tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post50917163549158239..comments2024-03-27T17:15:37.606-04:00Comments on Triablogue: What Logic Requires Us To Believe About The Existence of God--Part 3Ryanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17809283662428917799noreply@blogger.comBlogger10125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-40951802409679540922007-08-31T20:29:00.000-04:002007-08-31T20:29:00.000-04:00Apolonio said:---Cool. Sorry if I read too much in...Apolonio said:<BR/>---<BR/>Cool. Sorry if I read too much into it.<BR/>---<BR/><BR/>No need to apologize :-) Actually, I enjoy philosophical discussion. It just turns out that most other people <I>don't</I>. And I will acknowledge I am still sorting through certain portions of my entire argument, and if you can convince me that I erred at some point I would be more than happy to change.<BR/><BR/>In any case, you said:<BR/>---<BR/>You said that if I am not a self-existent being, then causation must follow. One may reply this way. First, that's not intuitive.<BR/>---<BR/><BR/>I disagree--I think it's the most intuitive answer. Think of it this way: if we assume that all we perceive is real and has actual existence and is not just some kind of imaginary thought or illusion, what we see everywhere we look is <I>ex nihilo nihil fit</I>--out of nothing, nothing comes. This has lead some people to posit that everything must have a cause (although this is logically invalid, as it puts us into an infinite redux problem too--if you want details I can provide, but I think you already know this).<BR/><BR/>Despite that, the overwhelming perception is that nothing gets you nothing and that everything comes from something else. Intuition would lead us to think that this must always be the case; but logic tells us we enter into infinite redux problems unless something is outside the loop, so to speak.<BR/><BR/>So I would disagree as to which view is more intuiative--but then, intuition isn't "proof" so this doesn't do anything for the argument.<BR/><BR/>Apolonio said:<BR/>---<BR/>Second, there is certainly a way where I can be a non self-existent being and still have no causation following. Suppose I am a property of X. X would *entail* my existence. But we would not say that X causes my existence. Rather, what we would say is that X is a sufficient reason why I exist. There is a difference between ground-consequent and causation. So, one can say that I do not need a cause but I do have a ground for my existence. Of course one can say that I am not a property of X, but the point is that there need not be causation.<BR/>---<BR/><BR/>If we propose that I am a property of X, then the question must immediately become "Where did X come from?" This seems to be, therefore, another sub-set of the "self-existent" category. For instance, we could say: "(4) I am a property of a some other being that is self-existent" but we are still left with something being self-existent. (And this should also be read with the unexpressed idea of the chain of length <I>n</I> between X and the self-existent being as previously defined too.) Again, while this <I>could</I> have been stated in the original post, I think it would have caused confusion rather than understanding for most of our readers. After all, philosophy is hard enough for the average person to care about without piling it all on on top of them!<BR/><BR/>Apolonio said:<BR/>---<BR/>Also, you spoke of an infinite chain being logically impossible. But I think what you are speaking of is metaphysical possibility/impossibility.<BR/>---<BR/><BR/>Allow me to clarify: It's logically impossible for our concepts of space/time to be compatible with an infinite chain, as the two premises are contradictory. Naturally, one could argue either that our notion of space/time is flawed or that an infinite chain is impossible. I have chosen the latter, since I believe the former has already been established. However, to the extent that the validity of our concepts of space/time requires a metaphysical view, then you are correct that this is a <I>metaphysical</I> argument. The logical impossibility would be between the metaphysical idea of space/time and the idea of an infinite chain.<BR/><BR/>Apolonio said:<BR/>---<BR/>If you're interested in zeno's paradox and infinities...<BR/>---<BR/><BR/>Thanks, I'll check the link out. And on a similar note, have you read <I>The Motion Paradox</I> by Mauzer (I forget his first name)? It is useful at showing the quantized nature of time as it applies to Zeno's paradoxes too.<BR/><BR/>Apolonio said:<BR/>---<BR/>Oh, and also...you spoke of me being irrational if I don't have a sufficient reason.