tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post8118230044521341491..comments2024-03-27T17:15:37.606-04:00Comments on Triablogue: Secular scumbagsRyanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17809283662428917799noreply@blogger.comBlogger90125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-29904532020077457652009-01-13T09:02:00.000-05:002009-01-13T09:02:00.000-05:00I told Peter I'd post a single entry covering all ...I told Peter I'd post a single entry covering all of the basic issues that have been brought up here so far. It seems that's not going to happen. There's just too much to cover for a single entry. Even for a single blog post on my own blog.<BR/><BR/>So, what I've decided to do is post my arguments on my own blog as they come, and update you all here with the links.<BR/><BR/>I'm hoping to cover all the issues here in a small number of blog posts. Perhaps five or six. It's hard to say at this point. Also, I have no idea how much time I'll be able to devote to this little project. I may have a new entry up every week or so. Maybe not.<BR/><BR/>I'm posting this here, and not in Peter Pike's <A HREF="http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2008/12/jello-fellow.html" REL="nofollow">The Jello Fellow</A> thread, because I'm not allowed to post three times in a row in that thread, and nobody's posted there since my last two entries.<BR/><BR/>So, here's the latest entry: <A HREF="http://specterofreason.blogspot.com/2009/01/argument-for-theological-noncognitivism.html" REL="nofollow">An Argument For Theological Noncognitivism.</A>Jason Streitfeldhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06950357341620206095noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-86502758953347906262008-12-01T10:26:00.000-05:002008-12-01T10:26:00.000-05:00PAUL C SAID:“No, I don't claim that empiricism is ...PAUL C SAID:<BR/><BR/>“No, I don't claim that empiricism is the only way to determine motives. What I claim is that it's the way in which motive is determined in a court of law, which is what we are discussing. I have supported this with an example of the law as it relates to ascertaining criminal intent, a piece of evidence which (ironically) you have chosen to completely ignore. “<BR/><BR/>All you’ve done is to interpret that example empirically. The example itself doesn’t yield your interpretation. Asserting that it’s empirical is not an argument. Where’s the argument?<BR/><BR/>“The first approach is purely empirical.”<BR/><BR/>No, the first approach is not purely empirical. It involves the solicitation of a first-person viewpoint, which is otherwise inaccessible apart from the defendant volunteering this privileged information. <BR/><BR/>His statement is empirical, but his statement is a statement of a private state of mind which is not empirical. His statement cannot be empirically verified. <BR/><BR/>“The second approach is also empirical, since it relies entirely on one's observation of the situation.”<BR/><BR/>Wrong again. While the situation may be observable, what we’d do in the same situation goes back to our own unobservable motives. <BR/><BR/>“So far, you have failed to explain your alternative to the empirical processes currently employed in our legal systems. I can only assume that your decision to ignore the piece of evidence that I provided - of how legal systems actually work - is somehow connected to your belief that you have a superior alternative.”<BR/><BR/>So far, you’ve failed to even grasp what’s involved.stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16547070544928321788noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-71900479942940408912008-12-01T10:11:00.000-05:002008-12-01T10:11:00.000-05:00JASON STREITFELD SAID:“Lowe's relevant discussion,...JASON STREITFELD SAID:<BR/><BR/>“Lowe's relevant discussion, as quoted by Steve, is thus.”<BR/><BR/>No, everything I quoted from Lowe is relevant to the issue at hand.<BR/><BR/>“Is that the stunning argument by Lowe which you want me to counter, Steve?”<BR/><BR/>Of course, you truncated his argument. <BR/><BR/>“I, however, have approached a theory of how mathematics is true. It is true because it formalizes the rules of calculation, rules which are purely functional in nature, and thus whose truth is not limited by the nature of the system in which they are instantiated.”<BR/><BR/>A carburetor is functional. Does that make it true?<BR/><BR/>What makes the rules of calculation true? Formalization? <BR/><BR/>Are they true because they’re formalized? Or are they formalized because they’re true?<BR/><BR/>What makes a calculation true or false? Just a set of rules? Can we change the rules?stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16547070544928321788noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-91755216998152973412008-12-01T10:01:00.000-05:002008-12-01T10:01:00.000-05:00JASON STREITFELD SAID:“Steve doesn't see the logic...JASON STREITFELD SAID:<BR/><BR/>“Steve doesn't see the logic of his own absurd position. He says that mathematical proofs aren't based on observable evidence. And yet, the evidence is the proof itself!”