:

BTW, you still need to account for why rules exist the way they do. Is there a reason they do? If so, then what is it? If not, then we're left with an ad hoc rule once more.

As you can see, I’ve been consistent throughout here (note: I’m also focusing only on the portion that deals with how rules are established; you can read the original exchange for more background on the computer analogy if you wish). Jason responded with:

You say, "BTW, you still need to account for why rules exist the way they do. Is there a reason they do?"

Let's look at this broadly, okay?

First of all, the only accounting for the rules of mathematics I've seen around here is, "God did it."

That is not an accounting. It's merely an assertion. It does not explain the rules, or how they came about, or anything at all.

If your position does not further our understanding of the nature and functionality of mathematics, then it is not an explanation.

So, "God did it" does not explain anything.

Now, you ask me to account for the rules of mathematics. What if I can't? Does that mean God did it?

By what reason?

The way I see it is, mathematics is one kind of thing. It can involve different axioms, and so it is not limited to one set of rules. However, the rules we associate with mathematics are well-defined, based on what they are meant to accomplish.

Why are they defined as they are? Because of what they are meant to accomplish. The rules required by a system are dependent upon what that system needs to do.

For example, asking "why are the rules of arithmentic the way they are" is like asking, "why are the rules of tying our shoes the way they are?"

If you want to tie your shoes, you have to follow the rules defined by the task at hand--namely, loop one lace this way, another that way, and so on. If you want to do arithmetic, you have to follow the rules of arithmetic. It's that simple.

I responded:

You said:
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First of all, the only accounting for the rules of mathematics I've seen around here is, "God did it."
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That's funny. I've not seen anyone say "God did it" until you just did.

Be that as it may, if Christians do fundamentally presuppose that "God did it" is actually true, what is your counter argument? Thus far, all you've said is that "patterns did it."

I've asked twice now for your justification for them. You haven't brought any forth.

You said:
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That is not an accounting. It's merely an assertion. It does not explain the rules, or how they came about, or anything at all.
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Except for the fact that it does, everything else you say is right.

And for all your talk about looking at the issue "broadly" and all, you're missing the important step.

Forget what the explanation for the rules are for a moment and focus on this instead: what is it that the rules themselves require in order for the rules to be real.

I maintain that God, as defined by the Christian theist, maintains all the attributes needed to sustain those rules. This is not merely an "assertion"; this is a requirement of those rules themselves. In other words, if we assume that your rules exist, then your rules themselves presuppose the existence of God (specifically, the God as defined by Christian theism).

These rules cannot exist unless there exists something with the proper attributes to create those rules. If the rules are to have any relevance at all, they have to be transcendent; which means that which produces the rules must be transcendent. If they are to have any meaning at all, they must be timeless and unchanging; they must be true for all times and in all possible realities; they must be universal. In short, they must be eternal, omnipresent, and immutable...all attributes of the Christian God, mind you. And that's just for starts.

By the way, you also slip into ID again when you said:
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Why are they defined as they are? Because of what they are meant to accomplish. The rules required by a system are dependent upon what that system needs to do.
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Since you're maintaining that these rules are the basis for such things as logic, and that these rules are actually in force in the universe we experience, you are actually stating that the universe as a whole is a system that has a specific GOAL that the universe is INTENDED to achieve.

Why don't you just admit you're a theist? Your argumentation gives you away already.

As you can see, my argument has been the same throughout. But I posted this for another reason. I am going to respond to Jason’s response to me by doing little more than quoting back to him exactly what I’ve already written. In other words, this will demonstrate that Jason has not been responding to my posts at all. I doubt he’s even been reading them (he skims them looking for sentences he can “latch on to” to steamroll, but that’s not reading).

Jason said:

Peter asks,

"what is it that the rules themselves require in order for the rules to be real?"

As I've argued, rules are functional properties of physical systems. So, for a rule to be real, it must functionally occur in a physical system.

However, I already pointed out:

These rules cannot exist unless there exists something with the proper attributes to create those rules.

He has not provided those attributes. Indeed, he yet again slips into teleological language (this time using the idea of “functionally” working rules; which requires a purpose and a goal).

More importantly, Jason said:

Peter syas, "I maintain that God, as defined by the Christian theist, maintains all the attributes needed to sustain those rules."

What attributes would those be? And why should we believe that "God" (as defined by the Christian theist? what definition? which theist?) maintains those attributes?

Let’s play a quick game. Count the attributes I listed in the following paragraph (to make it easy, I’ll put them in bold):

These rules cannot exist unless there exists something with the proper attributes to create those rules. If the rules are to have any relevance at all, they have to be transcendent; which means that which produces the rules must be transcendent. If they are to have any meaning at all, they must be timeless and unchanging; they must be true for all times and in all possible realities; they must be universal. In short, they must be eternal, omnipresent, and immutable...all attributes of the Christian God, mind you. And that's just for starts.

Note that I specifically listed these as “all attributes of the Christian God, mind you.” Jason has chosen to ignore that completely, as if it was never offered.

Is it a definition? What is a definition if not a list of attributes of a thing? You ask, “What is an apple?” I give you a list of attributes. Jason asks, “What definition [of God]?” and I’ve already provided a (partial) list of attributes.

Jason said:

I interpret this as follows: for a physical system to exhibit the functional characteristics we call a rule, that rule must be able to be implemented at any time and at any place in the universe, and that the rule must exist at every place and time in all possible universes. Is that right?

And, can you explain why that is the case for us?

In my original response, I already explained this:

You can try to keep it surface level and pretend your materialism can account for all this, but at best all you can do with materialism is cut your own throat. At best, all you can say is, "The patterns are the way they are because they just happened to be the way they are." In which case, there is no impulse or imperative to follow the logic derrived from those patterns, in which case it is no great loss to be irrational. Why would it be problematic to violate THOSE rules of logic? And if our arguments violate them, as you claim, so what? It's not like they're meaningful rules of logic.

If you don't hold to objective logic, why do you care whether we are reasonable or rational people? It's not like that's a real standard or anything.

And:

You claim there are regularities in the universe. But absent something requiring them to be the way they are, you have no assurance they will continue to be the way they are now. For all the atheists talk about how if God can change reality on a whim, you're left in the same boat. You don't know why the universe behaves the way it does, yet you assert it will always continue to do so. And then you criticize theists as being naive and irrational. At best you're a pot mocking a kettle. At worst, you're flat out wrong.

Jason said:

Peter says I am slipping ID into the discussion when I wrote, "Why are they defined as they are? Because of what they are meant to accomplish. The rules required by a system are dependent upon what that system needs to do."

That's silly. I did not say that the rules were defined by some supernatural creator. Rather, the rules are defined by systems capable of defining the rules. In our case, that means human beings, though other organisms are theoretically capable of defining the same rules.

In other words, as I originally stated:

As Steve's pointed out several times, you cannot have contingent logic that transcends that it is contingent upon. Thus, you cannot have logic that is contingent upon human minds before human minds existed.

And:

You try to escape that by pointed to patterns of the universe, but does this mean that there is no logic before those patterns were formed (even if there was no mind to grasp the patterns)? If that is so, why did the patterns form in a way that would be grasped in the form of logic? Was it ad hoc, a mistake, a fluke? Or was there something more fundamental at work?

Clearly, Jason believes that logic is an ad hoc fluke created by human minds, in which case I yet again ask: “Why would it be problematic to violate THOSE rules of logic?” More importantly:

…[I]f something just happens with no reason whatsoever, then you'd have to be a complete idiot to trust in that to form your concepts of logic. The universe isn't logical; it just happens to at this point behave in a way that approximates logic. But there's no logical reason why it should continue to be that way, because it's not that way due to a logical reason.

Jason wants to have his cake and eat it too. He wants us to take his rules of logic seriously, but he cuts off all grounds for logic to be meaningful.

Jason also said:

Peter asks, "if Christians do fundamentally presuppose that 'God did it' is actually true, what is your counter argument?"

My counter argument is that the term "God" is not well-defined, and that the arguments in favor of "God did it" do not make sense, and do not further our understanding of life, the universe, or anything.

Which, aside from being absurd, falls prey to the fact that I DID define the term “God” with a partial list of attributes (already referenced above) and it DOES further our understanding of quite a lot.

Jason said:

Peter has asked me to justify the patterns that exist in nature. Why does anybody have to justify nature? Nature is what is. That's life.

Which is exactly what I’ve maintained Jason's position boils down to:

But you cannot allow for anything more than the universe, so you have to assert that the universe just does this. Why? Because it does. That's all you've got. The universe acts this way for no reason at all. It just does it.

