A stock objection to Calvinism is that it implicates God in evil because God "causes" or "determines" evil. Let's consider natural evil from the standpoint of freewill theism. Now, I think it's reasonable to claim that physical determinism governs nature at the macro level.
Depending on your interpretation of quantum physics, subatomic events are either statistical or deterministic. But even if you think they are statistical, that doesn't seem to transfer to the macro world.
According to Christian theology, there's an interplay between personal agents and natural processes. What the natural order does when left to itself is deterministic, absent outside intervention by a personal agent. (The subatomic order might be an exception.)
In that respect, nature is like a machine. If I create a mantrap, it's the trap that catches or kills the poacher or trespasser. Yet the trap was only doing what I designed it to do. It's not the mantrap, but me, that's responsible for the outcome.
Every so often we read a news report about someone who put a venomous snake in the mailbox of his enemy. When his enemy reaches into the box to get his mail, he is bitten by the snake.
Now, it was the snake, and not the culprit, that bit the man. But, of course, we still hold the man who put the snake in the mailbox responsible for the snakebite.
It isn't even a sure thing that his enemy will die of snakebite. It might be a dry bite. Or he might receive antivenom in time to save his life. Even so, the culprit will be charged with attempted murder.
Suppose it's the enemy's 10-year-old son who checks the mailbox that day, only to be bitten. The culprit didn't intend to harm or kill his enemy's son. But, of course, that hardly exonerates him. "I'm sorry, your Honor. I didn't mean to kill the boy. That was an accident. His dad was my target!"
I think I am missing your point. You seem to be arguing that God is routinely guilty of murder and attempted murder.
ReplyDeleteI'm responding to freewill theism on its own terms.
DeleteI think what you're saying is something like this: Suppose there's an earthquake and a lot of people die. And suppose that is caused by purely natural causes. No human beings fracking or anything caused this earthquake. It happened as a result of physical causes that reach all the way back to the creation of the world or the Big Bang or whatever. In that case, you are arguing, the freewill theist would have to *also* say that God determines or causes evil, because God set up the natural causes that brought about the earthquake. So how is God better off here than on a Calvinist view?
DeleteIs that how the argument goes?
I think if so the response should be that it's far worse for God to determine moral evil of finite creatures than for God to determine natural evil.
steve,
DeleteHow is your argument not completely disingenuous? You don't even believe what you are saying, that natural evil makes God a murderer and attempted murderer.
Another brainless, knee-jerk comment from Jeff.
Deletei) As I said, I'm responding to freewill theism on its own terms. That doesn't commit me to the assumptions of the freewill theist. Rather, I'm mounting an internal critique.
ii) I don't have a problem with God "causing" or "determining" evil. And I think God has some prerogatives that humans don't.
Lydia,
DeleteThere are two separate issues:
i) We can discuss whether it's wrong for God to determine moral evil, but that's not the topic of the post.
ii) Given the argument I presented–which you didn't challenge directly–if the God of freewill theism determines natural evil, or a subset of natural evils, and it's even worse for God to determine moral evil than natural evil, hasn't the freewill theist implicated God in wrongdoing?
That was my take on Lydia's response as well.
DeletePerhaps I'm over simplifying, but I interpreted it as, "Yes God is implicated by causing or ordaining natural evil, but it's worse for God to ordain the moral evil of finite creatures".
That seems like a tacit concession of the *actual* argument set forth in the OP, no?
My comment may have been brainless, but I resent the implication that it was knee-jerk and not carefully considered.
DeleteYou are arguing that natural evil is divine murder in the meat of your argument, but is not divine murder in your overall presuppositions. One undermines the other in my opinion. But never mind.
God put a snake in his enemy's mailbox because he is his enemy who ate the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil.
To Adam he said, “Because you listened to your wife and ate fruit from the tree about which I commanded you, ‘You must not eat from it,’
“Cursed is the ground because of you... etc.
Actual non-rhetorical question: Do you recognize categories of natural evil and moral evil, or is that also responding to free will theism on its own terms?
Your comments are never carefully considered. You don't know your limitations. Your confidence habitually overreaches your competence.
Delete"You are arguing that natural evil is divine murder…"
No, that's an analogy. Try to think for a change.
"…in the meat of your argument, but is not divine murder in your overall presuppositions."
Because I'm discussing the implications of natural evil in relation to freewill theism, rather than my own position.
