LVKA writes:
"And Revelation has been constantly rejected in the course of history by the very same Churches to which it was purportedly addressed. The only seven somethings that had ever received it constantly throughout human history are the Romans, whose city Rome is founded upon seven hills; and where Satan was enthroned (Revelation 2:13). This fact is not without reason, since the Romans seem to have been very fond of Apocalyptic writings generally: whether John's, or Peter's, or Hermas' Shephard, or Ezra's. (see the Muratory Canon, for instance; and remember that IV Ezra was part of Catholic Bibles up until the age of Trent, when 3rd and 4th Ezra weren't included). The fact that it was rejected by the very same cities to which it was supposed to have been written to is also of signifficance: the excuse for that is that some or certain heretics used it and abused it at a certain point in time"
LVKA doesn't make much of an effort to support his claims. And we aren't told why a book would have to be "constantly" accepted in order for us to accept it. If Revelation was widely accepted early on, but became less accepted later, why should the later status of the book be of much concern to us when making a judgment about its canonicity?
Revelation is different from some other Biblical books in that it's addressed to seven churches rather than one individual or one church, for example. The initial audience of seven churches creates more opportunity for verification or falsification of the book's canonicity. And unfortunately for LVKA's argument, the evidence from those churches points in the opposite direction of what he's suggesting. The data we have concerning the seven churches of Revelation 2-3 suggests that they initially accepted the book rather than rejecting it.
Some of the seven churches were prominent in early church history, and Christians from other locations were often in contact with these churches. For example, Ignatius writes to a few of the churches, some of the most prominent church leaders of the early patristic era came from those churches (Polycarp, Melito, Polycrates, etc.), some of those church's leaders traveled and communicated widely (Polycarp's visit to Rome, etc.), and Irenaeus cites the churches of Smyrna and Ephesus as two of the most significant churches of his day (Against Heresies, 3:3:4). If the seven churches of Asia Minor had rejected the book of Revelation, they were in a position to make that rejection widely known and to influence other churches and individuals to reject the book as well.
But the evidence suggests that, instead, Revelation was widely accepted:
"As early as the middle of the second century, Revelation was ascribed to John, 'one of the apostles of Christ' (Justin, Dial. 81). Other second-century works and writers make the same claim: a lost commentary on Revelation by Melito, bishop of Sardis (c. A.D. 165; see Eusebius, H.E. 4.26.2); Irenaeus (c. 180; Adv. Haer. 3.11.1, 4.20.11, 4.35.2); and the Muratorian Canon (late second century). Whether Papias, an even earlier witness than these (d.c. 130), can be added to this list is disputed, but a good case can be made out that he both knew Revelation and attributed it to John. The evidence of these writers is particularly strong in that two of them (three, if Papias is included) could well be reporting firsthand evidence. Sardis, where Melito was bishop, was one of the churches addressed in Revelation (1:11; 3:1-6). Irenaeus was from Smyrna, also a church addressed in Revelation (1:11; 2:8-11), and claims to have heard Polycarp, who had talked with John the apostle himself. Papias knew John the apostle personally. The early tradition is confirmed by the third-century fathers Tertullian, Hippolytus, and Origen. Not only do these authors ascribe Revelation to John the apostle, they do so without any hint of there being a contrary claim. No New Testament book, concludes Gerhard Maier, has a stronger or earlier tradition about its authorship than does Revelation." (D.A. Carson, et al., An Introduction To The New Testament [Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan, 1992], p. 468)
I would change some of the wording or add some qualifiers that Carson, Moo, and Morris don't mention, but the general thrust of their assessment is accurate. Other sources could be added to theirs, both in terms of authorship attribution and in terms of citations of the book as scripture. See, for example, Bruce Metzger's discussion of Clement of Alexandria, Cyprian, and other relevant sources in The Canon Of The New Testament (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
The claim would sometimes be made that the heretic Cerinthus authored Revelation, and later sources would speculate about authorship by some other John. But neither argument seems to have been prominent early on, and such claims are rarely even mentioned among the early sources.
Irenaeus refers to manuscripts of Revelation that were "ancient" in his day and how the correct text of a passage in Revelation was confirmed by "those men who saw John face to face" (Against Heresies, 5:30:1). Multiple eyewitnesses of the apostle John were still living when Revelation was circulating, and it was circulating long enough for them to be involved in commenting on the textual discrepancy Irenaeus references. The view of Revelation held by Irenaeus and his contemporaries was influenced by earlier sources.
Tertullian wrote:
"We have also churches which are nurselings of John's: for although Marcion disallows his Apocalypse, yet the succession of their bishops, when traced back to its origin, will be found to rest in John as originator." (Against Marcion, 4:5)
Tertullian isn't addressing the authorship of Revelation. He's addressing the apostolic origin of the churches of Revelation 2-3. But his comments imply that those churches accepted Revelation. It's unlikely that Tertullian would mention Marcion's rejection of Revelation only to go on to appeal to some churches that also rejected the book. Tertullian accepted Revelation himself, and his comments about the seven churches involve a claim to be knowledgeable about the history of those churches. It's unlikely that Tertullian would accept Revelation if he knew that the book was rejected by those seven churches. And it's unlikely that Tertullian would be ignorant of a rejection of Revelation by those churches, if they did reject it, especially given his claim to be so familiar with the history of the churches. Similarly, it's unlikely that men such as Irenaeus and Origen, who traveled and communicated so widely and showed such an interest in those churches, would be ignorant of their rejection of Revelation or would know of it, yet accept Revelation anyway.
Saturday, July 26, 2008
Friday, July 25, 2008
Clarification on Relativity
There appears to be some confusion over my previous post on Relativity so I want to produce some further clarification. First, we know that Einstein’s version of the train was used to destroy the concept of “simultaneity” because what is observed on the moving train as being simultaneous was not observed as being simultaneous outside the train. In reality what this demonstrated is that time itself is fluid; there is no objective time. Time, apart from frame of reference, is meaningless. Far from being a defeater to my argument (as Paul C. seems to think), this was my point.
Brian Greene gives his own example of this experiment:
In this picture, we have three events that occur separated by vast distances in space and time. For example, we could say that A is ten million light years from B, and likewise B from C (these are just arbitrary values for the sake of demonstration). We could also say that it takes 10 million years to go from “blue” to “red” to “green.” (Thus, time is going right to left.) Thus, the vertical axis of this diagram represents distance, the horizontal axis represents time.
Now from the perspective of one observer, all the “red” events at A, B, and C occur simultaneously. This observer has a “timeslice” that is directly perpendicular (in our graph). But from another perspective, the “green” event of A is simultaneous with the “red” event of B and the “blue” event of C. This “timeslice” is at a roughly 45 degree angle (both in space—that is distance—and in time—he is in the “future” if time is flowing from right to left).
Now let us give the graph some non-controversial meaning (although you must take note that the graph will not be to scale under these circumstances). Take line A as the life of a star that goes supernova (at green), line B is the life of a star that dwindles to a dwarf star (at green), and line C represents events that occur on Earth until Global Warming melts us (at green). Let’s further say that on Earth, the red dot represents the signing of the Declaration of Independence, and the blue dot represents the construction of the Great Pyramids. The red and the blue dots of the two stars are adjusted accordingly to be arbitrary events that occur at the correct time-scale.
Now obviously the observer that views perpendicularly sees that at the signing of the Declaration of Independence, both stars had the same amount of time left before reaching their ends. However, the observer at the 45 degree angle sees that the supernova star has actually gone supernova while the Great Pyramids are being built!
Now let us give it a little more controversial meaning (again, the graph is not to scale under these circumstances). Let us deal only with lines A and C. Let line A represent the bullet of a gun and let line C represent the finger that pulls the trigger. Line A is: “blue” = bullet loaded, “red” = bullet fired, “green” = bullet kills target. Line C is: “blue” = trigger finger in killer’s pocket, “red” = finger pulls trigger, “green” = finger rubbing killer’s nose. Now in this instance, the distance between line A and C is very, very short. But since a man’s finger and a bullet can never occupy the same space at the same time, there will always be some distance—even if it is only an atom’s length! As a result, the distance to the observer at the 45 degree angle (to both space AND time!) is going to be very, very far away. But the results are the same.
In one perspective, the trigger finger pulls the trigger at the instant the bullet is fired. But in the other perspective, we have the bullet being fired when the killer’s finger is in his pocket. Now the distance to this observer is probably outside the dimensions of our universe and far, far into the future from now. But that observation point does exist in theory. In theory, viewing any two events at the appropriate “timeslice” of the spacetime loaf will yield contradictions in cause and effect. Naturally, these are on such a large scale that for all practical purposes we can ignore them.
So once again, we can relate this back to what I’ve said about the logical before. Cause and effect is determined by what logically must occur before another thing can happen, NOT by what temporally occurs. Usually the logical and temporal correspond, but when it does not we have evidence that we have to adjust our frame of reference. There will be some frame of reference where that cause will temporally precede its effect, but that might not be our observational frame of reference. Our frame of reference, taken at face value, would cause us to be mistaken.
By the way, I also point out that this is the basis of the Lorentz transformation equations anyway. Those equations in essence seek to show the relationship between various frames of reference. And the point isn’t that cause and effect are destroyed at all—that’s never been what I claimed. Rather it’s the fact that cause and effect are temporally meaningless when there is no objective time; instead, they can only remain logically meaningful.
Logical precedence is not bound by frame of reference; it is the objective quality that causes must precede effects. Temporal “before” are strictly bound to frame of reference; it will always be a subjective quality. On Earth, it usually matches the objective frame of reference because the relative speed between observer and observee remains very small.
Hopefully that helps clear it up a bit.
Brian Greene gives his own example of this experiment:
Imagine that the leaders of two warring nations, sitting at opposite ends of a long negotiation table, have just concluded an agreement for a ceasefire, but neither wants to sign the accord before the other. The secretary-general of the United Nations comes up with a brilliant resolution. A light bulb, initially turned off, will be placed midway between the two presidents. When it is turned on, the light it emits will reach each of the presidents simultaneously, since they are equidistant from the bulb. Each president agrees to sign a copy of the accord when he or she sees the light. The plan is carried out and the agreement is signed to the satisfaction of both sides.Now we have three different examples (Einstein’s, my own, and now Greene’s), all of which really state the same thing. The sequence of events that one observes is dependent upon the relative motion between the observer and what is being observed. While Einstein and Greene both dealt strictly with concepts of simultaneity, it doesn’t take much thinking at all to change this into my own example where we have an event that occurs before another event according to one frame of reference occur after the other event in another frame of reference. In fact, in Greene’s second book (The Fabric of the Cosmos), he gave an illustration of this regarding cuts in the “space-time loaf.” Unfortunately, I’ve loaned that particular book out for the moment. But I will reproduce my own version of cutting the space-time loaf here.