<BR/><BR/>Jason is incorrigibly obtuse. A mathematical proof doesn’t make something true. Rather, it presupposes that something is already true.<BR/><BR/>It’s based on deductions from axioms and prior theorems. That’s the evidence on which it’s based. Not the proof itself. <BR/><BR/>A mathematician doesn’t begin with the proof. That’s the end-result of a process. So the evidence on which the proof is based cannot very well be the proof itself. Otherwise, the mathematician could never get started.<BR/><BR/>Moreover, the axioms and theorems are not intrinsically observable. It may be convenient to write these down, but they can also be memorized. <BR/><BR/>“Steve wishes to ground mathematics wholly in the intuition.”<BR/><BR/>No, I ground mathematics in abstract objects. <BR/><BR/>Intuition is simply a way of accessing the truth of abstract mathematical objects (like axioms). And logical intuition is also necessary to deduce further implications. <BR/><BR/>“Nobody accepts a mathematical proof on intuition.”<BR/><BR/>To the contrary, you must be able to apprehend that the proof is logically compelling. That comes down to intuition. The intuitive sense that the axioms are true. The intuitive sense that deductions are valid.stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16547070544928321788noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-33504693745468528532008-12-01T08:58:00.000-05:002008-12-01T08:58:00.000-05:00JASON STREITFELD SAID:“And I'm sure Steve will be ...JASON STREITFELD SAID:<BR/><BR/>“And I'm sure Steve will be happy to explain how this somewhat physical mind is also aspatial, since he quite clearly said it was.”<BR/><BR/>Look, dummy, I never said the mind was physical. I said the very opposite. The brain is physical, but the mind is not.<BR/><BR/>Why should I waste time answering your questions when, every time I answer one of your questions, you misstate the answer? <BR/><BR/>To say that x has physical manifestations doesn’t make x itself physical. Try not to be such a klutz, will you? Can you try, for just one day, not to be such a klutz? <BR/><BR/>“A test case?__How about a definition?”<BR/><BR/>You’re such an idiot. I gave you a definition.<BR/><BR/>“Does ‘omnipotence’ imply a complete lack of restrictions on one's abilities?”<BR/><BR/>You’re such an idiot. Don’t you know what the word “compossible” means?<BR/><BR/>“So, would that make all of us omnipotent?”<BR/><BR/>Can we all instantiate any compossible state of affairs?<BR/><BR/>“Question: If God enacts spatiotemporal events, does God react to spatiotemporal events?”<BR/><BR/>No.<BR/><BR/>“That is, do Gods ‘enactions’ ever result from spatiotemporal events?”<BR/><BR/>No.<BR/><BR/>“If God's behavior is a reaction, that means it is caused; it means God changes; it means God interacts.__So, no, I still don't see a coherent notion of ‘God’ on the table.”<BR/><BR/>In your usual stupidity, you draw a conclusion from a position you impute to me, rather than the position I actually stated. <BR/><BR/>“Relevant quotations would be appreciated.”<BR/><BR/>In other words, you haven’t bothered to read standard theological literature. Yet that didn’t prevent you from imputing positions to Christian theists. What theologians have you actually read?<BR/><BR/>“That doesn't explain anything, and it doesn't make any of my questions unnecessary or redundant.”<BR/><BR/>Now you’re moving the goal post. You asked whether the definition of God was incoherent. What is incoherent about saying that God can instantiate any compossible state of affairs?stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16547070544928321788noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-46862212218538700612008-12-01T08:42:00.000-05:002008-12-01T08:42:00.000-05:00Jason S,What I put on my blog was simply an excerp...Jason S,<BR/><BR/>What I put on my blog was simply an excerpt from the London Baptist Confession of 1689. I can tell you with confidence that the gents here hold to it. Interact with that; don't hold up the discussion for the sake of semantics.Rhologyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14245825667079220242noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-89931157911344210322008-12-01T07:41:00.000-05:002008-12-01T07:41:00.000-05:00Jason Engwer,In Steve's original post, he alluded ...Jason Engwer,<BR/><BR/>In Steve's original post, he alluded to a couple books in which he says the definition of "God" has been carefully laid out. Relevant quotations would be appreciated. <BR/><BR/>Steve also said: "God can instantiate any compossible state of affairs."<BR/><BR/>That doesn't explain anything, and it doesn't make any of my questions unnecessary or redundant.