There's nothing unusual about that mode of argumentation. For instance, I might critique the theory of evolution on its own grounds by granting certain evolutionary assumptions for the sake of argument, then show how the theory is inconsistent. That doesn't commit me to evolutionary assumptions. It's merely assumes the opposing viewpoint to test its coherence.
"God put a snake in his enemy's mailbox because he is his enemy who ate the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil."
That wasn't my example. You're going off on a tangent.
"Do you recognize categories of natural evil and moral evil."
Given how often I've discussed the issue, the question answers itself.
"God put a snake in his enemy's mailbox because he is his enemy who ate the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil."
DeleteThat wasn't my example. You're going off on a tangent.
What!? I'm really lost. I thought you said the relationship between God and natural evil is like a guy who puts a snake in his neighbor's mailbox. I don't know what you are talking about anymore.
But maybe the freewill theist would say it's _not_ bad for God to ordain natural evil and that freewill theism (unlike Calvinism) has no hint of God's ordaining moral evil. I'd certainly consider saying that. It seems plausible to me on its face.
DeleteLydia,
DeleteActually that seems *implausible* on its face to me... and I would think there are many more who agree with that since natural evils are usually a big talking point in the problem of evil, right?
Go with Steve's scenario: suppose a snake found its way into a mailbox and bit a 10 year old boy, killing him. The snake was ordained to do this by God. If the agent who caused the snake to be in the mailbox was anyone other than God wouldn't it be pretty obvious that said agent is responsible for the boy's death? So why not with God?
Steve, thank you for this post. As you said, the point of this post is to respond to free will theism on its own terms. But my question is more related with determinism in Calvinism. I've heard from Reformed philosophers that God does not determine evil the same way He determines good, and that includes both moral and natural evils. Could you explain this asymmetry? How does God determine evil?
ReplyDeleteIn election, human merit is not a consideration. In reprobation, human demerit is a necessary condition for punishment, since God only punishes the guilt. But it's not a sufficient condition, for otherwise, God would punish everyone.
DeleteI disagree! Yes, human demerit is an entirely sufficient condition for punishment. The wages of sin is death.
DeleteAnother brainless, knee-jerk comment from Jeff.
DeleteIf human demerit was a sufficient condition for reprobation, then every human would be damned.
...*but* the free gift of God is eternal life in Christ Jesus our Lord.
DeleteName one additional biblical condition for reprobation. There aren't any. If a human had a human demerit, that is condition enough for reprobation. There are no other requirements.
The free gift of eternal life is given to such humans who have all the sufficient conditions for reprobation. It is what the Bible says.
"How does God determine evil?"
Deletei) In one sense, God determines evil via predestination. God has a plan. Everything happens according to plan.
ii) In another sense, God determines evil through providence. That's how the plan is implemented. Usually through second causes.
iii) In another sense, God determines evil the way a novelist or cinematographer or video gamer creates an villain or an evil event. It begins with a scenario in the creator's mind. He then creates a situation that matches his idea. He instantiates his idea, objectifies his idea.
Along the same line of thinking divine omniscience is a perennial burr under the saddle of the freewill theist.
ReplyDeleteI think this is probably why Open Theism was invented. For example, if God knew from eternity that Person A would put a venomous snake in Person B's mailbox with the intent to kill, and that Person B's 10 year old son would instead reach his hand inside the box to check the mail, and be bitten, and die, why did God create Person A in the first place? Why didn't He act to thwart Person A's nefarious plot?
The freewill theist doesn’t get a free pass for these considerations. So the Open Theist responds with divine ignorance. As if *that's* comforting...
It's evident that you don't have a clue what a sufficient condition means, and you're too lazy to look it up. You're oblivious to the logic of the argument. For that matter, I doubt you know what reprobation means.
ReplyDeleteAnd, no, that's not what the Bible says. The Bible doesn't use the terminology of sufficient condition. That's philosophical usage.
I am not oblivious to the logic of your argument. I see what you are doing. You are logicing up clever sounding arguments to cover perceived gaps in the Biblical logic of salvation and damnation. I'm Lutheran. If someone goes to Hell it is all their fault. If someone goes to heaven it is all Jesus' doing.
ReplyDeleteYou didn't answer my question. If human demerit is not a sufficient condition for reprobation, what other condition must a human possess, biblical or otherwise?