Flushed with success, the secretary-general makes use of the same approach with two other embattled nations that have also reached a peace agreement. The only difference is that the presidents involved in this negotiation are sitting at opposite ends of a table inside a train travelling along at constant velocity. Fittingly, the president of Forwardland is facing in the direction of the train’s motion while the president of Backwardland is facing in the opposite direction. Familiar with the fact that the laws of physics takes precisely the same form regardless of one’s state of motion so long as this motion is unchanging, the secretary-general takes no heed of this difference, and carries out the light bulb-initiated signing ceremony as before. Both presidents sign the agreement, and along with their entourage of advisers, celebrate the end of hostilities.
Just then, word arrives that fighting has broken out between people from each country who had been watching the signing ceremony from the platform outside the moving train. All those on the negotiation train are dismayed to hear that the reason for the renewed hostilities is the claim by people of Forwardland that they have been duped, as their president signed the agreement before the president of Backwardland. As everyone on the train—from both sides—agrees that the accord was signed simultaneously, how can it be that the outside observers watching the ceremony think otherwise?
Let’s consider in more detail the perspective of an observer on the platform. Initially the bulb on the train is dark, and then at a particular moment it illuminates, sending beams of light speeding toward both presidents. From the perspective of a person on the platform, the president of Forwardland is heading toward the emitted light while the president of Backwardland is retreating. This means, to the platform observers, that the light beam does not have to travel as far to reach the president of Forwardland, who moves toward the approaching light, as it does to reach the president of Backwardland, who moves away from it. This is not a statement about the speed of the light as it travels toward the two presidents—we have already noted that regardless of the state of motion of the source or the observer, the speed of light is always the same. Instead, we are describing only how far, from the vantage point of the platform observers, the initial flash of light must travel to reach each of the presidents. Since this distance is less for the president of Forwardland than it is for the president of Backwardland, and since the speed of light toward each is the same, the light will reach the president of Forwardland first. This is why the citizens of Forwardland claim to have been duped.
When CNN broadcasts the eyewitness account, the secretary-general, the two presidents, and all their advisers can’t believe their ears. They all agree that the light bulb was secured firmly, exactly midway between the two presidents and that therefore, without further ado, the light it emitted travelled the same distance to reach each of them. Since the speed of the emitted light to the left and right is the same, they believe, and in fact observed, that the light clearly reached each president simultaneously.
Who is right, those on or off the train? The observations of each group and their supporting explanations are impeccable. The answer is that both are right. … The only sublety here is that the respective truths seem to be contradictory. An important political issue is at stake: Did the presidents sign the agreement simultaneously? The observations and reasoning above ineluctably lead us to the conclusion that according to those on the train they did while according to those on the platform they did not. In other words, things that are simultaneous from the viewpoint of some observers will not be simultaneous from the viewpoint of others, if the two groups are in relative motion.
This is a startling conclusion. It is one of the deepest insights into the nature of reality ever discovered. Nevertheless, if long after you set down this book you remember nothing of the chapter except for the ill-fated attempt at détente, you will have retained the essence of Einstein’s discovery. Without highbrow mathematics or a convoluted chain of logic, this completely unexpected feature of time follows directly from the constancy of the speed of light, as the scenario illustrates. Notice that if the speed of light were not constant but behaved according to our intuition based on slow-moving baseballs and snowballs, the platform observers would agree with those on the train. …
The constancy of the speed of light requires that we give up the age-old notion that simultaneity is a universal concept that everyone, regardless of their state of motion, agrees upon. The universal clock previously envisioned to dispassionately tick off identical seconds here on earth and on Mars and on Jupiter and in the Andromeda galaxy and in each and every nook and cranny of the cosmos does not exist. On the contrary, observers in relative motion will not agree on which events occur at the same time. Once again, the reason that this conclusion—a bona fide characteristic of the world we inhabit—is so unfamiliar is that the effects are extremely small when the speeds involved are those commonly encountered in everyday experience. If the negotiating table were 100 feet long and the train were moving at 10 miles per hour, platform observers would “see” that the light reached the president of Forwardland about a millionth of a billionth of a second before it reached the president of Backwardland. Although this represents a genuine difference, it is so tiny that it cannot be detected directly by human senses. If the train were moving considerably faster, say at 600 million miles per hour, from the perspective of someone on the platform the light would take almost 20 times as long to reach the president of Backwardland compared with the time to reach the president of Forwardland. At high speeds, the starting effects of special relativity become increasingly pronounced.
Greene, Brian. (1999). The Elegant Universe. New York: Vintage Books. 34-37 (all italics in original)
In this picture, we have three events that occur separated by vast distances in space and time. For example, we could say that A is ten million light years from B, and likewise B from C (these are just arbitrary values for the sake of demonstration). We could also say that it takes 10 million years to go from “blue” to “red” to “green.” (Thus, time is going right to left.) Thus, the vertical axis of this diagram represents distance, the horizontal axis represents time.
Now from the perspective of one observer, all the “red” events at A, B, and C occur simultaneously. This observer has a “timeslice” that is directly perpendicular (in our graph). But from another perspective, the “green” event of A is simultaneous with the “red” event of B and the “blue” event of C. This “timeslice” is at a roughly 45 degree angle (both in space—that is distance—and in time—he is in the “future” if time is flowing from right to left).
Now let us give the graph some non-controversial meaning (although you must take note that the graph will not be to scale under these circumstances). Take line A as the life of a star that goes supernova (at green), line B is the life of a star that dwindles to a dwarf star (at green), and line C represents events that occur on Earth until Global Warming melts us (at green). Let’s further say that on Earth, the red dot represents the signing of the Declaration of Independence, and the blue dot represents the construction of the Great Pyramids. The red and the blue dots of the two stars are adjusted accordingly to be arbitrary events that occur at the correct time-scale.
Now obviously the observer that views perpendicularly sees that at the signing of the Declaration of Independence, both stars had the same amount of time left before reaching their ends. However, the observer at the 45 degree angle sees that the supernova star has actually gone supernova while the Great Pyramids are being built!
Now let us give it a little more controversial meaning (again, the graph is not to scale under these circumstances). Let us deal only with lines A and C. Let line A represent the bullet of a gun and let line C represent the finger that pulls the trigger. Line A is: “blue” = bullet loaded, “red” = bullet fired, “green” = bullet kills target. Line C is: “blue” = trigger finger in killer’s pocket, “red” = finger pulls trigger, “green” = finger rubbing killer’s nose. Now in this instance, the distance between line A and C is very, very short. But since a man’s finger and a bullet can never occupy the same space at the same time, there will always be some distance—even if it is only an atom’s length! As a result, the distance to the observer at the 45 degree angle (to both space AND time!) is going to be very, very far away. But the results are the same.
In one perspective, the trigger finger pulls the trigger at the instant the bullet is fired. But in the other perspective, we have the bullet being fired when the killer’s finger is in his pocket. Now the distance to this observer is probably outside the dimensions of our universe and far, far into the future from now. But that observation point does exist in theory. In theory, viewing any two events at the appropriate “timeslice” of the spacetime loaf will yield contradictions in cause and effect. Naturally, these are on such a large scale that for all practical purposes we can ignore them.
So once again, we can relate this back to what I’ve said about the logical before. Cause and effect is determined by what logically must occur before another thing can happen, NOT by what temporally occurs. Usually the logical and temporal correspond, but when it does not we have evidence that we have to adjust our frame of reference. There will be some frame of reference where that cause will temporally precede its effect, but that might not be our observational frame of reference. Our frame of reference, taken at face value, would cause us to be mistaken.
By the way, I also point out that this is the basis of the Lorentz transformation equations anyway. Those equations in essence seek to show the relationship between various frames of reference. And the point isn’t that cause and effect are destroyed at all—that’s never been what I claimed. Rather it’s the fact that cause and effect are temporally meaningless when there is no objective time; instead, they can only remain logically meaningful.
Logical precedence is not bound by frame of reference; it is the objective quality that causes must precede effects. Temporal “before” are strictly bound to frame of reference; it will always be a subjective quality. On Earth, it usually matches the objective frame of reference because the relative speed between observer and observee remains very small.
Hopefully that helps clear it up a bit.
Evangelical & Reformed
Lee Irons has done a post on Reformed identity that’s getting a bit of a buzz:
http://www.upper-register.com/blog/?p=207
I’m of two minds about his post. Up to a point, I appreciate what he’s trying to say. However, when he says something I’m inclined to agree with, he justifies that statement with a supporting argument I can’t agree with. So even when he says something which might be true in its own right, what makes the statement true is, according to him, a reason which I think is either false or misleading.
So his post leaves me ambivalent. He makes it hard for me to agree with him even when I’d like to go along with him.
Speaking for myself, I feel free to use the “evangelical” label. That’s for two reasons:
i) We do need a general designation to denote Bible-believing Christians.
ii) Not every issue is distinctive to a particular theological tradition. So there are many times when we should frame the issue in broader terms.
That said, the very fact that “evangelical” is a general designation is also part of the problem. It’s a rather rubbery term. How far to the left of the theological spectrum can someone go and still be an “evangelical”?
There is no automatic cut-off point since “evangelical” is, by definition, a fairly flexible and fluid designation, subject to an evolving consensus of opinion.
Moving along:
Lee says that he considers himself to be “a Christian first, then a Protestant, then an evangelical, and only then Reformed.”
The pattern here is that he’s moving from a higher classification to a lower classification. Calvinists are a subset of evangelicals, who are a subset of Protestants, who are a subset of Christians.
But is the highest classification our central identity? Suppose I said that I consider myself an animal first, then a mammal, then a male mammal, then a man.
Would animality be central my identity? No. Animality tells you very little about my personal identity, or even my corporate identity.
My actual identity is my concrete identity. Yes, you can say I’m an animal, but I’m not a generic animal. There’s no such thing as a generic animal. My animality is exemplified in a very specific form.
Upper taxa are abstractions. The higher up you go, the less they define you.
Take Lee’s statement that he’s not a Calvinist who happens to be a Christian, but a Christian who happens to be a Calvinist (my paraphrase). It’s not the general properties that define us, but the specific properties—for even the general properties are exemplified in a specific set of properties. There’s no animal that isn’t a particular kind of animal, with other individuating traits, like gender.
