tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post2275989901201864764..comments2024-03-27T17:15:37.606-04:00Comments on Triablogue: The Nemes NemesisRyanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17809283662428917799noreply@blogger.comBlogger37125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-23397807729231693852011-08-11T10:28:54.462-04:002011-08-11T10:28:54.462-04:00"The only knowledge we can have of the compon...<i>"The only knowledge we can have of the components of the universe (e.g., deer, dogs, humans, etc.) is through our interaction with these things as we experience them in the natural order."</i><br /><br />So was the god-man (Jesus) not a component of the universe when he walked among us? Since he is still embodied forever as the god-man, is he not a "component" of the universe, being fully divine and fully human? I thought Aquinas would regulate knowledge here to faith, or revelation? Or would you just not say he's a component? Or that he's fully component, fully non-component? Or . . .Maul P.https://www.blogger.com/profile/15227129983621069565noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-68864038568936064942011-08-11T10:23:37.470-04:002011-08-11T10:23:37.470-04:00Hi Steven,
I just poped back in and saw this:
I ...Hi Steven,<br /><br />I just poped back in and saw this:<br /><br /><i>I deny the alleged invalidity of the is-ought [inference]. See Ed Feser:<br /><br />"From the traditional Thomistic point of view, however, there simply is no "fact/value distinction" in the first place. More precisely, there is no such thing as a purely "factual" description of reality utterly divorced from "value," for "value" is built into the structure of the "facts" from the get-go... No such gap, and thus no "fallacy" of inferring normative conclusions from "purely factual" premises, can exist given an Aristotelian-Thomistic essentialist and teleological conception of the world." (Aquinas, p. 175)</i><br /><br />I think:<br /><br />(a) It's not wise to deny the problematic inference<br /><br />and<br /><br />(b) That you've misunderstood Feser if you think he's denying the inference *per se*.<br /><br />Here's why:<br /><br />On (a), it just *is* fallacious to move *directly* from a *purely factual* premise to a *normative* conclusion. What rule of inference would allow this?<br /><br />On (b), I think Feser's right. This is because on Thomism there is no *purely* descriptive, for all things have *ends* or *purposes* or *proper* functions, thus, there is some inherent normativity to all of creation.<br /><br />So, I wouldn't put things the way you have. I'd say: "I don't deny the invalidity of the inference, but I don't think the problem arises for the Thomist since we're not moving *directly* from the *purely factual* to the *normative*, which would be fallacious if we did!"Maul P.https://www.blogger.com/profile/15227129983621069565noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-4996795978768786232011-08-10T23:09:05.904-04:002011-08-10T23:09:05.904-04:00STEVEN SAID:
“The only knowledge we can have of t...STEVEN SAID:<br /><br />“The only knowledge we can have of the components of the universe (e.g., deer, dogs, humans, etc.) is through our interaction with these things as we experience them in the natural order.”<br /><br />But when you make Olympian pronouncements like:<br /><br />“Forests, ecosystems, sawmills, etc., are not real things, so nothing is ‘really’ good for them.”<br /><br />And:<br /><br />“Nothing is a true thing with a nature if it has components that could exist and perform their functions independently of the existence of the whole.”<br /><br />And:<br /><br />“When I say that a bird qua bird does not tend towards death, I mean that it is not a part of the form of a bird, the essence of a bird, that it tend towards death.”<br /><br />And:<br /><br />“And it makes no sense to say that the final cause of a thing could be anything other than the well being of that thing. If something is the final cause of a thing, then attaining it is good for that thing; but nothing that involves a thing's annihilation is good for it, since the good is what improves the quality of a thing's existence, not ends it.”<br /><br />You didn’t arrive at these Olympian pronouncements through your interaction with biological organisms as you experience them in the natural order. You’re beginning with a top-down a priori theory rather than a bottom-up a posteriori theory. <br /><br />“It seems to me that this is a consequence of the presupposition of the intelligibility of the universe, which is a presupposition of our having any knowledge whatsoever. If we are to have knowledge of the universe, the universe must be intelligible; and since knowledge of the universe is simply knowledge of its components, then its components must be intelligible also.”<br /><br />How far to you take that? For instance, is quantum mechanics intelligible? What about philosophical paradoxes?stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16547070544928321788noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-29856151475895528012011-08-10T21:06:16.718-04:002011-08-10T21:06:16.718-04:00Cont. “The good for no thing can involve its annih...Cont. “The good for no thing can involve its annihilation (e.g., its being food for another being), since it can't benefit from its being annihilated since it no longer exists, and the good is what it benefits from, what improves the quality of its existence. So the good for a thing can only be something that it can have while being, which would be individual flourishing.”