John Howard Yoder was a well-known Anabaptist theologian and ethicist. In his little book When War Is Unjust (Augsburg 1984), he makes an indirect case for pacifism. He tries, by process of elimination, to establish pacifism by unhorsing its leading contender, the just-war doctrine.
And he goes about this by contending that no one really believe in just-war theory in actual practice. What makes a just war just is the satisfaction of just-war criteria. But he says that, in real world situations, the field commander or just-war theorist finds it necessary to fudge in various ways, and define downward the just-war criteria, with no principled least-lower threshold.
The one compelling objection to pacifism is that pacifism is unrealistic. Yoder’s counterargument is that just-war theory is unrealistic as well, so in that primary respect, just-war theory enjoys no advantage over pacifism.
This is an interesting argument, but the obvious counterargument is that pacifism is not the only alternative, that if just-war theory is unrealistic, then we can move in the direction, not of pacifism, but of a toughened-up version of just-war theory.
Yet Yoder will counter that when you try to introduce more flexibility into just-war criteria, you end up with no clear criteria whatsoever; instead, you’re left with a sliding scale in which you do whatever the enemy does, to win at any cost, by any means.
The heart of his book is chapter 5. Although few believers will be won over to pacifism, it is useful to test and refine our position against a critic like Yoder. He helps to keep us intellectually honest, from slipping into special-pleading, slack reasoning and a moral freefall.
Yoder lays out a number of examples where theory and praxis loosens up just-war criteria:
1. Combatant/noncombatant.
He notes that this distinction breaks down in guerrilla warfare. He also cites George Orwell as saying that "it is better to get the war over quickly by whatever means—once you have resolved to accept war at all—rather than let it be strung out and its total destructiveness increased by placing artificial limits on your most effective weapons. When the enemy's troops are draftees, they may well be no less morally 'innocent' than the aged. What should a war be better which kills only healthy young men" (58).
To add an illustration of my own, Paul Linebarger, although a Cold Warrior, was opposed to the Viet Nam war on the grounds that little wars don't change very much. What he seems to mean is that only a big enough war to shift the geostrategic balance for the better justifies all the inevitable mayhem.
These are good questions, well worth weighing. But how do they constitute an argument for pacifism? True, they're inconsistent with classic just-war theory, but let us not fall into the semantic trap of supposing that a war is only "just" if it coincides with "just-war" criteria. Many words have both general and special senses. The fact that we use the word "just" to designation a particular theory of warfare does not, of itself, render any deviation from that model morally unjust.
Perhaps, though, Yoder would say that a war cannot be just unless it can draw some distinction between the innocent and the guilty, and that once we make allowance for guerrilla warfare or Orwellian efficiency, that distinction is obliterated.
But this does not necessarily follow. To begin with, what about the distinction between the subject and the object of guerilla warfare? The subject (a guerilla warrior) is capable of distinguishing between strategic and nonstrategic targets. That is both a principled and practical distinction.
As to the object, this does indeed make it more difficult to draw such a distinction, but whose responsibility is that? If the enemy makes it practically impossible to distinguish between strategic and nonstrategic targets, then how is he entitled to benefit from that distinction? He has only himself to blame.
As to Orwell's point, this draws a distinction between indiscriminate killing to save more lives in the long run. That is both a principled and practical distinction. And it can still be limited to strategic objectives.
To absolutize the immunity of noncombatants and then hold that against the principle of national self-defense misses a much deeper point. It is in the very nature of evil that evil entails a certain amount of innocent suffering. We call this gratuitous evil. And evil imposes tragic choices on good men.
The pacifist tradition is naturally aghast at the atrocities of war, and at the rather ruthless expedients that both sides resort to in order to win. If the compelling argument against pacifism is its lack of realism, the compelling argument for pacifism is the slaughter of the innocents.
But this argument, while having great emotional power, really misses the point. For pacifism offers no practical alternative.
The whole world is not going to lay down its arms. If one side surrenders, that does not prevent the invading army from committing rape, murder, and torture. Indeed, without fear of retaliation, that may embolden the conquerors to commit atrocities with impunity, for no one is prepared to fight back, either now or in the future.
2. Proportionality.
Yoder's objection is that this criterion can be lowered from any means necessary to any means useful, "giving oneself carte blanche for any destruction that is not purely wanton or wasteful" (59).
Again, this may or may not be a step back from classic just-war criteria, but how is that an argument for pacifism?
The problem here is that the criterion of proportionality fails to distinguish between retribution and deterrence. As a principle of justice, retribution should be roughly proportionate to the provocation. But a commander may employ disproportionate force, not as a punitive measure, but as a way of disarming and disabling the enemy from future aggression. Retribution limits retaliation, but it is not a tactical or strategic principle.
Again, if the question at issue is whether it is ever moral to wage war, then distinctions that deviate from the traditional paradigm do not necessarily invalidate the possibility of a just war. They must be judged on their own merits.
3. Provoked/unprovoked warfare.
Here, Yoder addresses the view that if one side breaks the rules of warfare, then that releases the other side from abiding by the rules. This, he says, reflects social-contract theory. As he goes on to summarize the position,
"What those conventions forbid is not wrong morally and intrinsically, it is wrong conventionally between two parties who, in the interest of both, have agreed to fight by those rules. If, however, the other side breaks the rules, the deal is off and we are no longer bound to them either…While we still claim to be more moral than they, we descend to fight by their rules" (59--60).
But it is hard to see how the way he ends his analysis is justified by the way he begins it. The point is not that we are free to do to them whatever they do to us, as long as they did it first.
The point, rather, as he himself states it, is that certain agreements are entered into for the benefit of both parties, and if one party is in breech, then that voids the original rationale. There is nothing inherently wrong with changing your policy in light of changing circumstances, especially if the other side has violated the letter and spirit of the original understanding.
In addition, it is hard to see how the Geneva conventions and other modern treaties have any bearing on classic just-war theory, which is an artifact of medieval moral theology.
But there's a deeper issue as well. The party to make the first move has the most options, for by making the first move, it is free to choose from all of the available options. And by exercising its option, it takes that option out of play for the second party.
When one nation wages an unprovoked war against another, it may leave the innocent party with few, if any, good options. The innocent party no longer has the luxury of either doing nothing or doing good. Rather, it must now play the hand it's been dealt. If it's been dealt a bad hand, it must make the best of a bad situation. The damage has already been done, and now it's a question of damage-control.
Unprovoked aggression, or the credible threat thereof, makes good men to do things in self-defense that they would not normally do, things that the abhor having to do. This was forced upon them by the impending threat or actual aggression. They were painted into a corner not of their own choosing. Hence, their preemptive or counter-offensive measures are forced rather than free options.
4. Demonizing the enemy.
As Yoder summarizes this position,
"Michael Walzer was ready to admit a 'supreme' emergency argument in favor of the massive bombing of German cities, because a Nazi victory—more than most losses in war—would have meant the end of certain basic values of Western civilization…for it to be convincing one must have made some previous global judgments about Nazism and civilization.
Once more we can discern here a shift from intrinsic morality to contractual thinking. We are not obligated to respect the humanity of the enemy population because they are human, but only because they have committed themselves to carry on the combat according to our rules. If their rulers deny our basic value system, then the enemies forfeit the privilege of our respect. It is a…conditional right which they earned by meeting us on our terrain…'Savages' and 'outlaws' have no rights" (61-62).
But this is a very tendentious and not especially coherent summary and judgment. It is true, of course, that Walzer's position is predicated upon a particular value-system, but, in the nature of the case, that is true of any value-judgment, including Yoder's.
And it is a little hard to see how Yoder can lodge this criticism and at the same time suppose that we should honor the value-system of the enemy, for this—of itself—presupposes a global standard of human rights, under which both the Axis and Allied powers are subsumed.
Beyond that, Yoder then indulges in caricature. Warfare does not assume that you must dehumanize the enemy. To the contrary, it may just as well assume that because the enemy is human, he is morally responsible for his own actions.
And surely, too, there is a valid distinction to be drawn between human rights and civil rights, between what is—on the one hand—universal and inalienable, and what is—on the other hand—contingent on being a responsible member of society.
Why, indeed, should outlaws be entitled to due process when they don't believe in the rule of law, and play the system to destroy the system, invoking their rights to deny the same rights to others?