Now, as I said, Jason is free to comment to this post as long as he does not do more than two (2) comments in a row. What he also needs to do is actually provide a justification for why anyone should care about his rules of logic, since they are based on ad hoc random patterns and/or rules of the universe. Furthermore, he must establish why we should care about his rules of logic given that they are just formed by human minds which A) we know err often and B) are capable of seeing patterns that do not exist (e.g. faces in clouds).

As it is, so far all we've seen is that Jason knows how to avoid the thrust of an argument by pretending it never happened.

Luke's Census

Last year, I did a six-part series on some neglected evidence relevant to the census of Luke 2. If anybody is interested, here are links to all six parts: one, two, three, four, five, and six.

Do you feel lucky?

To my knowledge, all the major actors of the “golden age” of Hollywood are dead. As a consequence, the grim reaper is moving through the next rank, viz. Marlon Brando, Paul Newman, Charlton Heston.

The “golden age” movie stars tended to be personalities rather than actors. Method acting changed that. In general, today’s movie stars are better actors—but by the same token, less distinctive.

There’s a sense in which I think that Clint Eastwood is the most important actor of his generation. By that I don’t mean that he’s the best actor of his generation.

In some ways he’s a throwback to the golden age inasmuch as he is less of an actor than a presence. He doesn’t disappear into a role. He’s not a chameleon. Rather, he stars in certain roles which are suited to his personality.

As he’s aged, his personality has undergone some change, some depth, which is reflected in some of his later roles, like the Unforgiven.

But what makes him important, from a pop cultural standpoint, is that he projects a worldview—in a way that most actors do not.

This is partly rooted in his personal experience. He comes from working class background. He also served in the armed forces.

The younger generation came of age after the draft, so that’s an experience which they don’t have. And I think it shows. He played lean, tough-guy roles cuz life was lean and tough when he was growing up.

His worldview is also rooted in the Western genre. The Western genre was already on the way out when I was coming on the scene. To some extent, it was transposed to the SF genre.

The cowboy of the Western genre is, to some extent, an American version of the medieval knight. His code of honor has its historical antecedents in the chivalric code.

Eastwood’s Dirty Harry films are simply modern, urban Westerns. And, of course, he’s also made a number of films specific to the Western genre.

There are remnants of the chivalric code in his work, but it’s been secularized to a high degree, with a corresponding inversion of values.

A common theme, both of his Westerns, and the Dirty Harry series, is the role of the avenger. And it’s cast in ironic terms.

In classic Westerns, the lawman was the good guy and the outlaw was the bad guy. But in his films, he plays the righteous outlaw, confronting the unrighteous lawman.

Even when he himself is nominally a lawman, he is, in effect, an outsider. Justice, and not the law, is his overriding concern. His characters constantly skirt the edges of vigilantism.

This is one of the things that makes him a loner. An anti-hero.

But there’s another factor that contributes to his moral isolation. Although some of his films exploit Biblical motifs, there’s a fundamentally atheistic outlook to his cinematic vision.

His characters seem to inhabit a world which is not just ungodly, but truly godless. There is no cosmic justice. No divine intervention. It’s every man for himself.

Eastwood, both onscreen and off-screen, is a paradigmatic libertarian. And it’s libertarian, in part, because it’s so secular. You’re on your own in this world.

I think libertarianism is the default setting of fallen men. Do your own thing, as long as you don’t impose your values on someone else. (Of course, that’s impossible in practice.)

Vengeance is now or never. Retribution delayed is retribution denied. There is no God to right the scales of justice. It’s up to you.

This is reinforced by the iconography of the Western genre. Landscape has a symbolic resonance. And the symbolism varies with the landscape.

The rugged and often austere majesty of the “wild wild west” is emblematic of man’s mortality and vulnerability in a hostile wilderness. Man’s exile from Eden.

As a director, Eastwood has a good eye for the landscape. A bleak backdrop to a bleak worldview (e.g. High Plains Drifter, Pale Rider, Unforgiven).

This is not only true for his Westerns. Dirty Harry was originally situated in New York. Eastwood wisely resituated the story to San Francisco, which is more atmospheric and naturalistic than New York.

Take the scene on the deserted docks at the end of Magnum Force. All that empty space in the background (the water and the low-lying hills) accentuates his isolation, as he must fend for himself against the rogue policemen.

His worldview also reflects, unconsciously or not, the secular existentialism of an atheist like Camus. His characters have their own honor code. And they are incorruptible in relation to their own honor code. They have too much self-respect to compromise their values.

There’s a certain purity to his moral outlook, like spraying Agent Orange on a jungle. Defoliated purity. Manly and merciless.

And yet the code of honor is quite arbitrary. His characters retain an unshakable sense of justice in a world which—to all appearances—is not only unjust but—at a deeper level—amoral. Beyond good and evil. You live, you die, and that’s that.

Eastwood’s vision is powerful, but grim—and ultimately irrational. There is no right or wrong to underwrite his sense of right and wrong.

As such, his signature films present a striking comparison and contrast to the Christian worldview. Their moral vision is ultimately indebted to Christian tradition. But they’ve also lost touch with their moral foundations—leading to a tight cycle of wanton cruelty and private revenge. The most you can hope for is getting even before you die.

Tubs & tortoise-shells!

I finally got around to watching Prince Caspian. I haven’t read the book since I was a kid, so I can’t offer any invidious comparisons between the book and the movie.

In one respect, the second installment of the film series is an improvement over the first. The world of Narnia in The Lion, The Witch, & the Wardrobe seemed to be rather cramped. As if it was all filmed on a sound studio. A low budget affair.

By contrast, the cinematic world of Prince Caspian is far more expansive. Epic, if you will. And the FX is well done.

It’s a good-looking film. And that’s important, since the visual aspect is a dominant feature of the cinematic genre.

But that’s about the best thing I can say for Prince Caspian. Other than that, I find it unsatisfactory at various levels.

From a military standpoint, it’s unclear what vital role humans perform in this movie. When it comes to hand-to-hand combat with Conquistadors, surely a centaur or minotaur is more formidable than a teenage character. So why do the Narnians really need Prince Caspian or the Penvensie kids to lead them into battle?

And as the ill-fated attack on Miraz’s castle illustrates, it’s not as if Peter or Prince Caspian are tactical geniuses. I could also do without Susan as the ubiquitous, Hollywood superheroine.

The only reason seems to be that this is a coming-of-age story. It’s a learning and maturing experience for the teenage characters.

And no doubt Narnia would be an interesting place to come of age. But in that case, the teenage characters are there, not because they are needed in Narnia, but because they need Narnia.

And that’s a rather expensive lesson for the Narnians to pay. The Narnians bear the brunt of this exercise.

Which brings me to another issue: the movie raises the problem of evil without solving it. Why, indeed, does Aslan take such a hands-off approach?

Another problem is the target audience for this film. The books were written for children. But, of course, a coming-of-age story is primarily appealing to...well...to moviegoers who are coming of age. Not children, but teenagers—or older adults who look back wistfully on their own rites of passage.

Yet when you try to combine a children’s story with a coming-of-age story, this creates a jarring incongruity in the tone. How can we take the “adult” aspects of the story seriously when we see an army composed of talking mice and badgers and dwarves and dancing trees?

This is comical, and it’s meant to be comical, but comical according to a child’s sense of humor.

On a related note, the humorous dialogue is very hip and modern. It reflects the attitude of a different generation than the world of C. S. Lewis.

I don’t object to this on its own level, but a major point of reading classic literature is to immerse yourself in sensibilities of a very different time and place and culture than your own. I don’t need movie adaptations that update the material—as if I couldn’t possibly relate to anything that wasn’t written last week.

I also don’t need a lot of comic relief, as if my attention span is so limited that I can’t allow a dramatic arc to unfold naturally, at its own pace.

Or take the character of Reepicheep. Okay, that’s appealing to a little kid. But what viewpoint am I, as a grown-up, supposed to assume when I see that character?

I get the comic effect: the paradox of a militant mouse. But the sight-gag wears thin.

Since a mouse, even a talking mouse with a sword, is no match for a Conquistador, how am I supposed to react to his military prowess?

In addition, the fawns and centaurs and minotaurs remind me of something out of The Island of Dr. Moreau. There’s something diabolical about these hybrid creatures from Greek mythology. It’s not something you can baptize and add to the Christian furniture.

Another thing: although the landscape is often quite beautiful, it’s beautiful in a very ordinary and earthly way. At the geographical level, there’s nothing very fantastic about this fantasy world.

It’s far less fantastic than Perelandra or Malacandra. In that respect it lacks the imaginative creativity that we encounter in many SF movies and TV series. It’s a bit of a let down.

Then there’s the treatment of Peter. He’s portrayed as reckless and impetuous because he lacks Lucy’s faith. But within the confines of the narrative, I don’t see that his actions are inherently wrong. Aslan didn’t tell him to wait until Aslan gave him advice or Aslan personally intervened. Indeed, Aslan is very distant and detached.