<br /><br />On the face of it, we inhabit a world where many things don’t exist for their own benefit, but for the benefit of other things. A world full of dispensable, disposable organisms. <br /><br />“I don't understand. In the present discussion, I am being offered objections to natural law ethics and I am attempting to respond from within a broadly hylemorphic metaphysic; then, when I offer a response, I am asked to offer reasons for believing the metaphysic in the first place! Doesn't this seem dialectically improper to you?”<br /><br />I think an elementary condition of good philosophy is that it be true. Not just toying with ideas for the sake of ideas. Not investing many painstaking man-hours decorating the interior of air castles. <br /><br />Our God-given intelligence is not to be squandered on the philosophical equivalent of game shows, viz. Hollywood Squares.stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16547070544928321788noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-82090169178572590042011-08-10T21:05:42.047-04:002011-08-10T21:05:42.047-04:00STEVEN SAID:
“I imagine I could invoke the form/m...STEVEN SAID:<br /><br />“I imagine I could invoke the form/matter distinction and respond to this in the following way: biological organisms tend toward death _not_ by virtue of their form (e.g., not qua bird or shark) but by virtue of the corruptibility of their matter, that which took the form”<br /><br />But since on hylomorphism, there is no formless matter or immaterial forms, how is that distinction meaningful?<br /><br />Likewise, why should we define the essence of a birth by its form in contrast to its matter?<br /><br />You also seem to be saying form and matter are at odds. In that case, matter can’t express form.<br /><br />“When I say that a bird qua bird does not tend towards death, I mean that it is not a part of the form of a bird, the essence of a bird, that it tend towards death. It is because of its matter that it dies, not because of its birdhood.”<br /><br />i) Immortal birdhood might make some sense on a theory of platonic forms, where the form is something over and above matter, where the form is a temporal and temporary instance of a timeless form, but I don’t see how that follows on hylomorphism. <br /><br />ii) Moreover, are you suggesting the lifecycle of a bird is not a part of “birdhood”? A bird’s lifecycle doesn’t figure in its essence? If so, why should we accept that contention?<br /><br />“The hylemorphism is not to the point; to the point is whether a natural law theorist can resist the attempted reductios.”<br /><br />Isn’t natural law theory grounded in hylomorphism? After all, you quoted Feser on Thomism. <br /><br />“And it makes no sense to say that the final cause of a thing could be anything other than the well being of that thing. If something is the final cause of a thing, then attaining it is good for that thing; but nothing that involves a thing's annihilation is good for it, since the good is what improves the quality of a thing's existence, not ends it.”<br /><br />With all due respect, it’s these vacuous abstractions, divorced from the real world, that give philosophy a bad name. Do lice exist for their own sake? Lice must be an end in themselves, and not a means to an end? <br /><br />You need to pull your head out of the clouds and propose a theory of reality that has some recognizable connection with reality. Philosophy isn’t like writing a novel, where you are free to posit how you wish the world to be.stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16547070544928321788noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-18900278210921682782011-08-10T20:03:00.165-04:002011-08-10T20:03:00.165-04:00"The only knowledge we can have of the compon..."The only knowledge we can have of the components of the universe (e.g., deer, dogs, humans, etc.) is through our interaction with these things as we experience them in the natural order."<br /><br />That isn't true. I get lots of my knowledge other ways than by experience of the objects.Turretinfanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01802277110253897379noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-49172255424243022512011-08-10T19:37:50.238-04:002011-08-10T19:37:50.238-04:00Hi Turretinfan,
