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Thursday, July 22, 2010

"Truth for its own sake"

A couple of unbelievers have attempted to critique an argument I use in my introduction to The Infidel Delusion–one at Reppert's blog, and the other at the theologyweb. Here's my response:

ApostateAbe

Terrible, terrible introduction. It is basically a vindication of the title of their object of criticism, "The Christian Delusion," because it shamelessly tells the reader that there is no value in truth for its own sake when there is an appeal of heaven and threat of damnation hanging in the air. That is what delusion is all about. That is the whole point. That is the primary fault with Christianity--and Islam, and Hinduism, and old-school Buddhism, and all other religious ideologies that promise rewards and threaten you in the afterlife.

i) My argument wasn’t predicated on the threat of damnation.

ii) Abe’s problem is that, like a lot of unbelievers, he acts as if you can make fundamental changes in your worldview, but leave everything else intact.

But where atheism is concerned, we’re not simply dealing with some unfortunate local consequences. Rather, atheism is a global position with global consequences. If atheism leads to moral nihilism (or the equivalent), then there is literally no good reason to be an atheist.

Given moral nihilism, then there is no “value in truth for its own sake.” Without a value system, there are no values. The pursuit of truth cannot be artificially isolated from other values, as if that continues to flourish in its own little glasshouse.

If a worldview denies the very framework for right and wrong, then we have no responsibility to believe something just because it is the right thing to believe–including the worldview in question. Such a worldview summarily forfeits the right to be taken seriously. For a worldview is not entitled to our consideration if it disenfranchises the very notion of epistemic duties. Such a position disenfranchises itself from further consideration.

If a worldview rejects the possibility that true beliefs are praiseworthy, while false beliefs are blameworthy, then there’s nothing praiseworthy about pursing the truth for its own sake. And there’s nothing praiseworthy about believing a worldview which denies the praiseworthy character of true beliefs.

I’m making a radical claim because atheism has radical consequences which the average atheist stops short of taking. So I will do it for him. I’ll give him that extra little nudge over the cliff.

iii) I didn’t say that’s a reason to believe in Christianity. But it clears the underbrush. It narrows the field.


At July 21, 2010 6:21 PM , steve said...

Doctor Logic said...

“On page 1, Steve Hays starts out with the childish canard that the only morality worth caring about is absolute morality.”

“Childish” is a value judgment. But if you reject moral absolutes, then what’s wrong with being childish (assuming, for the sake of argument, that my “canard” was “childish”)?

“That's like saying that the only deliciousness worth caring about is absolute deliciousness…”

That’s an argument from analogy minus the argument. Why should I regard morality as equivalent to taste?

“Hays seems to be telling us that he doesn't give a %$#* about being courageous unless courage is an absolute moral virtue at the abstract level.”

If there are no moral absolutes, then what makes courage virtuous? You rattle off some putative counterexamples, but your counterexamples lose their moral worth once you ditch moral realism. So your exercise is self-defeating.

“(I think we're supposed to assume he lacks any subjective appreciation for courage from which he infers an absolute virtue.)”

What’s the value of subjective appreciation for courage if it doesn’t correspond to an objective moral fact about courage?

“For all practical purposes, Hays declares that it's preferable to be deluded and happy than be correct and stuck with a limited life in a physical universe.”

i) To begin with, that’s not what I said. Either you’re obtuse, or else you’d rather caricature what you cannot refute.

ii) But let’s play along with your caricature for the sake of argument. If you reject moral absolutes, then what is wrong with being deluded?

“He seems to back off from saying that this is an argument against atheism, but essentially he says that he doesn't care about being right if it's going to mean receiving bad news.”

No. What I said is, why should we care about being right if there is no epistemic duty to be right? Are you too dim to grasp the issue?

“If Hays really feels that way, there's not much point in engaging him in rational argument, is there?”

If you reject moral absolutes, then what’s the point of rational argument? There’s no obligation to be right.

“If Christians like Hays would just imagine a world without God, they might see that their appreciation for moral behavior exists independently of any abstract reasoning, and, thus, independent of any absolute values.”