5. Situational ethics.
Under this heading, Yoder discusses what he is pleased to brand an anti-intellectual appeal to common sense realism. As he puts it:
"'In a combat situation there is no time for complicated calculation of possibilities'; or, 'When the lives of my men are at stake, philosophy is not very convincing.'
The normal penchant of the human heart for such excuses is precisely why we need rules. Precisely because there is not much time, decision-makers need reminders of the fundamental rights of the other parties in the conflict, which remain even in the midst of unavoidable conflict. Precisely because abstract analysis is not appropriate or easy under fire, the limits of our entitlement to destroy our fellows' lives and property need to be formulated firmly ahead of time so as to be our (partially, but not infinitely) justified self-interest (62).
Although this is true in the abstract, it leaves the particulars dangling in thin air. Is it merely an "excuse" that a field commander feels responsible for the lives of the men under his charge? And in drawing the rules, where does the line fall in relation to his pressing concern?
Yoder doesn't answer his own question, although the answer is implicit in his Anabaptist theology. But for the average reader, who is not a doctrinaire pacifist, I suspect his sympathies will lie with the field commander rather than the enemy.
This also illustrates the selective compassion of the pacifist. The pacifist accuses the militarist of blurring the distinction between guilt and innocence. But the pacifist erases the distinction altogether by treating both sides as equally innocent or guilty, as the case may be. Yet the essence is justice is in the distinction between innocence and guilt, and if that cannot always be honored in practice.
Indeed, it is precisely this haughty disdain that justifies the impatience of the field commander. How is a commander supposed to do his job under Yoder's strictures. The answer is that he's not supposed to do his job at all.
But that does nothing to advance Yolder's own position. You cannot draw the rules of war so restrictively that it is impossible for a commander to win.
If you try to, the result will not be to limit the carnage, but to invite utter total war, for a commander will greet Yoder's strictures with well-earned contempt. It will, at most, convince a commander that since there is no common ground between realism and idealism, the only difference between right and wrong is winning and losing. The result is not greater restraint, but the lifting of all restraints whatsoever.
6. The double-effect.
Yoder's chief objection to this principle is that it can become very attenuated and subject to cynical abuse. This is no doubt true, but what of it?
It may well be better, instead of playing semantic games about never intending to target civilian populations, to instead explain the special circumstances under which the targeting of civilian populations is a necessary evil.
7. Nuclear pacifism.
Yoder introduces what was, during the Cold War, a popular argument for unilateral disarmament on the grounds that mutually assured destruction represents a limiting case and reductio ad absurdum of just-war doctrine.
There is, indeed, a certain hypothetical appeal to this objection, but—as always— pacifism can never prevent the circumstances which give rise to this conundrum, or offer a practical alternative. The perennial problem with pacifism is that it only works if you happen to be a pacifist. Pacifism has never pacified a militarist. So it's just a paper theory.
Yes, no one's interest is served if the entire world is blown up, if the only way to defend the human race is to destroy it. Although the logic is impeccable, it does nothing to either forestall or relieve the dilemma.
To begin with, once the technological know-how exists, there is no way of turning back the clock. Even unilateral disarmament would not prevent some madman from pushing the little red button.
So the only deterrent is a very daring and dangerous game of chicken, the hoped-for assumption being that neither side is crazy enough to call the other side's bluff.
Taken to a logical extreme, we are often confronted with moral quandaries and conflicting intuitions. And, frankly, it is only divine providence that can save us from these dead-end scenarios.
8. Unconditional surrender.
Yoder asks the reader if there is "any point at which it would be morally obligatory to surrender rather than to wrongly prosecute a war"? (64). Put that way, the answer is obviously in the affirmative. Indeed, surrender is often a practical necessity, for in every war there are winners and losers, regardless of who was in the wrong.
And yet it turns out to be a trick question, for Yoder immediately talks about the "defense of one's valid interests" through nonviolent means (65). But if these are valid claims and grievances, then what defines the war as unjust?
Of course, it is possible to have valid claims and grievances that do not justify killing or wholesale war. But, being a pacifist, Yoder doesn't bother to sift through these distinctions. Yet since his book is designed to persuade the reader, it is unconvincing for him to leave the questions he raises unanswered, for the average reader—not being a doctrinaire pacifist—may well find answers within the just-war tradition, or some suitable modification thereof.
Yoder also says that "if the only way not to lose a war is to commit a war crime, it is morally right to lose that war" (67). But this is a deception stipulation, for, from the perspective of a pacifist, every act of war and counteroffensive is a war crime.
And there are other moral and practical ambiguities in his imperative. There is, for example, the question of the common good. In most every war you have some atrocities on both sides. Should an entire—otherwise innocent—populace, suffer surrender just because a few of its soldiers committed a war crime? And what if surrender would entail atrocities committed by the invading army and occupying force?
Again, who is surrendering? To whom is he surrendering? And for whom is he surrendering? Are we talking about a foot-soldier? A field commander? A head-of-state? Certain very specific conditions must be in place for a unilateral and unconditional surrender even to be a live option. What mechanism does pacifism propose to supply and satisfy those conditions?
Yoder also says that just-war doctrine can never justify genocide, since this would flagrantly violate the principle of proportionality (67). But even on its own terms, that is not obviously the case. In a war of national survival, where one side is threatening to ethnically cleanse another, a genocidal counteroffensive would be consistent with the principle of proportionality.
And let us note that this was a feature of OT holy war, when God commanded the judicial execution of the Canaanites. Many Christians don't like to talk about this, but the Bible does have a theology of war, and in weighing the strengths and weaknesses of just-war doctrine, as well as pacifism, this cannot be left out of account.
One popular move is to demote OT holy war to an aspect of the ceremonial law. Israel was a type of the holy.
And that is true as far as it goes. But the relation of OT holy war to the moral law cannot be so easily decoupled. Either it was just or unjust of God to command the execution of the Canaanites. Typology alone would not justify this injunction unless it were warranted in the moral law—unless, that is, the Canaanites were indeed guilty and deserving of all such punishment.
And there is more than typology in play. It was necessary for the survival of the remnant. Peaceful coexistence between the godly and ungodly, while tenable in the short-term, degenerates over the long haul—for the ungodly gain the upper hand and seek to extirpate the elect. That is why God brought the flood. That is why God rained down fire and brimstone on Sodom and Gomorrah.
My immediate point is not to make a case for the continuity of holy war. For now, it is sufficient to argue from the greater to the lesser. If the greater was justified in the eyes of God, then surely the lesser.
9. Obsolete criteria.
Yoder contends that certain modern-day developments, such as national sovereignty and theologies of revolution, have rendered some of the traditional just-war criteria obsolete. If tyrannicide is ever justified, then that moots the criterion of just authority. Again, the rise of nation-states assigns just cause to national self-interest, in competition with rival states.
Yoder may be right about this, but how is that relevant? On the one hand, any just-war theory has to adapt to the political configurations of the day, since that supplies the concrete context in which wars are fought. But that no more invalidates just-war theory than advances in medical science will invalidate bioethics.
On the other hand, one could also argue that the traditional criteria were right all along, and we should therefore employ these criteria to correct certain modern aberrations. Perhaps national sovereignty should give way to international law. Perhaps tyrannicide should give way to a transnational court.
It is not my aim to argue any of these points. I myself am not a globalist. Rather, the burden is on Yoder to show why such strategies are not available to the just-war theorist.
10. Pluralism.
Yoder raises the question of whether, in a pluralistic society, it is possible to arrive at a democratic consensus regarding the application of just-war criteria.
This is a fair question, but one could pose the same question of pacifism. So the objection either proves too much or too little.
Monday, June 07, 2004
Saturday, June 05, 2004
Child sacrifice
A resolution was recently introduced at the SBC urging Christian parents to withdraw their children from the public schools.
What is of interest is the hostile reaction that this is provoking from some putatively conservative Christian quarters. So far I’ve tallied the following objections:
1. It runs counter to the Baptist belief in freedom of conscience.
2. It is divisive.
3. It will be ineffectual, like the Disney boycott.
4. Fundamentalists are busybodies.
5. It is hypocritical. We need to put our own house in order.
6. Public schools are only symptomatic of the problem, not its source.
7. It would dilute our public witness.
Let us weigh the worth of these objections.
1.
i) This sidesteps the question of the child’s welfare in the interest of some abstract principle of freedom. But what is more important—to be a good Baptist, or to be a good parent?
ii) Since the resolution, even if it were to pass, would be a nonbinding resolution, it is hard to see how this infringes on individual conscience.
