tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post5441260292537070673..comments2024-03-27T17:15:37.606-04:00Comments on Triablogue: You're Irrational!Ryanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17809283662428917799noreply@blogger.comBlogger7125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-90552653276755704572008-04-18T13:20:00.000-04:002008-04-18T13:20:00.000-04:00Paul, You said "God reveals P to me." How do you ...Paul, <BR/><BR/>You said "God reveals P to me." How do you know that P is what God has revealed?<BR/><BR/>Also, if P implies ~Q, and you think God has revealed both P and Q, then is it not true that your solution involves some doubt of either P or Q? In fact, the solution you seem to give is to say (P & Q) is not the case, but rather (P1 & Q), or (P & Q1), or (P1 & Q1), or some combinations that is not exactly P & Q.<BR/><BR/>Given that, then it remains irrational to assert (P & Q) when you also believe that <BR/>Q->~P and P->~Q. <BR/><BR/>Now if Anderson's book is not saying we have warrant to believe P & Q when they are contradictory, then why go through the trouble of "making the explicit the equivocation". Doesn't that step really cast doubt on our understanding of P and Q simple because they are contradictory as given. <BR/><BR/>So you're now claiming a reasonable solution is possible, but your hedging at bit on saying that a reasonable solution is also reasonably conceivable (believable because it is logical, non-contradictory, understandable, and not so ambiguous to be meaningless). And what ever the solution, it still means we can only reasonable believe other than P & Q is the case.Civberthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05472053836577852035noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-10128493546942805062008-04-18T12:49:00.000-04:002008-04-18T12:49:00.000-04:00Paul,When I say my argument still stands, it means...Paul,<BR/><BR/>When I say my argument still stands, it means I have confidence that my argument, as given, is sufficient for making my case - even in consideration of your "rebuttal". Simply saying you have refuted me, does not mean your refutation was effective. It's a fairly common tactic to claim X has refuted Y, as if it is a given that X has clearly proven Y is wrong, when it is more often the case that X has simply given a counter argument that may or may not have been an effective response. <BR/><BR/><BR/>So I believe my argument still stands. That is my opinion. You disagree. That is your opinion. OK?Civberthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05472053836577852035noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-64335623524087498522008-04-17T21:40:00.000-04:002008-04-17T21:40:00.000-04:00Hi Civbert,Saying your arguments stands doesn't me...Hi Civbert,<BR/><BR/>Saying your arguments stands doesn't mean it does.<BR/><BR/>Where's the argument that it is irrational to believe what you believe is not a real contradiction?<BR/><BR/>If you think IP is self-evident, then you don't know what self-evidency is.<BR/><BR/>Your argument for IP was rebutted since we don't believe that the claims are false. I showed this.<BR/><BR/><I>"I'd say if S believes that component parts of P appear to be contradictory, and he does not have a reasonable (or even a non-heterodox) way to resolve this apparent contradiction, then S is "warranted" in believing that the component parts of P can not be true. Correct?"</I><BR/><BR/>Incorrect, for the reasons spelled out in this post, the review, and the book.<BR/><BR/><I>"A reasonable solution has to be conceivable, even if not provable, for you to show that believing P is not irrational."</I><BR/><BR/>What does this mean?<BR/><BR/>Anderson did point out possible solutions. So, I could conceive of how P <I>might</I> be resolved. It's just that, presently, we have no revelation to this effect. So, they are unresolved for me.<BR/><BR/>Thus, no solutions are endorsed since I have no warrant to endorse any...and remain orthodox or avoid paradox.<BR/><BR/>Furthermore, as Anderson said, they are resolved in the mind of God. So, they are *in fact* resolvable and resolved, even if *I* don't know how that is.<BR/><BR/>Thus I believe in paradoxical doctrines that are in fact resolved..in God's mind.<BR/><BR/>God reveals P to me. God says all the component parts are true. I trust God. I take his word for it. I don't believe the component claims are false. I don't believe we have a real contradiction. I believe they are ultimately resolved in his mind. I believe all of this with warrant. Where's the irrationality?<BR/><BR/>Lastly, I might as well point out that on your Scripturalist assumptions, you don't *know* that:<BR/><BR/>1. IP is self-evident.<BR/><BR/>2. if S believes that component parts of P appear to be contradictory, and he does not have a reasonable (or even a non-heterodox) way to resolve this apparent contradiction, then S is "warranted" in believing that the component parts of P can not be true.<BR/><BR/>3. A reasonable solution has to be conceivable, even if not provable, for you to show that believing P is not irrational<BR/><BR/>On Scripturalist assumptions you don't *know* 1 --> 3.Errorhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10615233201833238198noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-88254760082819918552008-04-17T20:22:00.000-04:002008-04-17T20:22:00.000-04:00Wow! Sorry. My mistake. However, my argument sti...Wow! Sorry. My mistake. However, my argument still stands. I can add more, but it's still simply the case that it's irrational to believe what you also believe is contradictory. You can't have your cake and eat it too. <BR/><BR/>Dr. Anderson said it: <I>"As for Van Til, I believe he would say that there are reasonable solutions to the paradoxes, and these solutions are known by God (of course), <B>but that we do not presently have access to those solutions,</B> either because of a lack of information or because of limitations in our cognitive apparatus (or both). </I><BR/><BR/>And I think it <I>is</I> self-evident, that as Dr. Anderson said: <I>"(IP) Necessarily, if S believes some set of claims P that appear to be inconsistent, but S is not aware of any way to remove the appearance of inconsistency without abandoning one or more of the claims, then S is irrational to continue to believe all of the claims in P."