“Moral behavior” which doesn’t answer to moral absolutes is indistinguishable from immoral behavior.

“Alas, fear and superstition prevent Christians from performing this sort of ‘what if’ analysis.”

i) Hypotheticals are a basic feature of rationality.

ii) If you reject moral absolutes, then there’s no obligation to avoid “fear and superstition.”

Thanks for your self-refuting tirade, Dr. Illogic.


At July 22, 2010 7:31 AM , steve said...

Doctor Logic said...

“I'm calling your bluff on this one.”

Never call a player’s bluff when you have a losing hand.

“It doesn't matter if there's no absolute, objective reason why every person should eschew childishness. My argument is compelling to you because you prefer - you care - not to be childish.”

i) If I were an atheist, it wouldn’t matter. Unless your argument is morally compelling (which you deny at the outset), then it has no force.

ii) If your “argument” reduces to emotional bullying, then that’s not an “argument.” Rather, that’s high school social dynamics. Who’s hot and who’s not.

“The same goes for rational thinking. There's no absolute, objective reason why every person should be rational. (Indeed, any such rational justification you come up with would be circular.) The point is that we desire to be rational, and are often biologically compelled to be rational.”

i) I don’t think evolutionary biology compels us to be rational.

ii) But let’s play along with your claim for the sake of argument. That only works for animals which are unaware of their biological programming. If, however, an animal becomes conscious of its biological programming, then it’s in a position to realize that its “desire to be rational” it not, itself, a rational desire.

iii) You’re downshifting to psychological coercion, like the desire of an adolescent schoolgirl to fit in. To do whatever it takes to be accepted. Wearing the “right” clothes. The “right” hairdo. The “right” makeup. Listening to the “right” music.

iv) I might like to murder the guy who stole my girlfriend if I thought I could get away with it. In your worldview, my murderous desire is amoral.

“So, you sit across the table from me, holding a spoonful of dung, asking me to give you an absolute reason why you ought not eat the dung. Sorry, but I'm not worried that either of us is going to start eating dung, especially not on a regular basis.”

If you want to bring “rationality” down to the level of certain tastes and odors we find naturally repellent, that doesn’t exactly commend your worldview.

“Let's suppose (contra reality) that you really didn't care about being rational. How would the existence of some absolute moral imperative cause you to be rational? Surely, such an imperative only has a hold on you if you care. If you lack a subjective appreciation for rationality, a rational argument won't change that.”

There’s a fundamental asymmetry between atheism and Christian theism at this point. In Christianity, there’s a match between our subjective appreciation for rationality and objective epistemic duties. But by your own admission, you don’t have that in atheism.

“None of what I have said is self-defeating. My arguments appeal to people who subjectively value rationality. People who don't subjectively value rationality won't give a damn about my arguments, and I can live with that.”

Of course it’s self-refuting. You appeal to “rationality.” But your real position boils down to one’s personal preference, which is hardly interchangeable with rationality.

“The reason you think my comments are self-defeating is that your model of morality is wrong. You mistakenly think that people are moral because the perform some sort of deductive inference from self-evident moral absolutes. The reality is that morality is caring, not deduction. A man's supposed moral absolutes are inferred from his cares. It's not the other way around.”

I said nothing about moral motivations. I’ve been discussing the metaphysical foundations of morality.

“If I could somehow prove to you on paper that objectively good people absolutely ought to rape, kill and steal, would you still want to be an ‘objectively good’ person? I put it to you that you would prefer to be a subjectively good person, and an objectively evil person. You would rather be ‘objectively evil’ because you care about not murdering, not raping, etc.”

i) We can always dream up hypothetical scenarios which generate tensions between what is subjectively the case and what is objectively the case. But why not deal with the real world situation of atheism and Christian theism? Does Christian theism trigger this cognitive dissonance? No.

ii) And, once again, that goes to the asymmetry between the respective positions.

