tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post63490659996690018..comments2024-03-27T17:15:37.606-04:00Comments on Triablogue: The Fallacies of Arminian Apologetics – Fallacy #1Ryanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17809283662428917799noreply@blogger.comBlogger11125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-62156517991204659692009-06-20T14:11:20.847-04:002009-06-20T14:11:20.847-04:00GODISMYJUDGE SAID:
“Your response leads me to bel...GODISMYJUDGE SAID:<br /><br />“Your response leads me to believe you move away from exhaustive determinism.”<br /><br />You’re confusing two different issues. God’s exhaustive predetermination of the future doesn’t mean that God’s own choices are predetermined. Rather, God’s choices (exhaustively) predetermine the future. It’s the difference between:<br /><br />i) An agent is predetermined to do X<br /><br />And:<br /><br />ii) An agent predetermines X<br /><br />Why is that elementary distinction so difficult for you to absorb?<br /><br />God’s actions are not predetermined. Rather, his actions predetermine the state of the world.<br /><br />God is necessary, the world is contingent.<br /><br />“Is there something holding you back from affirming God's choices could have been otherwise (i.e. affirming God has LFW)?”<br /><br />I’ve said on many occasions that God could have done otherwise. That’s not a sufficient definition of libertarian freedom.<br /><br />i) Libertarian freedom doesn’t merely mean freedom to do otherwise, but freedom to do otherwise under the same circumstances. But God isn’t choosing for a set of preexisting circumstances. Rather, divine choice is responsible for whatever concrete circumstances come into being.<br /><br />ii) Likewise, the freedom to do otherwise, in and of itself, would include the freedom to choose either good or evil. That’s inapplicable to God.<br /><br />“In one sense agree with your circumstances comment, but I have always thought God's nature yields various possible worlds (aka natural knowledge) and He chooses one of them. Thus God's 'options' are natural not volitional. I am not sure if your comment was intended to say the possible worlds themselves are a product of His choice or not.”<br /><br />As I’ve said before, possible worlds are a way of expressing what God could possibility do, given his omnipotence. He chooses which possible world to instantiate given his self-knowledge of his own omnipotence. <br /><br />Once again, that’s hardly comparable to human freedom, even if you attribute libertarian freedom to human beings–which I don’t.stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16547070544928321788noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-19993230819873455062009-06-20T13:05:39.891-04:002009-06-20T13:05:39.891-04:00Hi Steve,
Your response leads me to believe you m...Hi Steve,<br /><br />Your response leads me to believe you move away from exhaustive determinism. Is there something holding you back from affirming God's choices could have been otherwise (i.e. affirming God has LFW)?<br /><br />In one sense agree with your circumstances comment, but I have always thought God's nature yields various possible worlds (aka natural knowledge) and He chooses one of them. Thus God's 'options' are natural not volitional. I am not sure if your comment was intended to say the possible worlds themselves are a product of His choice or not. <br /><br />God be with you,<br />DanGodismyjudgehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05310455924556730920noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-88585197045972691542009-06-19T15:32:26.194-04:002009-06-19T15:32:26.194-04:00GODISMYJUDGE SAID:
“Determinate and indeterminate...GODISMYJUDGE SAID:<br /><br />“Determinate and indeterminate seem like mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories. Are you suggesting there is some third category we don't know about or perhaps this is a logical paradox?”<br /><br />i) Nothing predetermines God. And nothing predetermines what he will do. Rather, his choices result in predeterminate outcomes.<br /><br />ii) Human agents must act according to the situation in which they find themselves. Much of the time they don’t get to choose their circumstances. Much of the time that’s something determined by forces beyond their control.<br /><br />By contrast, God is never confronted with a set of preexisting circumstances. Rather, God chooses the circumstances. <br /><br />iii) Although there’s nothing which predetermines what God will do, there are some things which God can’t do due to his wisdom and goodness.stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16547070544928321788noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-32140015201104764482009-06-19T14:21:34.978-04:002009-06-19T14:21:34.978-04:00Hi Steve,
