tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post1024049140274548937..comments2024-03-27T17:15:37.606-04:00Comments on Triablogue: Ad ReppertRyanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17809283662428917799noreply@blogger.comBlogger7125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-6305456140008949512009-04-16T00:57:00.000-04:002009-04-16T00:57:00.000-04:00Holy cow, Paul. Can't you see the phrase "prima fa...Holy cow, Paul. Can't you see the phrase "prima facie support?" All I was claiming there was that Scripture appears, on the face of things, to teach a universal intent to save in place, as well as a universal atonement. Whether this stands up to further exegetical analysis is precisely what's at issue. <br /><br />The central argument is that Calvinist exegetes appear to concur with me that the Bible teaches that God loves every person, including the reprobate. However, to say that God loves the reprobate makes no coherent sense.Victor Repperthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10962948073162156902noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-89427744199144623102009-04-13T14:46:00.000-04:002009-04-13T14:46:00.000-04:00sorry, that was a quote from Helm. He has made the...sorry, that was a quote from Helm. He has made the same point in other places, but the above si representativeErrorhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10615233201833238198noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-46515474426857487872009-04-13T14:45:00.000-04:002009-04-13T14:45:00.000-04:00sic et non,“So does it follow from such knowing an...sic et non,<BR/><BR/>“So does it follow from such knowing and willing permission of evil that the universe is in every detail as God intends it to be? This is an interesting question, but it is unclear as it stands. There is no reason to think that God intends the details of the universe separately; there is one divine will, which encompasses all events. It would be fallacious to suppose that the divine attitude is the same with respect to every detail of what God wills…As Aquinas put it, “God, and nature, and indeed every causal agent, does what is best overall, but not what is best in every part, except when the part is regarded in its relationship to the whole.” We may suppose that when God knowingly and willingly permits certain events he does so in furtherance of some wider consideration wholly consistent with his character with respect to which they are a logically necessary condition. And likewise some of those things which he causes are means to some further end. It is a fallacy to think that because some arrangement is wise, every detail of that arrangement, considered in isolation, is wise.” (J. Beilby & P. Eddy, eds. Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views (IVP 2001), 182.)<BR/><BR/>-PaulErrorhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10615233201833238198noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-18567475333182659972009-04-13T11:45:00.000-04:002009-04-13T11:45:00.000-04:00That was very helpful! I had not really considered...That was very helpful! I had not really considered that such objections can always be rephrased to apply to the Arminian position (I'm very new to <I>Triablogue</I>, so I've missed it if you've developed it earlier).<BR/><BR/>Could you direct me to the Helms work you mention?<BR/><BR/>Thanks.Marshallhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07230963959726472651noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-84071969718297103292009-04-13T09:59:00.000-04:002009-04-13T09:59:00.000-04:00sic et non,If someone makes a claim that I do not ...sic et non,<BR/><BR/>If someone makes a claim that I do not find obvious, why do I have to do the explaining? Seems odd.<BR/><BR/>Anyway, the problem, as I've pointed out numerous times, is that the statement I refer to is hopelessly vague and ambiguous.<BR/><BR/>Thus, there may be some ways to understand that statements that, once properly analyzed, I might agree with. Other ways, not. <BR/><BR/>Now, with Victor the problem is that he frequently tosses out ill-thought-out objections that stem from his "gut", i.e., the pre-philosophical, pre-argumentative intuitions. He also has been seen to, time and time again, offer objections based on a misunderstanding of Calvinism. He sends up a lot of balloons, without caring if one is consistent with the other, and hopes one of them ends up neing filled with more than air.<BR/><BR/>Now, the claim, as stated by Victor, is obviously meant to *imply* that God is doing something naughty. However, I obviously don't think that when god ordains sin he is doing something naughty. So I want to see how Victor *argues* for this linkage.<BR/><BR/>In my post, there was, I think, enough information to work with so that you could fgigure somethings out for yourself. For example, I hold that God ordained, predetermined, planned, etc., Jesus' murder. So, if by "want" or "desire" you can allow that God ordained murder, and so wanted murder, and also was not naughty, then that's fine.<BR/><BR/>Or, to take it a step further, I don't see the distinction between God's knowing a murder would occur a head of time, have the ability to stop it, and then say this is different that the position of the Calvinist. Take your example and extend it: In every instance of human action I can think of, we would say that if S knew ahead of time about some heinous act, had the ability to stop it, but still allowed it without bothering to stop it, he is guilty of something--indeed, it looks like he wanted it to happen. If not, why allow it?<BR/><BR/>Or to peer a bit further, almost all Arminians claim that no one would be able to commit an act if God were not upholding all the laws, particles, etc., necessary for a person to commit that act. If God din't want it to happen, why give the person the power to do it?<BR/><BR/>Another way to express it: God chose to create a world with a total of <I>n</I> child molestations. That means he "wanted" a world with n rather than n-1 child molestations.<BR/><BR/>See, as Paul Helm as contended, that God has a good plan for the whole, does not mean each part is good. So if "want" the evil to happen is meant to be read as some kind of evil desire to see evil happen for the sake of evil, i.e., you *want* evil to occur because you like evil, or desire its instantation as an end in itself, then we have a problem.<BR/><BR/>Therefore, it depends on how all of this gets parsed out. I am of the opinion that there is no answer the Arminian can give that is not susceptibel to a "I'm rubber, you're glue, everything you say bounces off of me and sticks to you," kind of a response.<BR/><BR/>Hence, "how does it follow" that if God determs S to sin, God wants S to sin" - where 'wants' is meant to imply some kind of nastiness on God's part? Is it the hidden and supressed and controversial premise that determinism and compatibilism are not the case? So is it that reppert's argument assumed the falsity of Calvinism to show its falsity? But that's uninteresting. If it that if God ordained S to sin he naughtily-wants-it, yet if God "allows" S to sin when he could have stopped it (something naughty if you or I were to do it) he non-naughtily-wants-it? <BR/><BR/>What, precisely, is it? How does it follow that God wants these things in a naughty way? If Reppert's contention is not that this wanting is naughty, then where's the problem?Errorhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10615233201833238198noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-30836706602162214262009-04-13T00:35:00.000-04:002009-04-13T00:35:00.000-04:00Is it that since God determines that S sin God wan...<I>Is it that since God determines that S sin God wants S to sin? How does that follow?</I><BR/><BR/>Could you explain how that <I>doesn't</I> follow? In every instance of human action I can think of, we only determine X (in the sense of making certain that X comes to pass) if we desire X to come to pass (even if our desire for the actualization of X is only instrumental). I don't see how this relationship can be broken.<BR/><BR/>Of course, human action and divine action could be disanalogous at this point. But then I don't see how you can do anything more than insist on the distinction of the two words. Can you give the relationship between them any conceptual meaningfulness? <BR/><BR/>Thanks.Marshallhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07230963959726472651noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-41136859689503969402009-04-12T23:18:00.000-04:002009-04-12T23:18:00.000-04:00Nice, Paul. Haven't talked to you in a while... h...Nice, Paul. Haven't talked to you in a while... hope all is well with you and your wife and children. Happy Easter... Christ is risen!Craig Sowderhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11624212251233585028noreply@blogger.com