If a conscientious objection such a hothouse flower that it will wilt under a little heat, then it lacks much moral or intellectual substance.
2. Taking a stand on anything is divisive. Not to take a stand is also divisive. So the only relevant question is whether a given issue is important enough to risk division over. Surely the moral formation of our youth ought to be a high priority.
3.
i) It is hard to see how the same stand can be both divisive and ineffectual. It can only be divisive if it enjoys some measure of popular support, in which case it should enjoy some measure of popular success.
Of course, everyone will not go along with it, but since when is unanimity a condition of moral action?
The pertinent question is whether it would do more good than hard.
ii) The objection is circular. I won’t take a stand since taking a stand is ineffectual. I won’t make a move until you make the first move. Obviously, though, its degree of success is in direct proportion to the number of those who act on it.
iii) In any event, this objection is another red-herring. Parents are primarily responsible for what they do with their own kids, and not what other parents do.
4. Even if true, this ad hominem attack is not germane to the issue.
5. The fact that the SBC has a problematic attendance record and retention rate is hardly an argument against the resolution. If anything, this is designed to counter complacency and get parents more involved.
6.
i) This is a half-truth. Public schools are both a source and symptom of the problem. The NEA is well to the left of the general culture, and is trying to recruit the next generation.
ii) This is an all-or-nothing argument. But you do what you can. You don’t do nothing because you can’t do everything. And the only way of doing the most you can is to attack the problem on several fronts at once or over time.
7.
i) Even if this were so, it is not the duty of a child to be an evangelist—any more than to be a boy soldier. In the nature of the case, a child is imitative and impressionable. You corrupt a child by putting him in a corrupt environment.
There are, of course, exceptions, depending on the child’s maturity and strength of character. But this is not a general argument for placing Christian children in the public school system. Rather, the reverse. Make no mistake, this is spiritual warfare, and the battlefield is no place of kids.
ii) The best method of child-to-child evangelism is to raise Christian children, and then let them freely relate with the other kids in the neighborhood. Tossing your kids in a snake pit is a way of losing your own kids rather than saving any others. The way to save a snake-bit victim is not to for me to get bitten as well, but for me to stay healthy so that I can suck the poison from his wound.
What is of interest is the hostile reaction that this is provoking from some putatively conservative Christian quarters. So far I’ve tallied the following objections:
1. It runs counter to the Baptist belief in freedom of conscience.
2. It is divisive.
3. It will be ineffectual, like the Disney boycott.
4. Fundamentalists are busybodies.
5. It is hypocritical. We need to put our own house in order.
6. Public schools are only symptomatic of the problem, not its source.
7. It would dilute our public witness.
Let us weigh the worth of these objections.
1.
i) This sidesteps the question of the child’s welfare in the interest of some abstract principle of freedom. But what is more important—to be a good Baptist, or to be a good parent?
ii) Since the resolution, even if it were to pass, would be a nonbinding resolution, it is hard to see how this infringes on individual conscience.
If a conscientious objection such a hothouse flower that it will wilt under a little heat, then it lacks much moral or intellectual substance.
2. Taking a stand on anything is divisive. Not to take a stand is also divisive. So the only relevant question is whether a given issue is important enough to risk division over. Surely the moral formation of our youth ought to be a high priority.
3.
i) It is hard to see how the same stand can be both divisive and ineffectual. It can only be divisive if it enjoys some measure of popular support, in which case it should enjoy some measure of popular success.
Of course, everyone will not go along with it, but since when is unanimity a condition of moral action?
The pertinent question is whether it would do more good than hard.
ii) The objection is circular. I won’t take a stand since taking a stand is ineffectual. I won’t make a move until you make the first move. Obviously, though, its degree of success is in direct proportion to the number of those who act on it.
iii) In any event, this objection is another red-herring. Parents are primarily responsible for what they do with their own kids, and not what other parents do.
4. Even if true, this ad hominem attack is not germane to the issue.
5. The fact that the SBC has a problematic attendance record and retention rate is hardly an argument against the resolution. If anything, this is designed to counter complacency and get parents more involved.
6.
i) This is a half-truth. Public schools are both a source and symptom of the problem. The NEA is well to the left of the general culture, and is trying to recruit the next generation.
ii) This is an all-or-nothing argument. But you do what you can. You don’t do nothing because you can’t do everything. And the only way of doing the most you can is to attack the problem on several fronts at once or over time.
7.
i) Even if this were so, it is not the duty of a child to be an evangelist—any more than to be a boy soldier. In the nature of the case, a child is imitative and impressionable. You corrupt a child by putting him in a corrupt environment.
There are, of course, exceptions, depending on the child’s maturity and strength of character. But this is not a general argument for placing Christian children in the public school system. Rather, the reverse. Make no mistake, this is spiritual warfare, and the battlefield is no place of kids.
ii) The best method of child-to-child evangelism is to raise Christian children, and then let them freely relate with the other kids in the neighborhood. Tossing your kids in a snake pit is a way of losing your own kids rather than saving any others. The way to save a snake-bit victim is not to for me to get bitten as well, but for me to stay healthy so that I can suck the poison from his wound.
License to kill
What, exactly, are the best arguments for abortion, and how should a Christian respond? Jonah Engle has gleaned seven "talking points" for "freedom of choice," from NARAL, Planned Parenthood, the ACLU, and the National Abortion Federation.
Cf. http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20030519&s=engle
Let's run through each of these and evaluate them one-by-one. For ease of reference, her numbered points will be put in quotation marks.
"1) Reproductive Freedoms Are a Fundamental Human Right
It is a fundamental right of each individual to manage his or her fertility. Such reproductive rights are an integral part of women's social, economic and political rights, and have been affirmed in numerous international treaties and conventions including CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women) and the Program of Action of the United Nations International Conference on Population and Development."
i) Note here, and throughout her talking-points, the studied use of abstract nouns and generic designations. "Woman." "Abortion." "Procedure." But abortion is a "procedure" applied to "pregnant" women. A pregnant woman is a mother. So why not discuss abortion in relation to motherhood? Wouldn't that be more accurate? And an expression like "prenatal infanticide" would be more transparent and accurate than an opaque term like "abortion" or an antiseptic term like "procedure."
But, of course, the reason for the choice of such words is—on the one hand—to dehumanize the object of abortion (the baby), while—on the other hand—to distance the subject of abortion (the mother, abortionist) from moral complicity. Clear communication would weaken rather than strengthen the argument for abortion, so Engle resorts to vague euphemisms.
"Mother" is a very loaded word. Motherhood implies a relationship in a way that "womanhood" does not. What is more, motherhood implies a responsible relationship. Consider the difference between saying that "a woman has a right to an abortion" and "a mother has a right to kill her own child"? Obviously it's easier to sell the first formulation than the second. Yet the second is formulation is what we're really talking about.
ii) Note, also, the euphemism of "reproductive rights." Are prolifers denying women the right to reproduce? If Engle believes in abortion, why is she afraid to say what she means?
iii) To say that abortion is a fundamental human right begs the whole question. This is a tendentious assertion rather than a reasoned argument.
iv) But, assuming, for the sake of argument, that abortion is a human right, then why appeal to international law? A political entity cannot confer a human right, but only a civil right. So either abortion is a human right, in which case international law is irrelevant; or else abortion is a civil right, in which case it is not a human right, and is revocable by the same political process that conferred it in the first place.
v) The appeal to international law is viciously circular. To the extent that abortion is a civil right under international law, that is only because the abortion industry has lobbied to make it so.
vi) We might add that the whole notion of having rights is, itself, a cultural construct of the Enlightenment. So how, then, can this framework achieve the force of a universal norm? Why does Engle canonize the ethical scheme of dead white European males?
vii) Why the abrupt introduction of the male pronoun into the discussion—"his or her fertility." I thought we were talking about abortion. Do men have abortions?