So why shouldn’t Peter take the initiative? On the face of it, he and his siblings were brought back to Narnia to liberate Narnia from the Telmarines. And the clock is ticking.

Also, would Peter really be tempted by the offer of the White Witch? Surely he knows her character. That she would be a treacherous ally. That she would use him to regain the throne for herself.

And why should Lucy have to go riding off into the woods to fetch Aslan? What’s he waiting for? Why does he need her to come to him? Why can’t he take the initiative?

Indeed, the character of Aslan is a central problem. For Lewis, he represents Christ. But in this movie, I’m struck by how un-Christlike he is. In what respect does he correspond, even symbolically, to the Christ of the Gospels?

He’s more like Yoda in a lion suit. A big stuffed animal with a fund of fortune-cookie platitudes. Just pull the string.

The surviving Telmarines also get off pretty light. After killing all those innocent Narnians, they are then allowed to go back to where they came from. All is forgiven.

Where’s the justice? Seems like cheap grace to me.

Don’t some of them deserved to be punished for their crimes?

The film also ends with a dreadful pop song. Over the last few years I’ve noticed that this has become a Hollywood convention. When there’s a “significant” moment in a film or TV show, like the death of a beloved character, the audience is treated to a pop song accompaniment.

This has come to take the place of prayer, a sermon, or hymn. In the past, we would turn to religion, to the church, to the Bible—for solace, and for the final word.

The Bible supplied the moral framework. The Bible supplied the interpretation of the event. Its ultimate significance in the grand scheme of things.

But now, directors and screenwriters and TV producers substitute a pop song as the moral makeweight and commentary on events. Not only does this tell you what kind of music they like, but where they look for inspiration. How they make an event “meaningful.”

They don’t turn to the Psalms or the Gospels. Or even a good hymn. They don’t go to church. Instead, the pop song is the eulogy. The pop vocalist is their priest or pastor.

Church, state, and fate

I'm posting another (edited version of an) email correspondence I recently had.

“It seems to me that throughout the world, we have not simply a pendulum swinging back and forth (as it has seemed in the US as the two parties rise and fall over the years), but more like a sea in which waves rise and fall in various places.”
 
Voters are fickle. They get bored. They want change for the sake of change. They’re also passive creatures of habit. They’ll go along with the status quo until catastrophe strikes—even when the catastrophe was foreseeable and, at one point, avoidable.
 
As you know, the problem with socialism is that it’s inherently insolvent. A businessman is a risk-taker. But socialism rewards the risk-averse and punishes the successful risk-taker.
 
Coupled with that is the demographic suicide of a culture that uses abortion and contraception to the point where it falls below the replacement rate—at which juncture it becomes a pyramid scheme with fewer on the bottom supporting ever more on the top. That’s unsustainable.
 
So, eventually, it falls of its own dead weight. But that doesn’t mean the next generation ever learns from the mistakes of the former generation. The next generation tends to make the same mistakes all over again.
 
For a lot of folks, unless they personally experience something, it’s unreal to them. They can’t think in abstract terms.
 
“I know you disagree, but I can't help but think that George Bush's almost boastful portrayal of his Christianity, and the notion or perception that somehow a ‘Christian’ government was in place, has hurt the church. “
 
Except for Ashcroft, Bush was the only high profile Christian in the administration, and Bush is just a layman, and a rather anti-intellectual layman at that, so his theology isn’t what you’d call sophisticated.
 
“But in Hortons 2K model, it is not just natural law that is foundational, but it's the fact that God, thru his common grace, is still overseeing things, even in the most godless secular governments. That is what is foundational in Horton, and maybe even in Kline, I have not read him. (I know that seems like a stretch, but biblically, it has to be that way, don't you agree?)”
 
But what do you do after you lay the foundation? You have to build something on the foundation.
 
All Horton is doing here is to discuss the providential underpinnings of human gov’t. But that doesn’t furnish any specific guidance as to what forms of social conduct the state should prescribe, proscribe, or permit.
 
I’m not saying the Bible has all the answers. Scripture gives us a combination of general norms and specific illustrations. We can get a lot of moral mileage out of that if we try.
 
But Scripture is silent on some issues. That’s fine. That’s a point of liberty. There can be more than one acceptable course of action in a given situation. My problem is when Scripture isn’t consulted for the answers it has.
 
“Maybe this is why I am not alarmed at the election of Obama, the possible passage of FOCA -- God is still in charge.”
 
That’s also true in N. Korea, but you wouldn’t want to live under that regime, or raise your kids under that regime, if you could avoid it.
 
We need to avoid the temptation of hypercalvinistic fatalism, where it doesn’t matter what we do or don’t do. For the decree includes the role of human agents in history.
 
"Some time ago, I read a bunch of Schaeffer's stuff, and he cited that magical 51% figure as being necessary to enact legislation. Christians seem to be falling away from that figure (if you think of the truly Christian population in this country, and how it has fallen as a percentage). “
 
As a practical matter, a total theonomic package will never be enacted into law. In the OT, God simply imposed his law code on Israel. He didn’t put it up for a vote. It didn’t depend on the consent of the governed. And there were curse sanctions if the nation as a whole balked at the law. There was a credible threat to back it up.
 
Under our system, human legislators pass laws. And a human lawmaker is disinclined to pass a self-incriminating law. For example, we will never have harsh penalties for adultery, because that’s an evil which a certain percentage of lawmakers are likely to commit, and they’re not going to leave themselves liable to harsh punishment for breaking that law. Hence, a law like that will never get on the books.
 
However, theonomy is still useful in laying down some basic parameters. One can operate within that framework, even if the framework as a whole will never be enacted into law.
 
“We’ve had Jerry Falwell's Moral Majority, and Pat Robertson's run for the White House, and other movements like that.”
 
But these did some good. We need to separate the men from the movements they inspired or the institutions they established. Liberty U and Regent U are more important than Falwell or Robertson.
 
There are people who became disillusioned with the Moral Majority and the Reagan Revolution because it felt short of their expectations. But that was unrealistic. The question is not whether various movements achieve utopia, but whether they make things better than the situation would otherwise be absent those movements. All I’m looking for is improvement, or even a counterbalance to the forces of evil.
 
“That Christians have identified themselves with the Republican party leaves them open to charges of hypocrisy because Newt Gingrich was married three times, having abandoned his first wife under almost horrific conditions.”
 
I’m not impressed by unbelievers who accuse Christians of hypocrisy when said unbelievers don’t know the first thing about Christian ethics. Their ignorant standards need to be challenged, not appeased.
 
We endorse a policy, not a person. But it takes a person to lobby for a policy.
 
“It seems unhelpful to the gospel that Christians feel compelled in the world to tie their hopes to (smart, reasoned, but morally flawed) individuals like Gingrich.”
 
But that’s a caricature. It’s not as if all our hopes are vested in one man. Gingrich is just a vehicle. We use him until he runs out of gas. Then we thumb down another vehicle to take us on the next leg of the journey. We’re political hitchhikers.
 
BTW, I’m not saying that we should treat everyone as a vehicle. We shouldn’t disown a fellow Christian if he becomes a political liability. We might tell him that he’s done his tour of duty, and it’s time for him to retire from active combat. But he’ll still be a friend.
 
No, I’m talking about cynical politicians who exist to be used. Who live for power.
 
“But did the earliest Christians want to live in the Roman empire, being persecuted as they were?”
 
But Christian fortunes oscillate in time and place. We play the hand we’ve been dealt. You work with what you’ve got and try to build on that.
 
I’d distinguish between principles and processes. The principles are invariant. But we should be flexible and adaptable about the process we employ. A process is just a mean to an end. It’s the vehicle, not the destination. We don’t have to use the same vehicle from start to finish. We can change cars during the course of our journey.
 
I think some Christian political theorists make the mistake of trying to formulate a procedural metanarrative which will apply in every time and place. But we don’t need a single recipe to get things done. I’m a consummate pragmatist about the process issues. Process is entirely subordinate to principle. Depending on the terrain, I may switch from a sports car for a Land Rover or dirt bike or motorboat or chopper. What mode of transport I use at any given time is a question of pure expediency. We should be opportunistic about the process, but principled about the norms and the goals.
 

(Of course, some methods are out of bounds. I’m not suggesting that we do whatever it takes. Sometimes we have to take a loss if price of success is morally exorbitant.)
 
“That thread at Greenbaggins is now over 500 comments long. This clearly is a discussion that thoughtful Christians are itching to have. What do you think?”
 
Both in tone and substance, I think the “theonomists” performed badly in the first couple of innings. A lot of swashbuckling rhetoric in lieu of rational arguments.
 
