tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post111948709050883002..comments2024-03-27T17:15:37.606-04:00Comments on Triablogue: SolitaireRyanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17809283662428917799noreply@blogger.comBlogger10125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-1119726568556564292005-06-25T15:09:00.000-04:002005-06-25T15:09:00.000-04:00This question has been around since the days of Au...This question has been around since the days of Augustine (cf. City of God 12.14).<BR/><BR/>Seems to me that Scripture is silent on the question of ETs, and I don't see anything in Scripture to prejudge the question one way or the other.<BR/><BR/>The Bible is naturally androcentric because the Bible is addressed to men, and is primarily concerned with instructing us on our duty to God and our fellow man.<BR/><BR/>If there were (or are) ETs, I'd expect Scripture to be silent on the subject, for were it to reveal that fact, this would foster a lot of mischievous speculation, distracting us from our real needs and duties.<BR/><BR/>A traditional theological objection to ETs is that their existence would violate the unrepeatable character of Christian redemption.<BR/><BR/>But this objection rests on three assumptions:<BR/><BR/>1.If there are ETs, they must share in the Fall.<BR/>2.If there are ETs, they must share in redemption.<BR/>3.The redemption of ETs would violate the unrepeatable character of Christian redemption.<BR/><BR/>There is no prior reason, that I can see, to assume that ETs must be a fallen species. The fall of Adam was a local, historical event. <BR/><BR/>There is not prior reason, that I can see, to assume that ETs, if fallen, must be redeemed. The fallen angels were never redeemed.<BR/><BR/>Even if they were redeemed, the unpeatable character of God's union with human nature (the Incarnation) and his atoning death for the elect (my view), or even for the whole human race (Arminian view), does not preclude his union with an alien nature or atoning death for an alien species.<BR/><BR/>That would not be a repetition of the Incarnation or atonement, for it takes a different class of natural kinds.<BR/><BR/>Speaking for myself, I don't believe in ETs, and I don't disbelieve in ETs. I'm noncommittal.<BR/><BR/>If there are none, I wouldn't be surprised or disappointed; and if there are some, I wouldn't be surprised or unsettled.<BR/><BR/>I do disbelieve in UFOs.stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16547070544928321788noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-1119702356334261892005-06-25T08:25:00.000-04:002005-06-25T08:25:00.000-04:00You don't explain why the possibility of ETs bothe...You don't explain why the possibility of ETs bothers you, so there's nothing for me to respond to.stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16547070544928321788noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-1119624474659671432005-06-24T10:47:00.000-04:002005-06-24T10:47:00.000-04:00As to the question of what I think the most powerf...As to the question of what I think the most powerful objection to Christian belief is, that's a hard question to answer. The problem of evil seems to be the most popular objection. But that reflects, to no small degree, a copycat mentality, where it gets repeated over and over again as an abstract criticism rather than a heart-felt objection. Since I've offered my own theodicy, I don't regard this as a powerful objection.<BR/><BR/>Certain epistemic objections are powerful for philosophy majors. Again, though, I find these to be fallacious.<BR/><BR/>Comparative mythology can be impressive of one doesn't pay close attention to questions of dating and genre, as well as the many material disanalogies.<BR/><BR/>The charge that Scripture is full of contradictions is impressive for those who come to the Bible with a certain abstract preconceptions about photographic realism and the fact/value disjunction.<BR/><BR/>If, however, one takes a less extrinsic approach to Scripture, such as we find in Blomberg's Historical Reliability of the Gospels, then almost all these problems turn ot to be pseudo-problems.<BR/><BR/>Scientific objections come in two forms: scientific objections to specific events, such as the creation account or the flood account, and a metascientific objection to the effect that Scripture as a whole is working is a mythopoetic, prescientific worldview.<BR/><BR/>The latter is often tied to the view that the admission of miracles would render the natural order too unpredictable to do science at all.<BR/><BR/>How impressive the first objection is depends on such factors your philosophy of science (realist or antirealist), your interpretation of Scripture, as well as how you rate the evidence for, say, evolution, modern cosmology, and historical geography as over against alternative theories.<BR/><BR/>In addition, critics tends to generate artificial tensions by interpolating extra-Biblical assumptions into the Biblical record.<BR/><BR/>How impressive the second objection is depends, in part, on the personal experience of the individual. If the individual has had no experience of the paranormal in his own life or the life of some trusted acqaintance, then the paranormal dimension of Bible history will carry an air of unreality. The world of the Bible just doesn't look like the world he knows. Rather, it seems to be better described by blind forces and natural laws. <BR/><BR/>If, on the other hand, he has had a brush with the paranormal, then the Scriptural paradigm suddenly looks more realistic than the one-dimensional outlook of secularism.