"2) The Denial of Safe, Legal and Affordable Abortions Threatens Women's Health
In rare cases, carrying a pregnancy to term can pose a serious health risk to a pregnant woman. Whether or not abortion is safe, legal or affordable, women still have recourse to it. When abortion is illegal they are forced into having underground and often unsafe operations. This greatly compromises the health and well-being of pregnant women. Each year at least 78,000 women die around the world due to complications from unsafe abortions (13 percent of maternal deaths), and hundreds of thousands more suffer short- and long-term disability. Legalizing abortion helps prevent this tragedy--within five years of legalization, abortion-related deaths decreased 85 percent in the United States."
i) A life of crime can also pose a serious health risk. A sniper may be shot. A terrorist may blow himself up. Are we entitled to do wrong with impunity?
ii) How are mothers "forced" into abortion? The only example I know of are boyfriends who resent the prospect of paying child support. Is feminism siding with the boyfriend? Doesn't sound like women's rights to me.
iii) When I was growing up, which was not so very long ago (I was born in 1959), a defining feature of familial love and duty was that a husband would give his life to save his wife, while a mother would give her life to save her child. But now we've come to the point where the child should die to save the mother—even if the mother's life is not in danger. I would only remark that children tutored in the abortion ethic are more than likely to round out the logical by euthanizing their elderly parents. It is a very short, logical step from aborticide to parricide.
iv) Another unspoken assumption which underlies this argument is that no one should ever be called upon to do the right thing if it entails a personal hardship. But this, once again, illustrates the moral inversion of abortion ethics. For the acid test of virtue is doing the right thing when it does cost you something, when it does entail a sacrifice of your own well-being in the interests of another.
"3) Legalizing Abortion Does Not Increase its Incidence
Statistics show that women worldwide, when faced with an unwanted pregnancy, seek abortions regardless of the legality of the procedure, and whether or not safe services are available. Countries as diverse as Canada, Tunisia and Turkey liberalized their abortion laws without an increase in the abortion rate. Holland, though it has a non-restrictive abortion law and free abortions, has one of the lowest abortion rates in the world, far lower than many countries where abortion is illegal (e.g., Chile and Brazil)."
i) Statistics also show that wife-beaters worldwide, when faced with an unwanted wife, seek to batter or murder their spouse regardless of the legality of the procedure. So should we legalized uxoricide? There are, in fact, cultures in which wife-killing is socially condoned.
ii) Suppose we were to substitute "unwanted blacks" or "unwanted Jews" for "unwanted pregnancies." Is the value of my life contingent on the valuation of a second-party? Many genocidal tyrants would appreciate Engle's ethical calculus.
"4) Medical Abortion Is a Very Safe Procedure, Especially in the First Trimester (When 88 Percent of Abortions Take Place)
The health risks from an abortion are minimal.
- Less than 1 percent of women experience a major complication.
- The risk of death associated with childbirth is eleven times greater than the risk of death from an abortion."
i) The abortionist is hardly a disinterested source of information. Malpractice suits are bad for business.
ii) In fact, Planned Parenthood and other abortuaries hide behind privacy laws.
iii) Assuming for the sake of argument that the stats are true, so what? Is murder supposed to be safe?
iv) Were it not for childbirth, there would be no abortionists. The radical feminist comes into the world the same way as the prolifer. The only difference is that the prolifer is grateful for the process whereas the abortionist wants to slam the door on those who come after.
v) Statistics show that 100% of everyone born will die one day. Pretty high risk! Should we outlaw childbirth?
"5) When Women Are Not Free to Choose, Children Risk Coming into the World With Parents Who Are Not in a Position to Properly Look After Them"
i) "Free to choose"? Another euphemism. Isn't "to choose" the sort of verb that ordinarily takes a direct object? You'd think we were talking about a woman's right to choose a dress or order an entrée.
ii) Except for victims of rape and incest, most pregnant women have already made a choice. They chose to engage in procreation. That is what sex is. "Sex" is short for sexual reproduction. Pregnancy is the natural outcome of sexual intercourse.
iii) Either Engle believes that women are moral agents, in which case they're responsible for the consequences of their life-style choices; or else she believes that they are like little children who must be placed under the authority of a guardian. If the latter, they don't have the right to make their own decisions, for they are in a condition of diminished responsibility; if the former, then they don't have the right to demand that government protect them from the consequences of their life-style choices.
iv) The child is already in the world. It has been conceived. The child is in its mother's womb, and the mother is in the world. So this would not be an argument for abortion, but—at most—contraception. Abortion does more than put a child at risk—it kills him in the womb.
v) A child is not like a sales' item you can return to the store if you change your mind.
vi) If women were truly autonomous, why would they seek intimacy with members of the other sex. Why not go the lesbian route? Why are there so many unwanted pregnancies unless women need men because they're emotionally dependent on men, just as men need women for the same reason? What the argument for abortion presupposes is not autonomy, but codependency; but, of course, that's an argument against a "woman's" right to an abortion.
"6) Though Abortion Remains Legal, Restricting Access to Abortion Penalizes the Poor, Who Are Less Able to Pay for Such Operations
Despite the fact that abortion is legal in the United States, access is decreasing as numerous barriers have been set up. These include consent forms, extended waiting periods and, most notably, the Hyde Amendment, passed into law in 1977. The legislation denies federal funding for abortions (except in cases of rape, incest or when a pregnant woman's life is endangered) for poor women who rely on Medicaid, disabled women who rely on Medicare and Native American women who rely on the Indian Health Service for healthcare. In addition to these women, federal legislation denies access to abortions for Peace Corps volunteers, women in federal prison, women in the military, teenagers who participate in the State Children's Health Insurance Plan, patients of Title X family-planning clinics, residents of the District of Columbia and federal employees and their families. Only fifteen states make state Medicaid monies available for nondiscriminatory funding of abortion. Abortions in the first trimester without complications start at $250-$350, and can run into the high hundreds or thousands of dollars. Without Medicaid funding, low-income women do not have equal access to a vital and legal medical procedure. Furthermore, welfare laws discourage states from providing assistance for abortions as well as to unwed mothers, placing low-income women in a double bind."
i) A well-heeled Mafia Don can better afford to hire a hit-man than a guy flipping hamburgers for a living. Does that mean that the government should provide hit-men free of charge for those who cannot afford one?
ii) Where is the father in this equation? Doesn't a man have some contribution to make in this process? How does a pregnant woman become impregnated in the first place?
Why does feminism place all the burden on the mother? Why does feminism let the guy off the hook? To listen to Engle, you'd think that every birth was a virgin birth.
Obviously a man shares equal responsibility. But Engle can't bring herself to make that elementary point, for as soon as she concedes that a man has some input in getting a woman pregnant, then—as the father—he ought to have some input in whether to terminate the pregnancy.
But that would spoil the argument for the feminine autonomy. In order for the woman to be an autonomous agent, she must be held solely responsible; in order for her to be held solely responsible, the man must not be held responsible for his actions. This is a paradox of feminism. It "empowers" women by absolving men of any blame, for men cannot be blameworthy unless they're responsible, and they cannot be responsible unless they share responsibility with the woman they impregnate. Isn't it obvious that promiscuous men get the better of this deal?
iii) If there is a moral disparity in play, it is that children of the well-to-do are at higher risk of being murdered in the womb than the children of the poor. If we outlaw abortion, then that will level out the injustice. Abortion penalizes the innocent child.
iv) Is Engle afraid that we have too many American Indian babies? Is she advocating genocide? Would she like to keep them a permanent and infinitesimal minority? Is she disappointed that more dumpsters aren't overflowing with aborted Indian babies? Seems rather racist to me.
v) There is, of course, a financial correlation between poor mothers and unwed mothers. Once again, lifestyle choices have economic consequences. Whose responsibility is that?
vi) In what sense is abortion a "vital medical procedure." Pregnancy is not a life-threatening disease.
vii) I suppose you can call abortion a "medical procedure," just as you could call the gas chambers a medical procedure.
viii) "Teenagers"? "Parental consent"? Well, yes. Even if you believe in abortion for grown women, is Engle such a fanatic that she would insist on privacy laws which prevent the prosecution of statutory rape because it can't be reported to the authorities?
ix) Why should a school counselor or stranger at an abortion clinic—a stranger with a vested business interest—have more input on the decision than the girl's mother or father? For what other major medical "procedure" would Engel leave the decision-making up to an underage girl and her handlers, then bandage her up and dump her back on the doorstep of her own home—without ever notifying a parent of potential complications or emotional trauma? What if the abortion is botched?