<BR/>---<BR/><BR/>Actually, I said you would be "unreasonable" not "irrational." My response was attempting to keep the correlation between the term you used ("sufficient reason") and the response I gave ("unreasonable"). I agree that if I said you were illogical or irrational that would require arguing for, as I would have to illustrate why it is illogical and irrational to be illogical (which I think can be done--but why bother when the word "unreasonable" works perfectly well?) :-)<BR/><BR/>Apolonio proposed:<BR/>---<BR/>in every event or object, there must be a *necessary* reason for its existence. so instead of sufficient reason, we look for a necessary reason.<BR/>---<BR/><BR/>At first glance, this does seem valid. I'll think on it some more and let you know if I end up with anything :-)Peter Pikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11792036365040378473noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-86332180756477049912007-08-31T18:54:00.000-04:002007-08-31T18:54:00.000-04:00Bah! 42 is so cliche!Bah! 42 is so cliche!Matheteshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13527032591499860552noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-37973488628165960592007-08-31T18:53:00.000-04:002007-08-31T18:53:00.000-04:00Oh, and also...you spoke of me being irrational if...Oh, and also...you spoke of me being irrational if I don't have a sufficient reason. Well, that needs arguing for. Of course that would go through a lot of things that might go beyond the scope of your posts. But it may not be irrational, maybe it's just...non-rational. There is a difference. But what do you think about this:<BR/><BR/>in every event or object, there must be a *necessary* reason for its existence. so instead of sufficient reason, we look for a necessary reason. for more, see hawthorne's principle of necessary reason.Aphttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04226017144967122488noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-2149913435993874592007-08-31T18:50:00.000-04:002007-08-31T18:50:00.000-04:00Peter,Cool. Sorry if I read too much into it. Let ...Peter,<BR/><BR/>Cool. Sorry if I read too much into it. Let me give a little reply.<BR/><BR/>You said that if I am not a self-existent being, then causation must follow. One may reply this way. First, that's not intuitive. Second, there is certainly a way where I can be a non self-existent being and still have no causation following. Suppose I am a property of X. X would *entail* my existence. But we would not say that X causes my existence. Rather, what we would say is that X is a sufficient reason why I exist. There is a difference between ground-consequent and causation. So, one can say that I do not need a cause but I do have a ground for my existence. Of course one can say that I am not a property of X, but the point is that there need not be causation. <BR/><BR/>Also, you spoke of an infinite chain being logically impossible. But I think what you are speaking of is metaphysical possibility/impossibility. <BR/><BR/>As for the other infinity and the existence of numbers, I'll let that go for now because I don't want my head to start spinning and I don't want to open another can of worms...It *is* Friday.. :-)<BR/><BR/>If you're interested in zeno's paradox and infinities, see:<BR/><BR/>http://fas-philosophy.rutgers.edu/arntzeni/<BR/><BR/>Go down to the draft of book chapters. He presented it to the seminar I was in. It's very good and changed the way I thought. Again, it seems that I still lean towards Aristotle on infinity but there are some problems I still have to face.Aphttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04226017144967122488noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-109351080934952602007-08-31T18:03:00.000-04:002007-08-31T18:03:00.000-04:00Shows what Mathetes knows.The answer is always 42....Shows what Mathetes knows.<BR/><BR/>The answer is always 42.Peter Pikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11792036365040378473noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-40228920923178129222007-08-31T17:23:00.000-04:002007-08-31T17:23:00.000-04:00Apolonio,Don't listen to Peter. The answer is "eig...Apolonio,<BR/><BR/>Don't listen to Peter. The answer is "eight".Matheteshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13527032591499860552noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-52316935547730180872007-08-31T16:09:00.000-04:002007-08-31T16:09:00.000-04:00Apolonio said:---I think what you mean is that “If...Apolonio said:<BR/>---<BR/>I think what you mean is that “If I am self-existent, then I necessarily contain the attribute of existence.” Now, you did say that in the next sentence....