Freewill theism and antinatalism

As I’ve noted on more than one occasion, antinatalism is the reductio ad absurdum of atheism. But there’s a sense in which antinatalism is also the reductio ad absurdum of freewill theism.

One of the major arguments for antinatalism is that it’s wrong to bring someone into existence without his consent. And that generates a dilemma: you can’t obtain the prior consent of a nonentity. But once you’ve brought him into being, it’s too late for him to withhold consent. Hence, it’s always wrong to bring anyone into existence.

But, of course, that’s the price of admission for contingent beings like you and me. If we are to live at all, then our will depend on factors outside ourselves, on forces beyond our control. That’s the only mode of subsistence available to a creature. It’s either that or nonexistence.

The antinatalist can’t stand the idea of being a creature. Can’t stand the inherent limitations. To be utterly dependent on something else or someone else–like a baby in a crib. He says he’d rather not exist than have to exist on such demeaning terms. If you can’t be God, be nothing.

And isn’t that freewill theism, taken to a logical extreme?