Jeff,
DeleteDemerit is a necessary but insufficient condition for reprobation. Only sinners go to hell. Yet not every sinner goes to hell. Hence, that's not a sufficient condition.
If you wish to maintain the privilege of commenting on this blog, you better stop acting like an intellectual deadbeat. You have the screwy notion that you don't need to master essential concepts. You can just go by the seat-of-your-pants. If you continue to leave willfully uniformed comments, you will be banned.
"If you continue to leave willfully uniformed comments, you will be banned."
DeleteYou have more patience then me on that :-D
Demerit is a necessary but insufficient condition for reprobation. Only sinners go to hell. Yet not every sinner goes to hell. Hence, that's not a sufficient condition.
DeleteI understand. I understood the first time you said it. It is very logical. A+ for logic. I just asked a follow up question, which you didn't answer.
"Jeff D2/09/2016 6:00 PM☍
DeleteI disagree! Yes, human demerit is an entirely sufficient condition for punishment. The wages of sin is death.
Jeff, you clearly don't understand, because you affirm that it's a sufficient condition while you deny what that entails.
Delete"...while you deny what that entails."
DeleteI did not so deny! Leastways I didn't mean to. Where do you think I did? Let's clear up that misunderstanding.
Q: Which person who has had his transgressions removed as far as the east is from the west meets the sufficient condition for punishment which is so defined as human demerit?
A: Not one.
If his transgressions are forgiven, then demerit was an insufficient condition for reprobation damnation.
DeleteEither you're too lazy to look up the definition of terms, or you fail to grasp their implications.
Suppose you live in a country where owing $1000 is enough to get you thrown into debtors' prison. There is a jailer whose job it is to double check the people coming in to see if they belong there. So as you are entering the jail, he checks to see if you owe at least $1000. That's all he has to check. He doesn't have to check anything else. Owing $1000 is a sufficient condition for being thrown into debtors' prison. If you owe $1000, you get escorted to a cozy cell.
ReplyDeleteSuppose before you get to the door, someone pays your debt for you. Once you get to the door, the jailer checks and finds out that you don't owe any money. You don't meet the sufficient conditions for being thrown into debtors' prison and he lets you go.
Jeff D
DeleteFor one thing, metaphors have their limitations.
For another, one can come up with a different metaphor to support a different conclusion.
Anyway, in your example, if someone paid your debt, then your debt wasn't enough to keep you in prison. Your indebtedness was an insufficient condition to imprison you.
But according to your analogy, Jeff, that means demerit is not a sufficient condition for reprobation. So you've now reversed yourself.
DeleteJeff D., honestly you've come across as arrogantly ignorant and impervious to patient repeated correction throughout this exchange.
DeleteYou've not demonstrated that you're honoring God with your mind. That's not a virtue, it's a vice.
rockingwithhawking
ReplyDeleteAnyway, in your example, if someone paid your debt, then your debt wasn't enough to keep you in prison. Your indebtedness was an insufficient condition to imprison you.
This made absolutely no sense to me. Clearly in my story debt was enough to put people who owe money in debtors' prison. You laid down "my debt wasn't enough to keep me in prison" like a trump card, puzzlingly right after playing "if someone paid your debt." The significance of that appears to be blindingly obvious to you, but I have serious trouble following along. My debt, which was paid, leaving me with no money owed, was not enough to keep me in debtors' prison. Which means that indebtedness was an insufficient condition to imprison me (who owes no money). Therefore... owing money is not a sufficient condition for imprisoning debtors?
I am trying to think it through, but I am not nearly there. I think our worldviews must be poles apart. To let you know what I am honestly thinking, I imagine you are coming from the perspective of a strangely flat and static Calvinistic universe which leads you to conclusions that are hopelessly foreign to me.
Ditto for your reply, steve.
CR
Jeff D., honestly you've come across as arrogantly ignorant and impervious to patient repeated correction throughout this exchange.
Thank you for your honesty. That would certainly explain some of the replies I have gotten. Arrogantly ignorant is not what I am going for. In my mind I try to keep my combox authorship intelligent, concise, brief, and ever so slightly entertaining. The reasons are to avoid confusion and avoid boring people.