“Of course, this is all hypothetical because there are no decent arguments about objective goods, let alone proofs. But it does make the important point. People aren't good because they perceive and obey some abstract objective moral framework of absolutes. They act on their cares.”

i) This isn’t a question of what makes people good, since–on your view–nobody is good. There is no good to emulate.

ii) And, once again, I’m not discussing incentives or disincentives. Rather, I’m discussing what grounds moral ascriptions. You admit that moral ascriptions are baseless.

“If you don't care about being rational, and don't care about being childish, then my argument isn't going to work on you.”

To call one’s opponent “childish” is an attempt to shame him into changing his belief or behavior. But your moral nihilism takes the sting out of that accusation.

“Like I said, I can live with that.”

Yes, well…if the ship were going down, I won’t be stepping into the same lifeboat you do. Hard to sleep in a lifeboat with a moral nihilist by my side. I might be missing some body parts when I awake.

7 comments:

  1. Thanks for giving me the time of day, Steve. More than I deserve. :) When I wrote my statement, it was after a long quote from your introduction, which a moderate sliced down to a third, because it violated the fair use policy. Now that you have given your permission to quote long strings of text (thank you), it won't happen again. For now, however, it may have led to a misunderstanding about which of your statements that I was referring to. I didn't have the point about the lack of absolute morality in mind. That didn't concern me as much. I had passages like this in mind:

    Likewise, from an atheistic standpoint, what does it matter if you draw the right con-
    clusions or the wrong conclusions? Suppose, for the sake of argument, that atheism is
    true. There is no heaven or hell. This is it.


    and:

    Okay, so tell me why I should care which is which? Someday that will be your brain or
    my brain floating in the formaldehyde. What difference does it make if your dead brain
    drew the right conclusions while my dead brain drew the wrong conclusions? What dif-
    ference does it make if your brain disapproved of my brain? At that point it makes no dif-
    ference to either one of us.


    This is an NOT argument based on the evidence, and the probabilities have little if anything to do with it, regardless of what the point of this argument may be. Clears the underbrush? Narrows the field? Still irrelevant if we make decisions based on truth (evidence, reason, logic, probability) and nothing else. Delusion tends to bring in arguments that do not depend on the probability of the explanations--not the evidence nor the logic. They instead play to wishes, fears and emotions.

    For example, here is a passage from the Koran:

    Koran 22:19-23
    Garments of fire have been prepared for the unbelievers. Scalding water shall be poured upon their heads, melting their skins and that which is in their bellies. They shall be lashed rods of iron. Whenever, in their anguish, they try to escape from Hell, back they shall be dragged, and will be told: 'Taste the torment of the Conflagration!'

    It is far more illustrative than Jesus' descriptions of hell, and contemptibly so: if it influence's the faith and decisions of Muslims and their targets of evangelism because of the mere possibility that it may be true, then it is a delusion in the truest sense of the word.

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  2. Delusion tends to bring in arguments that do not depend on the probability of the explanations--not the evidence nor the logic. They instead play to wishes, fears and emotions.

    What unique definition of "delusion" are you using here? And do you realize how much of TCD your words here would apply to? By your measure, The Christian Delusion is itself, in large part, a work of delusion. Not only if TID is correct, but flat out in some cases (every time an idea is rejected out of hand or denounced because the writers find it subjectively distasteful, for example. And that happens a number of times in TCD.)

    What's more, I'd point out that you aren't contesting the truth of what you quote. You're claiming that it's irrelevant, so long as we make decisions "based on truth (evidence, reason, logic, probability) and nothing else."

    There's some problems with that. One is whether your definition of "truth", if followed, would lead to the abandonment of truth. If the "truth" itself is as you quote - valueless, meaningless, ultimately pointless, etc - then truth leaves one free to make decisions, oddly enough, that aren't based on truth. The truth can set you free, indeed - in this case by expanding what factors go into your decisions.