>> This idea that "the...Hi Turretinfan,<br /><br />>> This idea that "the majority of instances of a kind you observe in nature are going to be generally good instances of that kind" is a framework that you are supplying. It can't be supported by or derived from the evidence. Where does it come from then? Therein lies the problem.<br /><br />It's not an answer to the problem to simply assert that one has to or must necessarily assume such a thing. Even if it were true that the only way it could be done is that way, that in itself would not inform us that the approach is reliable. In other words, just because a technique is operable doesn't mean it is reliable. One can operate a magic 8-ball ... <<<br /><br />It seems to me that this is a consequence of the presupposition of the intelligibility of the universe, which is a presupposition of our having any knowledge whatsoever. If we are to have knowledge of the universe, the universe must be intelligible; and since knowledge of the universe is simply knowledge of its components, then its components must be intelligible also. The only knowledge we can have of the components of the universe (e.g., deer, dogs, humans, etc.) is through our interaction with these things as we experience them in the natural order. If we are to have any knowledge of these components, then, we have to assume that the vast majority of their instances in nature are good instances of their respective kinds.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-12486883898972084842011-08-10T18:45:30.018-04:002011-08-10T18:45:30.018-04:00I'm surprised you haven't spotted it all r...I'm surprised you haven't spotted it all ready, but I'm happy to oblige with a more particular explanation.<br /><br />Let's take your comment: "<i>The presupposition is just that the majority of instances of a kind you observe in nature are going to be generally good instances of that kind, and so you can make inferences as to what is natural and normal for that kind from what you observe in those instances. This is a presupposition of any kind of study of nature whatsoever; if you did not presuppose this, then there could not be any knowledge at all of what is natural to a certain kind.</i>"<br /><br />This idea that "the majority of instances of a kind you observe in nature are going to be generally good instances of that kind" is a framework that you are supplying. It can't be supported by or derived from the evidence. Where does it come from then? Therein lies the problem.<br /><br />It's not an answer to the problem to simply assert that one has to or must necessarily assume such a thing. Even if it were true that the only way it could be done is that way, that in itself would not inform us that the approach is reliable. In other words, just because a technique is operable doesn't mean it is reliable. One can operate a magic 8-ball ... <br /><br />Does that adequately spell it out for you?<br /><br />-TurretinFanTurretinfanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01802277110253897379noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-39945820658932165382011-08-10T17:20:58.897-04:002011-08-10T17:20:58.897-04:00Hi Turretinfan,
>> I only broadly hinted at...Hi Turretinfan,<br /><br />>> I only broadly hinted at the problems associated with this alternative. Let me be more specific.<br /><br />The biggest problem is that the process of inference from examples requires a set of tools a priori. That's not problematic in a court-room setting - there are strict rules there established by law.<br /><br />It is more problematic in situations like natural law theory, unless that natural law theory is directly informed by special revelation.<br /><br />I hope that's helpful. <<<br /><br />What you're saying is not specific enough to me to be very helpful, unfortunately.<br /><br />What exactly is the problem you're hinting at?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-68389019412080343572011-08-10T16:45:10.916-04:002011-08-10T16:45:10.916-04:00"My response to you, however, was that it'..."My response to you, however, was that it's not necessary that every instance of a human have an intellect in order for that inference to be a good one."<br /><br />I only broadly hinted at the problems associated with this alternative. Let me be more specific.<br /><br />The biggest problem is that the process of inference from examples requires a set of tools <i>a priori</i>. That's not problematic in a court-room setting - there are strict rules there established by law.<br /><br />It is more problematic in situations like natural law theory, unless that natural law theory is directly informed by special revelation.<br /><br />I hope that's helpful.<br /><br />-TurretinFanTurretinfanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01802277110253897379noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-63652181546863596082011-08-10T09:59:57.043-04:002011-08-10T09:59:57.043-04:00Hi Turretinfan,
>> You had proposed "o...Hi Turretinfan,<br /><br />>> You had proposed "on the basis of every human's having intellect" ... I was responding to what you proposed.<br /><br />The alternative of "most humans" or "most humans I know" has different problems than the "every human" approach. <<<br /><br />You're right, I told Paul that the fact that every human has intellect is good reason to think intellect comes naturally to humans. <br /><br />My response to you, however, was that it's not <i>necessary</i> that every instance of a human have an intellect in order for that inference to be a good one. To express the thought another way: we could have plenty of evidence to think Mr Smith is guilty of murder, but even without some of the evidence we might have, we could still be reasonably certain of it.<br /><br />The presupposition is just that the majority of instances of a kind you observe in nature are going to be generally good instances of that kind, and so you can make inferences as to what is natural and normal for that kind from what you observe in those instances. This is a presupposition of any kind of study of nature whatsoever; if you did not presuppose this, then there could not be any knowledge at all of what is natural to a certain kind.