tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post4574212169265365124..comments2024-03-27T17:15:37.606-04:00Comments on Triablogue: Walls v. McCallRyanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17809283662428917799noreply@blogger.comBlogger1125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-16093665364556790552014-01-09T00:36:52.252-05:002014-01-09T00:36:52.252-05:00I assume this is stemming from the Helm/Craig dial...I assume this is stemming from the Helm/Craig dialogue? I understood Helm's point differently. McCall seems to be thinking that the objectors are looking for some explanation as to how God's knowledge forming process works, whether applied to agents like humans or tomorrow's weather. But I thought Helm was pointing to a special difficulty concerning *libertarian agents*. In other words, it's not just an issue of being ignorant of how God acquires his justified true beliefs (or what have you), but that there is something about libertarian agency that makes acquiring knowledge of their (libertarian) choices appear difficult if not impossible, regardless of how God's knowledge faculties work.<br /><br />And that would be something like the following:<br /><br />If Jones can choose x or ~x in circumstance C, then there is a possible world in which it is true that Jones chooses x and a possible world in which it is false that Jones chooses x. Supposing that God could pick out the possible world in which Jones chooses x in circumstance C (say this is world W), what's to prevent Jones from exercising his libertarian freedom to choose ~x? If Jones isn't determined in W and has the power of contrary choice there seems to be a problem in the very idea that there is a fixed truth value to a statement like "Jones will do x in circumstance C in W." And that's independent of how God acquires his knowledge.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com