<BR/><BR/>I don't think I'm out of line for pointing out the fact that nobody's put a definition of "God" on the table here. (Rhology at least had the courtesy and the courage to do that on his blog, but he hasn't completely followed through with that discussion yet.) And the fact that what has been said about God is anything but clear.Jason Streitfeldhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06950357341620206095noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-74681187976330389912008-12-01T07:08:00.000-05:002008-12-01T07:08:00.000-05:00Jason Streitfeld wrote:"As for omnipotence, it is ...Jason Streitfeld wrote:<BR/><BR/>"As for omnipotence, it is a little ambiguous. Does 'omnipotence' imply a complete lack of restrictions on one's abilities? Can God, for example, make '1+1=2' false? Can God sin? Can God spit on the sidewalk? Can God be an atheist?"<BR/><BR/>Why don't you interact with what Steve wrote on the subject in the first post in this thread instead of asking questions he's already answered?Jason Engwerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17031011335190895123noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-12154205651585550902008-12-01T02:14:00.000-05:002008-12-01T02:14:00.000-05:00When asked to provide a definition of the term "Go...When asked to provide a definition of the term "God," Steve replied:<BR/><BR/>"I already cited omnipotence as a test case. Go back and interact with what I wrote."<BR/><BR/>A test case?<BR/><BR/>How about a definition?<BR/><BR/>As for omnipotence, it is a little ambiguous.<BR/><BR/>Does "omnipotence" imply a complete lack of restrictions on one's abilities?<BR/><BR/>Can God, for example, make "1+1=2" false?<BR/><BR/>Can God sin?<BR/><BR/>Can God spit on the sidewalk?<BR/><BR/>Can God be an atheist?<BR/><BR/>If there are some things I can do, but which God cannot do, then God is limited.<BR/><BR/>Perhaps God is limited to being able to do only those things which are in God's nature to do.<BR/><BR/>But, then, aren't we all limited to being able to do only those things which it is in our nature to do?<BR/><BR/>So, would that make all of us omnipotent?<BR/><BR/>Steve also says : "God is a mental being" which "remains unchanged" and which "doesn’t interact with 'spatiotemporal events" but which "enacts spatiotemporal events."<BR/><BR/>Question: If God enacts spatiotemporal events, does God react to spatiotemporal events?<BR/><BR/>That is, do Gods "enactions" ever result from spatiotemporal events?<BR/><BR/>If God's "enactions" do result from spatiotemporal events, then what does it mean to say that God does not change?<BR/><BR/>If God's behavior is a reaction, that means it is caused; it means God changes; it means God interacts.<BR/><BR/>So, no, I still don't see a coherent notion of "God" on the table.Jason Streitfeldhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06950357341620206095noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-88329987193348980972008-11-30T16:26:00.000-05:002008-11-30T16:26:00.000-05:00When trying to come to terms with Steve's bizarre ...When trying to come to terms with Steve's bizarre comment about the "physical manifestations of the mind," I asked: "Are these physical manifestations aspatial, in Steve's view? Probably not."<BR/><BR/>Steve responded: "Another stupid question. By definition, physicality generally includes spatiality."<BR/><BR/>Now, if one had reason to assume that Steve had a solid grasp of logic, science, and common sense, one might think it stupid to ask such a simple question as I had done.<BR/><BR/>But I try not to make unreasonable assumptions.<BR/><BR/>So, Steve says there are physical manifestations of the mind. That is, the mind is physically manifest. Spatial. At least to some degree, or in some ways which Steve may one day decide to explain for us.<BR/><BR/>And I'm sure Steve will be happy to explain how this somewhat physical mind is also aspatial, since he quite clearly said it was.Jason Streitfeldhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06950357341620206095noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-48087000937019969812008-11-30T16:22:00.000-05:002008-11-30T16:22:00.000-05:00Steve says, "Jason is a cornucopia of incompetence...Steve says, <BR/><BR/>"Jason is a cornucopia of incompetence. Did I say mathematical proofs were unobservable? No. I said the evidence on which they’re based is unobservable."<BR/><BR/>Steve doesn't see the logic of his own absurd position. He says that mathematical proofs aren't based on observable evidence. And yet, the evidence is the proof itself!<BR/><BR/>Thus, I asked him to show me an unobservable mathematical proof. He says I missed his point. The fact is, his point is absurd.<BR/><BR/>Steve wishes to ground mathematics wholly in the intuition. He says, "Mathematical proofs involve the intuition mathematical truths along with their logical relationships."