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-73646256407767440612011-08-10T09:49:13.892-04:002011-08-10T09:49:13.892-04:00"I don't see why this is true. It need no..."I don't see why this is true. It need not be that every human ever has intellect in order for it to be natural for humans to have intellect, just that the normal human will have intellect. "<br /><br />You had proposed "on the basis of every human's having intellect" ... I was responding to what you proposed.<br /><br />The alternative of "most humans" or "most humans I know" has different problems than the "every human" approach.<br /><br />-TurretinFanTurretinfanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01802277110253897379noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-89299865901366073062011-08-10T01:22:37.036-04:002011-08-10T01:22:37.036-04:00Small typo:
I deny the alleged invalidity of the...Small typo: <br /><br /><i>I deny the alleged invalidity of the is-ought problem.</i><br /><br />should be<br /><br /><i>I deny the alleged invalidity of the is-ought inference.</i>Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-76675249161277996282011-08-10T01:21:42.980-04:002011-08-10T01:21:42.980-04:00Hi Turretinfan,
>> a) Even that couldn'...Hi Turretinfan,<br /><br />>> a) Even that couldn't be a basis for decision, since you'd never complete the data collection necessary. <<<br /><br />I don't see why this is true. It need not be that every human ever has intellect in order for it to be natural for humans to have intellect, just that the normal human will have intellect. See <a href="http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2010/05/generally-speaking.html" rel="nofollow">Ed Feser on Aristotelian categoricals</a>.<br /><br />>> b) There would be other hurdles besides the vast quantity of data necessary, such as whether you count anencephalic children as humans, and how you measure the intellect of such children. <<<br /><br />The response to this is obvious from the above. Not everything need to have intellect in order to be human, despite the fact that humans naturally have intellect, since there can be instances of a kind that are defective in one way or the other. Furthermore, it is clear that the reproductive product of two things of one kind is going to generally be of the same kind.<br /><br />>> c) But here is an obvious alternative to this approach of trying to build up a conclusion based on inferences from is to what ought. <<<br /><br />I deny the alleged invalidity of the is-ought problem. See Ed Feser:<br /><br />"From the traditional Thomistic point of view, however, there simply is no "fact/value distinction" in the first place. More precisely, there is no such thing as a purely "factual" description of reality utterly divorced from "value," for "value" is built into the structure of the "facts" from the get-go... No such gap, and thus no "fallacy" of inferring normative conclusions from "purely factual" premises, can exist given an Aristotelian-Thomistic essentialist and teleological conception of the world." (<i>Aquinas</i>, p. 175)Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-26081741691178536372011-08-09T21:05:59.852-04:002011-08-09T21:05:59.852-04:00"If we can't decide that it's natural..."If we can't decide that it's natural for humans to have intellect, for instance, on the basis of every human's having intellect, then what other grounds could we possibly have?"<br /><br />a) Even that couldn't be a basis for decision, since you'd never complete the data collection necessary.<br /><br />b) There would be other hurdles besides the vast quantity of data necessary, such as whether you count anencephalic children as humans, and how you measure the intellect of such children.<br /><br />c) But here is an obvious alternative to this approach of trying to build up a conclusion based on inferences from <i>is</i> to what <i>ought</i>.<br /><br />-TurretinFanTurretinfanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01802277110253897379noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-3655536046646274842011-08-09T20:39:58.943-04:002011-08-09T20:39:58.943-04:00Hi Paul,
>> I admit, I do not know what to ...Hi Paul,<br /><br />>> I admit, I do not know what to say to the "it's just obvious" defeater. :-)<br /><br />Anyway, good points, I don't want to wast my time defending Zen Buddhism! <<<br /><br />:-) Well, I didn't just say it's obvious. I argued that we don't have any other way of knowing what is natural for a thing unless we assume that the vast majority of instances we find of it in nature are typically good instances. If we can't decide that it's natural for humans to have intellect, for instance, on the basis of every human's having intellect, then what other grounds could we possibly have?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-8543594850069284182011-08-09T20:39:35.276-04:002011-08-09T20:39:35.276-04:00Hi Steve,