I think the theonomic side of the debate underwent a dramatic improvement in later innings as some of the early, B-team players dropped out while some A-team players took their place.
 
Both in tone and substance, I think the 2k proponents have performed badly from start to finish. This may be in part because they are also backbenchers. It would be useful to see what some A-team players like Irons, Tipton, or VanDrunen would have to say if they took to the field. 
 
“This is one reason why I think that it's important for Christians not to simply hitch their wagons to one party, but for Christian principles to be suffused (somehow) throughout the Democratic party.”
 
The GOP is a temporary vehicle. Conservative Christians generally vote Republican for the simple reason that Republican candidates are generally more sympathetic to our agenda while Democrats are generally antagonistic to our agenda.
 
“And I think, in these last few elections when we've seen pro-life Democrats and former military Democrats winning seats in congress, this is happening.”
 
In principle, a prolife Democrat is better than a proabortion Republican.
 
On the other hand, politics is often about majority rule. Which side has the most votes. Therefore, the position of the party is often more important than the position of an individual politician.
 
Take Congress. The minority views of a prolife Democrat will be diluted by the proabortion views of his colleagues. There are times when voting for a prolife Democrat might shift the balance of power from a Congressional prolife majority to a Congressional proabortion majority. Therefore, we need to vote tactically and strategically with a view to the net result. It’s the policy that counts, not the individual politician. The total vote tally, and not any individual vote.
 
“But Bush was the name on the ticket.”
 
Bush is not the Church or the State. To judge Christianity by Bush is like people who refuse to salute the flag because, to their warped way of thinking, the flag symbolizes a particular administration or foreign policy.
 
That’s irrational, and I don’t cater to stupid objections. If some people choose to attack Christianity via Bush, they’re entitled to be stupid, but that’s their problem, not mine.
 
“And, the church should ‘be the church,’ that is, should adhere to word and sacrament.”
 
But this way of categorizing the issue is misleading. We’re not talking about the “church,” or what your pastor does on Sunday. We’re talking about Christians in general. What should lay Christians do Monday-Saturday? What should a Christian lawmaker do?
 
“I like the two-kingdoms model of churches preparing people to be Christians in society.”
 
How are they actually doing that? 

Probability & culpability

I appreciate Paul Manata’s recent post on probability and inexcusability. I’m going to second his position with a few supporting arguments of my own. In the process, I’d like to reorient the discussion a bit.

1.Before we discuss what renders a sinner guilty before God, it might be useful to discuss guilt generally.

i) Let’s take the insanity defense.

a) In my opinion, for a normal adult not to know the difference between right and wrong is culpable rather than exculpatory. A normal adult is supposed to know the difference. So, not knowing the difference between good and evil is, itself, evil.

b) But suppose someone commits murder because he has brain cancer. In that case, I think we’d agree that he’s in a condition of diminished responsibility. He’s not responsible for his actions.

c) There also seems to be a class of people, like Bobby Fischer and Ted Kaczynski, who work themselves into a state of mental illness. They weren’t always insane.

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that Kaczynski was clinically insane at the time he committed murder. Is that an exculpatory circumstance?

I’d say, no. He’s still guilty of murder because he is guilty of psyching himself into a condition of criminal insanity.

The analogy I’m making is this: suppose, for the sake of argument, that the unbeliever has successfully forgotten what he used to know about God. Does that render him blameless before God?

No, for he’s guilty of forgetting what he used to know about God. That, of itself, is an evil thing to do.

d) We might also use the example of a torturer or serial killer who’s become desensitized to the pain and suffering he inflicts on others. At the outset of his career, he felt a twinge of conscience about the way he treated his victims. But over time, he’s become callous and unfeeling.

Is that culpable or exculpatory? Clearly the former.

2.Now let’s approach this issue from a different angle. Can I be culpable if I fail to take reasonable precautions in some situations? Here, “reasonable” would fall short of certainty.

For example, if a hotel is on fire, should the firemen conduct a sweep of the hotel, floor-by-floor and room-by-room to see if all the guests got out in time?

Suppose the fire chief didn’t order them to do that. As a result, 20 guests died of smoke inhalation.

Suppose the fire chief justifies his inaction as follows: the firemen didn’t have time to knock on every room or check every room. They didn’t have time to check to see if anyone was hiding under the bed or cowering in the closets.

Since they didn’t have time to conduct a thorough search of the premises, there was no point in conducting even a cursory search since the results of a cursory search would be inconclusive.

We would still regard the inaction of the fire chief as culpable. Although any search within the time allotted (before the hotel burned down) would be less than exhaustive, he still had an obligation to make a good faith effort to do the best he could under the circumstances.

The analogy I’m making is this: even if, for the sake of argument, we say the unbeliever’s evidence for God is merely probable rather than conclusive, an unbeliever is still culpable if he responds unreasonably in the face of the available evidence.

I’m not equating this with Paul’s argument in Rom 1 (which is a separate question). I’m just discussing general grounds for culpable conduct.

3.Finally, Paul grounds culpability in more than one factor. Human culpability is overdetermined. The suppression of revelation is one ground.

But in chapter 5, he also grounds culpability in the sin of Adam.

That’s interesting because, unlike chapter 1, it doesn’t depend on the knowledge of the interested party. It might depend on Adam’s knowledge, but not on the knowledge of his posterity.

Of course, many people think that original sin is unfair. At the moment, I’m not trying to defend Paul’s argument (which I’ve done elsewhere). I’m merely discussing the Pauline grounds for guilt.

And, of course, Paul also grounds guilt in actual sin.

The upshot is that the unbeliever could be “inexcusable” for a number of different reasons.

Christmas Resources

In a recent book critical of the traditional Christian view of the infancy narratives, Marcus Borg and John Crossan wrote:

"The stories of Jesus's birth are the foundation of the world's most widely observed holiday. Christmas is celebrated by the world's two billion Christians, a number about twice that of the next largest religion, Islam. Moreover, because of the cultural and commercial importance of Christmas in Western culture and beyond, it is observed by many non-Christians as well. Indeed, no other religious holiday is so widely commemorated by people who are outside of the tradition that originated it....Indeed, in contemporary Western culture and even for many Christians, the commemoration of Christmas exceeds the commemoration of Easter. Because of the importance of Christmas, how we understand the stories of Jesus's birth matters. What we think they're about - how we hear them, read them, interpret them - matters. They are often sentimentalized. And, of course, there is emotional power in them. They touch the deepest of human yearnings...Moreover, for many Christians, they are associated with their earliest memories of childhood. Christmas has emotional power....They [the infancy narratives] speak of personal and political transformation." (The First Christmas [New York, New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2007], pp. vii-viii)

Though I disagree with much of what Borg and Crossan go on to say, I agree with their assessment of the significance of Christmas and the infancy narratives.

Last year, I organized much of Triablogue's material on the infancy narratives by linking it to the relevant texts from Matthew and Luke. You can also access all of our posts archived under the topic of Christmas here. If you're looking for material on Luke's census, for example, you can click on the relevant links in the text of Luke 2 on the second page linked above, or you can go to the third page linked above and search under "census" with the Ctrl F feature on your keyboard. You may want to scroll through the third link above, or click a lot of the links within the first two pages, to get a better idea of the range of material we've written. We've covered many topics that I've rarely or never seen addressed elsewhere on the web. There are hundreds of relevant articles in our archives.

Glenn Miller has some good material on the infancy narratives, including an article he wrote this year on alleged contradictions between the accounts in Matthew and Luke. J.P. Holding has some good material as well. So does CADRE Comments. John McCarthy has some helpful material on the infancy narratives at The Roman Theological Forum.

I would recommend the same books on the historicity of the infancy narratives that I've mentioned in previous years. The best resource on Matthew's infancy material is Craig Keener's commentary on that gospel (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1999). The best resource on Luke is Darrell Bock's commentary (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Books, 1994). Raymond Brown's The Birth Of The Messiah (New York, New York: Doubleday, 1999), though wrong on many points, covers the issues in a lot of depth and remains one of the best resources available. A good concise treatment is Ben Witherington's article in the Dictionary Of Jesus And The Gospels, Joel B. Green, et al., edd. (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1992), pp. 60-74.

I've reviewed the most influential modern scholarly work on the infancy narratives, Raymond Brown's book cited above, in three articles: one, two, and three. I've also reviewed two more recent works critical of the infancy narratives, Geza Vermes' The Nativity (New York: Doubleday, 2006) and Marcus Borg and John Crossan's The First Christmas (New York, New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2007). I've reviewed Vermes' book here. Borg and Crossan's book is reviewed in five parts: one, two, three, four, and five.