<BR/><BR/>Of course, mathematicians (like all great scientists, artists, philosophers, etc.) rely on their intuition. But the intuition does not ground the truth of a mathematical theorem. Nobody accepts a mathematical proof on intuition. At least, nobody but Steve.Jason Streitfeldhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06950357341620206095noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-4636605211878536372008-11-30T16:15:00.000-05:002008-11-30T16:15:00.000-05:00Steve quote's Lowe's discussion of why abstract en...Steve quote's Lowe's discussion of why abstract entities are not reducible to physical systems.<BR/><BR/>Lowe's relevant discussion, as quoted by Steve, is thus:<BR/><BR/>"it is not so easy to eliminate the ontology of mathematics without undermining the very truths of mathematics, which we may be loath to do. If numbers do not exist, it is hard to see how it could be true to say that 2 plus 1 equals 3. So perhaps we should reconcile ourselves to the existence of abstract entities."<BR/><BR/>So, Lowe's argument is, it's hard to imagine how mathematics could be true if there isn't a Platonic realm of forms. Therefore, "perhaps" we should believe there is a Platonic realm of forms. <BR/><BR/>Perhaps?<BR/><BR/>Is that the stunning argument by Lowe which you want me to counter, Steve?<BR/><BR/>Perhaps?<BR/><BR/>The funny thing is, postulating a Platonic realm does not help us understand how our mathematical theorems are true. It just claims that our mathematical theorems correspond to some Platonic realm. The question of "how" remains unanswered.<BR/><BR/>I, however, have approached a theory of how mathematics is true. It is true because it formalizes the rules of calculation, rules which are purely functional in nature, and thus whose truth is not limited by the nature of the system in which they are instantiated.<BR/><BR/>This doesn't seem so hard to understand, contrary to Lowe's assertion. So I don't see much reason to take his "perhaps" so seriously.Jason Streitfeldhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06950357341620206095noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-1472875594594848712008-11-29T18:54:00.000-05:002008-11-29T18:54:00.000-05:00JASON STREITFELD SAID:“No, Steve. Godel's proof do...JASON STREITFELD SAID:<BR/><BR/>“No, Steve. Godel's proof does not specify anything about ‘human systems’."<BR/><BR/>Naturally, since that’s your distinction, not his. <BR/><BR/>“Am I the only one here who sees a difference between regarding the implications of a proven theorem and disregarding irrelevant and problematic philosophical assumptions made by the person who first formulated the theorem?”<BR/><BR/>To say they’re irrelevant and problematic is just another question-begging assertion on your part.<BR/><BR/>“What definition, Steve? I've responded to those definitions presented to me. Where's yours?”<BR/><BR/>I gave an example, using the divine attribute of omnipotence—which you ignored.<BR/><BR/>There’s no point expanding my definition when you ignore what you’ve already been told.<BR/><BR/>“All you've said is that God's mind is aspatial and atemporal. Should we regard God and God's mind as two distinct entities?”<BR/><BR/>God is a mental being.<BR/><BR/>“Should we regard God (or God's mind) as having an active involvement in what happens in space and time? That is, does God (or God's mind) react to spatio-temporal events, or does it remain unchanged?”<BR/><BR/>It remains unchanged.<BR/><BR/>“If it remains unchanged, then how could it interact with spatiotemporal events?”<BR/><BR/>It doesn’t interact with “spatiotemporal events” (a bit redundant on your part since an event is inherently temporal).<BR/><BR/>Rather, it enacts spatiotemporal events.<BR/><BR/>“If it does not remain unchanged, then how can it change without those changes occuring in time and space?__Time is measured as a matter of change, after all. If there is change, there is time.__The lack of coherence in your definition of ‘God’ is apparent.”<BR/><BR/>What’s apparent is that you’re attacking a straw man argument by building on a false premise. You impute to me a position that I haven’t stated or implied, then claim the position is incoherent.<BR/><BR/>“Clearly, in legal terms, evidence must be presentable to a court or jury. That means it must be third-person information.__Thus, Steve rejects the requirement that we support our legal answers with evidence.”<BR/><BR/>i) What a stupid statement. Testimonial evidence isn’t limited to second parties. The accused can also testify to his motives. That would reflect a first-person perspective, not a third-person perspective.<BR/><BR/>ii) Let’s also keep in mind that trials can only arrive at what is, at best, a probable conclusion regarding the criminal intent (or lack thereof) of the accused. Only the accused can know for a fact what his motives were. (God also knows the motives of the accused, but not by empirical means.)