>> i) If they tend toward death b...Hi Steve,<br /><br />>> i) If they tend toward death both by virtue of their form and their matter, then how isn’t that their natural entelechy? <<<br /><br />That was an unfortunate typo, I apologize. I meant to say: <i>I imagine I could invoke the form/matter distinction and respond to this in the following way: biological organisms tend toward death <b>_not_</b> by virtue of their form (e.g., not qua bird or shark) but by virtue of the corruptibility of their matter, that which took the form.</i><br /><br />>> How is the qua relevant? At best, that would be germane if you were bifurcating form and matter such that “qua bird” distinguishes the organism from non-qua bird. From matter apart from form. <<<br /><br />When I say that a bird qua bird does not tend towards death, I mean that it is not a part of the form of a bird, the essence of a bird, that it tend towards death. It is because of its matter that it dies, not because of its birdhood.<br /><br />The next two are related:<br /><br />>> What evidence do you have that organisms are hylomorphically constituted? Did you arrive at your theory by examining the empirical properties of biological organisms? If not, what makes you think your theory accurately describes or successfully refers to biological organisms, rather than a paper theory which is extrinsic to its putative object? ...<br /><br />Sounds like you’re stalling for time because you don’t have a good answer.<br /><br />However, I’m not interested in your exposition of hylomorphism. Why should we care unless we have reason to believe it’s true? <<<br /><br />I'm not stalling for time because I don't have an answer, but because reasons for believing hylemorphism and this general metaphysic are distinct from how someone would deal with your infanticide reductio. The hylemorphism is not to the point; to the point is whether a natural law theorist can resist the attempted reductios.<br /><br />>> And where’s your argument? Why should we accept your atomistic restriction of teleology to discrete particulars rather than organic relations?<br /><br />Does a deer exist for its own sake? <<<br /><br />I think of teleology of the sort relevant to ethical considerations as being inherent in substances, i.e., discrete particulars, as a part of their nature, what makes them an instance of what they are.<br /><br />Suppose we have two deer who both live to a nice old age, and both their lives, up to the point of death, are of exactly the same quality, but one dies of old age and the other is eaten by a wolf. Is the latter a better as a deer for that fact? I can't see that it is. And it makes no sense to say that the final cause of a thing could be anything other than the well being of that thing. If something is the final cause of a thing, then attaining it is good for that thing; but nothing that involves a thing's annihilation is good for it, since the good is what improves the quality of a thing's existence, not ends it.<br /><br />>> What’s your justification for restricting teleology to individual flourishing? Did you arrive at that conclusion from the study of nature? <<<br /><br />I'll use the argument I just gave above. The good for no thing can involve its annihilation (e.g., its being food for another being), since it can't benefit from its being annihilated since it no longer exists, and the good is what it benefits from, what improves the quality of its existence. So the good for a thing can only be something that it can have while being, which would be individual flourishing.<br /><br />>> Once again, the question at issue is not how you expound your position, but how you justify your position. Truth by stipulation is not an argument. <<<br /><br />I don't understand. In the present discussion, I am being offered objections to natural law ethics and I am attempting to respond from within a broadly hylemorphic metaphysic; then, when I offer a response, I am asked to offer reasons for believing the metaphysic in the first place! Doesn't this seem dialectically improper to you?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-54590437893233306182011-08-09T19:13:53.190-04:002011-08-09T19:13:53.190-04:00Hi Steven,
I admit, I do not know what to say to ...Hi Steven,<br /><br />I admit, I do not know what to say to the "it's just obvious" defeater. :-)<br /><br />Anyway, good points, I don't want to wast my time defending Zen Buddhism!Maul P.https://www.blogger.com/profile/15227129983621069565noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-37075882064614621552011-08-09T19:07:21.230-04:002011-08-09T19:07:21.230-04:00STEVEN SAID:
“I imagine I could invoke the form/m...STEVEN SAID:<br /><br />“I imagine I could invoke the form/matter distinction and respond to this in the following way: biological organisms tend toward death by virtue of their form (e.g., not qua bird or shark) but by virtue of the corruptibility of their matter, that which took the form. Thus it is not a natural tendency of birds qua birds to tend towards death, but their matter does not allow for their immortality.”<br /><br />i) If they tend toward death both by virtue of their form and their matter, then how isn’t that their natural entelechy? <br /><br />ii) How is the qua relevant? At best, that would be germane if you were bifurcating form and matter such that “qua bird” distinguishes the organism from non-qua bird. From matter apart from form. <br /><br />But you just said they tend toward death on both counts.