There's a lot of relevant, and often underestimated, material in the church fathers. Below are a few representative passages, which should give you an idea of how the early Christians interpreted the infancy accounts and how non-Christians responded to those accounts, for example:

Justin Martyr, Dialogue With Trypho, 77-79
Justin Martyr, First Apology, 34
Julius Africanus, Eusebius' Church History, 1:7
Origen, Against Celsus, 1:51
Origen, Against Celsus, 1:58-61

The earliest commentary on one of the infancy narratives is Origen's homilies on Luke. They're available in English translation in Joseph Lienhard, Origen: Homilies On Luke, Fragments On Luke (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University Of America Press, 1996).

Concerning whether it's acceptable for Christians to celebrate Christmas, see here.

A good resource on the history of Christmas as a holiday, such as its cultural influence and the development of Christmas traditions, is Bruce Forbes' Christmas: A Candid History (Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 2007). I disagree with Forbes on some issues, especially related to the earliest history of Christmas, but the book has a lot of information about the history of the holiday.

Here are some points to keep in mind regarding the historicity of the infancy narratives:

- There would have been interest in Jesus' background, including some elements of the infancy narratives, among both Christians and non-Christians even before Jesus died. Such interest is to be expected, given the common Messianic expectations of that era (see, for example, here and here). Paul, the gospels, and other early Christian sources express interest in Jesus' background, and all of the gospels agree that both Jesus' followers and His opponents were interested in His background before Jesus even died. Christians wouldn't have waited until late in the first century to begin asking questions about issues such as Jesus' ancestry and birthplace.

- The early Christians and their enemies had access to multiple sources who would have had reliable information on the events surrounding Jesus' infancy. Some of the sources with the most knowledge of Jesus' background were initially opposed to Christianity, so information about His infancy that would have been damaging to Christianity, if that sort of information existed, would have been accordingly accessible to non-Christian sources.

- Critics who cite sources like Josephus and Tacitus against the infancy narratives, such as when discussing the Slaughter of the Innocents or Luke's census, shouldn't then argue that reliable information about such issues wouldn't have been preserved as late as the time of the gospels. If reliable information wasn't available at that time, then Josephus and Tacitus didn't have it either.

- The gospels of Matthew and Luke belong to a historical genre, and the earliest Christian and non-Christian sources interpreted the infancy narratives as accounts meant to convey history.

- Historians regularly practice harmonization of sources, and the infancy narratives can be harmonized. That harmonization depends on some premises critics often deny or minimize, such as the premise that two accurate genealogies of the same individual can significantly differ and the premise that Matthew 2:16 probably places the events of Matthew 2 after everything in Luke's gospel prior to Luke 2:39. But those premises are reasonable and make better sense of other data involved, such as the early and widespread acceptance of both gospels as harmonious.

- An argument that Matthew and Luke are inconsistent, if granted, doesn't give us reason to reject both accounts or even everything in one account. The argument from inconsistency only goes so far.

- Contrary to what critics allege, the infancy narratives are consistent with what the gospels and other sources report about Jesus' public ministry.

- Human memory is more reliable than skeptics often suggest.

- The early opponents of Christianity weren't apathetic about the religion, and they weren't apathetic about the infancy narratives. Many of the arguments used by modern critics of the infancy accounts are found in Justin Martyr's Dialogue With Trypho, Origen's Against Celsus, John Chrysostom's Homilies On Matthew, and Augustine's Harmony Of The Gospels, for example.

- Vague accusations of gullibility on the part of ancient people are insufficient to dismiss the historicity of the traditional Christian view of Jesus' infancy. Any accusation of gullibility would have to be argued, not just asserted. It would have to be shown that the degree of gullibility is sufficient to establish what the critic wants to establish. Other factors would have to be taken into account, such as the fact that the early opponents of Christianity wouldn't have had a desire to believe in Christianity. Christian gullibility wouldn't explain non-Christian corroboration of Christian claims. And the critic who dismisses ancient people as too gullible to trust should explain why historians disagree with him, should explain whether he trusts ancient sources on other matters, and should explain why he's trusting sources like Josephus and Tacitus if he's going to cite them against the infancy narratives.

- The early enemies of Christianity corroborated some of the evidence for the infancy narratives that modern critics argue against, such as the authorship attributions of the gospels (see here, here, here, and here) and Jesus' birth in Bethlehem.

- Some of the modern critics' objections to the infancy narratives weren't raised by the early enemies of Christianity, even though those early enemies were in a better position than modern critics to judge the Christian claims. An example is the historicity of Luke's census.

- Some significant arguments and conclusions of conservative scholarship on the infancy narratives are accepted by non-conservative scholars. See, for example, here and here.

- Just as conservative scholars disagree among themselves on some points related to the infancy narratives, so do non-conservatives. For example, compare the three books I've cited above that are critical of the infancy narratives. Brown, Vermes, Borg, and Crossan agree on some points, but disagree on others.

- Scholarly disagreements over the infancy narratives largely occur for the same reasons they occur on other such issues: whether naturalism is assumed, how much weight is assigned to external evidence, etc. Brown's book cited above, for example, though more reasonable than works like Vermes' and Borg and Crossan's, rests heavily upon highly speculative arguments from internal evidence. He often recognizes the speculative nature of his arguments and acknowledges that he doesn't have much reason to be confident about his conclusions. He'll suggest that one part of the infancy narratives may have been derived to a significant extent from one portion of the Old Testament, then he'll appeal to a different portion of the Old Testament to explain another part of the infancy accounts. Brown has to appeal to a wide range of Old Testament sources in his attempt to explain much of the infancy narratives as something other than an effort to convey history. On p. 193, we're told about a wide range of possible sources for the material in Matthew 2, including "the combined story of Joseph in Egypt and Moses...the stories of the birth of Abraham, the visit of the Queen of Sheba to Solomon, and the struggle between Laban and Jacob...the most likely background is offered by the episode centered on Balaam in Num 22-24...The Matthean Herod resembles both the Pharaoh and Balak." After citing such a diverse array of possibilities, Brown assures us that he's omitted any mention of other parallels that are "too tenuous" (n. 40 on p. 193). I prefer his advice elsewhere that "one should be cautious in drawing an identification from such echoes of an OT scene." (p. 344) Brown often acknowledges that his conclusions could be wrong and that the narratives could be more historical than he concludes (for example, pp. 578-579). The Old Testament is a large collection of literature that covers a wide range of personalities, circumstances, and issues. Finding some parallels of New Testament events in the Old Testament doesn't have the sort of significance that liberal scholars often suggest, nor does the use of Old Testament language by first-century Jews who lived in an atmosphere so heavily influenced by that language. Brown doesn't go as far as critics like Vermes, Borg, and Crossan, but he does arrive at a view of Jesus' infancy that's far from what the early Christians or their opponents believed. When modern liberal scholars find themselves so far to the left even of the earliest enemies of Christianity, they ought to ask themselves where they went wrong.