<BR/>---<BR/><BR/>Which makes this "objection" (not sure I'd actually call it that, but I can't think of a better word at the moment) is really a stylistic difference. I should note that my posts are not designed to address every single philosophical issue here. Rather, they stem from the fact that I've used a much simpler form of the entire discussion and had e-mails from non-philosophers who asked if I could expand it. I could have responded with philosophical jargon, but that would not have helped them; this is why my style is more "populus" based at the moment, although I'm trying not to go too simple either (given the subject matter, I don't think that's really possible anyway...) ;-)<BR/><BR/>Apolonio said:<BR/>---<BR/>First, in asking “where did my existence come from?” one may say that you are already assuming the principle of Causation (PC). One might say that you have not provided an argument for that. Maybe the reason for the existence of myself is not a causal explanation. <BR/>---<BR/><BR/>In which case I would say this is equivalent to stating that I am self-existent, which is one of the three categories I gave. In other words, if I am not a self-existent being (and since self-creation is illogical) then the causation <I>must</I> follow.<BR/><BR/>Both the self-existent and self-created categories do not rely on causation. Non-causal arguments would apply into one of them (although feel free to demonstrate how existence can be non-self-existent and yet also non-caused).<BR/><BR/>Apolonio said:<BR/>---<BR/>Take:<BR/>(4) I am created by a contingent being<BR/><BR/>Of course you go into this with regards to infinity and such which I will come back on later. However, (4) is definitely a possibility. <BR/>---<BR/><BR/>Actually, the point about this with regards to infinity is why I didn't mention it explicitly as one of the three options. At some point, you are still left with the origin on the chain being self-existent. While this does not mean that my own existence would be directly from a self-existent being with no intermediate steps, my existence is, at some point, bound to that self-existent being. The logic of the argument doesn't change if we add in any chain of length <I>n</I> (where <I>n</I> is >= 0 and < infinity) and reword it to:<BR/><BR/>(3) My existence is contingent upon a self-existent being after <I>n</I> number of intermediate steps of non-self-existent beings.<BR/><BR/>Stating it in this manner would have required more explanation at this point in my post than I felt warranted by my target audience, which is why I did not include it explicitly but instead only gave the example of why an infinite chain would not be logically possible.<BR/><BR/>Apolonio said:<BR/>---<BR/>Also, take the example of the number 2. Does one ask “where does the number 2 come from?” Do they need to be created?<BR/>---<BR/><BR/>I don't believe that the number 2 has existence or being as has been defined so far. Remember, I am speaking in this post with a severely limited context. Existence has thus far only been established as that which is known by direct knowledge via perception (and as such, thus far I have only been able to prove that I exist, and that if <I>anything</I> exists then something must exist self-existently--I haven't even established yet whether I am that self-existent being or not, for the existence of other objects has not yet been "proven" by my argument). This is why I provided the links to the previous posts and why this post is "Part 3" instead of "Part 1" :-)<BR/><BR/>Apolonio said:<BR/>---<BR/>Suppose I am a being with no sufficient reason to exist. Is that illogical?<BR/>---<BR/><BR/>Depends on how you define logic here. (Again, I refer you to my first post so you can see how I am using this term here.)<BR/><BR/>Oh, and to answer the question, I would say it is "unreasonable" that a being without sufficient reason to exist would exist, in keeping with the framework of the sentence (i.e. It addresses reason rather than logic proper, so to jump from reason to logic in the answer is a category error).<BR/><BR/>Apolonio said:<BR/>---<BR/>Someone will respond: that’s not true. Take a line. A line is made up of points. Points are zero-sized.<BR/>---<BR/><BR/>But time is not zero-sized; it is quantized at Planck time. Remember, we are dealing with time as defined by "that which clocks measure" (i.e. physical processes) and since the Heisenburg principal shows we cannot measure smaller than Planck length, we cannot measure smaller than Planck time either (the length of time it takes light to go the Planck length).