It tells you a lot about the level of moral desperation when the "right" of teenage access to abortion comes at the cost of immunity to medical malpractice and statutory rape. With the teenage "right" to an abortion comes the right to be raped and butchered. Feminism is a beautiful thing, ain't it though?
x) If we have too many unwanted pregnancies in the military, that's an argument, not for abortion, but for abolishing a coed military.
xi) Engle overlooks the obvious correlation between the welfare state and a culture of poverty and dependency. But this is only too typical of left-wing social policy. When one entitlement fails, it demands yet another entitlement to prop up the first.
xii) "Complications"? Whoa! I thought Engle had just assured us, under point #4, that abortion was a very safe "procedure." Now, however, she's warning us about the medical complications. In order to make a therapeutic argument for abortion, she must play down the health risk; but in order to make a fiscal argument, she must play up the risk.
"7) The Most Effective Way to Reduce Abortions Is to Reduce Unintended Pregnancies
Western and Eastern Europe have similar abortion laws but the West has far greater access to effective contraception. They also have, respectively, the lowest and highest abortion rates in the world. The Bush Administration's decision to end contributions to the UN Population Fund, which funds family-planning projects in 142 countries, will perversely result in approximately 2 million unwanted pregnancies, 800,000 abortions, 4,700 maternal deaths and 77,000 infant and child deaths."
i) I have no objection to contraction, although some so-called contraceptives are really abortifacients in disguise (e.g. the morning-after pill).
ii) Engle is deliberately confounding abortion with contraception.
iii) Why does Engle suppose that American wage-earners, who work hard to feed and clothe their own kids, are responsible for funding birth-control measures around the world? Isn't that pretty paternalistic?
iv) Of course, the only "effective" form of contraception is abstinence. So Engle should be advocating abstinence programs instead.
v) Hasn't Engle ever heard of private charity? If feminism is really that compassionate about the plight of poor mothers around the world, why don't Engle and her coterie chip in and start their own fund for the free distribution of prophylactics? They seem to be very generous with everyone's money but their own.
vi) For that matter, if Engle and her coterie feel that tender-hearted about the plight of the poor, why don't they sell their domiciles in Malibu and Manhattan, go live with the poor, role up their sleeves, and apply their social theories about the root-causes of poverty in situ? Or would such a move put a crimp in their standard of living?
Cf. http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20030519&s=engle
Let's run through each of these and evaluate them one-by-one. For ease of reference, her numbered points will be put in quotation marks.
"1) Reproductive Freedoms Are a Fundamental Human Right
It is a fundamental right of each individual to manage his or her fertility. Such reproductive rights are an integral part of women's social, economic and political rights, and have been affirmed in numerous international treaties and conventions including CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women) and the Program of Action of the United Nations International Conference on Population and Development."
i) Note here, and throughout her talking-points, the studied use of abstract nouns and generic designations. "Woman." "Abortion." "Procedure." But abortion is a "procedure" applied to "pregnant" women. A pregnant woman is a mother. So why not discuss abortion in relation to motherhood? Wouldn't that be more accurate? And an expression like "prenatal infanticide" would be more transparent and accurate than an opaque term like "abortion" or an antiseptic term like "procedure."
But, of course, the reason for the choice of such words is—on the one hand—to dehumanize the object of abortion (the baby), while—on the other hand—to distance the subject of abortion (the mother, abortionist) from moral complicity. Clear communication would weaken rather than strengthen the argument for abortion, so Engle resorts to vague euphemisms.
"Mother" is a very loaded word. Motherhood implies a relationship in a way that "womanhood" does not. What is more, motherhood implies a responsible relationship. Consider the difference between saying that "a woman has a right to an abortion" and "a mother has a right to kill her own child"? Obviously it's easier to sell the first formulation than the second. Yet the second is formulation is what we're really talking about.
ii) Note, also, the euphemism of "reproductive rights." Are prolifers denying women the right to reproduce? If Engle believes in abortion, why is she afraid to say what she means?
iii) To say that abortion is a fundamental human right begs the whole question. This is a tendentious assertion rather than a reasoned argument.
iv) But, assuming, for the sake of argument, that abortion is a human right, then why appeal to international law? A political entity cannot confer a human right, but only a civil right. So either abortion is a human right, in which case international law is irrelevant; or else abortion is a civil right, in which case it is not a human right, and is revocable by the same political process that conferred it in the first place.
v) The appeal to international law is viciously circular. To the extent that abortion is a civil right under international law, that is only because the abortion industry has lobbied to make it so.
vi) We might add that the whole notion of having rights is, itself, a cultural construct of the Enlightenment. So how, then, can this framework achieve the force of a universal norm? Why does Engle canonize the ethical scheme of dead white European males?
vii) Why the abrupt introduction of the male pronoun into the discussion—"his or her fertility." I thought we were talking about abortion. Do men have abortions?
"2) The Denial of Safe, Legal and Affordable Abortions Threatens Women's Health
In rare cases, carrying a pregnancy to term can pose a serious health risk to a pregnant woman. Whether or not abortion is safe, legal or affordable, women still have recourse to it. When abortion is illegal they are forced into having underground and often unsafe operations. This greatly compromises the health and well-being of pregnant women. Each year at least 78,000 women die around the world due to complications from unsafe abortions (13 percent of maternal deaths), and hundreds of thousands more suffer short- and long-term disability. Legalizing abortion helps prevent this tragedy--within five years of legalization, abortion-related deaths decreased 85 percent in the United States."
i) A life of crime can also pose a serious health risk. A sniper may be shot. A terrorist may blow himself up. Are we entitled to do wrong with impunity?
ii) How are mothers "forced" into abortion? The only example I know of are boyfriends who resent the prospect of paying child support. Is feminism siding with the boyfriend? Doesn't sound like women's rights to me.
iii) When I was growing up, which was not so very long ago (I was born in 1959), a defining feature of familial love and duty was that a husband would give his life to save his wife, while a mother would give her life to save her child. But now we've come to the point where the child should die to save the mother—even if the mother's life is not in danger. I would only remark that children tutored in the abortion ethic are more than likely to round out the logical by euthanizing their elderly parents. It is a very short, logical step from aborticide to parricide.
iv) Another unspoken assumption which underlies this argument is that no one should ever be called upon to do the right thing if it entails a personal hardship. But this, once again, illustrates the moral inversion of abortion ethics. For the acid test of virtue is doing the right thing when it does cost you something, when it does entail a sacrifice of your own well-being in the interests of another.
"3) Legalizing Abortion Does Not Increase its Incidence
Statistics show that women worldwide, when faced with an unwanted pregnancy, seek abortions regardless of the legality of the procedure, and whether or not safe services are available. Countries as diverse as Canada, Tunisia and Turkey liberalized their abortion laws without an increase in the abortion rate. Holland, though it has a non-restrictive abortion law and free abortions, has one of the lowest abortion rates in the world, far lower than many countries where abortion is illegal (e.g., Chile and Brazil)."
i) Statistics also show that wife-beaters worldwide, when faced with an unwanted wife, seek to batter or murder their spouse regardless of the legality of the procedure. So should we legalized uxoricide? There are, in fact, cultures in which wife-killing is socially condoned.
ii) Suppose we were to substitute "unwanted blacks" or "unwanted Jews" for "unwanted pregnancies." Is the value of my life contingent on the valuation of a second-party? Many genocidal tyrants would appreciate Engle's ethical calculus.
"4) Medical Abortion Is a Very Safe Procedure, Especially in the First Trimester (When 88 Percent of Abortions Take Place)
The health risks from an abortion are minimal.
- Less than 1 percent of women experience a major complication.
- The risk of death associated with childbirth is eleven times greater than the risk of death from an abortion."
i) The abortionist is hardly a disinterested source of information. Malpractice suits are bad for business.
ii) In fact, Planned Parenthood and other abortuaries hide behind privacy laws.
iii) Assuming for the sake of argument that the stats are true, so what? Is murder supposed to be safe?
iv) Were it not for childbirth, there would be no abortionists. The radical feminist comes into the world the same way as the prolifer. The only difference is that the prolifer is grateful for the process whereas the abortionist wants to slam the door on those who come after.
v) Statistics show that 100% of everyone born will die one day. Pretty high risk! Should we outlaw childbirth?