Grateful When Some Questions Aren't Answered

"Let us therefore give thanks not only for blessings which we see, but also for those which we see not, and for those which we receive against our will. For many are the blessings He bestows upon us, without our desire, without our knowledge. And if ye believe me not, I will at once proceed to make the case clear to you. For consider, I pray, do not the impious and unbelieving Gentiles ascribe everything to the sun and to their idols? But what then? Doth He not bestow blessings even upon them? Is it not the work of His providence, that they both have life, and health, and children, and the like? And again they that are called Marcionites, and the Manichees, do they not even blaspheme Him? But what then? Does He not bestow blessings on them every day? Now if He bestows blessings on them that know them not, much more does he bestow them upon us. For what else is the peculiar work of God if it be not this, to do good to all mankind, alike by chastisements and by enjoyments? Let us not then give thanks only when we are in prosperity, for there is nothing great in this. And this the devil also well knows, and therefore he said, 'Doth Job fear God for nought? Hast Thou not made an hedge about him and about all that he hath on every side? Touch all that he hath; no doubt, he will renounce Thee to Thy face!' However, that cursed one gained no advantage; and God forbid he should gain any advantage of us either; but whenever we are either in penury, or in sicknesses, or in disasters, then let us increase our thanksgiving; thanksgiving, I mean, not in words, nor in tongue, but in deeds and works, in mind and in heart. Let us give thanks unto Him with all our souls. For He loves us more than our parents; and wide as is the difference between evil and goodness, so great is the difference between the love of God and that of our fathers. And these are not my words, but those of Christ Himself Who loveth us....The ungrateful, however, and unfeeling say, that this were worthy of God’s goodness, that there should be an equality amongst all. Tell me, ungrateful mortal, what sort of things are they which thou deniest to be of God’s goodness, and what equality meanest thou? 'Such an one,' thou wilt say, 'has been a cripple from his childhood; another is mad, and is possessed; another has arrived at extreme old age, and has spent his whole life in poverty; another in the most painful diseases: are these works of Providence? One man is deaf, another dumb, another poor, whilst another, impious, yea, utterly impious, and full of ten thousand vices, enjoys wealth, and keeps concubines, and parasites, and is owner of a splendid mansion, and lives an idle life.' And many instances of the sort they string together, and weave a long account of complaint against the providence of God....For why does it concern thee, if such an one is blind, or such an one poor? God hath not commanded thee to look to this, but to what thou thyself art doing. For if on the one hand thou doubtest that there is any power superintending the world, thou art of all men the most senseless; but if thou art persuaded of this, why doubt that it is our duty to please God?...Go to the physician’s, and thou wilt see him, whenever a man is discovered to have a wound, using the knife and the cautery. But no, in thy case, I say not so much as this; but go to the carpenter’s. And yet thou dost not examine his reasons, although thou understandest not one of the things which are done there, and many things will appear to thee to be difficulties; as, for instance, when he hollows the wood, when he alters its outward shape. Nay, I would bring thee to a more intelligible craft still, for instance, that of the painter, and there thy head will swim. For tell me, does he not seem to be doing what he does, at random? For what do his lines mean, and the turns and bends of the lines? But when he puts on the colors, then the beauty of the art will become conspicuous. Yet still, not even then wilt thou be able to attain to any accurate understanding of it. But why do I speak of carpenters, and painters, our fellow-servants? Tell me, how does the bee frame her comb, and then shalt thou speak about God also. Master the handiwork of the ant, the spider, and the swallow, and then shalt thou speak about God also. Tell me these things. But no, thou never canst. Wilt thou not cease then, O man, thy vain enquiries? For vain indeed they are. Wilt thou not cease busying thyself in vain about many things? Nothing so wise as this ignorance, where they that profess they know nothing are wisest of all, and they that spend overmuch labor on these questions, the most foolish of all. So that to profess knowledge is not everywhere a sign of wisdom, but sometimes of folly also. For tell me, suppose there were two men, and one of them should profess to stretch out his lines, and to measure the expanse that intervenes between the earth and heaven, and the other were to laugh at him, and declare that he did not understand it, tell me, I pray, which should we laugh at, him that said he knew, or him that knew not? Evidently, the man that said that he knew. He that is ignorant, therefore, is wiser than he that professes to know. And what again? If any one were to profess to tell us how many cups of water the sea contains, and another should profess his ignorance, is not the ignorance here again wiser than the knowledge? Surely, vastly so. And why so? Because that knowledge itself is but intense ignorance. For he indeed who says that he is ignorant, knows something. And what is that? That it is incomprehensible to man. Yes, and this is no small portion of knowledge. Whereas he that says he knows, he of all others knows not what he says he knows, and is for this very reason utterly ridiculous....how many things are there to teach us to bridle this unseasonable impertinence and idle curiosity; and yet we refrain not, but are curious about the lives of others; as, why one is a cripple, and why another is poor. And so by this way of reasoning we shall fall into another sort of trifling which is endless, as, why such an one is a woman? and, why all are not men? why there is such a thing as an ass? why an ox? why a dog? why a wolf? why a stone? why wood? and thus the argument will run out to an interminable length. This in truth is the reason, why God has marked out limits to our knowledge, and has laid them deep in nature....And so then let us only 'give thanks for all things.' 'Wherefore,' says he, 'give thanks for all things.' This is the part of a well-disposed, of a wise, of an intelligent servant; the opposite is that of a tattler, and an idler, and a busy-body. Do we not see amongst servants, that those among them who are worthless and good for nothing, are both tattlers, and triflers and that they pry into the concerns of their masters, which they are desirous to conceal: whereas the intelligent and well-disposed look to one thing only, how they may fulfill their service....Tell me, now, which is the widest difference, between our age and that of children, or between God and men? between ourselves compared with gnats, or God compared with us? Plainly between God and us. Why then dost thou busy thyself to such an extent in all these questions? 'Give thanks for all things.' 'But what,' say you, 'if a heathen should ask the question? How am I to answer him? He desires to learn from me whether there is a Providence, for he himself denies that there is any being thus exercising foresight.' Turn round then, and ask him the same question thyself. He will deny therefore that there is a Providence. Yet that there is a Providence, is plain from what thou hast said; but that it is incomprehensible, is plain from those things whereof we cannot discover the reason. For if in things where men are the disposers, we oftentimes do not understand the method of the disposition, and in truth many of them appear to us inconsistent, and yet at the same time we acquiesce, how much more will this be so in the case of God? However, with God nothing either is inconsistent, or appears so to the faithful. Wherefore let us 'give thanks for all things,' let us give Him glory for all things." (John Chrysostom, Homilies On Ephesians, 19)

Update On The James Ossuary

Chris Price has posted another summary of recent news related to the James Ossuary.

To Form A More Secular Union

One of the most important freedoms guaranteed by our Constitution, the freedom from religion, is being threatened by an obvious hoax circulating on the web. I'm referring to two thanksgiving proclamations purportedly issued by Presidents George Washington and Abraham Lincoln. These are palpable forgeries. Just read the First Amendment. It's obvious.

By the President of the United States of America. a Proclamation.

Whereas it is the duty of all Nations to acknowledge the providence of Almighty God, to obey his will, to be grateful for his benefits, and humbly to implore his protection and favor--and whereas both Houses of Congress have by their joint Committee requested me "to recommend to the People of the United States a day of public thanksgiving and prayer to be observed by acknowledging with grateful hearts the many signal favors of Almighty God especially by affording them an opportunity peaceably to establish a form of government for their safety and happiness."

Now therefore I do recommend and assign Thursday the 26th day of November next to be devoted by the People of these States to the service of that great and glorious Being, who is the beneficent Author of all the good that was, that is, or that will be--That we may then all unite in rendering unto him our sincere and humble thanks--for his kind care and protection of the People of this Country previous to their becoming a Nation--for the signal and manifold mercies, and the favorable interpositions of his Providence which we experienced in thecourse and conclusion of the late war--for the great degree of tranquillity, union, and plenty, which we have since enjoyed--for the peaceable and rational manner, in which we have been enabled to establish constitutions of government for our safety and happiness, and particularly the national One now lately instituted--for the civil and religious liberty with which we are blessed; and the means we have of acquiring and diffusing useful knowledge; and in general for all the great and various favors which he hath been pleased to confer upon us.

and also that we may then unite in most humbly offering our prayers and supplications to the great Lord and Ruler of Nations and beseech him to pardon our national and other transgressions--to enable us all, whether in public or private stations, to perform our several and relative duties properly and punctually--to render our national government a blessing to all the people, by constantly being a Government of wise, just, and constitutional laws, discreetly and faithfully executed and obeyed--to protect and guide all Sovereigns and Nations (especially such as have shewn kindness onto us) and to bless them with good government, peace, and concord--To promote the knowledge and practice of true religion and virtue, and the encrease of science among them and us--and generally to grant unto all Mankind such a degree of temporal prosperity as he alone knows to be best.

Given under my hand at the City of New-York the third day of October in the year of our Lord 1789.

Go: Washington



By the President of the United States of America.

A Proclamation.

The year that is drawing towards its close, has been filled with the blessings of fruitful fields and healthful skies. To these bounties, which are so constantly enjoyed that we are prone to forget the source from which they come, others have been added, which are of so extraordinary a nature, that they cannot fail to penetrate and soften even the heart which is habitually insensible to the ever watchful providence of Almighty God. In the midst of a civil war of unequaled magnitude and severity, which has sometimes seemed to foreign States to invite and to provoke their aggression, peace has been preserved with all nations, order has been maintained, the laws have been respected and obeyed, and harmony has prevailed everywhere except in the theatre of military conflict; while that theatre has been greatly contracted by the advancing armies and navies of the Union. Needful diversions of wealth and of strength from the fields of peaceful industry to the national defence, have not arrested the plough, the shuttle or the ship; the axe has enlarged the borders of our settlements, and the mines, as well of iron and coal as of the precious metals, have yielded even more abundantly than heretofore. Population has steadily increased, notwithstanding the waste that has been made in the camp, the siege and the battle-field; and the country, rejoicing in the consiousness of augmented strength and vigor, is permitted to expect continuance of years with large increase of freedom. No human counsel hath devised nor hath any mortal hand worked out these great things. They are the gracious gifts of the Most High God, who, while dealing with us in anger for our sins, hath nevertheless remembered mercy. It has seemed to me fit and proper that they should be solemnly, reverently and gratefully acknowledged as with one heart and one voice by the whole American People. I do therefore invite my fellow citizens in every part of the United States, and also those who are at sea and those who are sojourning in foreign lands, to set apart and observe the last Thursday of November next, as a day of Thanksgiving and Praise to our beneficent Father who dwelleth in the Heavens. And I recommend to them that while offering up the ascriptions justly due to Him for such singular deliverances and blessings, they do also, with humble penitence for our national perverseness and disobedience, commend to His tender care all those who have become widows, orphans, mourners or sufferers in the lamentable civil strife in which we are unavoidably engaged, and fervently implore the interposition of the Almighty Hand to heal the wounds of the nation and to restore it as soon as may be consistent with the Divine purposes to the full enjoyment of peace, harmony, tranquillity and Union.