<BR/><BR/>By the way, quantization neutralizes all of Zeno's paradoxes :-) See, for instance, <A HREF="http://calvindude.com/dude/blog/2006/09/having-fun-with-infinity/" REL="nofollow">having Fun With Infinity</A>.<BR/><BR/>In any case, I appreciated your response (although your level of philosophical training was not the level I was originally writing to, which was for beginning philosophers). After I'm done with these series, if I have time I'll go over it more indepth to address the deeper philosophical questions.Peter Pikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11792036365040378473noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-31456527244600483442007-08-31T04:39:00.000-04:002007-08-31T04:39:00.000-04:00argh, correction: the second premise should look l...argh, correction: the second premise should look like:<BR/><BR/>[ ] P--> PAphttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04226017144967122488noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-11426874206367443842007-08-31T04:37:00.000-04:002007-08-31T04:37:00.000-04:00Oh, and also, I think with regards to causation, y...Oh, and also, I think with regards to causation, you can argue:<BR/><BR/>there is either always something at every t or nothing at some t.<BR/><BR/>Is this a good premise? Well, I don't know if the disjunction holds, it seems that it does. But, the question is, what exactly is "nothing"? Well, someone might say, a set with no existential value. Or, "an empty set." But that seems to be hard to grasp. Can we really speak of an empty *set*? So, maybe there must be something at every t. Of course the argument with this is that God exists outside of time (I don't know what your view on this is as other Christians like Craig, Woltersoff, etc have different views on God and time). However, I think one can adjust the premise above. I don't know. It does seem there is something there.Aphttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04226017144967122488noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-8850047136806653082007-08-31T04:28:00.000-04:002007-08-31T04:28:00.000-04:00Peter,Nice job. It’s a nice representation of the ...Peter,<BR/><BR/>Nice job. It’s a nice representation of the old argument from contingency. I do have some worries. First, let me refine what you said. You said, “If I am self-existent, then I contain as one of my attributes the attribute of existence.” Well, yes, that’s true, but non-self-existent beings also contains the attribute of existence; that is, because they exist. I think what you mean is that “If I am self-existent, then I necessarily contain the attribute of existence.” Now, you did say that in the next sentence, but you can also refine it this way, “If I am self-existent, then I essentially contain the attribute of existence.” Now, when you speak of containing the attribute of existence, it seems that you are speaking of existence as a property. So, this means that a self-existent being has existence as its essential property. Of course this will go to the problem of whether existence is a property or not. But that’s just a minor point, I think. <BR/><BR/>Now you said there are three possibilities:<BR/><BR/>1. I am self-created.<BR/>2. I am self-existent.<BR/>3. I am created by something else that is self-existent.<BR/><BR/>Here are some criticisms a skeptic might give. First, in asking “where did my existence come from?” one may say that you are already assuming the principle of Causation (PC). One might say that you have not provided an argument for that. Maybe the reason for the existence of myself is not a causal explanation. So I think one might object by saying that you have not provided a case why we should apply PC rather than, say, the principle of sufficient reason (PSR). Both are not the same thing (I think Anscombe also pointed this out in her critique of Lewis). I think it would be much better off if you used PSR rather than PC in this case. Second, those three are not just the three possibilities if by possibilities you mean logical possibility. Take:<BR/>(4) I am created by a contingent being<BR/><BR/>Of course you go into this with regards to infinity and such which I will come back on later. However, (4) is definitely a possibility. Suppose you created a robot. Now, that robot created object X (put in here whatever you want). Now, X was not created by me. It was created by the robot. One might ask, Why am I not like X? Why do I have to be either self-created, self-existent, or created by a necessary being? Why can’t I just have been created by a contingent being, like X being created by the robot? Before you go with the infinite explanation, you will have to speak of (4). (4) is definitely a logical