<BR/><BR/>iii) As a further mark of his ineptitude, Jason is conflating the general issue of what counts as legal evidence with the specific issue of what would count as particular evidence of criminal intent. <BR/><BR/>For example, fingerprint evidence may be relevant to establishing the defendant’s actions, but that’s irrelevant to establishing his intent. <BR/><BR/>The question at issue is not whether empirical evidence can establis what he did, but whether empirical evidence can establish why he did it. <BR/><BR/>“Maybe Steve thinks we can judge a person's motives with some other kind of evidence, some non-empirical evidence. What counts as non-empirical evidence in Steve's book, then?”<BR/><BR/>Another stupid remark since I’ve already stated the relevant lines of evidence.<BR/><BR/>http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2008/11/secular-scumbags.html#3990737697006000772<BR/><BR/>“He cannot be sure what is in a person's mind. Even if he asks them, they could lie.”<BR/><BR/>i) Of course, that wasn’t my only line of evidence.<BR/><BR/>ii) Moreover, this objection is equally applicable to an empirical criterion since a defendant can also indulge in deceptive behavior. <BR/><BR/>“Of course, people often disagree about whether or not something is evil. Our intuitions don't seem to match up a lot of the time. Does this mean that some people are simply good, and some are simply evil?”<BR/><BR/>It means we need divine revelation to correct or confirm our moral intuitions.<BR/><BR/>“In that case, by what right does Steve have to presume that he is good and that another person is evil?”<BR/><BR/>Since when do Christians presume that they are good?<BR/><BR/>“On what basis can he justify his intuitive judgments about evilness?”<BR/><BR/>Notice, once again, how Jason simply imputes a position to his opponent, then attacks the implications of his own imputation. It’s like watching a cat attack it’s own reflection in the mirror.<BR/><BR/>“Where are Steve's grounds for moral superiority?”<BR/><BR/>The moral superiority of what? Christian ethics? That would be grounded in divine revelation.<BR/><BR/>“Show me a mathematical proof that is not observable, please.__Show me any instance in which an unobservable mathematical proof has been accepted.”<BR/><BR/>Jason is a cornucopia of incompetence. Did I say mathematical proofs were unobservable? No. I said the evidence on which they’re based is unobservable. <BR/><BR/>How does one even begin to reason with someone as hopelessly uncomprehending as Jason?<BR/><BR/>Mathematical proofs involve the intuition mathematical truths along with their logical relationships.<BR/><BR/>“In Steve's view, this means that brains are physical versions of abstract entities, called ‘minds’."<BR/><BR/>Since I never said that or implied that, this isn’t “Steve’s view.”<BR/><BR/>I’ve never defined what “brains” are in this debate. Neuroscience is not at the point where we can offer a comprehensive definition of the human brain. <BR/><BR/>“Now, steve will also tell you that an apple is a physical manifestation of an abstract apple. So, again, the physical apple is a manifestation of an abstract entity, namely, an apple.”<BR/><BR/>A physical apple is a concrete exemplification of God’s abstract concept of that particular apple.<BR/><BR/>“Now, unless Steve has invented a new term for an abstract apple (perhaps he calls them ‘abapples’), Steve uses one word here: ‘apple’.”<BR/><BR/>Of course, there’s a standard terminology for abstract objects. It goes back to Plato. And it’s been refined over the centuries with additional nomenclature. The fact that Jason is too much of a philosophical ignoramus to know this doesn’t mean I have to invent a new term.<BR/><BR/>“But now Steve uses two words when it comes to the mind. First there's the physical brain. Then there's the mind.__This is confusing.”<BR/><BR/>It’s confusing if you’re as easily confused as Jason. I never used the word “physical brain” as a synonym for the “mind.”<BR/><BR/>“If the brain is just one physical instance of a mind, then why not admit that a person's mind is actually occuring in their brain?”<BR/><BR/>The human mind uses the brain. <BR/><BR/>“I did not attribute apophatic definitions to theists in general.”<BR/><BR/>You have to attribute apophatic definitions to theists in general to dismiss theism in general in the way you did.<BR/><BR/>If your attribution only applies to some theists, then your dismissal of theism only applies to some versions of theism, but not others.<BR/><BR/>“No, I didn't, and I already explained that I didn't. Now Steve just won't accept the truth.”<BR/><BR/>What I won’t accept is your fallacious explanation, which I dealt with at the time.<BR/><BR/>“The fact is, I have yet to see anyone define ‘the supernatural’ or ‘God’ in a way that makes sense.”<BR/><BR/>Of course, this is so vague that it hardly merits a response. Unless you say what you mean, there’s nothing to respond to. <BR/><BR/>“It's an open challenge to all of you: put a definition of the word ‘God’ on the table, and let's see if we can make heads or tails of it.