<br /><br />iii)What evidence do you have that organisms are hylomorphically constituted? Did you arrive at your theory by examining the empirical properties of biological organisms? If not, what makes you think your theory accurately describes or successfully refers to biological organisms, rather than a paper theory which is extrinsic to its putative object?<br /><br />“What reasons there may be for accepting my quasi-Aristotelian view is a distinct issue from how I would respond to your pro-infanticide reductio argument from within my system.”<br /><br />Sounds like you’re stalling for time because you don’t have a good answer.<br /><br />However, I’m not interested in your exposition of hylomorphism. Why should we care unless we have reason to believe it’s true?<br /><br />“I'm not inclined to think that any natural substance, of its nature, is for any other natural substance. It may be that trees, deer, squirrels, bugs, etc., when they are all put together, fit nicely into an ecosystem that is relatively self-sustaining, but it's not as if a deer couldn't be a good deer unless it was eventually food for a wolf.”<br /><br />And where’s your argument? Why should we accept your atomistic restriction of teleology to discrete particulars rather than organic relations?<br /><br />Does a deer exist for its own sake? <br /><br />“I think every substance is an end in itself; if a tree were naturally a means to an end, then that means the tree, qua tree, could not flourish without being a means to that end.”<br /><br />What’s your justification for restricting teleology to individual flourishing? Did you arrive at that conclusion from the study of nature? <br /><br />Take the caste-system in an ant colony, where soldier ants sacrifice themselves in defense of the queen or the colony. <br /><br />“Nothing is a true thing with a nature if it has components that could exist and perform their functions independently of the existence of the whole.”<br /><br />Once again, the question at issue is not how you expound your position, but how you justify your position. Truth by stipulation is not an argument.stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16547070544928321788noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-18029487463267398402011-08-09T13:13:18.905-04:002011-08-09T13:13:18.905-04:00Hi Steve,
>> All biological organisms tend ...Hi Steve,<br /><br />>> All biological organisms tend to death. <<<br /><br />I imagine I could invoke the form/matter distinction and respond to this in the following way: biological organisms tend toward death by virtue of their form (e.g., not <i>qua</i> bird or shark) but by virtue of the corruptibility of their matter, that which took the form. Thus it is not a natural tendency of birds <i>qua</i> birds to tend towards death, but their matter does not allow for their immortality.<br /><br />>> One problem is that you’re stipulating distinctions to salvage your theory. But why should we accept your theory in the first place? <<<br /><br />What reasons there may be for accepting my quasi-Aristotelian view is a distinct issue from how I would respond to your pro-infanticide <i>reductio</i> argument from within my system.<br /><br />>> You’re also opposing teleology to entelechy. You’re driving a wedge between what a tree is (i.e. the “essence”) and what a tree is for (i.e. contributing to the balance of nature). But why should we accept that artificial bifurcation? <<<br /><br />I'm not inclined to think that any natural substance, of its nature, is <i>for</i> any other natural substance. It may be that trees, deer, squirrels, bugs, etc., when they are all put together, fit nicely into an ecosystem that is relatively self-sustaining, but it's not as if a deer couldn't be a good deer unless it was eventually food for a wolf.<br /><br />>> Why can’t the tree be a means to an end rather than an end in itself? <<<br /><br />I think every substance is an end in itself; if a tree were naturally a means to an end, then that means the tree, <i>qua</i> tree, could not flourish without being a means to that end. But that doesn't seem right. Couldn't a tree flourish even if nothing was breathing its oxygen, eating its leaves, etc.?<br /><br />>> You’re kidding, right? <<<br /><br />No. Nothing is a true thing with a nature if it has components that could exist and perform their functions independently of the existence of the whole. Sawmills, for example, are artifacts, and only have a good relative to our use of them, not in themselves.<br /><br />Hi Paul,<br /><br />>> I may agree, but will they? This seems to presuppose a certain conception of the world and the origin and purpose of those faculties. So how do we know that you're not just elevating some set of caught and taught social desiderata? This seems to beg the question, assuming that we're 'naturally' endowed with these things. Also, it seems loss of things like 'hate' is good for us, but then why were we "endowed with the capacities" to hate? <<<br /><br />I am presupposing a certain amount of rationality and reasonableness in the universe, you're right. If our supposed interlocutors would disagree with that, then we must take the discussion to a more basic level than that at which it currently is among us two.