possibility. Contingent beings create things all the time. Also, take the example of the number 2. Does one ask “where does the number 2 come from?” Do they need to be created? (I know Plantinga actually made an argument for God’s existence on numbers and properties, etc). Again, a heavy question that needs a lot of other explanations. So, one might say, does the number 3 either have to be created, self-exist, or self-created? If not, then why do I have to be? In other words, why am I not like abstract objects? So I think you have to say something along the lines of, concrete individuals that are not uncaused need an explanation for its existence. Of course, the question then becomes: why does there have to be be a sufficient reason for my existence? Suppose I am a being with no sufficient reason to exist. Is that illogical? No. Metaphysically counterintuitive? Maybe. Nonetheless, it does seem to defeat your position which is a *logical* argument. Again, I think it would be better if you are making an argument from metaphysical possibility and necessity rather than logical possibility and necessity. Metaphysical possibility is a bit “weaker” and that would be an advantage, I think. In fact, I think when you speak of logical, you seem to speak of metaphysics. <BR/><BR/>Now with infinity. I am created by my parents. We ask, are my parents self-existent? And so on to infinity. You then ask, why can’t we have an infinite series? Well, here are a couple of problems. First, maybe a *linear* infinite series cannot fulfill PSR but a non-linear infinite chain can fulfill PSR, say, like a web, like the way the Coherentists argue about epistemic justification. So why think that causation or SR has to be linear? If Coherentism is right, then a “web” infinite series may fulfill PSR. Just a though. Second, I actually lean towards the Aristotelian distinction between potential and actual infinity, but it is hard to define the difference once you look at it closely. Maybe you have an argument on this. Third, you said, <BR/><BR/>“But if it took an infinite amount of time to form, then we could not presently be in our current time—we would still be an infinite time in the past from this point!” <BR/> <BR/>Someone will respond: that’s not true. Take a line. A line is made up of points. Points are zero-sized. So, Zeno asks, “If 0+0+0+0…infinity..= 0, then how can there be a line?” Or, take a 2 feet line. From 1ft to 2ft, there are an infinite number of points. But we do not say, “if there is an infinite number of points, there would be no 2ft!” However, there is 2ft. So, it seems that it is in some way possible. Also, in mathematics, .1+.1+.1, infinity does equal to 1. That is what mathematicians tell me. I may be wrong, but that seems to be what mathematicians say. So one can counter your argument by saying that time is like a line. Or take the numbers between 1 and 2. Are they infinite? Yes. Are they actual? Well, yeah, because numbers are actual; not concrete, but actual. Why can’t concrete events or causes by like numbers? If you have an argument for this, I would like to hear it because I have been struggling with this for years. For more on this, see Frank Arntzenius’s stuff. I would also recommend Alex Pruss’s book on the principle of sufficient reason. <BR/><BR/>But I don’t want to leave in a simple criticism because I want your argument to succeed. In fact, I have made my own version of it when I debated an atheist. However, I have began to doubt my own argument. Here is something that might be worth looking at as it has been used by contemporary philosophers (Plantinga, Pruss, Gale, etc.) Take this argument:<BR/><BR/>< > [ ] P --> [ ] P<BR/><BR/>[ ] P--> [ ] P<BR/><BR/>< > [ ] P<BR/><BR/>[ ] P <BR/><BR/>P<BR/><BR/>Take argument is valid. The first premise is true. It is axiom S5. Now, Let P= there exists a supreme, intelligent, all-powerful, all-good, etc creator. Here you have a proof for God’s existence. Or, let P= God. <BR/><BR/>Is it sound? That’s the big question. There may be an equivocation on “possibility”, though, one of the premise being metaphysically possible but the other premises being logically possible. If that’s the case, then it’s no good. For more on this, see Alex Pruss/Gale’s cosmological argument. See also Robert Koons’s own cosmological argument. I think it would be better off if you use this type of argument, using axiom S5. Also, of course, the key premise would be:<BR/><BR/> < > [ ] P<BR/><BR/>Here, you will have to use, I think, PSR. Now, for arguments against PSR, cf. Conee/Sider Riddles of Existence.Aphttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04226017144967122488noreply@blogger.com