    Now, if you dig in your heels and say "NO! All your decisions should value (this set type of) truth and only truth! And no truth you encounter should ever make you deviate from this view!" well, surprise. You aren't making decisions based only on "truth" anyway. You're working off some kind of dogma that rules out possible decisions truth could lead you to right from the outset.

    I'd also point out that a person who insists they make their decisions based only and entirely on truth and truth alone, devoid of background influences, emotional and other factors, etc, would - if they were not accounting for those factors - be deluded.

    It is far more illustrative than Jesus' descriptions of hell, and contemptibly so: if it influence's the faith and decisions of Muslims and their targets of evangelism because of the mere possibility that it may be true, then it is a delusion in the truest sense of the word.

    No, it's not. Why in the world would being influenced by threat of hell, or even the possibility of hell, itself be a delusion?

    Again, you seem to be using a very unique, otherwise unheard of definition of "delusion" here.

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  3. Crude, the definition of "delusion" that I implicitly had in mind was:

    noun: a belief driven primarily by emotional or irrational psychological forces, not primarily by the mechanisms of reason

    My favorite dictionary is onelook.com, so I went to onelook.com and entered "delusion," and this was the definition that seemed closest:

    noun: (psychology) an erroneous belief that is held in the face of evidence to the contrary

    That isn't the same nor even significantly similar enough to my own definition to be considered effectively the same, so I am in error, and I apologize. I conflated beliefs that are motivated by irrational psychological forces (that tend to lead to false conclusions) with beliefs that are just plain false. They are not the same, because many beliefs that are motivated by emotions are nevertheless correct. If there was scientifically conclusive evidence for hell, then many people may still believe in hell for no reason other than it is part of their cult or religion, but it would no longer be a delusion according the onelook.com definition.

    Instead of saying, "...it is a delusion in the truest sense of the word," I should have said, "...it is strongly characteristic of a delusion." There seems to be nothing I would like to change in my statement, "Delusion tends to bring in arguments that do not depend on the probability of the explanations--not the evidence nor the logic." I used the word, "tends," which I think makes it remain true regardless of the definition. Do you agree?

    Let's move on. You say, "One [problem] is whether your definition of "truth", if followed, would lead to the abandonment of truth." I followed your complete reason. You seem to think that atheism (and the nihilism that logically follows from it) would at least allow the abandonment of all absolute standards of deciding truth.

    I can't disagree too much. Belief in the non-existence of God really does tend to lead to a libertarian moral environment, where just about anything can be believed, which is especially apparent in entire societies where atheism is a dominant belief and non-religion is a dominant position. You see people in places like Japan, Sweden and Great Britain, where it is common to believe New Age ideologies and practices, astrology, psychics and other types of BS to fulfill their wishful thinking for meaning, purpose, self-importance, and hope for life after death. That isn't the tendency the atheists and other non-religious people in the United States, where they very much tend to be of one personality type--people who value belief in the truth for the sake of itself, and they tend to be scientific minded and well-educated.

    You say that if I dig in my heals and say, "NO! All your decisions should value (this set type of) truth and only truth! And no truth you encounter should ever make you deviate from this view!" then I am really working off some kind of dogma.

    Again, I can't disagree, and I actually think that some dogmas are better than others. My dogma is that any belief should be chosen based on the evidence, and the best hypothesis is decided on what hypothesis has the most explanatory power, most explanatory scope, most plausibility, most consistency with existing beliefs, and the least ad hoc. It is called "the Argument to the Best Explanation" in New Testament scholarship, but I apply it to any field of making decisions of belief, including general philosophy.

    At the least, this makes my dogma consistent. I apply my dogma when deciding where to start looking for my car keys and deciding which job opportunities to apply, in addition to which beliefs I have about the cosmos. You presumably use the same dogma as me when making everyday life decisions, but you use a different dogma when deciding your beliefs about the cosmos.

    Sorry, I have rambled too much on a tangent, and I'll stop and go do something else.

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  4. Abe,

    There seems to be nothing I would like to change in my statement, "Delusion tends to bring in arguments that do not depend on the probability of the explanations--not the evidence nor the logic." I used the word, "tends," which I think makes it remain true regardless of the definition. Do you agree?