If I may say in closing, “And you, who were dead in your trespasses and the uncircumcision of your flesh, God made alive together with him, having forgiven us all our trespasses, by canceling the record of debt that stood against us with its legal demands. This he set aside, nailing it to the cross.” Colossians 2:13–14
Jeff D
Delete"This made absolutely no sense to me. Clearly in my story debt was enough to put people who owe money in debtors' prison. You laid down 'my debt wasn't enough to keep me in prison' like a trump card, puzzlingly right after playing 'if someone paid your debt.' The significance of that appears to be blindingly obvious to you, but I have serious trouble following along. My debt, which was paid, leaving me with no money owed, was not enough to keep me in debtors' prison. Which means that indebtedness was an insufficient condition to imprison me (who owes no money). Therefore... owing money is not a sufficient condition for imprisoning debtors?
You're so passive-aggressive. On the one hand, you act like you honestly don't understand and honestly want to understand. But on the other hand, you make borderline antagonistic remarks which overinterpret what's been said, as if you were somehow privy to our thoughts or motives (e.g. "You laid down...like a trump card," "blindingly obvious to you"). Again, you're passive-aggressive.
"I am trying to think it through, but I am not nearly there. I think our worldviews must be poles apart. To let you know what I am honestly thinking, I imagine you are coming from the perspective of a strangely flat and static Calvinistic universe which leads you to conclusions that are hopelessly foreign to me."
The fact that you say "I imagine you are coming from the perspective of a strangely flat and static Calvinistic universe" is closer to insult or dismissal than attempting to understand. If this is you "honestly thinking," then I'd hate to see what it's like when you're not "honestly thinking"!
"I am trying to think it through, but I am not nearly there. I think our worldviews must be poles apart. To let you know what I am honestly thinking, I imagine you are coming from the perspective of a strangely flat and static Calvinistic universe which leads you to conclusions that are hopelessly foreign to me. Ditto for your reply, steve."
DeleteThis has absolutely nothing to do with worldviews or theology. Rather, it's about concepts. The concept of a necessary condition and what that entails.
You've given no evidence that you even bothered to look it up. Instead, you just bluff your way through these debates.
Here's a definition: "A sufficient condition for some state of affairs S is a condition that, if satisfied, guarantees that S obtains."
According to that definition, if guilt is a sufficient condition for reprobation, then anyone and everyone who is guilty is a reprobate. And since everybody is a sinner, it follows that everybody is hellbound–assuming guilt (or demerit) is a sufficient condition for reprobation/damnation.
The question at issue isn't whether you agree with the concept. Rather, that's what the concept means and implies.
This is your last chance.
"“And you, who were dead in your trespasses and the uncircumcision of your flesh, God made alive together with him, having forgiven us all our trespasses, by canceling the record of debt that stood against us with its legal demands. This he set aside, nailing it to the cross.”Colossians 2:13–14"
DeleteAmen to this glorious truth, a truth that clearly proves that guilt/sin is not a sufficient condition for reprobation.
Thank you for making the case so strongly.
A sufficient condition for some state of affairs S is a condition that, if satisfied, guarantees that S obtains.
DeleteOK. Last chance. No bravado. S=guilt. Through Jesus blood, S is blotted out perfectly thoroughly from all time and space such that no trace of S exists anywhere or anywhen. The elect do not meet said conditions.
You constantly miss the point. The question isn't theology, but concepts. If you say, as you did, that human demerit is a "sufficient condition" of reprobation, then that necessarily entails the damnation of the sinner. Appealing to the blood of Jesus is irrelevant, since the question at issue is what a concept entails. It's a logical relation. The only way around this is to deny that demerit is a sufficient condition of reprobation.
DeleteIf you say, as you did, that human demerit is a "sufficient condition" of reprobation, then that necessarily entails the damnation of the sinner.
ReplyDeleteI know. You have been insisting that I am not aware of this, which has been frustrating, but I know.
The next thing someone might say to me is, "does that mean you do not consider yourself a sinner?" I would say I am Sumul Justus et Peccator. And link to a very good explanation from R. C. Sproul.
ReplyDeleteYou say you understand, then you say that even if that condition is met, it doesn't entail the reprobation/damnation of a sinner because God might forgive him. But that disregards what it means for something to be a necessary condition, and what follows if that condition is met.
DeleteThis is about consistency and concepts. For instance, you can't say the blood of Christ might protect Superman from Kryptonite. That's because the concept of Superman requires vulnerability to Kryptonite.
Notice that this isn't a question of whether the concept is true. In this example, we're dealing with a fictional character.