"5) When Women Are Not Free to Choose, Children Risk Coming into the World With Parents Who Are Not in a Position to Properly Look After Them"
i) "Free to choose"? Another euphemism. Isn't "to choose" the sort of verb that ordinarily takes a direct object? You'd think we were talking about a woman's right to choose a dress or order an entrée.
ii) Except for victims of rape and incest, most pregnant women have already made a choice. They chose to engage in procreation. That is what sex is. "Sex" is short for sexual reproduction. Pregnancy is the natural outcome of sexual intercourse.
iii) Either Engle believes that women are moral agents, in which case they're responsible for the consequences of their life-style choices; or else she believes that they are like little children who must be placed under the authority of a guardian. If the latter, they don't have the right to make their own decisions, for they are in a condition of diminished responsibility; if the former, then they don't have the right to demand that government protect them from the consequences of their life-style choices.
iv) The child is already in the world. It has been conceived. The child is in its mother's womb, and the mother is in the world. So this would not be an argument for abortion, but—at most—contraception. Abortion does more than put a child at risk—it kills him in the womb.
v) A child is not like a sales' item you can return to the store if you change your mind.
vi) If women were truly autonomous, why would they seek intimacy with members of the other sex. Why not go the lesbian route? Why are there so many unwanted pregnancies unless women need men because they're emotionally dependent on men, just as men need women for the same reason? What the argument for abortion presupposes is not autonomy, but codependency; but, of course, that's an argument against a "woman's" right to an abortion.
"6) Though Abortion Remains Legal, Restricting Access to Abortion Penalizes the Poor, Who Are Less Able to Pay for Such Operations
Despite the fact that abortion is legal in the United States, access is decreasing as numerous barriers have been set up. These include consent forms, extended waiting periods and, most notably, the Hyde Amendment, passed into law in 1977. The legislation denies federal funding for abortions (except in cases of rape, incest or when a pregnant woman's life is endangered) for poor women who rely on Medicaid, disabled women who rely on Medicare and Native American women who rely on the Indian Health Service for healthcare. In addition to these women, federal legislation denies access to abortions for Peace Corps volunteers, women in federal prison, women in the military, teenagers who participate in the State Children's Health Insurance Plan, patients of Title X family-planning clinics, residents of the District of Columbia and federal employees and their families. Only fifteen states make state Medicaid monies available for nondiscriminatory funding of abortion. Abortions in the first trimester without complications start at $250-$350, and can run into the high hundreds or thousands of dollars. Without Medicaid funding, low-income women do not have equal access to a vital and legal medical procedure. Furthermore, welfare laws discourage states from providing assistance for abortions as well as to unwed mothers, placing low-income women in a double bind."
i) A well-heeled Mafia Don can better afford to hire a hit-man than a guy flipping hamburgers for a living. Does that mean that the government should provide hit-men free of charge for those who cannot afford one?
ii) Where is the father in this equation? Doesn't a man have some contribution to make in this process? How does a pregnant woman become impregnated in the first place?
Why does feminism place all the burden on the mother? Why does feminism let the guy off the hook? To listen to Engle, you'd think that every birth was a virgin birth.
Obviously a man shares equal responsibility. But Engle can't bring herself to make that elementary point, for as soon as she concedes that a man has some input in getting a woman pregnant, then—as the father—he ought to have some input in whether to terminate the pregnancy.
But that would spoil the argument for the feminine autonomy. In order for the woman to be an autonomous agent, she must be held solely responsible; in order for her to be held solely responsible, the man must not be held responsible for his actions. This is a paradox of feminism. It "empowers" women by absolving men of any blame, for men cannot be blameworthy unless they're responsible, and they cannot be responsible unless they share responsibility with the woman they impregnate. Isn't it obvious that promiscuous men get the better of this deal?
iii) If there is a moral disparity in play, it is that children of the well-to-do are at higher risk of being murdered in the womb than the children of the poor. If we outlaw abortion, then that will level out the injustice. Abortion penalizes the innocent child.
iv) Is Engle afraid that we have too many American Indian babies? Is she advocating genocide? Would she like to keep them a permanent and infinitesimal minority? Is she disappointed that more dumpsters aren't overflowing with aborted Indian babies? Seems rather racist to me.
v) There is, of course, a financial correlation between poor mothers and unwed mothers. Once again, lifestyle choices have economic consequences. Whose responsibility is that?
vi) In what sense is abortion a "vital medical procedure." Pregnancy is not a life-threatening disease.
vii) I suppose you can call abortion a "medical procedure," just as you could call the gas chambers a medical procedure.
viii) "Teenagers"? "Parental consent"? Well, yes. Even if you believe in abortion for grown women, is Engle such a fanatic that she would insist on privacy laws which prevent the prosecution of statutory rape because it can't be reported to the authorities?
ix) Why should a school counselor or stranger at an abortion clinic—a stranger with a vested business interest—have more input on the decision than the girl's mother or father? For what other major medical "procedure" would Engel leave the decision-making up to an underage girl and her handlers, then bandage her up and dump her back on the doorstep of her own home—without ever notifying a parent of potential complications or emotional trauma? What if the abortion is botched?
It tells you a lot about the level of moral desperation when the "right" of teenage access to abortion comes at the cost of immunity to medical malpractice and statutory rape. With the teenage "right" to an abortion comes the right to be raped and butchered. Feminism is a beautiful thing, ain't it though?
x) If we have too many unwanted pregnancies in the military, that's an argument, not for abortion, but for abolishing a coed military.
xi) Engle overlooks the obvious correlation between the welfare state and a culture of poverty and dependency. But this is only too typical of left-wing social policy. When one entitlement fails, it demands yet another entitlement to prop up the first.
xii) "Complications"? Whoa! I thought Engle had just assured us, under point #4, that abortion was a very safe "procedure." Now, however, she's warning us about the medical complications. In order to make a therapeutic argument for abortion, she must play down the health risk; but in order to make a fiscal argument, she must play up the risk.
"7) The Most Effective Way to Reduce Abortions Is to Reduce Unintended Pregnancies
Western and Eastern Europe have similar abortion laws but the West has far greater access to effective contraception. They also have, respectively, the lowest and highest abortion rates in the world. The Bush Administration's decision to end contributions to the UN Population Fund, which funds family-planning projects in 142 countries, will perversely result in approximately 2 million unwanted pregnancies, 800,000 abortions, 4,700 maternal deaths and 77,000 infant and child deaths."
i) I have no objection to contraction, although some so-called contraceptives are really abortifacients in disguise (e.g. the morning-after pill).
ii) Engle is deliberately confounding abortion with contraception.
iii) Why does Engle suppose that American wage-earners, who work hard to feed and clothe their own kids, are responsible for funding birth-control measures around the world? Isn't that pretty paternalistic?
iv) Of course, the only "effective" form of contraception is abstinence. So Engle should be advocating abstinence programs instead.
v) Hasn't Engle ever heard of private charity? If feminism is really that compassionate about the plight of poor mothers around the world, why don't Engle and her coterie chip in and start their own fund for the free distribution of prophylactics? They seem to be very generous with everyone's money but their own.
vi) For that matter, if Engle and her coterie feel that tender-hearted about the plight of the poor, why don't they sell their domiciles in Malibu and Manhattan, go live with the poor, role up their sleeves, and apply their social theories about the root-causes of poverty in situ? Or would such a move put a crimp in their standard of living?
Friday, June 04, 2004
The many flavors of fideism
Fideism is a common phenomenon in Christendom. And it is generally used as a term of abuse. Hence, it is important for us to define our terms and sort out the varieties and various motives giving rise to fideism.
I. Exposition:
In the nature of the case, fideism tends to be anti-intellectual. Hence, it is somewhat elusive of definition, for it amounts to a rather fuzzy, nugatory position. In general, fideism opposes faith to reason, and places faith above reason. But this is so vague that it could mean almost anything, so let us break the question down into different answers given by different schools of fideism.
1. Pragmatic fideism.
Many believers are too unsophisticated to know how to answer objections to the faith. They become flustered and intimidated when confronted with such objections. A class case is the Christian college student who comes out of a reflexive and unreflective Christian environment, and is suddenly thrown into a social environment hostile to his hereditary and unquestioning faith.
Having no ready-made answers or mental discipline, one reaction is to retreat into the citadel of his fideistic will-power. He has faith in faith. The act of faith becomes a self-validating exercise.
This form of fideism is basically a defense mechanism or default-setting, in the absence of a positive counteroffensive.
2. Dogmatic fideism.
Many believers are committed to a theological tradition or another which assigns a large role to mystery. God is believed to be almost ineffable. We know not what he is, but what he is not. Or else, it is said that the relation between various articles of the faith presents the mind with evident and irreconcilable antinomies. So these teachings must be held in a state of tension, affirming them separately without attempting to relate them. Indeed, any effort at harmonization is deemed to be downright impious.