God's freedom is sui generis. It do...Hi Steve,<br /><br /><i>God's freedom is sui generis. It doesn't fall into either model of human agent theory, whether libertarian or determinist.</i><br /><br />Determinate and indeterminate seem like mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories. Are you suggesting there is some third category we don't know about or perhaps this is a logical paradox?<br /><br />God be with you,<br />DanGodismyjudgehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05310455924556730920noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-975186053002354432009-06-17T18:55:47.584-04:002009-06-17T18:55:47.584-04:00I think Hendryx simply has the Arminian over a bar...I think Hendryx simply has the Arminian over a barrel here and this is only one of two reactions they can take and maintain their system.<br /><br />Either they must admit that the reason they're saved is that they earned it through their goodness or choice, or they can attempt to wiggle out of answering as Thibodaux tries here.<br /><br />Thibodaux states: "the defining property of a libertarian decision is that nothing caused it to be one way or another except the person’s own will"... that's like answering that that the "ice cream is vanilla" when asked where it came from. We know it's vanilla, we asked from whence it came.<br /><br />To claim that "nothing caused it to be one way or the other" fails to grasp that the "person's own will" is never truly free in a libertarian sense, that is, there are always external (and internal) forces at work on that will. Why does Thibodaux eat the ice cream? Cause he likes vanilla... his appreciation of the flavor of vanilla is one reason he ate it.<br /><br />We all know that, in Thibodaux's worldview, he is saved is because he willed it to be... the question stands, but why? Why did he will it to be whereas others with the same exact opportunity and <i>prevenient</i> grace reject?<br /><br />Thibodaux must answer the question, for it is at the heart of the synergism vs monergism debate. Did he 'accept' because he was more spiritual, more holy or lucky? What was it about him that caused him to choose?<br /><br />He cannot say that equal opportunity wasn't given, for is that not the foundation of their supposed system... fairness?Lockheedhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05433104440503646253noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-91554256882891115012009-06-17T15:18:00.503-04:002009-06-17T15:18:00.503-04:00Yes, on this view, freedom of choice is like a raf...Yes, on this view, freedom of choice is like a raffle. You pick a ticket out of the rotating basket at random.stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16547070544928321788noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-1045808385087201182009-06-17T15:07:24.781-04:002009-06-17T15:07:24.781-04:00Steve,
That's what I was wondering about re: ...Steve,<br /><br />That's what I was wondering about re: your last two points.<br /><br />If there is not reason or motive for ones choice is it still a choice? Wouldn't the action just be a random action?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-149104846965674452009-06-17T15:04:17.129-04:002009-06-17T15:04:17.129-04:00Two additional problems:
i) If he's defining ...Two additional problems:<br /><br />i) If he's defining the will as the faculty that chooses, then it's tautologous to say the will causes us to choose.<br /><br />ii) Moreover, if he's defining will in contrast to reasons, such that our reasons don't cause us to choose, but only a sheer will, then he loses the element of rationality which is a standard condition of free choice even by libertarian criteria.stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16547070544928321788noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-44084852921820831412009-06-17T14:00:41.475-04:002009-06-17T14:00:41.475-04:00No, I've repeatedly said that God's freedo...No, I've repeatedly said that God's freedom is sui generis. It doesn't fall into either model of human agent theory, whether libertarian or determinist.stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16547070544928321788noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-30008813787575791282009-06-17T14:00:07.087-04:002009-06-17T14:00:07.087-04:00A causal account fails to salvage Josh's posit...A causal account fails to salvage Josh's position from the objection of Hendryx. Hendryx asked what "motives" a human agent to believe X, or what principle "in him" makes him choose the way he does.<br /><br />Those would be causal factors, but factors internal to the agent. If Josh espouses a causal account of libertarianism, then he can't object to the way in which Hendryx framed the question. <br /><br />And once you endorse a causal account, then that only pushes the question back a step. Did the agent choose to have that belief, intention, or desire which, in turn, causes him to make other choices? If he didn't choose what causes him to make other choices, then the incentive for libertarianism is lost.stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16547070544928321788noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-30849936286785890352009-06-17T13:48:26.054-04:002009-06-17T13:48:26.054-04:00Dear Steve,
Last we spoke, I believe you mentione...Dear Steve,<br /><br />Last we spoke, I believe you mentioned you thought God has LFW. How do you avoid the argument from luck?<br /><br />The quotes you provide argue against non-causal accounts and Josh provided a causal account: "nothing caused it to be one way or another except the person’s own will". As such, perhaps Clarke's comments about Oconner would be more approprate then his comments about McCann.<br /><br />God be with you,<br />DanGodismyjudgehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05310455924556730920noreply@blogger.com