    Agree that being influenced by fear of hell is itself "strongly characteristic of a delusion"? But that doesn't seem clear at all - it depends on how the person goes about deciding on whether and why they'll take the threat seriously. Is belief in a phlogiston strongly characteristic of a delusion? How about quarks? The same problem pops up, because it's not the belief itself that does the heavy lifting here, by the reasons behind the belief.

    That isn't the tendency the atheists and other non-religious people in the United States, where they very much tend to be of one personality type--people who value belief in the truth for the sake of itself, and they tend to be scientific minded and well-educated.

    According to who? And what, you think people in Sweden or Japan would say "No, I don't value truth for its own sake"? Or consider themselves and those who agree with them to be scientific-minded? The article I just linked to indicates some of the problems with assuming "well-educated" = "less likely to believe in that strange stuff the overseas irreligious do". Not to mention the problem with just writing off those beliefs because of their label, or due to your psychoanalysis of them.

    My dogma is that any belief should be chosen based on the evidence, and the best hypothesis is decided on what hypothesis has the most explanatory power, most explanatory scope, most plausibility, most consistency with existing beliefs, and the least ad hoc.

    There are plenty of people who believe in psychics who would claim to hold to that exact same "dogma". Plenty of religious people too. And of course, plenty of atheists. I wouldn't be surprised if most of the Triabloggers could assent to it. But as you said, you're not just committing yourself to truth. You're committing yourself to at least one dogma (and therefore, it's no longer all about truth and truth alone.) Possibly more than one, especially considering the role subjective judgment calls will play in that system.

    You presumably use the same dogma as me when making everyday life decisions, but you use a different dogma when deciding your beliefs about the cosmos.

    Not at all. But if we're going to talk about inconsistency, I'll note again that the OP here was illustrating inconsistency on the part of certain atheists with regards to truth and value. The OP pointed out that, given moral nihilism, truth had no value. That's no delusion - it's just the fact of the matter. Making a dogma out of your idea of truth doesn't change that. And arguing your dogma is better is either mere subjectivity (and thus meaningless here), or inconsistent.

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  5. Crude, again, thanks for taking the time to criticize my arguments.

    I justify my assertion that the influence of the fear of going to hell is strongly characteristic of a delusion like so: (1) the influence is not driven by the evidence nor a reasonable probability estimate, but it is driven by a fear of the mere possibility, and (2) there are a handful of religions and thousands of cults that use the fear of hell or other unfavorable afterlife consequences (in addition to many other irrational forces) to manipulate their adherents into stronger adherence and evangelism. There is no better explanation for the presence of belief in hell in such belief systems. Delusions tend to be likewise disconnected from evidence and sound arguments. Therefore, the influence of the fear of going to hell is strongly characteristic of a delusion, though of course the belief in hell is not verifiably a delusion (false belief). I am not claiming that the fear of hell has an effect of scaring people into adherence who otherwise don't adhere (it does not), but it certainly has a tremendous effect on adherents to motivate greater faith and evangelism, and it is often used as though it is an argument to change behavior, as Steve Hays has done.

    I made a claim that it "isn't the tendency the atheists and other non-religious people in the United States [to believe New Age ideologies and practices, astrology, psychics]." You made a counterpoint by linking to an editorial that stated that 31% of people who never worship expressed strong belief in the paranormal, as opposed to only 8% of people who regularly attend a house of worship. There is no great harm in using editorials for providing evidence for arguments on blogs where all arguments are done from the seat of one's pants, but one must still be cautious. Christians are expected to disbelieve palm reading, astrology, ancient advanced civilizations, ghosts, seances and Bigfoot, not necessarily because the existence and utility of such things are improbable explanations for the relevant evidence (as non-religious people would tend to reason), but because such disbelief follows directly from the Christian dogmas. Disbelief in astrology, for example, is required for Biblical adherents, because astrologers are strongly condemned in the Old Testament.

