tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post116208651824666766..comments2024-03-14T14:41:17.663-04:00Comments on Triablogue: TAG and InerrancyRyanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17809283662428917799noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-1162129003469237402006-10-29T08:36:00.000-05:002006-10-29T08:36:00.000-05:00EvanmayBut any Christian "presuppositionalist" wou...Evanmay<BR/><BR/><I>But any Christian "presuppositionalist" would argue that, because biblical Christian theism is the only coherent worldview, the TAG is not effective to argue for any worldview that denies infallible and inerrant revelation from God.</I><BR/><BR/>One could argue against this necessity in a few different ways, since as Walker points out, these transcendentals are "objective, prescriptive and metaphysically ultimate". I am thinking that Scripture cannot meet this requirement, nor special revelation generally. The reason is in reference to a passage from Walker:<BR/><BR/><I>"The laws on which we rely must be objective as well as prescriptive. They must also be metaphysically ultimate. If they were not, then in view of their prescriptivity they would have to be dependent either on attitudes of our own (which could serve to motivate us) or else on matters of fact to which we have attitudes. The former possibility denies their objectivity, and we have just rejected it. The only version of the latter that has any plausibility is the suggestion discussed earlier on, that they hold in virtue of the fact that sticking to them provides results that are likely to be true, coupled with a concern on our part to get at the truth. This was also rejected, on the grounds that even if there are such facts we have no reason to believe there are; and a parallel argument could be employed against any other version of the proposal."</I> (p. 78, Ralph Walker, "Transcendental Arguments", in <I>Objections to Physicalism</I>, 1993, Robinson.)<BR/><BR/>Consider a TAG which argues that X must be objective, prescriptive and metaphysically ultimate (OPMU). Let X = morality.<BR/><BR/>Is it the case that a revealed morality meets these conditions? Is it the case that an "inscribed/imbued" morality does?<BR/><BR/>Walker rejects the idea that, "they [OPMU X's] would have to be dependent either on attitudes of our own (which could serve to motivate us) or else on matters of fact to which we have attitudes". <BR/><BR/>Anon asked a question about inerrancy that I think comes into play when we consider morality and the Xian version of the TAG.<BR/><BR/>When Xians argue that the Scriptures provide for us an OPMU for morality, how does this fare through Walker's filter? They presuppose that these Scriptures are divine in origin, admit that the copies we hold are not inerrant, and appeal to autographs which no one has or can produce in a "human attitude-independent fashion". That is, in going through the Scripture to try to find the OPMU-worthy autographic material, how do we begin? What attitudes do we bring in with us in the quest of hermeneutics, exegesis, etc.? <BR/><BR/>I would argue that this consideration presents a substantial challenge to the claim that OPMU morality can be based upon divine revelation via Scripture. It seems that the criteria cannot be met in an attitude-independent fashion, given the errant supposed copies we have of an OPMU moral law.<BR/><BR/>The same problem would apply to a person-limited special revelation -- for instance a prophet claiming to have heard from God, and commanding others to heed his own voice as the voice of God.<BR/><BR/>I will think this over for a bit, and perhaps post on it, but it seems that your claim about the necessity of revelation is dubious. It also seems that the sort of revelation you claim is not OMPU-adequate.<BR/>______<BR/>I thought I'd provide a little background for those who aren't familiar with the exchange from a few months back involving the TAG between this site and DC:<BR/>1) <A HREF="http://debunkingchristianity.blogspot.com/2006/04/justifying-tag.html" REL="nofollow">Exbeliever: "Justifying the TAG"</A><BR/>2) <A HREF="http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2006/04/response-to-ex-believer-and-his.html " REL="nofollow">Paul's response</A><BR/>3) <A HREF="http://debunkingchristianity.blogspot.com/2006/04/justifying-tag-part-2-response-to-paul.html " REL="nofollow">Exbeliever's response</A><BR/><BR/>I thought I'd also point out the <A HREF="http://notmanywise.blogspot.com/2006/06/tag-index.html" REL="nofollow">long-standing open challenge</A> from exbeliever to theists to provide support for the first premise of a TAG formulated in the following manner:<BR/>i) If X, then God<BR/>ii) X<BR/>iii) .: God<BR/><BR/>Where, especially, X = logic.nsflhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04129382545589470620noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-1162103483597829962006-10-29T01:31:00.000-05:002006-10-29T01:31:00.000-05:00Hey, thanks for answering my question!Hey, thanks for answering my question!Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-1162091041310775802006-10-28T23:04:00.000-04:002006-10-28T23:04:00.000-04:00Once you treat TAG as an *argument* as opposed to ...Once you treat TAG as an *argument* as opposed to a method of arguing, you get peppered with questions about what the argument is that is supposed to exclude the (epistemic) possibility of innumerable imagininative cases. What often happens in the process is that TAG, when treated as a single argument, appears to have too little content by way of convincing power since the key premise in question (under Paul Franks' construal of TA's, ~(~x)), has difficulty being argued for, namely, the sufficiency of the view and nothing more to be accepted, or it turns out to not be a single argument at all. But maybe by "epistemological argument" you meant a cluster of combined arguments, making it a sort of "inference to the best explanation," or something like that. But in that case, I'm not sure how it is a transcendental argument at work, at least under their historic usage. (Of course, I may turn out to know a lot less about the role of transcendental arguments and you can tell me otherwise).Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-1162088131483170902006-10-28T22:15:00.000-04:002006-10-28T22:15:00.000-04:00Why does it have to be a trinitary god? I know so...Why does it have to be a trinitary god? I know some use the problem of the one and the many to justify it IIRC, but why three, why not a half dozen?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com