Suppose I were to say I’m an animal that happens to be a man—rather than, say, a millipede. Is the difference between a man and a millipede incidental to my identity?
What if I’m an animal that happens to be an aardvark? Is animality central to my identity? Is the difference between a man and an aardvark an incidental property? At the risk of offending PETA, my human identity isn’t secondary to my personal identity.
So there’s a deceptive degree of continuity to Lee’s classification scheme.
Of course, there’s a sense in which a Christian is a Christian first and foremost. But that’s ambiguous. What does it mean to be a Christian?
Here some tension surface in Lee’s definition. One the one hand, he downplays the Reformed confessions in favor of “the primary NT confession.” On the other hand, he plays up the “historic ecumenical creeds.”
But, in that case, which is primary—the scriptures or the creeds? He still seems to focus on credal identity. It’s just a choice of which creed supplies the point of reference.
Is he going to say it comes down to which creed is more Biblical? Okay. But since he seems to identify himself as a Calvinist, does he regard Reformed confessions as less Biblical than the “historical ecumenical creeds”?
And when he gets around to defining his terms, they’re a good deal narrower than his opening statement.
Consider his classification scheme:
Christian>Protestant>Evangelical>Reformed
Then consider some of his specific criteria: sola fide, substitutionary atonement, adherence to Nicene Orthodoxy and Chalcedonian Christology.
How do these criteria match up with his theological taxonomy?
Commitment to sola fide would fall somewhere between Evangelical and Reformed. So that’s about two and a steps below what he said was central to his spiritual identity.
He’s clearly moving within the tight little orbit of the Magisterial Reformation at this juncture.
What about Chalcedon? Does he mean that the Oriental Orthodox (e.g. the Copts) are not even Christians?
What does he mean by “substitutionary atonement”? Is this a synonym for penal substitution?
He seems to be using forensic categories. Where does that leave the Eastern Orthodox or the Anabaptists?
His actual position appears to be a good deal more exclusive than it looked like at first blush. He talks about what we have in common, but his draws the boundaries of common ground quite narrowly when you eye the landmarks.
Incidentally, there’s nothing “ecumenical” about Nicea or Chalcedon. They were meant to be exclusionary.
Moving along:
There’s a failure to distinguish between what makes a man a Christian and what makes Christianity true. Do you need to be a Calvinist to be a Christian? No. That’s incidental to your personal Christian identity.
But could you be a Christian if Calvinism were false? Could you be a Christian if the Father had not unconditionally elected you? Could you be a Christian if the Holy Spirit hadn’t monergistically renewed you?
It isn’t necessary to believe in predestination to be necessarily saved by predestination. The belief may be secondary, but the fact is primary.
What are we to make of Lee’s utilitarian yardstick? In what sense is predestination (to take one example) merely useful? “Useful” in relation to what? Is the Incarnation useful? Is the Incarnation useless? Is predestination more useful than the Incarnation? Less useful than the Incarnation?
Shouldn’t we judge Reformed distinctives by whether or not they’re true, rather than whether or not they’re useful?
Does the Bible itself compartmentalize doctrine in this fashion? Are Reformed distinctives theological accessories?
Remember, Lee seems to retain his Reformed commitments. So he agrees with the Reformed interpretation of various passages in Scripture.
Are Reformed distinctives secondary to the gospel in Jn 6 or Rom 9-11 or Eph 1-2? Are they not, in fact, integral to the way in which John and Paul explicate the gospel?
Speaking for myself, we should welcome anyone who can make a credible profession of faith into God’s family, and—hence—into our own family of faith.
So we should avoid cliquishness and clannishness. We should move freely from Christian to Christian. At that level, I agree with Lee.
http://www.upper-register.com/blog/?p=207
I’m of two minds about his post. Up to a point, I appreciate what he’s trying to say. However, when he says something I’m inclined to agree with, he justifies that statement with a supporting argument I can’t agree with. So even when he says something which might be true in its own right, what makes the statement true is, according to him, a reason which I think is either false or misleading.
So his post leaves me ambivalent. He makes it hard for me to agree with him even when I’d like to go along with him.
Speaking for myself, I feel free to use the “evangelical” label. That’s for two reasons:
i) We do need a general designation to denote Bible-believing Christians.
ii) Not every issue is distinctive to a particular theological tradition. So there are many times when we should frame the issue in broader terms.
That said, the very fact that “evangelical” is a general designation is also part of the problem. It’s a rather rubbery term. How far to the left of the theological spectrum can someone go and still be an “evangelical”?
There is no automatic cut-off point since “evangelical” is, by definition, a fairly flexible and fluid designation, subject to an evolving consensus of opinion.
Moving along:
Lee says that he considers himself to be “a Christian first, then a Protestant, then an evangelical, and only then Reformed.”
The pattern here is that he’s moving from a higher classification to a lower classification. Calvinists are a subset of evangelicals, who are a subset of Protestants, who are a subset of Christians.
But is the highest classification our central identity? Suppose I said that I consider myself an animal first, then a mammal, then a male mammal, then a man.
Would animality be central my identity? No. Animality tells you very little about my personal identity, or even my corporate identity.
My actual identity is my concrete identity. Yes, you can say I’m an animal, but I’m not a generic animal. There’s no such thing as a generic animal. My animality is exemplified in a very specific form.
Upper taxa are abstractions. The higher up you go, the less they define you.
Take Lee’s statement that he’s not a Calvinist who happens to be a Christian, but a Christian who happens to be a Calvinist (my paraphrase). It’s not the general properties that define us, but the specific properties—for even the general properties are exemplified in a specific set of properties. There’s no animal that isn’t a particular kind of animal, with other individuating traits, like gender.
Suppose I were to say I’m an animal that happens to be a man—rather than, say, a millipede. Is the difference between a man and a millipede incidental to my identity?
What if I’m an animal that happens to be an aardvark? Is animality central to my identity? Is the difference between a man and an aardvark an incidental property? At the risk of offending PETA, my human identity isn’t secondary to my personal identity.
So there’s a deceptive degree of continuity to Lee’s classification scheme.
Of course, there’s a sense in which a Christian is a Christian first and foremost. But that’s ambiguous. What does it mean to be a Christian?
Here some tension surface in Lee’s definition. One the one hand, he downplays the Reformed confessions in favor of “the primary NT confession.” On the other hand, he plays up the “historic ecumenical creeds.”
But, in that case, which is primary—the scriptures or the creeds? He still seems to focus on credal identity. It’s just a choice of which creed supplies the point of reference.
Is he going to say it comes down to which creed is more Biblical? Okay. But since he seems to identify himself as a Calvinist, does he regard Reformed confessions as less Biblical than the “historical ecumenical creeds”?
And when he gets around to defining his terms, they’re a good deal narrower than his opening statement.
Consider his classification scheme:
Christian>Protestant>Evangelical>Reformed
Then consider some of his specific criteria: sola fide, substitutionary atonement, adherence to Nicene Orthodoxy and Chalcedonian Christology.
How do these criteria match up with his theological taxonomy?
Commitment to sola fide would fall somewhere between Evangelical and Reformed. So that’s about two and a steps below what he said was central to his spiritual identity.
He’s clearly moving within the tight little orbit of the Magisterial Reformation at this juncture.
What about Chalcedon? Does he mean that the Oriental Orthodox (e.g. the Copts) are not even Christians?
What does he mean by “substitutionary atonement”? Is this a synonym for penal substitution?
He seems to be using forensic categories. Where does that leave the Eastern Orthodox or the Anabaptists?
His actual position appears to be a good deal more exclusive than it looked like at first blush. He talks about what we have in common, but his draws the boundaries of common ground quite narrowly when you eye the landmarks.
Incidentally, there’s nothing “ecumenical” about Nicea or Chalcedon. They were meant to be exclusionary.
Moving along:
There’s a failure to distinguish between what makes a man a Christian and what makes Christianity true. Do you need to be a Calvinist to be a Christian? No. That’s incidental to your personal Christian identity.
But could you be a Christian if Calvinism were false? Could you be a Christian if the Father had not unconditionally elected you? Could you be a Christian if the Holy Spirit hadn’t monergistically renewed you?
It isn’t necessary to believe in predestination to be necessarily saved by predestination. The belief may be secondary, but the fact is primary.
What are we to make of Lee’s utilitarian yardstick? In what sense is predestination (to take one example) merely useful? “Useful” in relation to what? Is the Incarnation useful? Is the Incarnation useless? Is predestination more useful than the Incarnation? Less useful than the Incarnation?
Shouldn’t we judge Reformed distinctives by whether or not they’re true, rather than whether or not they’re useful?
Does the Bible itself compartmentalize doctrine in this fashion? Are Reformed distinctives theological accessories?
Remember, Lee seems to retain his Reformed commitments. So he agrees with the Reformed interpretation of various passages in Scripture.
Are Reformed distinctives secondary to the gospel in Jn 6 or Rom 9-11 or Eph 1-2? Are they not, in fact, integral to the way in which John and Paul explicate the gospel?
Speaking for myself, we should welcome anyone who can make a credible profession of faith into God’s family, and—hence—into our own family of faith.
So we should avoid cliquishness and clannishness. We should move freely from Christian to Christian. At that level, I agree with Lee.
Wednesday, July 23, 2008
The Logical Before
Since Paul C. is having difficulty understanding why causality is linked to a logical order, not a temporal order, and since others might be interested in seeing why this is the case, I decided to write another post spelling it out clearly. Before I get into the main point, we already know that temporal order is not sufficient to infer causality because that is the post hoc ergo propter hoc (after this, therefore because of this) fallacy. A simple example will suffice: the Oklahoma City bombing happened before 9/11 happened, therefore 9/11 was caused by Timothy McVeigh. This is an obvious example of the post hoc fallacy. Others are not so obvious, and we see this many times in movies about crime. For example: The victim is killed moments before the defendant leaves the premise.
So we know that temporal order is not sufficient to infer causality. In this post, I am going to take it one step further. To do so, I must talk a bit about Einstein’s theory of Relativity. In order to follow what will occur, the most important aspect to grasp is the fact that light moves at a constant velocity regardless of the framework of the observer. This is counter-intuitive, and a simple example should show why.