So (2) has a theological basis, unlike (1). Yet someone raised in (2) will fall back very easily on (1).
3. Liberal fideism.
Some professing believers have divided intellectual loyalties. They believe that precritical faith is simply incredible. But they still wish to retain a foot in the church.
So they compartmentalize faith and reason and devise insulating strategies to safe-guard a little corner for faith. They redefine the scope of faith, relegating it to the confines of an airtight, climate-controlled hothouse where it can flourish on its own, shielded from direct and deadly contact with the outside elements.
Traditional terms and categories are retained, but redefined, as a code language, with a different set of truth-conditions.
These range along the left-hand of the theological continuum from mediating theologians—who continue to honor some remnants of traditional orthodoxy—to Christian-coated infidels—who don’t believe in God at all.
II. Evaluation
1.
i) One problem with this maneuver is that those who resort to it the most are least equipped to shoulder the burden. They repair to faith because their faith has been shaken by reason, or what appears to be reason. So they’re making more demands on their faith at the very time in which their faith is overtaxed. To fall back on faith during a crisis of faith is like trying to clamber one's way out of a gravel pit.
ii) Faith without reason is only as strong as we happen to feel at any given moment. And our feelings are calibrated to our physical and emotional well-being. Putting faith in faith is a form of self-cannibalism that repays ever-diminishing returns. It places a boulder on the wobbly shoulders of a weak-kneed believer who is least able to bear up under the personal pressure.
A few ounces of solid reason are worth a ton of will-power. Uncovering the rational foundations of faith lays a solid foundation for intellectual security, not insecurity. Paving over the fault-lines does not forestall an earthquake. If you suffer from intellectual doubts and impediments to faith, then the best remedy is to answer your doubts and remove your impediments.
This doesn’t mean that you have to have the answers to everything. But, again, one benefit of knowing why you believe is that it helps you to discriminate between what answers you can and cannot live without by teaching you what questions are important and answerable.
iii) Often, too, the proper object of faith is lost sight of in fideism. Faith is not self-referential. Faith does not supply its own object. This is not, or ought not to be, a question of my will-power, of my will to believe—as if faith were a mirror or human monument. Faith is not about me and my will, but about God and God’s will.
iv) A beleaguered believer needs to remind himself that, in the church, different members have different gifts and callings. The fact that he may not feel cut out to do apologetics doesn’t mean that he should turn against sanctified reason. Rather, it means that he should delegate the task of defending the faith to a fellow believer who does have a vocation in apologetics.
v) At the same time, it is easy for a Christian to sell himself short. He may have more intellectual aptitude that he is aware of.
vi) It is often said that Scripture assumes rather than proves the existence of God. But this is a half-truth. It is true that Scripture never treats the existence of God as an open question. God is the foundation for everything else.
On the other hand, most of Scripture is addressed to the community of faith, so there is rarely occasion even to raise the issue. When, however, the Bible is addressed the unbeliever, as in Isaiah’s indictment of idolatry (Isa 40-48), or Paul’s speech before the Areopagus, it does make a case for faith.
vii)
2.
i) This argument is only as good as the argument for the theological tradition that underwrites it. So it only pushes the problem back a step. Why believe that God is ineffable? Why believe in dialectical theology?
ii) "Faith" means more than one thing. "Faith" can mean conviction, a conviction founded on trustworthy testimony or self-evident intuition.
Or faith can mean "taking on faith" something you don’t know to be true. You hope it’s true, and you act as thought it’s true.
Now certainly there are cases in Scripture where a believer simply takes God’s word for it, without any corroborative evidence, or even in the teeth of apparently contrary evidence.
So you might say that he’s taking something on faith, and yet he’s not taking everything on faith. He believes in the promise of God because he knows that God has given him this promise.
iii) It is licit to invoke mystery as a result of exegesis; it is illicit to invoke mystery as an exegetical short-cut.
iv) One of the problems with dogmatic fideism is that it lacks a principled criterion for telling when and when not to apply the harmonistic principle. For example, universalism, conditional immortality, and everlasting punishment have all found proponents who cite Scripture in defense of their doctrine.
Yet conservative churches otherwise amenable to irreconcilable tensions in theology are quick to reconcile the Biblical data to the exclusion of one or more rival views on the afterlife.
v) These churches almost make it an article of faith that certain articles of faith are paradoxical. But the Bible itself never says that. This is, at most, a subjective impression that some readers receive when they study Scripture and do systematic theology.
And this impression is often generated by certain preconceived notions they bring to the study of Scripture, such as the one-over-many relation, or relation between time and eternity, or conditions of moral incumbency.
Yet we should never canonize our extra-canonical preconceptions, according them a dogmatic status, and then appeal to that as justification to disdain apologetics. Ironically, to do so is—itself—a tacit appeal to rationalism in defense of fideism.
vi) The conventional terms of the debate tend to prejudice our expectations and options. When you talk about the relation between faith and reason, this treats faith as one thing and reason as another. But, of course, that is one of the very points at issue.
Is this the best way to frame the contrast? Could we not recast the issue as a contrast between divine and human reason? And even though finite reason is naturally subordinate to infinite reason, there is, in this, a reasonable, and not unreasonable, submission of lower reason to higher reason.
vii) There is also the question of whether we have a right to divide the spoils of God’s kingdom, ceding the high ground of reason to the Devil while we reserve the low road of faith for ourselves. Does the devil really have a monopoly on reason? Doesn’t Scripture present infidelity as irrational—even insane?
viii) It is frequently felt that reason is a threat to faith. And it often works out that way, does it not? But if reason can incline to infidelity, ignorance can incline to heresy. So fideism is as much a threat to the faith as unbridled reason.
3.
i) Liberal fideism is a transparent exercise in damage control, and one wonders just who the liberal fideist thinks he’s kidding. He isn’t fooling the outright atheist; he isn’t fooling the conservative. Is he fooling himself? If so, this evinces an unhealthy and insatiable appetite for self-delusion. But oftentimes the exercise is so calculated that it’s hard to think there isn’t an element of willful deception as well. It is, however, psychologically possible to be both a deceiver and self-deceived, to varying degrees.
ii) There is a basic duplicity to liberal fideism. On the one hand, it seems to demote reason, holding reason in low esteem. On the other hand, this is a last-ditch maneuver. It really believes that reason got the better of the argument, that science or philosophy or higher criticism has invalidated precritical faith. Hence, the resort to faith, which appears to promote faith over reason, really assumes a very low view of faith and a very high view of reason. So the paeans to pious faith and existential authenticity are a fairly conspicuous and clumsy charade.
iii) The Christian faith claims to be both true and obligatory because it is a revealed religion, predicated on certain historic events, reflecting the direct intervention of God in time and space. But unless the Christian faith is true on these grounds, it cannot be validated on any other grounds; and unless it is credible on these grounds, it cannot be rendered credible on any other grounds.
iv) Liberal fideism often lays stress on non-cognitive knowledge, on an ineffable, existential encounter with God. But this surrogate is false on two grounds:
a) In this life, we know Christ by description, and not by acquaintance. As John often explains, authentic faith is a matter of knowing and doing the truth. We enter into a personal relationship with Christ by exercising faith in propositions about the person and work of Christ.
b) Unless God is, in some measure, an object of reason, there is no cause for supposing that an existential encounter, however defined, is an encounter with God rather than an undigested apple dumpling.
Another duplicitous feature of fideism, and this is something it shares in common with its principled and liberal forms alike, is that the astute fideist devotes a lot of time and ingenuity to devising a sophisticated case for fideism. But why come up subtle arguments to prove that there’s no need of proof? Why not spend the same time devising subtle arguments to make a positive case for faith?
Instead of rendering a rational justification for the subject of faith—the believer—why not render a rational justification for the object of faith—God and God’s word?
I. Exposition:
In the nature of the case, fideism tends to be anti-intellectual. Hence, it is somewhat elusive of definition, for it amounts to a rather fuzzy, nugatory position. In general, fideism opposes faith to reason, and places faith above reason. But this is so vague that it could mean almost anything, so let us break the question down into different answers given by different schools of fideism.
1. Pragmatic fideism.
Many believers are too unsophisticated to know how to answer objections to the faith. They become flustered and intimidated when confronted with such objections. A class case is the Christian college student who comes out of a reflexive and unreflective Christian environment, and is suddenly thrown into a social environment hostile to his hereditary and unquestioning faith.