<br /><br />And I think it is obvious we are naturally endowed with reason and intellect. Who would deny this? Is every human on the planet a faulty or flawed instance of humanity, then? We can't know anything about any substance or kind unless we assume that the vast majority of instances we find in nature are generally good instances of that kind.<br /><br />Our capacity to hate is a result of a more general capacity for emotion. The misuse of that capacity is made possible because we have will; but it doesn't follow from this fact that we would be better without that capacity, for it may be that hate of the sort that is reprehensible and improper is a <i>misuse</i> of that natural capacity, just as someone's cutting off his legs is a <i>misuse</i> of the natural capacity of his arms. It doesn't mean we would be better off without arms. <br /><br />>> Yeah, I'm not sure about this. Seems pretty universal. Take an American kid's toy, hell rage on you and bite your stomach, same result with the Hindu kid's toy. <<<br /><br />This is a sticky issue, I will have to give it more thought.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-37359004736535241902011-08-08T14:49:05.608-04:002011-08-08T14:49:05.608-04:00Hi Steven,
Well, in addition to observation of wi...Hi Steven,<br /><br /><i>Well, in addition to observation of widespread tendencies in instances of a certain kind, we can also judge what is good for a thing on the basis of the faculties and powers that thing is naturally endowed with. If the loss of all knowledge and categories was good for us, it makes no sense that we are endowed with the capacity to know.</i><br /><br />I may agree, but will they? This seems to presuppose a certain conception of the world and the origin and purpose of those faculties. So how do we know that you're not just elevating some set of caught and taught social desiderata? This seems to beg the question, assuming that we're 'naturally' endowed with these things. Also, it seems loss of things like 'hate' is good for us, but then why were we "endowed with the capacities" to hate?<br /><br /><i>"I would still say that such behavior presupposes a certain system of values which motivate toddler behavior, however primitive and undeveloped it may be, to which a human being, as such, need not naturally tend. How convincing this is, however, I am not sure; I may have to think over it some more."</i><br /><br />Yeah, I'm not sure about this. Seems pretty universal. Take an American kid's toy, hell rage on you and bite your stomach, same result with the Hindu kid's toy.Maul P.https://www.blogger.com/profile/15227129983621069565noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-22115355267254114952011-08-08T13:57:57.254-04:002011-08-08T13:57:57.254-04:00STEVEN SAID:
“The final cause of a thing can be k...STEVEN SAID:<br /><br />“The final cause of a thing can be known by observation of what all or most instances of its kind tend towards.”<br /><br />All biological organisms tend to death.<br /><br />“No doubt there is a complex system of overlapping goods in the natural world; good trees produce oxygen which allows certain animals to prosper, and in their prospering they produce CO2 which allows trees to prosper, etc.”<br /><br />Not just overlapping goods, but competing goods. What’s good for the herbivore isn’t good for the edible plant.<br /><br />“But these are all accidental, not essential, features of the good for a tree. A tree can prosper just fine in an atmosphere in which its oxygen is left unconsumed and CO2 from without is fed it through a ventilation system, or whatever. There's nothing about the essence of a tree as such that requires it to play a part in the ecosystem that it actually plays a part in.”<br /><br />i) One problem is that you’re stipulating distinctions to salvage your theory. But why should we accept your theory in the first place? <br /><br />ii) You’re also opposing teleology to entelechy. You’re driving a wedge between what a tree is (i.e. the “essence”) and what a tree is for (i.e. contributing to the balance of nature). But why should we accept that artificial bifurcation? <br /><br />“Furthermore, it can't be a part of the essence of a tree to provide a source of food for certain animals, because this is tantamount to saying that a final cause of a tree is to be annihilated (in being eaten by other animals).”<br /><br />Why can’t the tree be a means to an end rather than an end in itself?<br /><br />“Forests, ecosystems, sawmills, etc., are not real things, so nothing is ‘really’ good for them.”<br /><br />You’re kidding, right?stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16547070544928321788noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-20987888221535165142011-08-08T13:30:21.332-04:002011-08-08T13:30:21.332-04:00A small disclaimer: I have not thought over these ...A small disclaimer: I have not thought over these issues in very great detail, so I appreciate the opportunity to do that now. However, because of this fact, I cannot promise that every response I give will be fully satisfactory, or that I will even agree with what I've said after giving the issue more thought!Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-6996226057566464442011-08-08T13:29:07.342-04:002011-08-08T13:29:07.342-04:00Hi Paul,