Suppose you are travelling in a car that is moving at 60 miles per hour. If you throw a baseball at 60 miles an hour in the same direction that you are travelling, the ball will look (from your perspective) like it is travelling 60 miles per hour. From someone on the ground, however, the ball will look like it is travelling at 120 miles per hour. That is because the observer outside your car sees the ball’s velocity as the sum of your throw (60 miles per hour) plus your vehicles velocity (60 miles per hour).
Suppose that you saw the observer on the side of the road and wanted to throw the ball back at him after you’ve already passed. Your car is still travelling at 60 miles an hour, but you give a little extra effort and throw the ball at the observer at 70 miles per hour. The observer on the side of the road will have the ball come toward him at 10 miles per hour. (The car is moving 60 miles per hour in one direction, and you throw the ball in the opposite direction (indicated by a – sign), so the result is 60 – 70 = -10 miles per hour; or 10 miles per hour in the opposite direction that the car is moving.)
This makes sense to us because we’ve seen it in action. Suppose, however, that instead of a baseball, the person in the car turns on a flashlight. Relativity states that light will appear at approximately 3 x 108 m/sec for both the observer in the vehicle and the observer outside the vehicle. That is, there is no adding on the velocity of the observer to light. It moves at a constant speed through all frames of reference.
So with this in mind, let me give a slightly different version of Einstein’s train. Suppose there are two people on opposite ends of a train and these people are named Adam and Bill. At the midpoint of the train is a bomb. Adam and Bill both have buttons they can press. This will send an electrical signal that travels at the speed of light to the bomb in the middle of the train. Adam wants to blow up the train; Bill wants to keep Adam from blowing up the train. As a result, Adam’s signal will cause the bomb to detonate while Bill’s signal will keep the bomb from detonating. Furthermore, let us stipulate that Bill is at the front of the train (i.e., toward the engine) while Adam is at the back of the train (i.e., the caboose).
For ease of math, let us stipulate that light moves at exactly 3 x 108 m/s. Let us also stipulate that the distance between Bill and the bomb is exactly 1,000 meters. However, due to an error when the experiment was set up, Adam is slightly closer to the bomb: he’s only 900 meters away. Let us stipulate that from the train’s framework, Adam and Bill press their buttons at the exact same time.
Now it is obvious without even doing math that because Adam is closer to the bomb and because light travels at a constant velocity that the bomb will detonate if both press their buttons at the same time. Nevertheless, let us do the math on it.
If light travels at 300,000,000 m/s, how long does it take light to go 1,000 meters? This is a simple physics problem: t = d/v. In this case, t = 1,000 / 300,000,000 or 3.3 x 10-6 seconds.
How long does it take light to travel 900 meters? In this case, t = 900 / 300,000,000 or 3.0 x 10-6 seconds. This means that Adam’s signal will reach the bomb 3 x 10-7 (0.0000003) seconds before Bill’s signal will reach the bomb.
Now suppose that there is an outside observer named Charlie. The train is moving. But because light has a constant velocity irrespective of the observer, he will see both signals travel at 3 x 108 m/s just like those inside the train. Suppose that at the exact instant (from Charlie’s perspective) the bomb is in front of him, both Adam and Bill press their buttons, what does Charlie see? He sees two signals travelling at 3 x 108 m/s. But he also sees the bomb travelling toward Bill's position (Bill is at the engine) and away from Adam's (Adam is in the caboose).
This means from Charlie’s perspective, if Adam and Bill were exactly the same distance apart and pressed their buttons at exactly the same instant, the signal from Bill’s button would reach the bomb before the signal from Adam’s button would reach the bomb. But because we know that Adam is 100 meters closer to the bomb than Bill, we ask a question: how fast must the train be moving so that from Charlie’s perspective both signals will reach the bomb at the same time?
As we calculated above, Bill’s signal will reach the bomb 3 x 10-7 seconds after Adam’s. And we know that the difference in distance is 100 meters. So we need the train to cover 100 meters in 3 x 10-7 seconds. However, this distance is split between Adam and Bill. That is, because the signal is moving toward Bill and away from Adam, the train needs to actually only cover 50 meters in 3 x 10-7 seconds. This gives us 50m /0.0000003s = 1.67 x 108 m/s, or just over 50% the speed of light.
So let us suppose that the train is moving at 2 x 108 m/s, or 2/3s the speed of light. What will Charlie see?
He sees Adam press his button. The signal moves out at 3 x 108 m/s and covers 900 meters. However, when it hits the 900 meter mark (from Charlie’s perspective) 3.0 x 10-6 seconds later, the bomb has moved. The bomb is moving at 2 x 108 m/s, and it does so for the same 3.0 x 10-6 seconds. That means the bomb has moved 600 meters further down the track after that 3.0 x 10 -6 seconds. Ultimately, this means it takes Adam’s signal 9.0 x 10-6 seconds to actually read the bomb.
At the same instant, Charlie sees Bill press the button. Bill’s signal travels out at 3 x 108 m/s and the bomb has moved toward him at 2 x 108 m/s too. This means that it takes only 2.0 x 10-6 for Bill’s signal to reach the bomb. From Charlie’s perspective, Bill’s signal reaches the bomb 7.0 x 10-6 seconds before Adam’s does.
What will the train do? Answer: it will explode. Even from Charlie’s perspective, it will still explode. Why is that? Because on the train, which is where the bomb is located, Adam’s signal reaches the bomb 3 x 10-7 seconds before Bill’s signal does. Charlie observes Bill’s signal arriving 7.0 x 10-6 seconds before Adam’s does, however. From Charlie’s perspective, the signal that causes the bomb to explode arrives after the signal to keep the bomb from exploding should have neutralized it.
So what caused the train to explode? Adam’s signal did. But from Charlie’s perspective, it shouldn’t have. But Charlie is still left with an exploding train, one that does not fit in a temporal causative sense. It does, however, fit logically. He knows that logically Adam’s signal must have caused the train to explode, and that Bill’s counter-signal did not neutralize the bomb.
Naturally, the train had to be going extremely fast: 2/3 the speed of light. Since we never reach those speeds on Earth, cause and effect usually follow the temporal scheme. However, it is a fallacy for us to believe that causes are temporal causes for the reasons illustrated above. The only thing that matters is whether logically they are causes. If we know that A and only A logically causes B, then even if we observe B occurring before A we know that A is the cause of B. This must be the case.
This is also why we can have logical precedence (that is, a logical before) without having a temporal before. This is commonly seen in theology when, for instance, we talk about the decrees of God. The difference between Infralapsarians and Supralapsarians boils down to the logical order of the decrees of God, not the temporal order (since all agree that temporally each decree occurred before the foundation of the world, in eternity past; that is, outside of time). There is no temporal before in causality; there is only a logical before.
So we know that temporal order is not sufficient to infer causality. In this post, I am going to take it one step further. To do so, I must talk a bit about Einstein’s theory of Relativity. In order to follow what will occur, the most important aspect to grasp is the fact that light moves at a constant velocity regardless of the framework of the observer. This is counter-intuitive, and a simple example should show why.
Suppose you are travelling in a car that is moving at 60 miles per hour. If you throw a baseball at 60 miles an hour in the same direction that you are travelling, the ball will look (from your perspective) like it is travelling 60 miles per hour. From someone on the ground, however, the ball will look like it is travelling at 120 miles per hour. That is because the observer outside your car sees the ball’s velocity as the sum of your throw (60 miles per hour) plus your vehicles velocity (60 miles per hour).
Suppose that you saw the observer on the side of the road and wanted to throw the ball back at him after you’ve already passed. Your car is still travelling at 60 miles an hour, but you give a little extra effort and throw the ball at the observer at 70 miles per hour. The observer on the side of the road will have the ball come toward him at 10 miles per hour. (The car is moving 60 miles per hour in one direction, and you throw the ball in the opposite direction (indicated by a – sign), so the result is 60 – 70 = -10 miles per hour; or 10 miles per hour in the opposite direction that the car is moving.)
This makes sense to us because we’ve seen it in action. Suppose, however, that instead of a baseball, the person in the car turns on a flashlight. Relativity states that light will appear at approximately 3 x 108 m/sec for both the observer in the vehicle and the observer outside the vehicle. That is, there is no adding on the velocity of the observer to light. It moves at a constant speed through all frames of reference.
So with this in mind, let me give a slightly different version of Einstein’s train. Suppose there are two people on opposite ends of a train and these people are named Adam and Bill. At the midpoint of the train is a bomb. Adam and Bill both have buttons they can press. This will send an electrical signal that travels at the speed of light to the bomb in the middle of the train. Adam wants to blow up the train; Bill wants to keep Adam from blowing up the train. As a result, Adam’s signal will cause the bomb to detonate while Bill’s signal will keep the bomb from detonating. Furthermore, let us stipulate that Bill is at the front of the train (i.e., toward the engine) while Adam is at the back of the train (i.e., the caboose).
For ease of math, let us stipulate that light moves at exactly 3 x 108 m/s. Let us also stipulate that the distance between Bill and the bomb is exactly 1,000 meters. However, due to an error when the experiment was set up, Adam is slightly closer to the bomb: he’s only 900 meters away. Let us stipulate that from the train’s framework, Adam and Bill press their buttons at the exact same time.
Now it is obvious without even doing math that because Adam is closer to the bomb and because light travels at a constant velocity that the bomb will detonate if both press their buttons at the same time. Nevertheless, let us do the math on it.
If light travels at 300,000,000 m/s, how long does it take light to go 1,000 meters? This is a simple physics problem: t = d/v. In this case, t = 1,000 / 300,000,000 or 3.3 x 10-6 seconds.
How long does it take light to travel 900 meters? In this case, t = 900 / 300,000,000 or 3.0 x 10-6 seconds. This means that Adam’s signal will reach the bomb 3 x 10-7 (0.0000003) seconds before Bill’s signal will reach the bomb.
Now suppose that there is an outside observer named Charlie. The train is moving. But because light has a constant velocity irrespective of the observer, he will see both signals travel at 3 x 108 m/s just like those inside the train. Suppose that at the exact instant (from Charlie’s perspective) the bomb is in front of him, both Adam and Bill press their buttons, what does Charlie see? He sees two signals travelling at 3 x 108 m/s. But he also sees the bomb travelling toward Bill's position (Bill is at the engine) and away from Adam's (Adam is in the caboose).
This means from Charlie’s perspective, if Adam and Bill were exactly the same distance apart and pressed their buttons at exactly the same instant, the signal from Bill’s button would reach the bomb before the signal from Adam’s button would reach the bomb. But because we know that Adam is 100 meters closer to the bomb than Bill, we ask a question: how fast must the train be moving so that from Charlie’s perspective both signals will reach the bomb at the same time?