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington, this Third day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and of the Independence of the Unites States the Eighty-eighth.

By the President: Abraham Lincoln

Secular scumbags

JASON STREITFELD SAID:

“Apparently you're not interested in understanding or faithfully representing what I've written.”

I answered you on your own grounds. You said that Rhology was “scum.” That’s a value judgment. But you also said that morality is a process of negotiation. Yet you didn’t negotiate with Rhology over the propriety of your epithet.

You also like to hurl epithets like “fascist.” Yet, by your own definition of morality, fascism is a social convention. A social contract. So there’s nothing wrong with fascism if we apply your own definition of morality to the phenomenon of fascism.

For example, you said:

“That’s easy. Authority is granted by convention, of course. The most rationally conceived authority is one most adapted to the needs of the community and most adaptive to the demands of reason. Morality is all a matter of justification, after all. So, a moral authority is a person or body of persons whose decisions on moral questions are respected within a community.”

i) But Nazi German satisfied those conditions—for Germans. That was their social contract.

ii) And while we're on the subject, how can a social contract define what rights we have? After all, a process of negotiation assumes at the outset that we have a right to enter into contractual negotiations. That right can’t derive from social contract theory. For human rights or civil rights would be a result of such negotiations, and not a presupposition thereof.

“I've explained what morality is.”

Indeed you did. And I simply used some concrete examples like the Third Reich, Double Indemnity, and The Godfather to illustrate the cash-value of your explanation.

“How it is objective.”

Indeed you did. This is how you attempt to explain objective morality:

“Now, listen. I will explain what an objective moral authority is. In so doing, it should be clear why your argument is bankrupt on two fronts: first, because you wrongly accuse atheists of lacking objective moral authority; second, because you wrongly claim to have an objective moral authority of your own. See, I’m about to turn your argument upside down. Ready?”

Ready.

“The term ‘objective’ refers to that which can be observed and measured by anybody (in theory, of course), and not what is only available for a single person. Of course, people react differently to objective events, and no matter how similar people’s experiences tend to be, there is often some small difference in what they observe and measure. Yet, in so far as something is theoretically available to be observed and measured, we call it ‘objective,’ even if our observations and measurements are not always exactly the same. Often we have to negotiate an understanding of objective events, because our experiences aren’t always exactly the same. In this way, objectivity can be established through discourse.”

Unfortunately for you, there are some basic problems with this explanation:

i) We can observe an event, but the rightness or wrongness of an event is unobservable. Moral properties are not empirical properties. We can observe a bank robbery, but the bank robbery doesn’t look or sound or smell or taste or feel right or wrong.

ii) What metric to you use to measure morality? What units of measurement do you employ? Is morality measured in liters or meters?

Is something wrong because is has more liters/meters of wrongness or fewer meters/liters of wrongness? How do you empirically measure the immorality of murder—assuming you think that murder is wrong?

Here’s another definition you gave: “Morality is a process of deciding what is best for humanity and civilization.”

i) Of course, this begs the question since you first need to derive and justify the concept of “best” before you can apply it to a concrete situation.

ii) You also beg the question of what humanity and civilization even matters. Why assume that what is good for humanity is good? Is what is good for Stalin good?

Why, on your grounds, should humanity exist, survive, and prosper?

Here you give it another try:

“Justice, beauty, truth, rights . . . these are human values. We all have them because we have working human brains and because we are actively involved in the world around us.”

How does that distinguish the mass murderer from the philanthropist? Stalin had a working human brain. And he was actively involved in the world around him. Very active!

“I've explained why notions of ‘God’ are meaningless, and why they cannot be used to justify any moral arguments.”

Indeed you did. You appealed to “theological noncognitivism,” which is just a warmed over version of the long discredited school of logical positivism.

You also claim that “The term ‘supernatural’ is meant to refer to that which cannot be observed or comprehended in any rational way. The supernatural cannot possibly be understood. Ever. By anyone.”

“Theologians for ages have known that the term ‘God’ is defined in a way that is impossible to understand. By recognizing the lack of coherence here, I am only pointing out what religious believers through the ages have willingly acknowledged. They have claimed that the inability to understand the meaning of the term ‘God’ is one of the main reasons why God must be embraced as a matter of faith.”

i) I notice that you don’t actually quote any theologians to that effect. What theologians have you actually read? List some names and titles to document your sweeping claim.

ii) At best, your claim would only apply to the apophatic tradition. But many theologians are not apophatic theologians. For example, Francis Turretin, in the Institutes of Elenctic Theology, spends a lot of time carefully defining the divine attributes.

Or, to take a modern example, Kathrin Rogers, in Perfect Being Theology, devotes several chapters to carefully defining certain divine attributes.

Therefore, you historical claim is demonstrably ignorant and demonstrably false.

iii) But let’s take a specific case. Take the conventional definition of divine omnipotence: God can instantiate any compossible state of affairs.

Try to explain how that concept is either unintelligible or incoherent.

“I have not expressed any dogmatic allegiance to any texts, not even the Humanist Manifesto, contrary to your suggestion.”

i) You were dismissing Biblical ethics on the mere grounds that it’s contained in a book. An old book. “It's just a collection of really old stories.”

Are you now modifying your original objection?

Christians don’t believe in Biblical ethics because it’s contained in a book. A book is just an information storage and retrieval mechanism.

ii) You also object to Biblical ethics because it’s “old.” But how is that germane to your own definition of morality? An old social convention would be just as valid or invalid as a new social convention. What makes it valid is not the age of the convention, but its conventional acceptance.

“By the way, you are totally misreading the point about ‘selfish’ genes. The point is that human altruism can be explained as the product of natural selection, as the result of genes that are not interested in our own well-being, but which just go about replicating themselves as much as possible. That does not mean that human beings are all scumbags.”

Several problems:

i) Dawkins says that human beings are reducible to bacteria. Cellular colonies of bacteria. Question: does a bacterium have rights? Does a colony of bacteria have rights?

ii) He also says we’re blindly programmed robots. Question: do blindly programmed robots have rights?

iii) To “justify” altruism by appealing to natural selection commits the naturalistic fallacy. Morality is not about what is, but what ought to be. Even if our sense of altruism is a product of natural selection, that’s a descriptive statement, not a normative statement.

iv) Moreover, once we become aware of our evolutionary conditioning, we’re in a position to resist our evolutionary conditioning. It only works if we’re unaware of it. Like someone who’s been brainwashed. The moment he becomes conscious of the fact that he’s been brainwashed, the programming breaks down.

So you have yet to explain why we should be altruistic. Selfish genes won’t do the trick.

“You say atheism cannot account for abstractions. Sure it can, and we can talk about abstractions without postulating any non-physical realm.”

i) Sure about that? Do you even know what an abstract object is?

Take possible worlds. At one point you say “There are also some laws which apply to any possible world in which certain conditions are met.”

What is your point of reference? For you, the real world is all there is, and the real world is physical.

So where do possible worlds come from? Not from the real world, since a possible world is a way the real world might have been, but isn’t. A possible world is a world apart from the real world. An unexemplified possibility. Unexemplified in space and time. It doesn't exist in the actual world.

The real world is a possible world which has been instantiated in time and space.

ii) Or what about infinite sets, like the Mandelbrot set. In what does that inhere? Not in the human mind, since the human mind is finite.

Yet a set must include all its members. A set is a given totality. To what physical structure does the Mandelbrot set correspond?

We can represent the Mandelbrot set, but that’s not the same thing. A representation of something is not the thing-in-itself.

Likewise, we can define or formulate the Mandelbrot set, but that’s not the same thing as the thing-in-itself.

An offer he can't refuse

I’ve been reading some choice things that an atheist as to say about Rhology:

http://specterofreason.blogspot.com/2008/11/losing-patience-with-scum.html

“The problem is, your scumminess prevents you from understanding what a moral position actually looks like. I’ve been trying to explain this to you, but your mind has been so infiltrated by scum that you can’t see beyond the scum. You are trapped in a mental web of scum. It’s sad, because I think there is an intelligent and well-meaning person underneath all those layers of scum. But maybe I’m wrong, and you’re just scum to the bone.”