__Any takers?”<BR/><BR/>I already cited omnipotence as a test case. Go back and interact with what I wrote.<BR/><BR/>“Steve says that he has defined what the term ‘abstract realm’ refers to.__Can anyone point me to it?”<BR/><BR/>“Abstract realm” is your term, not mine. I quoted some paradigm examples along with the attendant explanations.<BR/><BR/>For another illustration of what I mean, read “The Model,” and “Some Consequences,” in chap. 3 of the following thesis:<BR/><BR/>http://www.ccir.ed.ac.uk/~jad/welty/mphil.pdf<BR/><BR/>“Steve also says that the ‘mind of man’ is ‘aspatial.’__Steve's evidence for this?”<BR/><BR/>I quoted examples of mental properties, along with Lowe’s discussion of why these are irreducible to physical properties. <BR/><BR/>Why do you constantly demand answers to questions that have already been answered? Are you terminally dense?<BR/><BR/>“Are these physical manifestations aspatial, in Steve's view? Probably not.”<BR/><BR/>Another stupid question. By definition, physicality generally includes spatiality.stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16547070544928321788noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-15981056589219522752008-11-29T16:19:00.000-05:002008-11-29T16:19:00.000-05:00How would a court of law ascertain the motives of ...<I>How would a court of law ascertain the motives of an individual in any given situation without relying on empirical process?</I><BR/><BR/>Previously in the thread this response was offered:<BR/><BR/>steve: <BR/><I>We try to ascertain the motives of someone is two different ways: <BR/><BR/>i) By asking the individual why he did it.<BR/><BR/>ii) By analogizing from our own motives (if we were in the same situation) to his motives.</I><BR/><BR/>To which PaulC responded:<BR/><I>Judges and juries don't sit around pontificating in the abstract about the motives of the defendant; they hear evidence and then make a decision. This is an empirical process.</I><BR/><BR/><BR/>I don't think you've yet dealt with the two examples steve provided. If you did then my apologies for missing it.David Parkerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13714637134009580948noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-17575238916812242462008-11-29T15:06:00.000-05:002008-11-29T15:06:00.000-05:00Of course it does. You’ve made that explicit claim...<I>Of course it does. You’ve made that explicit claim on several occasions now—appealing to empiricism as the only way to determine motives.</I><BR/><BR/>No, I don't claim that empiricism is the only way to determine motives. What I claim is that it's the way in which motive is determined <B>in a court of law</B>, which is what we are discussing. I have supported this with an example of the law as it relates to ascertaining criminal intent, a piece of evidence which (ironically) you have chosen to completely ignore.<BR/><BR/><I>I already addressed the question some time ago</I><BR/><BR/>Yes, I agree that you tried to address the question, but all you offered were statements that support my point, not yours. Let's take a trip down memory lane:<BR/><BR/><I>We try to ascertain the motives of someone is two different ways:<BR/>i) By asking the individual why he did it.<BR/>ii) By analogizing from our own motives (if we were in the same situation) to his motives.</I><BR/><BR/>The first approach is purely empirical; the second approach is also empirical, since it relies entirely on one's observation of the situation. In a court of law, one is presented with evidence upon which one must base judgement - an empirical process. So I continue to ask you to answer a simple question:<BR/><BR/><B>How would a court of law ascertain the motives of an individual in any given situation without relying on empirical process?</B><BR/><BR/>So far, you have failed to explain your alternative to the empirical processes currently employed in our legal systems. I can only assume that your decision to ignore the piece of evidence that I provided - of how legal systems actually work - is somehow connected to your belief that you have a superior alternative.Paul Chttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13361948689477122420noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-58825541558160211412008-11-29T14:34:00.000-05:002008-11-29T14:34:00.000-05:00Steve also says that the "mind of man" is "aspatia...Steve also says that the "mind of man" is "aspatial."<BR/><BR/>Steve's evidence for this?<BR/><BR/>So far, he's said that the mind has physical manifestations in the brain. Are these physical manifestations aspatial, in Steve's view? Probably not.Jason Streitfeldhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06950357341620206095noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-60914191914857500902008-11-29T13:45:00.000-05:002008-11-29T13:45:00.000-05:00Steve says, "We know what it’s like to be human fr...Steve says, "We know what it’s like to be human from the inside out, not the outside in."