As we calculated above, Bill’s signal will reach the bomb 3 x 10-7 seconds after Adam’s. And we know that the difference in distance is 100 meters. So we need the train to cover 100 meters in 3 x 10-7 seconds. However, this distance is split between Adam and Bill. That is, because the signal is moving toward Bill and away from Adam, the train needs to actually only cover 50 meters in 3 x 10-7 seconds. This gives us 50m /0.0000003s = 1.67 x 108 m/s, or just over 50% the speed of light.
So let us suppose that the train is moving at 2 x 108 m/s, or 2/3s the speed of light. What will Charlie see?
He sees Adam press his button. The signal moves out at 3 x 108 m/s and covers 900 meters. However, when it hits the 900 meter mark (from Charlie’s perspective) 3.0 x 10-6 seconds later, the bomb has moved. The bomb is moving at 2 x 108 m/s, and it does so for the same 3.0 x 10-6 seconds. That means the bomb has moved 600 meters further down the track after that 3.0 x 10 -6 seconds. Ultimately, this means it takes Adam’s signal 9.0 x 10-6 seconds to actually read the bomb.
At the same instant, Charlie sees Bill press the button. Bill’s signal travels out at 3 x 108 m/s and the bomb has moved toward him at 2 x 108 m/s too. This means that it takes only 2.0 x 10-6 for Bill’s signal to reach the bomb. From Charlie’s perspective, Bill’s signal reaches the bomb 7.0 x 10-6 seconds before Adam’s does.
What will the train do? Answer: it will explode. Even from Charlie’s perspective, it will still explode. Why is that? Because on the train, which is where the bomb is located, Adam’s signal reaches the bomb 3 x 10-7 seconds before Bill’s signal does. Charlie observes Bill’s signal arriving 7.0 x 10-6 seconds before Adam’s does, however. From Charlie’s perspective, the signal that causes the bomb to explode arrives after the signal to keep the bomb from exploding should have neutralized it.
So what caused the train to explode? Adam’s signal did. But from Charlie’s perspective, it shouldn’t have. But Charlie is still left with an exploding train, one that does not fit in a temporal causative sense. It does, however, fit logically. He knows that logically Adam’s signal must have caused the train to explode, and that Bill’s counter-signal did not neutralize the bomb.
Naturally, the train had to be going extremely fast: 2/3 the speed of light. Since we never reach those speeds on Earth, cause and effect usually follow the temporal scheme. However, it is a fallacy for us to believe that causes are temporal causes for the reasons illustrated above. The only thing that matters is whether logically they are causes. If we know that A and only A logically causes B, then even if we observe B occurring before A we know that A is the cause of B. This must be the case.
This is also why we can have logical precedence (that is, a logical before) without having a temporal before. This is commonly seen in theology when, for instance, we talk about the decrees of God. The difference between Infralapsarians and Supralapsarians boils down to the logical order of the decrees of God, not the temporal order (since all agree that temporally each decree occurred before the foundation of the world, in eternity past; that is, outside of time). There is no temporal before in causality; there is only a logical before.
Clementine ornithology
JNORM888 SAID:
One of the ways we know that a teaching is most likely a teaching that was held everywhere(all regions of the Church) is when it doesn't cause a ripple in the Faith. PM caused a fued in Alexandria and Rome. The doctrine of the Trinity did not. The early ripples we see in regards to the issue of God are from Marcian, Noetus, Praxeas, and Arius, and maybe a few others.
People who teach heretical stuff do stick out like sore thumbs.
What I am saying is that we can trust them for if one got it wrong, then the others who heard the same apostle would of corrected the one who miss-understood. And if the person refused to change, then it would of caused a ripple in the Faith.
Back to Apostolic tradition:__Now you are saying that only a few were able to listen to an Apostle. That is wrong. Anyone in the same Church plant was able to hear the same Apostle. Now it is true that for the ones who wrote, we only have a few that sat at an Apostles feet. And for those that wrote, if their letters were passed around and copied from Church to Church (and region to region) then the other churches had a chance to check out the doctrinal teaching of those who wrote, and if they were teaching something that didn't line up with the Apostolic tradition of their region, then it would of caused a ripple in the Faith.
http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2008/07/heretical-apostolic-succession.html#396197501474127944
Jnorm has just given us the ripple argument for Clementine ornithology. To my knowledge, Clement’s avian proof for the Resurrection didn’t generate any ripples. Didn’t stick out like a sore thumb.
So the immortality of the phoenix must go all the way back to the apostles. After all, if Clement misunderstood what an apostle was saying about the phoenix, other listeners or other churches would have corrected him. And if he didn’t recant, that would have caused a ripple. He would stick out like a sore thumb. Hence, Clementine ornithology figures in the deposit of faith. He who refuses to profess the immortality of the phoenix is anathema.
One of the ways we know that a teaching is most likely a teaching that was held everywhere(all regions of the Church) is when it doesn't cause a ripple in the Faith. PM caused a fued in Alexandria and Rome. The doctrine of the Trinity did not. The early ripples we see in regards to the issue of God are from Marcian, Noetus, Praxeas, and Arius, and maybe a few others.
People who teach heretical stuff do stick out like sore thumbs.
What I am saying is that we can trust them for if one got it wrong, then the others who heard the same apostle would of corrected the one who miss-understood. And if the person refused to change, then it would of caused a ripple in the Faith.
Back to Apostolic tradition:__Now you are saying that only a few were able to listen to an Apostle. That is wrong. Anyone in the same Church plant was able to hear the same Apostle. Now it is true that for the ones who wrote, we only have a few that sat at an Apostles feet. And for those that wrote, if their letters were passed around and copied from Church to Church (and region to region) then the other churches had a chance to check out the doctrinal teaching of those who wrote, and if they were teaching something that didn't line up with the Apostolic tradition of their region, then it would of caused a ripple in the Faith.
http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2008/07/heretical-apostolic-succession.html#396197501474127944
Jnorm has just given us the ripple argument for Clementine ornithology. To my knowledge, Clement’s avian proof for the Resurrection didn’t generate any ripples. Didn’t stick out like a sore thumb.
So the immortality of the phoenix must go all the way back to the apostles. After all, if Clement misunderstood what an apostle was saying about the phoenix, other listeners or other churches would have corrected him. And if he didn’t recant, that would have caused a ripple. He would stick out like a sore thumb. Hence, Clementine ornithology figures in the deposit of faith. He who refuses to profess the immortality of the phoenix is anathema.
Patristic Premillennialism
Jnorm888, an Eastern Orthodox poster, has been making some dubious, undocumented claims about the history of premillennialism. He's argued that the apostles taught contradictory views of eschatology, that premillennialism came from John, whereas men like Paul and Mark taught a different eschatology. He's claimed that the canonicity of Revelation was rejected by most Christians for a while. And he's claimed that a sixth-century ecumenical council condemned premillennialism. When asked for documentation of such claims, he wrote:
"The fact that you want me to list my sources to back up everything I say about Church history only tells me that you don't read the primary sources of the Ante-Nicene Fathers, Nicene & Post Nicene Fathers. And you probably haven't read too many church history books either. That is not my fault. No, you will have to do your own homework. I'm not gonna dig through my books for you." (source)
Here are some of his assertions, in his own words:
"only the christians from Ashia Minor were mostly PM [premillennial]. Ashia minor is where Saint John mostly lived and died, and so the Apostolic Tradition that came from his region mostly held on to 'Chilism'. Justin Martyre and some others who were from that region but moved to Rome later in life spread that teaching to other parts of Christiandom. The book of Revelations wasn't embraced by everyone. It was by those who knew John and lived in Ashia minor, but it wasn't embraced by a lot of christians outside of Ashia minor....PM was always givin a hard time by christians living outside of modern day Turkey and Syria....So is it [premillennialism] historic? Yes, but it was only limited to a certain region of christianity....Most christians rejected the book of Revelations, So most christians never had a pre-mill view to begin with. And when the early PMers started to spread to other regions, this is when you had arguments about such a view....the Apostolic tradition of Saint John (on this issue) was trumped by the Apostolic traditions of Mark, Andrew, Peter, and Paul....ancient PM was disliked by most christians in other regions...So at the end of the day, the onlything you can say about ancient christianity is: Some believed in a literal 1,000 year reign of Christ on planet earth. Most did not believe in a literal 1,000 year reign of Christ on planet earth." (sources here and here)
I've addressed some of the problems with Jnorm's claims elsewhere. See, for example, here and here.
The apostle John lived in Asia Minor, and he wrote Revelation to some of the churches there. But premillennialism's origin and prominence in that region don't imply some of the other conclusions Jnorm has reached. Premillennialism is found early in Asia Minor (Papias), but also is found early outside of Asia Minor (The Epistle Of Barnabas). Premillennialists like Justin Martyr and Irenaeus lived in multiple locations, so how does Jnorm know where they acquired their premillennialism, and how does he know that such men had the role he claims they had in spreading premillennialism? If premillennialism was opposed in other regions by people who had received a different eschatology from their own apostolic sources and a larger number of apostolic sources, then why would men like Justin and Irenaeus be able to spread premillennialism so successfully in those other regions? Why would people give up their own apostolic eschatology, supported by a larger number of apostolic sources, for another region's apostolic eschatology that came from only one apostolic source?
Here are some examples of ante-Nicene sources who advocated premillennialism while living outside of Asia Minor:
Pseudo-Barnabas (The Epistle Of Barnabas, 15)
Justin Martyr (Dialogue With Trypho, 80)
Irenaeus (Against Heresies, 5:28:3, 5:33:2-4)
Tertullian (Against Marcion, 3:24)
Hippolytus (On Daniel, 2:4)
Cyprian (section 2 in the preface and chapter 11 in Treatise 11, On the Exhortation to Martyrdom)
Nepos (Eusebius, Church History, 7:24)
Commodianus (Writings, 44)
Victorinus (On The Creation Of The World)
Lactantius (The Divine Institutes, 7:14)
Remember, Jnorm claims that premillennialism was always "given a hard time by Christians living outside of modern day Turkey and Syria".
Premillennialism became much less popular in later centuries, but it was widespread during the ante-Nicene era. The large majority of extant ante-Nicene sources who advocate the doctrine do so while living outside of Asia Minor. A smaller number of mainstream ante-Nicene sources opposed premillennialism, such as Origen and Dionysius of Alexandria, but not with the sort of argumentation we're getting from Jnorm. They didn't oppose one apostolic eschatology to another. Rather, Dionysius of Alexandria, for example, argued for a different interpretation of Revelation and other portions of scripture rather than arguing that one apostolic form of eschatology should be rejected in favor of another (Eusebius, Church History, 7:24-25).