Notice the finality of his condemnation. But I thought he also told Rhology that morality is a “process of negotiation” (see below). Did he work with Rhology to establish this charge? Did he enter into negotiations with Rhology over his alleged scumminess? Shouldn’t the charge of scumminess be open to further negotiation?

Looks like Jason Streitfeld being very “dictatorial” and “fascistic.” Issuing a unilateral condemnation. That’s very scummy of him, is it not?

“Now, this view is so patently stupid and absurd, it’s hard to decide where to begin. Let’s begin by comparing your scumminess to that of the Nazis. You see, as I mentioned, they had a book, too.”

While we’re on the subject, let’s begin by comparing Streitfeld’s scumminess to that of the other atheists. You see, they had a book, too. Mao’s Little Red Book.

“And they thought it told the truth.”

Ditto: Maoist atheists.

“They killed millions of people because of the ideas written in that book.”

Ditto: Maoist atheists.

Other scummy atheistic titles also come to mind, such as the Marquis de Sade’s Les 120 journées de Sodome, ou l'École du libertinage.

“Now, on what grounds do you embrace your Bible, and not Mein Kampf?”

Now, on what grounds does Streitfeld embrace the Humanist Manifesto, and not Mein Kampf?

And on what grounds does Streitfeld condemn Mein Kampf? Surely he’s not trying to “end all negotiations” on the morality of Mein Kampf?

“Why should anyone take one book as a guide to moral absolutes, and not another book?”

Maybe because one book is right while another is wrong.

“The fact is, scum, your allegiance to the Bible is wholly arbitrary. It’s no better than the Nazis’ allegiance to Mein Kampf.”

Only if you disregard all of the evidence for Scripture.

“You blindly assert that, if atheism is true, then morality is impossible.”

Rhology probably got that idea from reading scummy atheists like Richard Dawkins:

For the first half of geological time our ancestors were bacteria. Most creatures still are bacteria, and each one of our trillions of cells is a colony of bacteria.

What are all of us but self-reproducing robots? We have been put together by our genes and what we do is roam the world looking for a way to sustain ourselves and ultimately produce another robot a child.

We are survival machines—robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known as genes.

This is one of the hardest lessons for humans to learn. We cannot admit that things might be neither good nor evil, neither cruel nor kind, but simply callous - indifferent to all suffering, lacking all purpose.

The universe we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil and no good, nothing but blind pitiless indifference.

http://www.simonyi.ox.ac.uk/dawkins/WorldOfDawkins-archive/Catalano/quotes.shtml

If it's true that it causes people to feel despair, that's tough. It's still the truth. The universe doesn't owe us condolence or consolation; it doesn't owe us a nice warm feeling inside. If it's true, it's true, and you'd better live with it.

http://www.beliefnet.com/News/Science-Religion/2005/11/The-Problem-With-God-Interview-With-Richard-Dawkins.aspx

Sounds like we’re all a bunch of evolutionary scumbags. Returning to my fellow scum:

“You see, morality is a process whereby justifications are established. It is an ongoing process, and it requires discourse.”

Like the way a philandering husband (or wife) justifies his adultery, you mean? Speaking of which, here's one example of negotiated morality:

http://rogerebert.suntimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/19981220/REVIEWS08/401010313/1023

“It is based on the very need for people to establish common notions of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’.”

Like Nazi Germany.

“Morality is thus based in human need, and it is the product of biology and civilization.”

What if I need to murder someone?

“You seem to think that, without a book to tell us exactly what is right and wrong, we would all be lost. We wouldn’t be able to do anything. We would, in short, be ignorant and confused savages.”

Like Jason Streitfeld.

“And yet, we have reason.”

So did the Unabomber. Indeed, serial killers are very clever. That’s why it takes so long to catch them.

“We can work together to establish social systems based on our ability to reason and negotiate values together. That is what morality is. It is a process of negotiation.”

Reminds me of a scene in The Godfather:

VITO CORLEONE
Don Barzini, I want to thank you for helping me organize this meeting here today. And also the other heads of the Five Families—New York and New Jersey. Carmine Corleone from the Bronx and ah…Brooklyn—Philip Tattaglia. An' from Staten Island, we have with us Victor Strachi. And all the other associates that came as far as from California, and Kansas City, and all the other territories of the country—thank you.

How did things ever get so far? I don't know. It was so—unfortunate—so unnecessary.

Tattaglia lost a son—and I lost a son. We're quits. And if Tattaglia agrees, then I'm willing to—let things go on the way they were before...

BARZINI
We're all grateful to Don Corleone for calling this meeting. We all know him as a man of his word—a modest man -- he'll always listen to reason...

TATTAGLIA
Yes, Don Barzini—he's too modest. He had all the judges and politicians in his pocket. He refused to share them...

VITO CORLEONE
When—when did I ever refuse an accommodation? All of you know me here—when did I ever refuse?—except one time. And why? Because I believe this drug business—is gonna destroy us in the years to come. I mean, it's not like gambling or liquor—even women—which is something that most people want nowadays, and is ah forbidden to them by the pezzonovante of the Church. Even the police departments that've helped us in the past with gambling and other things are gonna refuse to help us when in comes to narcotics. And I believed that then and I believe that now.

BARZINI
Times have changed. It's not like the Old Days when we can do anything we want. A refusal is not the act of a friend. If Don Corleone had all the judges, and the politicians in New York, then he must share them, or let us others use them. He must let us draw the water from the well. Certainly he can present a bill for such services; after all, we are not Communists.

ZALUCHI
I also don't believe in drugs. For years I paid my people extra so they wouldn't do that kind of business.

Somebody comes to them and says, "I have powders; if you put up three, four thousand dollar investment, we can make fifty thousand distributing." So they can't resist. I want to control it as a business, to keep it respectable. I don't want it near schools—I don't want it sold to children! That's an infamia. In my city, we would keep the traffic in the dark people—the colored. They're animals anyway, so let them lose their souls...

VITO CORLEONE
I hoped that we would come here and reason together. And as a reasonable man I'm willing to do whatever's necessary to find a peaceful solution to these problems...

BARZINI
Then we are agreed. The traffic in drugs will be permitted, but controlled, and Don Corleone will give up protection in the East, and there will be the peace.

TATTAGLIA
But I must have strict assurance from Corleone—as time goes by and his position becomes stronger, will he attempt any individual vendetta?

BARZINI
Look, we are all reasonable men here; we don't have to give assurances as if we were lawyers...

VITO CORLEONE
You talk about vengeance—is vengeance gonna bring your son back to you? Or my boy to me? I forgo the vengeance of my son. But I have selfish reasons. My youngest son was forced to leave this country, because of this Sollozzo business. All right—and I have to make arrangements to bring him back here safely, cleared of all these false charges. But I'm a superstitious man—and if some unlucky accident should befall him—if he should get shot in the head by a police officer, or if he should hang himself in his jail cell, or if he's struck by a bolt of lightning—then I'm going to blame some of the people in this room. And that, I do not forgive.

But—that aside—let me say that I swear on the souls of my grandchildren that I will not be the one to break the peace that we have made here today...

Continuing with Streitfeld:

“You wish to end all negotiations and condemn those who do not adopt the views written in your very old book. That is one way to approach the process whereby moral questions are negotiated—it is a dictatorial, fascist way to approach the process, because it denies the very possibility of negotiation. You are therefore unreasonable and potentially dangerous to the very possibility of morality.”

But I thought that Streitfeld just condemned Rhology as scum. He didn’t even open negotiations with Alan over the charge of scumminess—much less terminate them. That makes Streitfeld an unreasonable person, and potentially dangerous to the very possibility of morality, does it not?

“By claiming that morality cannot be negotiated, and that it can only be embraced as the word of ‘God,’ you are denying the very process whereby morality is established. You are against morality.”

I’m sure the philandering husband would appreciate Streitfeld’s definition of morality. Adultery can be negotiated. The husband of the wife he’s banging is “scum” for feeling that he’s the wronged party in this transaction.

“Why should anyone think that the writings in your very old book are of any more value than the ramblings of any idiot on the street?”

Yeah, old books like…Euclid. Geometry is so old hat. Newer is truer. Like the latest Paris fashion.

“I embrace morality, because I embrace that process whereby people work together to try to justify their decisions.”

Like Hitler and Himmler and Goebbels.

“It is not a perfect process, but it’s success is not predicated upon any supposed infallibility. It leaves room for error, but it works.”

Like the Third Reich.

“Now, please, give us all a single reason why we should abandon morality and embrace your Bible. Why should we value that book any more than we value Mein Kampf or other such insults to humanity and reason?”

Why not do some rudimentary reading in Christian apologetics?