>> How do I know what is said to ...Hi Paul, <br /><br />>> How do I know what is said to be natural, and thus good for me to develop or move toward, isn't something that has been informed by upbringing etc? Why think, say, quest for knowledge is natural to humans as such, rather than some normative meme caught from intellectualist societies. Don't some societies teach the loss of all knowledge and categories is good? <<<br /><br />Well, in addition to observation of widespread tendencies in instances of a certain kind, we can also judge what is good for a thing on the basis of the faculties and powers that thing is naturally endowed with. If the loss of all knowledge and categories was good for us, it makes no sense that we are endowed with the capacity to know.<br /><br />>> As far as the unreflective person's selfish and aggressive tendencies being taught and caught from society, I'm assuming you haven't spent much time in the company of infants and toddlers? :-) Indeed, one might argue that we are taught to suppress these selfish and aggressive traits so as to make certain conceptions of society run more smoothly. <<<br /><br />No, I haven't spent time with toddlers and infants at all! My only brother is but a few years younger than me, so I never had little kids in the house at a time when I would have been able to appreciate the experience. :-)<br /><br />I would still say that such behavior presupposes a certain system of values which motivate toddler behavior, however primitive and undeveloped it may be, to which a human being, as such, need not naturally tend. How convincing this is, however, I am not sure; I may have to think over it some more.<br /><br />Hi Steve,<br /><br />>> But even if we accept that claim, it’s purely programmatic. How do we isolate and identify its final cause? <<<br /><br />The final cause of a thing can be known by observation of what all or most instances of its kind tend towards. Not every final cause of every thing will be easily discernible, but nothing about natural law ethics and the metaphysics behind it that I subscribe to requires this.<br /><br />>> Isn’t that simplistic? Is the goodness of a tree what is good for the tree, or what the tree is good for?<br /><br />Perhaps the entelechy of a tree is to oxygenate the atmosphere for the benefit of animals, or supply food for herbivores, which–in turn–supply food for carnivores. <br /><br />So is being a good tree good for the sake of the tree, for good for the sake of the biosphere, even if that’s bad for the tree? <<<br /><br />No doubt there is a complex system of overlapping goods in the natural world; good trees produce oxygen which allows certain animals to prosper, and in their prospering they produce CO2 which allows trees to prosper, etc. <br /><br />But these are all accidental, not essential, features of the good for a tree. A tree can prosper just fine in an atmosphere in which its oxygen is left unconsumed and CO2 from without is fed it through a ventilation system, or whatever. There's nothing about the essence of a tree as such that requires it to play a part in the ecosystem that it actually plays a part in.<br /><br />Furthermore, it can't be a part of the essence of a tree to provide a source of food for certain animals, because this is tantamount to saying that a final cause of a tree is to be annihilated (in being eaten by other animals).<br /><br />>> Once again, isn’t that simplistic? Forest fires are bad for individual trees, but they are good for the overall heath of the ecosystem. When trees grow too tall and too close together, they hog the sunlight and choke out other vegetation. A forest fire frees up ground previously allocated to the trees.<br /><br />So what’s the fundamental unit of teleological goodness? A tree? The forest? <br /><br />What about chopping down a tree for firewood? What about a sawmill? <<<br /><br />Forests, ecosystems, sawmills, etc., are not real things, so nothing is "really" good for them.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-63434015111707726162011-08-08T12:19:24.745-04:002011-08-08T12:19:24.745-04:00For those reading without much familiarity with is...For those reading without much familiarity with issues pertaining to NL, Hays is bringing up the problems usually classified as problems of how one interprets the basic values from which various conclusions about what actions are or right good are drawn. <br /><br />Other examples might be, "human life has value and so is to be protected and preserved, thus actions like suicide are wrong," but what about sky diving, or smoking? Does NL make these things immoral? Depends on how you interpret the basic goods. Is civil disobedience allowed, or does it challenge the basic good of sociability? What about divorce, procreation, etc? The problem here is that NL basics are usually so basic as to allow a wide range of different viewpoints about which particular actions are right or wrong, and this, in turn, affects one aspect all good moral theories need to live up to: providing an action guide for right and wrong action. Moral theories need more than authority, they need relevance for our daily lives (e.g., "Always do good!" is pretty authoritative, but it's hardly relevant, since I don't know what counts as the good and how to decide between all the various courses of action I could take).Maul P.https://www.blogger.com/profile/15227129983621069565noreply@blogger.com