Some ante-Nicene sources rejected the canonicity of Revelation, but acceptance of the book as scripture seems to have been the mainstream view in the earliest centuries:
"As early as the middle of the second century, Revelation was ascribed to John, 'one of the apostles of Christ' (Justin, Dial. 81). Other second-century works and writers make the same claim: a lost commentary on Revelation by Melito, bishop of Sardis (c. A.D. 165; see Eusebius, H.E. 4.26.2); Irenaeus (c. 180; Adv. Haer. 3.11.1, 4.20.11, 4.35.2); and the Muratorian Canon (late second century). Whether Papias, an even earlier witness than these (d.c. 130), can be added to this list is disputed, but a good case can be made out that he both knew Revelation and attributed it to John. The evidence of these writers is particularly strong in that two of them (three, if Papias is included) could well be reporting firsthand evidence. Sardis, where Melito was bishop, was one of the churches addressed in Revelation (1:11; 3:1-6). Irenaeus was from Smyrna, also a church addressed in Revelation (1:11; 2:8-11), and claims to have heard Polycarp, who had talked with John the apostle himself. Papias knew John the apostle personally. The early tradition is confirmed by the third-century fathers Tertullian, Hippolytus, and Origen. Not only do these authors ascribe Revelation to John the apostle, they do so without any hint of there being a contrary claim. No New Testament book, concludes Gerhard Maier, has a stronger or earlier tradition about its authorship than does Revelation." (D.A. Carson, et al., An Introduction To The New Testament [Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan, 1992], p. 468)
Carson, Moo, and Morris are only mentioning a portion of the evidence here. Much more could be cited.
The tendency was to classify apostolic books as scripture, so acceptance of the apostolic status of Revelation tends to suggest acceptance of the book as scripture. I can document that tendency, and I can give examples of the citation of Revelation as scripture by such sources, if Jnorm wants to dispute the point.
We need to keep in mind the distinction between what was believed in one era of church history and what was believed in another era. Later opposition to premillennialism doesn't, by itself, lead to the conclusion that earlier affirmations of the doctrine were a minority position during that earlier period. Jnorm can't just cite later sources and assume that they represent what was mainstream in those regions of the world in earlier centuries. For example, we wouldn't conclude that if there isn't much belief in premillennialism in the area of Asia Minor today, then there must not have been much belief in the doctrine in that region in the second or third century either. Later sources can be relevant, but Jnorm will have to do more than just citing later sources.
What does Jnorm's behavior suggest about his Eastern Orthodoxy? Why does he so often fail to document claims that he ought to document, and why does he make so many false and misleading claims about church history?
"The fact that you want me to list my sources to back up everything I say about Church history only tells me that you don't read the primary sources of the Ante-Nicene Fathers, Nicene & Post Nicene Fathers. And you probably haven't read too many church history books either. That is not my fault. No, you will have to do your own homework. I'm not gonna dig through my books for you." (source)
Here are some of his assertions, in his own words:
"only the christians from Ashia Minor were mostly PM [premillennial]. Ashia minor is where Saint John mostly lived and died, and so the Apostolic Tradition that came from his region mostly held on to 'Chilism'. Justin Martyre and some others who were from that region but moved to Rome later in life spread that teaching to other parts of Christiandom. The book of Revelations wasn't embraced by everyone. It was by those who knew John and lived in Ashia minor, but it wasn't embraced by a lot of christians outside of Ashia minor....PM was always givin a hard time by christians living outside of modern day Turkey and Syria....So is it [premillennialism] historic? Yes, but it was only limited to a certain region of christianity....Most christians rejected the book of Revelations, So most christians never had a pre-mill view to begin with. And when the early PMers started to spread to other regions, this is when you had arguments about such a view....the Apostolic tradition of Saint John (on this issue) was trumped by the Apostolic traditions of Mark, Andrew, Peter, and Paul....ancient PM was disliked by most christians in other regions...So at the end of the day, the onlything you can say about ancient christianity is: Some believed in a literal 1,000 year reign of Christ on planet earth. Most did not believe in a literal 1,000 year reign of Christ on planet earth." (sources here and here)
I've addressed some of the problems with Jnorm's claims elsewhere. See, for example, here and here.
The apostle John lived in Asia Minor, and he wrote Revelation to some of the churches there. But premillennialism's origin and prominence in that region don't imply some of the other conclusions Jnorm has reached. Premillennialism is found early in Asia Minor (Papias), but also is found early outside of Asia Minor (The Epistle Of Barnabas). Premillennialists like Justin Martyr and Irenaeus lived in multiple locations, so how does Jnorm know where they acquired their premillennialism, and how does he know that such men had the role he claims they had in spreading premillennialism? If premillennialism was opposed in other regions by people who had received a different eschatology from their own apostolic sources and a larger number of apostolic sources, then why would men like Justin and Irenaeus be able to spread premillennialism so successfully in those other regions? Why would people give up their own apostolic eschatology, supported by a larger number of apostolic sources, for another region's apostolic eschatology that came from only one apostolic source?
Here are some examples of ante-Nicene sources who advocated premillennialism while living outside of Asia Minor:
Pseudo-Barnabas (The Epistle Of Barnabas, 15)
Justin Martyr (Dialogue With Trypho, 80)
Irenaeus (Against Heresies, 5:28:3, 5:33:2-4)
Tertullian (Against Marcion, 3:24)
Hippolytus (On Daniel, 2:4)
Cyprian (section 2 in the preface and chapter 11 in Treatise 11, On the Exhortation to Martyrdom)
Nepos (Eusebius, Church History, 7:24)
Commodianus (Writings, 44)
Victorinus (On The Creation Of The World)
Lactantius (The Divine Institutes, 7:14)
Remember, Jnorm claims that premillennialism was always "given a hard time by Christians living outside of modern day Turkey and Syria".
Premillennialism became much less popular in later centuries, but it was widespread during the ante-Nicene era. The large majority of extant ante-Nicene sources who advocate the doctrine do so while living outside of Asia Minor. A smaller number of mainstream ante-Nicene sources opposed premillennialism, such as Origen and Dionysius of Alexandria, but not with the sort of argumentation we're getting from Jnorm. They didn't oppose one apostolic eschatology to another. Rather, Dionysius of Alexandria, for example, argued for a different interpretation of Revelation and other portions of scripture rather than arguing that one apostolic form of eschatology should be rejected in favor of another (Eusebius, Church History, 7:24-25).
Some ante-Nicene sources rejected the canonicity of Revelation, but acceptance of the book as scripture seems to have been the mainstream view in the earliest centuries:
"As early as the middle of the second century, Revelation was ascribed to John, 'one of the apostles of Christ' (Justin, Dial. 81). Other second-century works and writers make the same claim: a lost commentary on Revelation by Melito, bishop of Sardis (c. A.D. 165; see Eusebius, H.E. 4.26.2); Irenaeus (c. 180; Adv. Haer. 3.11.1, 4.20.11, 4.35.2); and the Muratorian Canon (late second century). Whether Papias, an even earlier witness than these (d.c. 130), can be added to this list is disputed, but a good case can be made out that he both knew Revelation and attributed it to John. The evidence of these writers is particularly strong in that two of them (three, if Papias is included) could well be reporting firsthand evidence. Sardis, where Melito was bishop, was one of the churches addressed in Revelation (1:11; 3:1-6). Irenaeus was from Smyrna, also a church addressed in Revelation (1:11; 2:8-11), and claims to have heard Polycarp, who had talked with John the apostle himself. Papias knew John the apostle personally. The early tradition is confirmed by the third-century fathers Tertullian, Hippolytus, and Origen. Not only do these authors ascribe Revelation to John the apostle, they do so without any hint of there being a contrary claim. No New Testament book, concludes Gerhard Maier, has a stronger or earlier tradition about its authorship than does Revelation." (D.A. Carson, et al., An Introduction To The New Testament [Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan, 1992], p. 468)
Carson, Moo, and Morris are only mentioning a portion of the evidence here. Much more could be cited.
The tendency was to classify apostolic books as scripture, so acceptance of the apostolic status of Revelation tends to suggest acceptance of the book as scripture. I can document that tendency, and I can give examples of the citation of Revelation as scripture by such sources, if Jnorm wants to dispute the point.
We need to keep in mind the distinction between what was believed in one era of church history and what was believed in another era. Later opposition to premillennialism doesn't, by itself, lead to the conclusion that earlier affirmations of the doctrine were a minority position during that earlier period. Jnorm can't just cite later sources and assume that they represent what was mainstream in those regions of the world in earlier centuries. For example, we wouldn't conclude that if there isn't much belief in premillennialism in the area of Asia Minor today, then there must not have been much belief in the doctrine in that region in the second or third century either. Later sources can be relevant, but Jnorm will have to do more than just citing later sources.
What does Jnorm's behavior suggest about his Eastern Orthodoxy? Why does he so often fail to document claims that he ought to document, and why does he make so many false and misleading claims about church history?
Tuesday, July 22, 2008
"Family idolatry"
I’ve been asked to comment on a statement by Mark Driscoll, in relation to a critical statement by another blogger. Let’s begin with Driscoll’s statement:
“There is no office such as pastor’s wife or pastor’s children and I work very hard to ensure that our family remains our top priority over the church. Too many pastors put their ministry above their family and their wives and children get active in the church just so they can be close to their husband/daddy which is tragic. We have a normal fun family life and by God’s grace my wife and kids love Jesus, me and our church.”
I think Driscoll’s statement is basically correct, as well as being a useful corrective.
i) When you marry and have kids, you acquire a prior obligation. Becoming a pastor doesn’t discharge you of this obligation. If you can’t do justice to both, either don’t enter the ministry or leave the ministry.
ii) A pastor has a higher obligation to his family than your family.
iii) A pastor with an unhappy family life is going to be an unhappy pastor. He won’t do a very good job of ministering to others.
iv) Many pastors fail their families because they neglect their families. They take them for granted.
v) Being a pastor’s wife doesn’t make you a co-pastor.
vi) PKs shouldn’t be held to a higher standard than other kids in church. Regeneration and sanctification aren’t hereditary traits. And PKs are subject to the same cultural influences as other kids.
PKs are normal, standard issue kids. They weren’t born with an extra set of spiritual genes.