Having no ready-made answers or mental discipline, one reaction is to retreat into the citadel of his fideistic will-power. He has faith in faith. The act of faith becomes a self-validating exercise.
This form of fideism is basically a defense mechanism or default-setting, in the absence of a positive counteroffensive.
2. Dogmatic fideism.
Many believers are committed to a theological tradition or another which assigns a large role to mystery. God is believed to be almost ineffable. We know not what he is, but what he is not. Or else, it is said that the relation between various articles of the faith presents the mind with evident and irreconcilable antinomies. So these teachings must be held in a state of tension, affirming them separately without attempting to relate them. Indeed, any effort at harmonization is deemed to be downright impious.
So (2) has a theological basis, unlike (1). Yet someone raised in (2) will fall back very easily on (1).
3. Liberal fideism.
Some professing believers have divided intellectual loyalties. They believe that precritical faith is simply incredible. But they still wish to retain a foot in the church.
So they compartmentalize faith and reason and devise insulating strategies to safe-guard a little corner for faith. They redefine the scope of faith, relegating it to the confines of an airtight, climate-controlled hothouse where it can flourish on its own, shielded from direct and deadly contact with the outside elements.
Traditional terms and categories are retained, but redefined, as a code language, with a different set of truth-conditions.
These range along the left-hand of the theological continuum from mediating theologians—who continue to honor some remnants of traditional orthodoxy—to Christian-coated infidels—who don’t believe in God at all.
II. Evaluation
1.
i) One problem with this maneuver is that those who resort to it the most are least equipped to shoulder the burden. They repair to faith because their faith has been shaken by reason, or what appears to be reason. So they’re making more demands on their faith at the very time in which their faith is overtaxed. To fall back on faith during a crisis of faith is like trying to clamber one's way out of a gravel pit.
ii) Faith without reason is only as strong as we happen to feel at any given moment. And our feelings are calibrated to our physical and emotional well-being. Putting faith in faith is a form of self-cannibalism that repays ever-diminishing returns. It places a boulder on the wobbly shoulders of a weak-kneed believer who is least able to bear up under the personal pressure.
A few ounces of solid reason are worth a ton of will-power. Uncovering the rational foundations of faith lays a solid foundation for intellectual security, not insecurity. Paving over the fault-lines does not forestall an earthquake. If you suffer from intellectual doubts and impediments to faith, then the best remedy is to answer your doubts and remove your impediments.
This doesn’t mean that you have to have the answers to everything. But, again, one benefit of knowing why you believe is that it helps you to discriminate between what answers you can and cannot live without by teaching you what questions are important and answerable.
iii) Often, too, the proper object of faith is lost sight of in fideism. Faith is not self-referential. Faith does not supply its own object. This is not, or ought not to be, a question of my will-power, of my will to believe—as if faith were a mirror or human monument. Faith is not about me and my will, but about God and God’s will.
iv) A beleaguered believer needs to remind himself that, in the church, different members have different gifts and callings. The fact that he may not feel cut out to do apologetics doesn’t mean that he should turn against sanctified reason. Rather, it means that he should delegate the task of defending the faith to a fellow believer who does have a vocation in apologetics.
v) At the same time, it is easy for a Christian to sell himself short. He may have more intellectual aptitude that he is aware of.
vi) It is often said that Scripture assumes rather than proves the existence of God. But this is a half-truth. It is true that Scripture never treats the existence of God as an open question. God is the foundation for everything else.
On the other hand, most of Scripture is addressed to the community of faith, so there is rarely occasion even to raise the issue. When, however, the Bible is addressed the unbeliever, as in Isaiah’s indictment of idolatry (Isa 40-48), or Paul’s speech before the Areopagus, it does make a case for faith.
vii)
2.
i) This argument is only as good as the argument for the theological tradition that underwrites it. So it only pushes the problem back a step. Why believe that God is ineffable? Why believe in dialectical theology?
ii) "Faith" means more than one thing. "Faith" can mean conviction, a conviction founded on trustworthy testimony or self-evident intuition.
Or faith can mean "taking on faith" something you don’t know to be true. You hope it’s true, and you act as thought it’s true.
Now certainly there are cases in Scripture where a believer simply takes God’s word for it, without any corroborative evidence, or even in the teeth of apparently contrary evidence.
So you might say that he’s taking something on faith, and yet he’s not taking everything on faith. He believes in the promise of God because he knows that God has given him this promise.
iii) It is licit to invoke mystery as a result of exegesis; it is illicit to invoke mystery as an exegetical short-cut.
iv) One of the problems with dogmatic fideism is that it lacks a principled criterion for telling when and when not to apply the harmonistic principle. For example, universalism, conditional immortality, and everlasting punishment have all found proponents who cite Scripture in defense of their doctrine.
Yet conservative churches otherwise amenable to irreconcilable tensions in theology are quick to reconcile the Biblical data to the exclusion of one or more rival views on the afterlife.
v) These churches almost make it an article of faith that certain articles of faith are paradoxical. But the Bible itself never says that. This is, at most, a subjective impression that some readers receive when they study Scripture and do systematic theology.
And this impression is often generated by certain preconceived notions they bring to the study of Scripture, such as the one-over-many relation, or relation between time and eternity, or conditions of moral incumbency.
Yet we should never canonize our extra-canonical preconceptions, according them a dogmatic status, and then appeal to that as justification to disdain apologetics. Ironically, to do so is—itself—a tacit appeal to rationalism in defense of fideism.
vi) The conventional terms of the debate tend to prejudice our expectations and options. When you talk about the relation between faith and reason, this treats faith as one thing and reason as another. But, of course, that is one of the very points at issue.
Is this the best way to frame the contrast? Could we not recast the issue as a contrast between divine and human reason? And even though finite reason is naturally subordinate to infinite reason, there is, in this, a reasonable, and not unreasonable, submission of lower reason to higher reason.
vii) There is also the question of whether we have a right to divide the spoils of God’s kingdom, ceding the high ground of reason to the Devil while we reserve the low road of faith for ourselves. Does the devil really have a monopoly on reason? Doesn’t Scripture present infidelity as irrational—even insane?
viii) It is frequently felt that reason is a threat to faith. And it often works out that way, does it not? But if reason can incline to infidelity, ignorance can incline to heresy. So fideism is as much a threat to the faith as unbridled reason.
3.
i) Liberal fideism is a transparent exercise in damage control, and one wonders just who the liberal fideist thinks he’s kidding. He isn’t fooling the outright atheist; he isn’t fooling the conservative. Is he fooling himself? If so, this evinces an unhealthy and insatiable appetite for self-delusion. But oftentimes the exercise is so calculated that it’s hard to think there isn’t an element of willful deception as well. It is, however, psychologically possible to be both a deceiver and self-deceived, to varying degrees.
ii) There is a basic duplicity to liberal fideism. On the one hand, it seems to demote reason, holding reason in low esteem. On the other hand, this is a last-ditch maneuver. It really believes that reason got the better of the argument, that science or philosophy or higher criticism has invalidated precritical faith. Hence, the resort to faith, which appears to promote faith over reason, really assumes a very low view of faith and a very high view of reason. So the paeans to pious faith and existential authenticity are a fairly conspicuous and clumsy charade.
iii) The Christian faith claims to be both true and obligatory because it is a revealed religion, predicated on certain historic events, reflecting the direct intervention of God in time and space. But unless the Christian faith is true on these grounds, it cannot be validated on any other grounds; and unless it is credible on these grounds, it cannot be rendered credible on any other grounds.
iv) Liberal fideism often lays stress on non-cognitive knowledge, on an ineffable, existential encounter with God. But this surrogate is false on two grounds:
a) In this life, we know Christ by description, and not by acquaintance. As John often explains, authentic faith is a matter of knowing and doing the truth. We enter into a personal relationship with Christ by exercising faith in propositions about the person and work of Christ.
b) Unless God is, in some measure, an object of reason, there is no cause for supposing that an existential encounter, however defined, is an encounter with God rather than an undigested apple dumpling.
Another duplicitous feature of fideism, and this is something it shares in common with its principled and liberal forms alike, is that the astute fideist devotes a lot of time and ingenuity to devising a sophisticated case for fideism. But why come up subtle arguments to prove that there’s no need of proof? Why not spend the same time devising subtle arguments to make a positive case for faith?
Instead of rendering a rational justification for the subject of faith—the believer—why not render a rational justification for the object of faith—God and God’s word?
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