<BR/><BR/>That's half true, and half false.<BR/><BR/>We know what it's like to be human from the inside out <B>and</B> from the oustide in. Our understanding of humanity is not just based on introspection, but also on observation. We understand ourselves by understanding those around us, and vice versa.<BR/><BR/>Steve is only looking at half the picture.Jason Streitfeldhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06950357341620206095noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-20097539793798216002008-11-29T13:34:00.000-05:002008-11-29T13:34:00.000-05:00Mathetes and Steve,I must apologize, my response t...Mathetes and Steve,<BR/><BR/>I must apologize, my response to Mathetes' last question was erroneous. Steve was explaining why, in his view, a naturalist could still be a dualist. I responded as though he were claiming that naturalists must be dualists.<BR/><BR/>It was an error . . . careless . . . you think God will have mercy on my soul?Jason Streitfeldhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06950357341620206095noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-90544817603734317892008-11-29T12:07:00.000-05:002008-11-29T12:07:00.000-05:00Steve says that he has defined what the term "abst...Steve says that he has defined what the term "abstract realm" refers to.<BR/><BR/>Can anyone point me to it?<BR/><BR/>(Hint: You can search for "abstract realm" and similar phrases on this page and the other page where Steve and I have been discussing this. See what you find.)Jason Streitfeldhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06950357341620206095noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-77542232446339603592008-11-29T12:02:00.000-05:002008-11-29T12:02:00.000-05:00Here's Steve misrepresenting my arguments again:"J...Here's Steve misrepresenting my arguments again:<BR/><BR/>"Jason attributed apophatic definitions to theists,"<BR/><BR/>More specifically, I referred to the apophatic tradition. I did not attribute apophatic definitions to theists in general.<BR/> <BR/>"and then he used that attribution to justify your charge of theological noncognitivism."<BR/><BR/>No, I didn't, and I already explained that I didn't. Now Steve just won't accept the truth.<BR/><BR/>The fact is, I have yet to see anyone define "the supernatural" or "God" in a way that makes sense.<BR/><BR/>It's an open challenge to all of you: put a definition of the word "God" on the table, and let's see if we can make heads or tails of it.<BR/><BR/>Any takers?Jason Streitfeldhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06950357341620206095noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-26258143510659861452008-11-29T11:59:00.000-05:002008-11-29T11:59:00.000-05:00Steve says I "have no competence to be presenting ...Steve says I "have no competence to be presenting [my] own arguments about the foundations of mathematics or Gödel’s theorem."<BR/><BR/>His justification for deeming me incompetent? The fact that my undergraduate degree is in Literary and Cultural Studies, and that I did not complete my graduate studies in Philosophy.<BR/><BR/>Right, because after all, anybody who decides that they can learn a whole lot more about a subject outside of academia must not be able to present a valid argument about that subject.<BR/><BR/>Indeed.Jason Streitfeldhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06950357341620206095noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-44565047622989005482008-11-29T11:55:00.000-05:002008-11-29T11:55:00.000-05:00Steve says, "If you think an apple is “manifested”...Steve says, "If you think an apple is “manifested” in physical reality, then you’re a dualist. The physical manifestation would be a concrete property-instance of an abstract property."<BR/><BR/>That's only if you beg the question and assume that everything that exists is a physical manifestation of a Platonic form.<BR/><BR/>But as I keep showing, there is no reason to make this assumption, and the implications of the assumption are problematic.<BR/><BR/>Steve's use of the term "manifest" is itself quite problematic.<BR/><BR/>Consider: Steve refers to the brain's "physical manifestations of the mind." In Steve's view, this means that brains are physical versions of abstract entities, called "minds."<BR/><BR/>Now, steve will also tell you that an apple is a physical manifestation of an abstract apple. So, again, the physical apple is a manifestation of an abstract entity, namely, an apple.<BR/><BR/>Now, unless Steve has invented a new term for an abstract apple (perhaps he calls them "abapples"), Steve uses one word here: "apple."<BR/><BR/>But now Steve uses two words when it comes to the mind. First there's the physical brain. Then there's the mind.<BR/><BR/>This is confusing.<BR/><BR/>If the brain is just one physical instance of a mind, then why not admit that a person's mind is actually occuring in their brain?