That said, it’s possible to take Driscoll’s admonition too far (I’m not claiming that he himself takes it too far).
i) According to Paul, one qualification for pastoral office is that a man be a good family man (1 Tim 3:4; Titus 1:5). So there is a relationship between the two.
ii) I don’t take this to mean that just any marital woe or rebellious child can automatically scuttle his ministry. For one thing, that would give sinners a coercive power over the Christian ministry.
For another thing, it’s quite possible that Paul himself was once a married man whose wife divorced him when he became a Christian.
So I take him to mean that if these problems result from how he mismanaged his familial affairs, then that disqualifies him from ministry.
iii) Although a pastor’s wife is not a co-pastor, a minister ought to marry a pious, prayerful woman who can support him spiritually and emotionally. She should share his vision and commitment.
iv) Paul also says that older women should teach younger women (Titus 2:3-4), so there’s nothing wrong with the pastor’s wife holding a women’s Bible study or belonging to a prayer chain.
Some women attend seminary to get an MAR and find a husband. They’re preparing themselves for life as a pastor’s wife. That’s fine.
Bethan Lloyd-Jones wrote an edifying little memoir about her husband’s early ministry: Memories of Sandfields.
It furnishes a good illustration of how a godly and supportive wife can contribute to her husband’s ministry.
v) Pastoral ministry is not dynastic. The qualifications for ministry are not hereditary. However, some sons of the manse do follow their fathers into the ministry, and there’s nothing wrong with that as long as they’re qualified in their own right.
Now let’s transition to some of Halden’s critical comments:
“This, to my mind, is perhaps the most clear articulation of the kind of idolatry of the family that is common among evangelical Christians in America today.”
“For my part, Driscoll’s comments are perhaps the most horrifying thing I could expect to hear from the mouth of any pastor about the priority of the family.”
“The problem is rather the sort of moral universe that such comments presuppose. Driscoll reifies the dominant notion that ‘natural’ institutions like the family simply are the moral norm which have value in and of themselves merely by vritue of their existence. The ethical vision of the New Testament, by contrast, is constituted by a radical interruption of all such ‘natural’ conventions of morality and social life. The scandal of the ethic of Jesus and the early church is precisely that all the commonly accepted priorities, allegiances, and social formations of this age are radically disrupted by the apocalyptic erruption of the advent of Christ in death and resurrection.”
http://inhabitatiodei.wordpress.com/2008/07/14/mark-driscoll-church-and-family-idolatry/
Halden’s final paragraph, which supplies the supporting argument for his critique, is about one part truth to nine parts falsehood.
i) In terms of ultimate priorities, a Christian should be prepared to choose Jesus over family if his family forces the issue. But this doesn’t mean that, as a rule, there’s a conflict between our spiritual duties and our familial duties.
ii) Even in case of conflict, that doesn’t mean we cease to have any familial obligations. Far from Christianity dissolving familial duties, it heightens them (1 Tim 5:8).
iii) Christian conversion isn’t a form of chemical castration. You don’t cease to have a sex drive. And you don’t lose the God-given emotional need for the companionship of a wife and kids. Grace is not a denial of nature, but a restoration of nature. Halden’s position is demonic (1 Tim 4:1-4).
iv) Yes, families are intrinsically good. The family is a divine institution. A creation mandate. And the NT reaffirms that mandate (e.g. 1 Tim 5:4,14).
“We are trying to be an authentic witness to the nature of our Lord. God has called us to follow his example and set aside ‘life’ (aspirations, pleasure, health, rest, safety, family, image, respect, dreams, etc., etc.) for the sake of His kingdom and for the sake of the other.”
http://inhabitatiodei.wordpress.com/what-i-am-about/my-ecclesial-agenda/
We’re not supposed to emulate Christ in every respect. He came to die.
There’s nothing wrong with natural goods. We should enjoy God’s handiwork.
Halden jumbles a number of things together. There’s a difference between worldly ambition and godly ambition.
“There is no office such as pastor’s wife or pastor’s children and I work very hard to ensure that our family remains our top priority over the church. Too many pastors put their ministry above their family and their wives and children get active in the church just so they can be close to their husband/daddy which is tragic. We have a normal fun family life and by God’s grace my wife and kids love Jesus, me and our church.”
I think Driscoll’s statement is basically correct, as well as being a useful corrective.
i) When you marry and have kids, you acquire a prior obligation. Becoming a pastor doesn’t discharge you of this obligation. If you can’t do justice to both, either don’t enter the ministry or leave the ministry.
ii) A pastor has a higher obligation to his family than your family.
iii) A pastor with an unhappy family life is going to be an unhappy pastor. He won’t do a very good job of ministering to others.
iv) Many pastors fail their families because they neglect their families. They take them for granted.
v) Being a pastor’s wife doesn’t make you a co-pastor.
vi) PKs shouldn’t be held to a higher standard than other kids in church. Regeneration and sanctification aren’t hereditary traits. And PKs are subject to the same cultural influences as other kids.
PKs are normal, standard issue kids. They weren’t born with an extra set of spiritual genes.
That said, it’s possible to take Driscoll’s admonition too far (I’m not claiming that he himself takes it too far).
i) According to Paul, one qualification for pastoral office is that a man be a good family man (1 Tim 3:4; Titus 1:5). So there is a relationship between the two.
ii) I don’t take this to mean that just any marital woe or rebellious child can automatically scuttle his ministry. For one thing, that would give sinners a coercive power over the Christian ministry.
For another thing, it’s quite possible that Paul himself was once a married man whose wife divorced him when he became a Christian.
So I take him to mean that if these problems result from how he mismanaged his familial affairs, then that disqualifies him from ministry.
iii) Although a pastor’s wife is not a co-pastor, a minister ought to marry a pious, prayerful woman who can support him spiritually and emotionally. She should share his vision and commitment.
iv) Paul also says that older women should teach younger women (Titus 2:3-4), so there’s nothing wrong with the pastor’s wife holding a women’s Bible study or belonging to a prayer chain.
Some women attend seminary to get an MAR and find a husband. They’re preparing themselves for life as a pastor’s wife. That’s fine.
Bethan Lloyd-Jones wrote an edifying little memoir about her husband’s early ministry: Memories of Sandfields.
It furnishes a good illustration of how a godly and supportive wife can contribute to her husband’s ministry.
v) Pastoral ministry is not dynastic. The qualifications for ministry are not hereditary. However, some sons of the manse do follow their fathers into the ministry, and there’s nothing wrong with that as long as they’re qualified in their own right.
Now let’s transition to some of Halden’s critical comments:
“This, to my mind, is perhaps the most clear articulation of the kind of idolatry of the family that is common among evangelical Christians in America today.”
“For my part, Driscoll’s comments are perhaps the most horrifying thing I could expect to hear from the mouth of any pastor about the priority of the family.”
“The problem is rather the sort of moral universe that such comments presuppose. Driscoll reifies the dominant notion that ‘natural’ institutions like the family simply are the moral norm which have value in and of themselves merely by vritue of their existence. The ethical vision of the New Testament, by contrast, is constituted by a radical interruption of all such ‘natural’ conventions of morality and social life. The scandal of the ethic of Jesus and the early church is precisely that all the commonly accepted priorities, allegiances, and social formations of this age are radically disrupted by the apocalyptic erruption of the advent of Christ in death and resurrection.”
http://inhabitatiodei.wordpress.com/2008/07/14/mark-driscoll-church-and-family-idolatry/
Halden’s final paragraph, which supplies the supporting argument for his critique, is about one part truth to nine parts falsehood.
i) In terms of ultimate priorities, a Christian should be prepared to choose Jesus over family if his family forces the issue. But this doesn’t mean that, as a rule, there’s a conflict between our spiritual duties and our familial duties.
ii) Even in case of conflict, that doesn’t mean we cease to have any familial obligations. Far from Christianity dissolving familial duties, it heightens them (1 Tim 5:8).
iii) Christian conversion isn’t a form of chemical castration. You don’t cease to have a sex drive. And you don’t lose the God-given emotional need for the companionship of a wife and kids. Grace is not a denial of nature, but a restoration of nature. Halden’s position is demonic (1 Tim 4:1-4).
iv) Yes, families are intrinsically good. The family is a divine institution. A creation mandate. And the NT reaffirms that mandate (e.g. 1 Tim 5:4,14).
“We are trying to be an authentic witness to the nature of our Lord. God has called us to follow his example and set aside ‘life’ (aspirations, pleasure, health, rest, safety, family, image, respect, dreams, etc., etc.) for the sake of His kingdom and for the sake of the other.”
http://inhabitatiodei.wordpress.com/what-i-am-about/my-ecclesial-agenda/
We’re not supposed to emulate Christ in every respect. He came to die.
There’s nothing wrong with natural goods. We should enjoy God’s handiwork.
Halden jumbles a number of things together. There’s a difference between worldly ambition and godly ambition.
Monday, July 21, 2008
The inhumanity of universalism
“In summary: he still disagrees with me and still things I am a bad and dangerous person.”
http://evangelicaluniversalist.blogspot.com/2008/07/steve-hays-responds.html
Of course, I haven’t said that about “Gregory MacDonald.”
He’s indulging in a rhetorical ruse. Pretend that I’ve cast him in the role of a comic book villain so that readers can fluff of the gravity of the issue.
Here’s a question: what’s the worst thing you could possibly do to a person?
Torture him to death?
That’s one of the worst things you can do to a person. But not the worst thing.
Torture one family member in front of another family member?
That’s one of the worst things you can do to a person. But not the worst thing.
Molest a little boy or girl?
That’s one of the worst things you can do to a person. But not the worst thing.
Play a cruel, practical joke—like impersonating physician and telling someone on the phone that his loved one was just brought into the ER after a ghastly traffic accident?
That’s one of the worst things you can do to a person. But not the worst thing.
We could keep dreaming up fiendish, vicious examples. But what’s the very worst thing you could ever do to a person?
Simple: Convince him that no matter what he thinks or does in this life, God will save him in the world to come.
On the scale of inhumanity, there’s nothing more harmful you could do to a person. That diabolical lie is without rival.
http://evangelicaluniversalist.blogspot.com/2008/07/steve-hays-responds.html
Of course, I haven’t said that about “Gregory MacDonald.”
He’s indulging in a rhetorical ruse. Pretend that I’ve cast him in the role of a comic book villain so that readers can fluff of the gravity of the issue.
Here’s a question: what’s the worst thing you could possibly do to a person?