<BR/><BR/>A lot also depends on what one reads. If one only reads one side of the argument, then that fosters or confirms a certain bias.<BR/><BR/>I deny that the admission of miracles renders the scientific enterprise impossible, but even if it did, it begs the question to say that x must be false because if x were true, it would falsify y. For the reasoning is reversible.<BR/><BR/>A more profound answer would be that it's a doctrine of divine creation and providence which supplies the necessary conditions of science. <BR/><BR/>Otherwise, evolutionary epistemology conduces to scepticism. <BR/><BR/>Likewise, materialism, by reducing everything to the level of a third-person observation, leaves the observer out of the picture. It has no place for mind or abstract objects (numbers, laws of logic).stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16547070544928321788noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-1119546262841664542005-06-23T13:04:00.000-04:002005-06-23T13:04:00.000-04:00I assume that "aquascum" is a subtle literary allu...I assume that "aquascum" is a subtle literary allusion, via Latin, to Jn 3:5 ("with water").stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16547070544928321788noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-1119546091198991022005-06-23T13:01:00.000-04:002005-06-23T13:01:00.000-04:00I meant to say that Plantinga has some "useful" ma...I meant to say that Plantinga has some "useful" material, not "usual" material.<BR/><BR/>To draw another distinction, Frame is more programmatic while Plantinga is more detailed. That is due, in part, to their different professional responsibilities.stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16547070544928321788noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-1119545320851201532005-06-23T12:48:00.000-04:002005-06-23T12:48:00.000-04:00I would second acquascum's contribution to this de...I would second acquascum's contribution to this debate, which more than equals my own contribution.stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16547070544928321788noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-1119540980364860802005-06-23T11:36:00.000-04:002005-06-23T11:36:00.000-04:00For example, when you identify yourself as an evid...For example, when you identify yourself as an evidentialist, who is your model? Moreland? Habermas? Montgomery? Craig? Corduin? Feinberg? Swinburne?stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16547070544928321788noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-1119540568674986102005-06-23T11:29:00.000-04:002005-06-23T11:29:00.000-04:00You seem to be mapping Plantinga onto presuppositi...You seem to be mapping Plantinga onto presuppositionalism. Plantinga is not a presup in the usual sense. So whatever I happen to think about Plantinga is not germane to what I think about presuppositionalism, which is what you were originally asking about. For the record, I think that Plantinga has some usual material, although his category of proper basicality is too thin for my bloodstream.<BR/><BR/>There is also the question of how we define evidentialism. Is this a form of positivism, where the facts speak for themselves and we follow the evidence whenever it leads? Or is there a value-laden component in play, here? If so, that begins to shade into presuppositionalism.stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16547070544928321788noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-1119534809510035672005-06-23T09:53:00.000-04:002005-06-23T09:53:00.000-04:00Before you weigh in you need to read my rejoinder ...Before you weigh in you need to read my rejoinder to Johnson. <BR/><BR/>Calvinism has no official epistemology. Plantinga co-oped the phrase "Reformed epistemology," but that's misleading.<BR/><BR/>You can see the way I actually do apologetics from my many many entries on the subject at Triablogue. Most of what I do is fairly conventional because it is usually sufficient for my purposes to simply argue with the unbeliever on his own grounds. He supplies me with all the raw materials I need.<BR/><BR/>There are also times, though, when I challenge his rules of evidence. This gets more presuppositional. <BR/><BR/>We can't fling a whole lot of evidence in the face of the unbeliever if he's drawn up the rules of evidence is such a restrictive way that our evidence doesn't count as evidence. <BR/><BR/>A lot depends on how radical and sophisticated the unbeliever is. The more astute and extreme, the more one needs to downshift from a debate over particular truth-claims to a debate over general truth-conditions. <BR/><BR/>As for the case for the Resurrection, I'm gearing up for a major review of the new attack on the Resurrection in the Price/Lowder book. So you'll get to see me in action.stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16547070544928321788noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6789188.post-1119529475033541502005-06-23T08:24:00.000-04:002005-06-23T08:24:00.000-04:00I've defended Van Til in my "Johnson on Van Til: A...I've defended Van Til in my "Johnson on Van Til: A Rejoinder."<BR/><BR/>I'd add that there's a difference between Clarkian presuppositionalism and Van Tilian presuppositionalism.<BR/><BR/>Speaking for myself, I'm an exemplarist, in the tradition of medieval exemplarism. One could say that exemplarism is a version of presuppositionalism. <BR/><BR/>I believe that the divine attributes function as abstract universals and furnish the template for the natural categories. There, I'm sure that's all self-explanatory! :-)stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16547070544928321788noreply@blogger.com