tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post2109693224711816153..comments2024-03-27T17:15:37.606-04:00Comments on Triablogue: Love Your Neighbor, so Long as He's no Calvinist!Ryanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17809283662428917799noreply@blogger.comBlogger9125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-82116615267527969102008-05-16T20:50:00.000-04:002008-05-16T20:50:00.000-04:00I'm having major computer problems that may requir...I'm having major computer problems that may require I get a new HD, so this may be my last post for some time. Since I can, right now, manage to get online, I'll leave it here for you.<BR/><BR/>Robert is yet again repeating himself when he cites Plantinga - because Robert does little more than repeat himself. I went over this before with him when he said he believes in LFW but denies that LFW means that there are no antecedent causes to our actions. He flatly said that was absurd and then proceeded to, if I recall, cite this same quote. But read the doggone quote:<BR/><BR/><I><BR/>“If a person is free with respect to a given action, then he is free to perform that action and free to refrain from performing it; no antecedent conditions and/or causal laws determine that he will perform the action, or that he won’t.</I><BR/><BR/>Notice that this quote flatly agrees with what I told him.<BR/><BR/>Now, his contention is that, since God's choices are "uncaused," God must have LFW. The problem here is that God's choices DO have a cause, namely Himself, His own character. God has the ability to choose in a manner in which His moral choices are not constrained by anything but His own moral character - and if Robert denies that is true, then that means Robert must believe that God can do both good and evil.<BR/><BR/>Robert, as Steve points out here is confused about what constitutes contracausal freedom. Neither God nor man have the power of contrary choice - the ability to do that which contradicts our natures. Both God and man have the ability to choose between alternatives, and Robert has consistently acted as if LFW constitutes the latter and not the former. He's confused, or dishonest, or confusedly dishonest.<BR/><BR/>That'll be all now, and maybe for quite some time. I have to figure out why my C: drive disappeared on this HD between boots (fortunately, I boot from another partition altogether). If the HD is bad, I may be some time in returning. Love to you all!GeneMBridgeshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10504383610477532374noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-16768805723574359442008-05-15T19:48:00.000-04:002008-05-15T19:48:00.000-04:00I added it about an hour after I initially posted,...I added it about an hour after I initially posted, so that's probably why you didn't see it!Errorhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10615233201833238198noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-64683275359280683672008-05-15T16:54:00.000-04:002008-05-15T16:54:00.000-04:00Paul,Somehow I missed your addendum! Oh well :-) ...Paul,<BR/><BR/>Somehow I missed your addendum! Oh well :-) Great minds think alike and all that!Peter Pikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11792036365040378473noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-38884423792306771092008-05-15T14:53:00.000-04:002008-05-15T14:53:00.000-04:00Yes, Peter. I tried to make that point in my adden...Yes, Peter. I tried to make that point in my addendum. It seems that given all those things Robert has granted, he's in a bind.<BR/><BR/>This is precisely why some Arminians (cf. Copan) have felt the need to argue that in heaven we will have compatibilist freedom.<BR/><BR/>To me this gives us all we need. For in heaven we will be free, and morally responsible, so the Arminian can't really object to our position.<BR/><BR/>Copan says that "in the past" we must of had LFW. Must of made some LFW choices. That's his tradeoff.<BR/><BR/>But this has many, many problems (I listed them in a post a while back). One is that there are, presumably, at least some infants who died in infancy that will be in heaven. But, unfortunately, they didn't make LFW choices. Namely, because they didn't make any choices. Furthermore, it is odd that "the best" world - heaven - is made of of people with CFW and not LFW. So how could LFW be so good as to justify evil when the best of all worlds doesn't include it?Errorhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10615233201833238198noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-46135485815657690162008-05-15T14:39:00.000-04:002008-05-15T14:39:00.000-04:00Obviously, if LFW can be redefined as choosing bet...Obviously, if LFW can be redefined as choosing between only good choices, then surely Adam could have been given LFW in some possible universe where he could only make a choice between good choices. Instead of God saying, "Do not eat from this tree" He could have said: "Eat from this tree to worship me one way, and eat from that three to worship me another way. It's totally up to you." Hence, LFW exists, and Adam cannot sin.<BR/><BR/>Hence the LFW response to the Problem of Evil falls flat on its face.<BR/><BR/>LFW <I>must</I> include evil actions as a possibility in order for the theodicy to survive; but it <I>cannot</I> include evil actions if we assert God has it. Therefore, the Arminian is in a true bind.Peter Pikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11792036365040378473noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-71384084540961685282008-05-15T11:31:00.000-04:002008-05-15T11:31:00.000-04:00S&S,That's been my argument in my last couple of p...S&S,<BR/><BR/>That's been my argument in my last couple of posts.<BR/><BR/>The LFWers have argued that LFW does not mean that one has the ability to do good or evil, one might only have good options to choose from. Say, G1, G2, G3, G4, G...<I>n</I>. They are not determined to choose G1 over G2, G3, G4, G...<I>n</I>.<BR/><BR/>So, given the exact same history leading up to an LFW agent who chose, say, G1, he could have, if we replayed history over, chosen G2 or ... .<BR/><BR/>So, that's there comeback.<BR/><BR/>God cannot do evil but also has LFW.<BR/><BR/>My arguments here and in the last post have sought to critique that objection given *other things* libertarisn have told me.<BR/><BR/>So, they may clean up their position such that it is consistent, when that happens I have other objections waiting in the wings.Errorhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10615233201833238198noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-43460835398084383602008-05-15T11:02:00.000-04:002008-05-15T11:02:00.000-04:00If no one can be held responsible (whether for goo...If no one can be held responsible (whether for good or evil) for their actions with respect to moral decisions unless they have LFW, and God does not have LFW with respect to moral actions, then how can God be given glory for all the good actions that he does since He could not have done otherwise?Saint and Sinnerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14166699860672840738noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-28731634216220709842008-05-15T08:32:00.000-04:002008-05-15T08:32:00.000-04:00I'd add that regarding the freedom of the unregene...I'd add that regarding the freedom of the unregenerate, Calvinism denies that they have the freedom of contrary choice (freedom to choose between good and evil), but affirms that they have the freedom of alternative choice (freedom to choose between alternative evils). Therefore, Robert is attacking a strawman.stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16547070544928321788noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-89621862446199927882008-05-15T00:19:00.000-04:002008-05-15T00:19:00.000-04:00Not only that, but the logical structure we are lo...Not only that, but the logical structure we are looking at is really this:<BR/><BR/>1. God cannot do particular action (X).<BR/><BR/>2. If LFW were true, God could do particular action (X).<BR/><BR/>3. Therefore, God does not have LFW.<BR/><BR/>In other words, we're not arguing that unless a person can do <I>everything</I> he does not have LFW; we're arguing that if God cannot do a <I>specific action</I> that LFW <I>requires</I> then God does not have LFW.<BR/><BR/>In any case, I do have to wonder about Robert on this one. Basically, he resorts to the LFW defense to avoid God seeming to be immoral. Yet in order for LFW, it must be "actually" "really" "no really" "I mean it, really really really" possible for God to do otherwise. And that means that Robert is in essence arguing that in order to keep God from being immoral, it must be "actually" "really" (etc.) possible that God is immoral.Peter Pikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11792036365040378473noreply@blogger.com