</I><BR/> <BR/>But I did not assume it was evident to all, so I gave a reasonable and clear argument for it. It is difficult sometimes to explain what seems apparent, but it appears also that it takes thousands of words (a whole book even) to "refute" self-evident truths. And asserting that my argument was an assertion is not an argument. :) We've been over that. <BR/><BR/>Dr. Anderson, you said "if S is strongly warranted in believing the individual claims of P, then S thereby has a reason to believe that the apparent inconsistency is merely apparent and not real."<BR/><BR/>I'd say if S believes that component parts of P appear to be contradictory, and he does not have a reasonable (or even a non-heterodox) way to resolve this apparent contradiction, then S is "warranted" in believing that the component parts of P can not be true. Correct? You say you did not "commit" on this in your book, but I it seems critical for defending the rationality of believing paradoxical statements. A reasonable solution has to be conceivable, even if not provable, for you to show that believing P is not irrational.Civberthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05472053836577852035noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-61348226615289107902008-04-17T17:08:00.000-04:002008-04-17T17:08:00.000-04:00Anthony,If my rule was that I could only respond t...Anthony,<BR/><BR/>If my rule was that I could only respond to arguments I felt were "compelling,' then I would probably have 1 or 2 posts on atheism, Arminianism, etc., rather than the few hundred I have.<BR/><BR/>I'm not an argumentist. That is, I'm not prejudiced towards only "good" arguments. I believe in equal treatment refutation.<BR/><BR/>Further, it is a fact of history that people get swayed by bad arguments all the time. So, those willing to address said bad arguments are needed lest the bad arguments obtain a following.<BR/><BR/>Finally, I can't stop you from thinking the argument still "holds up." But since I have directly rebutted your main point viz. we must believe one of the propositions to be false, then you must think your argument is suspended in mid-air. Abracadabra.Errorhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10615233201833238198noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-3430318123562332892008-04-17T15:51:00.000-04:002008-04-17T15:51:00.000-04:00Paul, I appreciate your posting my argument to yo...Paul, <BR/><BR/>I appreciate your posting my argument to your blog. It seems that you believe my argument was compelling enough that you should to respond to it. Even Dr. Anderson felt it warranted a response. I'll take that as a compliment. <BR/><BR/>I would prefer you cite the source of your quote. I make a point of putting my name to my posts to keep myself accountable for whatever I write. You might want to also add a link back to the original comments section of Rev. Lane Keister's "Green Baggins" blog so people can read all of our discussion. However, what you quoted covers it fairly well and I think it still holds up. <BR/><BR/>In Christ,<BR/><BR/>Anthony Coletti<BR/>Jonesborough, TN<BR/><BR/><I>(I'm a member of Midway Presbyterian Church and a "Clarkian" (Gordon H. Clark ).</I>Civberthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05472053836577852035noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-83371440034249278652008-04-17T08:40:00.000-04:002008-04-17T08:40:00.000-04:00The objection you quote isn't so much an argument ...The objection you quote isn't so much an argument as an assertion in search of an argument. The objection makes an implicit appeal to some epistemic principle like this:<BR/><BR/><B>(IP) Necessarily, if S believes some set of claims P that appear to be inconsistent, but S is not aware of any way to remove the appearance of inconsistency without abandoning one or more of the claims, then S is irrational to continue to believe all of the claims in P.</B><BR/><BR/>Now that's a pretty strong claim. It's not trivially true, if true at all. Why should we accept it without any argument to support it? (No supporting argument is given in the quotation.) Is it supposed to be self-evident? An indubitable truth of reason? A universally held intuition?<BR/><BR/>As you say, I give a bunch of reasons <I>not</I> to accept IP (or anything close) in the latter chapters of the book, all with respect to defensible accounts of epistemic warrant and rationality.<BR/><BR/>One point the objection misses, for example, is that if S is strongly warranted in believing the individual claims of P, then S <I>thereby</I> has a reason to believe that the apparent inconsistency is <I>merely apparent</I> and not real.<BR/><BR/>As for Van Til, I believe he would say that there <I>are</I> reasonable solutions to the paradoxes, and these solutions are known by God (of course), but that we do not <I>presently</I> have access to those solutions, either because of a lack of information or because of limitations in our cognitive apparatus (or both). Whether we will ever have access to such solutions is an open question, I think; although perhaps Van Til has some insight into the question <I>now</I> that he didn't have in this life. :) In any event, I don't commit myself one way or the other in the book on <I>that</I> issue.<BR/><BR/>Thanks again for the review, Paul, and your interaction with some of the critics!James Andersonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08026082657858307342noreply@blogger.com