    Take note, also, that the figure is 31%, which is still a significant minority. It is much like claiming that Satanism is a much stronger tendency among atheists than among Christians, which is true, but the percentage is diminishingly small among both groups. In contrast, look at the percentage of Christians who accept "paranormal" beliefs that are tolerated or encouraged by the Christian religion. For example, see this image posted on Gallup.com:

    Belief in Theory of Evolution, by Church Attendance

    (continued below)

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  6. (continued from above)

    You explained, "The OP pointed out that, given moral nihilism, truth had no value."

    Though I have tried to avoid that topic until now, I would agree with that judgment, except that I would claim, "...given moral nihilism, truth has no absolute objective value." There is still an allowance for subjective values, which isn't at all shameful or insignificant, much like there is no absolute objective value for a green $20 banknote, but it carries significant value hardly the less. There is a very common mistaken tendency to conflate subjective values with no values, which leads to a reckless condemnation of those without belief in God to be seen as either immoral or hypocritical. If you think it is hypocrisy for me to value the truth even though I don't have a basis for an absolute and objective value system, then I invite you to be consistent with your own logic and be gracious enough to FedEx to me all of your money in the form of cash, which has no absolute and objective value, not even following (presumably) from your absolute and objective value system.

    Let's talk about dogmas. I think I am at a disadvantage on this one, at least until you equally expose your own general philosophy. Whatever fault it may be for me to hold the dogma that I have, it is a consistent dogma for me. At a later time, I might claim a more foundational dogma, but I haven't yet figured out how the criteria contained in the "Argument to the Best Explanation" actually leads to the most probable explanations, though they seem to be greatly intuitive and well-attested methods for arriving at the most probable conclusions. I certainly would not claim that my dogma is always consistent in my actions (nobody is entirely consistent with their own dogmas), but I certainly believe that such a dogma is ideally applied consistently for all of my beliefs and actions, not just some of them.

    That said, I would love to know what your dogmas are. I acknowledge a dogma, which really is seemingly incongruous with my claim that I value truth for its own sake, even if the dogma is claimed to be for the sake of the truth, but I believe that my chosen dogma has the advantage of consistency, which is that I (ideally) apply the same dogma (that is the same methodology) for all of my beliefs and decisions, from the immediate Earthly realm to the philosophical and metaphysical domain. If you deny my charge that you have two or more different sets of dogmas divided unevenly among the aspects of your own life, then I would love to hear the explanation for that.

    Thank you.

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  7. ABE SAID:

    “This is an NOT argument based on the evidence, and the probabilities have little if anything to do with it, regardless of what the point of this argument may be. Clears the underbrush? Narrows the field? Still irrelevant if we make decisions based on truth (evidence, reason, logic, probability) and nothing else.”

    I deployed two distinct, but related arguments. Turning to the next argument, if I’m an atheist, then why should I give a fig about the truth except when the truth happens to coincide with my self-interest? Life is unfair. Nasty, brutish, and short. So why not be ruthlessly pragmatic? I only serve the truth if and when the truth serves me?

    I can still play the odds, but that’s not the same thing as pursing truth for its own sake.

    Christian theism and atheism are not symmetrical positions. Nothing ultimately matters in a godless universe. You can’t play for keeps. Sooner or later, you lose everything.

    “Delusion” carries a derogatory connotation. But in a world without moral absolutes, there is no reason you *shouldn’t* be deluded.

    “It is far more illustrative than Jesus' descriptions of hell, and contemptibly so: if it influence's the faith and decisions of Muslims and their targets of evangelism because of the mere possibility that it may be true, then it is a delusion in the truest sense of the word.”

    i) Fear of hell would only be delusive if hell is nonexistent.

    ii) You’re assuming that Jesus’ figures of speech should be taken literally.

    iii) Fear can be a rational factor in decision-making. Avoid high-risk behavior. Don’t gamble if you can’t afford to lose.

    iv) ”Contemptible” is a value judgment. But unless atheism can underwrite moral absolutes, what’s wrong with being “contemptible”?

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