tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post3940987478614506855..comments2024-03-27T17:15:37.606-04:00Comments on Triablogue: Divine permissionRyanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17809283662428917799noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-21837169464925907882009-08-25T19:40:01.793-04:002009-08-25T19:40:01.793-04:00Some quotes from Helm's debate with Hasker in ...Some quotes from Helm's debate with Hasker in the Blackwell Debates in Philosophy of Religion:<br /><br />First, the claim that an appeal to divine willing I the sense defined is a case of divine determinism. It is tempting, but I believe crude and misleading, to assimilate the working of such permission into intramundane models of causation, and particularly to general physical determinism. Such willing permission has this in common with determinism: that what is physically determined and what is willingly permitted will each, in virtue of the determinism and the occurrence of what is willingly permitted, come to pass. However, willingly to permit and action is not to cause that action; it is to provide necessary, but not sufficient , causal condition for the action. Whereas physical determinism has a string tendency to be reductionist and has difficulty in finding a place for a range of objects having their own causal powers, the divine willing permission is most certainly not reductionist in this sense” (ibid, 234).<br /><br />“One way of expressing this difference might be as follows. While it seems clear that intramundane causation is transitive, that if (where A, B, and C are events) A causes B, and B causes C. then A causes C, there is no necessary transivity in the case of any causal aspects or features of the divine willing permission, if there are any (there are some causal features if wicked people are upheld and conserved in being by God). It is not necessarily the case that of God governs by willingly permitting some event B, and B causes C, then God causes C; rather, God may will by permitting that B causes C and so willingly permit C. God’s willing permission is thus not a straightforward case of causation…” (ibid, 235)<br /><br />So those who hold that God governs whatever comes to pass may nevertheless make a distinction, within the overall government, between what God causes and what he permits. William Hasker says that the central idea of Calvinism is quite simple: ‘everything that happens, with no exceptions, is efficaciously determined by God in accordance with his eternal decrees.’ … To say that everything is risk-freely governed by God is not to say that everything is efficaciously determined by God” (ibid, 235).<br /><br />“So words like ‘cause’ or ‘decree’ or ‘permit,’ when used of God the uncreated cause, are used in rather different ways, with rather different logical implications, from those in which are ordinary notions of cause are used” (idid, 240).<br /><br />“It needs to be emphasized that to suppose that divine causation must be analogically related to ordinary causation between events is a perfectly general point about divine causation, and is not a case of special pleading on behalf of a no-risk position. For all theists, including Hasker, are faced with the problem of characterizing in a philosophically adequate manner the unparalleled causal feats of God’s creation of the universe ex nihilo, and of his conserving his creation in existence by upholding what he has created. It is hard to see that these are cases of ordinary causation, even supposing that we understand what ordinary causation is” (ibid, 241).Maul P.https://www.blogger.com/profile/15227129983621069565noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-57602597081044587102009-08-25T18:37:14.310-04:002009-08-25T18:37:14.310-04:00I tend to agree with Stephen. I'm not really c...I tend to agree with Stephen. I'm not really clear on what Paul means by saying that willing permission does not entail any kind of transitive causation. Neither am I clear on why he thinks it's necessary to maintain this. Admittedly, though, my knowledge of causality is a bit limited.<br /><br />Isn't it generally held in Calvinism that God's action is the primary cause for any sin, while man's action is the secondary cause (where primary and secondary refer to metaphysical priority)? Put another way, two causes of different kinds, God's action and Man's action are required to produce the effect of sin. God's action is an existential cause, and man's action is a natural cause:<br /><br />Man directly n-causes sin, where "n-cause" refers to the natural action of man's volitional faculties.<br /><br />God cannot directly n-cause sin because it would contravene his nature and is an incoherent concept.<br /><br />Man cannot e-cause sin, where "e-cause" refers to the unique existential action of God in instantiating something in reality.<br /><br />God directly e-causes sin.Dominic Bnonn Tennanthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03103838704540924679noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-91530156834915972812009-08-25T13:12:53.965-04:002009-08-25T13:12:53.965-04:00Dear Steve:
"Permitting" is a kind of &...Dear Steve:<br /><br />"Permitting" is a kind of "cause," especially in divine governement. If A cannot come to pass without the permission of B, then the coming to pass of A is dependent upon B. I hold a rock in my hand. I am keeping it from falling. If a rape cannot occur without my permission, then my permission becomes a kind of cause of the event. The herd of swine were permitted to enter the pigs. They could not have entered the pigs without this permission.<br /><br />Permissive will of God is still the will of God, of some sorts.<br /><br />Blessings,<br /><br />StephenStephen Garretthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10866698322854892197noreply@blogger.com