<BR/><BR/>Isn't that the same as saying that a person's apple is actually occuring in their fruit basket?<BR/><BR/>No, Steve wants his mind to be somewhere else. The logic of his position does not seem to be on his side, however.Jason Streitfeldhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06950357341620206095noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-79395809390230247672008-11-29T11:45:00.000-05:002008-11-29T11:45:00.000-05:00Steve says, "Mathematical proof isn’t based on obs...Steve says, "Mathematical proof isn’t based on observable evidence (to take one example)."<BR/><BR/>Show me a mathematical proof that is not observable, please.<BR/><BR/>Show me any instance in which an unobservable mathematical proof has been accepted.Jason Streitfeldhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06950357341620206095noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-66461129583955124432008-11-29T11:42:00.000-05:002008-11-29T11:42:00.000-05:00I said, "Steve rejects the requirement that we sup...I said, "Steve rejects the requirement that we support our answers with evidence."<BR/><BR/>Steve challenges me to quote him saying that.<BR/><BR/>Here are the relevant quotes:<BR/><BR/>First, Steve says, "There are cases in which murder and justified homicide are empirically indistinguishable. The distinguishing factor is the motive of the respective parties, and motives are nonempirical."<BR/><BR/>To elaborate on this point, Steve said, "Motives involve a private, first-person perspective, not a public third-person perspective."<BR/><BR/>So, in order to draw conclusions about a person's motives, we cannot rely on public, third-person information.<BR/><BR/>Since we're talking about legal decisions here, the relevant definition of "evidence" is the legal one:<BR/><BR/>"data presented to a court or jury in proof of the facts in issue and which may include the testimony of witnesses, records, documents, or objects." (<A HREF="http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/evidence" REL="nofollow">source</A>)<BR/><BR/>Clearly, in legal terms, evidence must be presentable to a court or jury. That means it must be third-person information.<BR/><BR/>Thus, Steve rejects the requirement that we support our legal answers with evidence.<BR/><BR/>Perhaps Steve wants to draw a distinction here. Maybe he wants to concede the argument about legal decisions, and talk instead about non-legal moral judgments about motives.<BR/><BR/>Maybe Steve thinks we can judge a person's motives with some other kind of evidence, some non-empirical evidence.<BR/><BR/>What counts as non-empirical evidence in Steve's book, then?<BR/><BR/>He has referred to intuition when talking about how mathematicians work. (Not like intuition is peculiar to mathematics, of course). So, maybe he thinks that intuition tells us when something is evil or not.<BR/><BR/>He cannot be sure what is in a person's mind. Even if he asks them, they could lie. So he must go on intuition.<BR/><BR/>Of course, people often disagree about whether or not something is evil. Our intuitions don't seem to match up a lot of the time. Does this mean that some people are simply good, and some are simply evil?<BR/><BR/>In that case, by what right does Steve have to presume that he is good and that another person is evil?<BR/><BR/>On what basis can he justify his intuitive judgments about evilness?<BR/><BR/>Where are Steve's grounds for moral superiority?Jason Streitfeldhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06950357341620206095noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-91618909256220425472008-11-29T11:38:00.000-05:002008-11-29T11:38:00.000-05:00PAUL C SAID [quoting me]: “There is nothing for me...PAUL C SAID [quoting me]: “There is nothing for me to answer since your point assumes what it needs to prove—that we can determine motives on a purely empirical basis.”<BR/><BR/>Paul C: “No, it assumes no such thing.”<BR/><BR/>Hays: Of course it does. You’ve made that explicit claim on several occasions now—appealing to empiricism as the only way to determine motives.<BR/><BR/>Paul C: “You now claim that: ‘You've asserted that, but you've furnished no argument. Motives involve private states of mind. Any attempt to ascertain motives will go beyond empirical resources’.”<BR/><BR/>Hays: “Now” claim? No, that’s been my argument all along. Motives are private mental states, involving privileged access. <BR/><BR/>Paul C: “I challenge you to explain how a court of law would ascertain the motives of an individual in any given situation without relying on empirical process.”<BR/><BR/>Hays: For someone who’s so big on empiricism, you’re not very observant or attentive. You’d make a lousy juror. <BR/><BR/>I already addressed the question some time ago:<BR/><BR/>http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2008/11/secular-scumbags.html#3990737697006000772stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16547070544928321788noreply@blogger.com