Torture him to death?
That’s one of the worst things you can do to a person. But not the worst thing.
Torture one family member in front of another family member?
That’s one of the worst things you can do to a person. But not the worst thing.
Molest a little boy or girl?
That’s one of the worst things you can do to a person. But not the worst thing.
Play a cruel, practical joke—like impersonating physician and telling someone on the phone that his loved one was just brought into the ER after a ghastly traffic accident?
That’s one of the worst things you can do to a person. But not the worst thing.
We could keep dreaming up fiendish, vicious examples. But what’s the very worst thing you could ever do to a person?
Simple: Convince him that no matter what he thinks or does in this life, God will save him in the world to come.
On the scale of inhumanity, there’s nothing more harmful you could do to a person. That diabolical lie is without rival.
Bible illiteracy
NIHILIST SAID:
Are you willing to apply the same standard to your own Scriptures? Here is a bunch of scientific problems with the Bible:__the bat is a bird (Lev. 11:19, Deut. 14:11, 18); _Some fowls are four-footed (Lev. 11:20-21); _Some creeping insects have four legs. (Lev. 11:22-23); _Hares chew the cud (Lev. 11:6); _Conies chew the cud (Lev. 11:5); _Camels don't divide the hoof (Lev. 11:4); _The earth was formed out of and by means of water (2 Peter 3:5 RSV); _The earth rest on pillars (1 Sam. 2:8); _The earth won't be moved (1Chron. 16:30); _A hare does not divide the hoof (Deut. 14:7); _The rainbow is not as old as rain and sunshine (Gen. 9:13); _A mustard seed is the smallest of all seeds and grows into the greatest of all shrubs (Matt. 13:31-32 RSV); _Turtles have voices (Song of Sol. 2:12); _The earth has ends or edges (Job 37:3); _The earth has four corners (Isa. 11:12, Rev. 7:1); _Some 4-legged animals fly (Lev. 11:21); _The world's language didn't evolve but appeared suddenly (Gen. 11:6-9) _A fetus can understand speech (Luke 1:44). _The moon is a light source like the sun (Gen 1:16) ___source: http://freethoughtpedia.com/wiki/The_Bible_and_Science
7/21/2008 4:06 AM
NIHILIST SAID:
The Bible makes references to mythical creatures, such as in Numbers 21:6 where it speaks of "fiery serpents".
http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2008/07/patristic-ornithology.html
Nihilist,
1.Most of your examples are taxonomic.
i) The Bible doesn’t pretend to offer a “scientific” taxonomy. Rather, it offers a cultic taxonomy.
Animals are classified for purposes of ritual purity and impurity. So it’s a question of how an average Israelite would identify, on sight, a ritually clean or unclean animal. So animals are classified according to certain superficial characteristics.
You’re making no effort to understand the text on its own terms. That’s very illiterate of you.
ii) I’d add that scientists can’t agree on how to classify animals. Some use a phenetic taxonomy, others a phylogenetic taxonomy, still others a cladistic taxonomy.
2.As to Gen 1:16,
i) The moon is a light source. Have you never observed moonlight? It’s possible to see at night on a full moon.
ii) Does the moon emit light the way the sun emits light? No. But the text never said that. The moon is still a source of light to an earthbound observer, and the text is written from that vantage-point.
iii) More to the point, the text is talking about the calendrical function of the sun and moon (e.g. solar and lunar calendars). For example, Israel had annual religious festivals. That required a calendar, based on phases of the moon or some other periodic process.
Once again, you’re making no effort to understand the text on its own terms. That’s very illiterate of you.
3.Cant 2:12 refers to doves. In the KJV, these are called “turtles,” which is short for turtledoves. Doves are songbirds. Let’s also keep in mind that Canticles consists of love poetry.
Instead of relying on some inept, “free-thought” Wikipedia article, you need to learn how to read a text of Scripture on its own terms. You also need to make allowance for an Elizabethan translation (KJV), as well as the difference between one literary genre and another.
4.As to 1 Chron 16:30,
i) This doesn’t refer to the “earth,” but the “ground.” Depending on context, the Hebrew word can be rendered more than one way.
ii) It isn’t talking about the relation of the “earth” to other celestial bodies, but to cataclysmic earthquakes.
iii) It’s very anachronistic of you to interpret the text in light of Ptolemaic astronomy.
iv) This verse comes from a battle song. It’s poetic.
5.As to Matt. 13:31-32,
i) That’s a proverbial, hyperbolic comparison—based on Palestinian agriculture.
ii) Also keep in mind the literary genre in which this comparison occurs. This is not a course in botany, but a parabolic illustration.
6.As to the shape of the earth, the Bible uses architectural metaphors. That’s because the earth is sacred space, and so it’s depicted as if it were a temple or tabernacle.
7.As to Gen 11:6-9,
i) The Bible doesn’t say that all modern languages originated suddenly. The text had reference to its own timeframe. We’d expect the survivors of the flood to speak one language.
ii) Also keep in mind that, in context, ha Eretz has reference to the whole “land,” not the whole “earth.” 11:2 mentions a migration from one compass point to another. So the perspective is local rather than global. If the whole earth were in view, there’d be no place to go.
8.As to 2 Peter 3:5, that’s obviously a literary allusion to the creation account in Gen 1. So what’s your point?
9.As to Lk 1:44, unborn babies have souls, and this was the soul of a prophet, so he was inspired. Can science disprove the soul? No. Can science disprove the Holy Spirit? No.
10.As to Gen 9:13,
i) Even if you interpret this in YEC terms, you can’t have a rainbow without sunshine or rain, so, yes, even at that level, rain and sunshine are causally (and temporally) prior to rainbows.
ii) However, the Bible often assigns a new function to a preexisting custom or entity (e.g. circumcision).
11. As to Num 21:6,
i) This refers, not to a mythological creature, but a venomous snake like a carpet viper.
ii) As Donald Wiseman explains, the Hebrew word (sarap) can either mean “fiery” or “poisonous.”
Cf. D. J. Wiseman, “Flying Serpents,” TynBul 23 (1972): 108-10
Are you willing to apply the same standard to your own Scriptures? Here is a bunch of scientific problems with the Bible:__the bat is a bird (Lev. 11:19, Deut. 14:11, 18); _Some fowls are four-footed (Lev. 11:20-21); _Some creeping insects have four legs. (Lev. 11:22-23); _Hares chew the cud (Lev. 11:6); _Conies chew the cud (Lev. 11:5); _Camels don't divide the hoof (Lev. 11:4); _The earth was formed out of and by means of water (2 Peter 3:5 RSV); _The earth rest on pillars (1 Sam. 2:8); _The earth won't be moved (1Chron. 16:30); _A hare does not divide the hoof (Deut. 14:7); _The rainbow is not as old as rain and sunshine (Gen. 9:13); _A mustard seed is the smallest of all seeds and grows into the greatest of all shrubs (Matt. 13:31-32 RSV); _Turtles have voices (Song of Sol. 2:12); _The earth has ends or edges (Job 37:3); _The earth has four corners (Isa. 11:12, Rev. 7:1); _Some 4-legged animals fly (Lev. 11:21); _The world's language didn't evolve but appeared suddenly (Gen. 11:6-9) _A fetus can understand speech (Luke 1:44). _The moon is a light source like the sun (Gen 1:16) ___source: http://freethoughtpedia.com/wiki/The_Bible_and_Science
7/21/2008 4:06 AM
NIHILIST SAID:
The Bible makes references to mythical creatures, such as in Numbers 21:6 where it speaks of "fiery serpents".
http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2008/07/patristic-ornithology.html
Nihilist,
1.Most of your examples are taxonomic.
i) The Bible doesn’t pretend to offer a “scientific” taxonomy. Rather, it offers a cultic taxonomy.
Animals are classified for purposes of ritual purity and impurity. So it’s a question of how an average Israelite would identify, on sight, a ritually clean or unclean animal. So animals are classified according to certain superficial characteristics.
You’re making no effort to understand the text on its own terms. That’s very illiterate of you.
ii) I’d add that scientists can’t agree on how to classify animals. Some use a phenetic taxonomy, others a phylogenetic taxonomy, still others a cladistic taxonomy.
2.As to Gen 1:16,
i) The moon is a light source. Have you never observed moonlight? It’s possible to see at night on a full moon.
ii) Does the moon emit light the way the sun emits light? No. But the text never said that. The moon is still a source of light to an earthbound observer, and the text is written from that vantage-point.
iii) More to the point, the text is talking about the calendrical function of the sun and moon (e.g. solar and lunar calendars). For example, Israel had annual religious festivals. That required a calendar, based on phases of the moon or some other periodic process.
Once again, you’re making no effort to understand the text on its own terms. That’s very illiterate of you.
3.Cant 2:12 refers to doves. In the KJV, these are called “turtles,” which is short for turtledoves. Doves are songbirds. Let’s also keep in mind that Canticles consists of love poetry.
Instead of relying on some inept, “free-thought” Wikipedia article, you need to learn how to read a text of Scripture on its own terms. You also need to make allowance for an Elizabethan translation (KJV), as well as the difference between one literary genre and another.
4.As to 1 Chron 16:30,
i) This doesn’t refer to the “earth,” but the “ground.” Depending on context, the Hebrew word can be rendered more than one way.
ii) It isn’t talking about the relation of the “earth” to other celestial bodies, but to cataclysmic earthquakes.
iii) It’s very anachronistic of you to interpret the text in light of Ptolemaic astronomy.
iv) This verse comes from a battle song. It’s poetic.
5.As to Matt. 13:31-32,
i) That’s a proverbial, hyperbolic comparison—based on Palestinian agriculture.
ii) Also keep in mind the literary genre in which this comparison occurs. This is not a course in botany, but a parabolic illustration.
6.As to the shape of the earth, the Bible uses architectural metaphors. That’s because the earth is sacred space, and so it’s depicted as if it were a temple or tabernacle.
7.As to Gen 11:6-9,
i) The Bible doesn’t say that all modern languages originated suddenly. The text had reference to its own timeframe. We’d expect the survivors of the flood to speak one language.
ii) Also keep in mind that, in context, ha Eretz has reference to the whole “land,” not the whole “earth.” 11:2 mentions a migration from one compass point to another. So the perspective is local rather than global. If the whole earth were in view, there’d be no place to go.
8.As to 2 Peter 3:5, that’s obviously a literary allusion to the creation account in Gen 1. So what’s your point?
9.As to Lk 1:44, unborn babies have souls, and this was the soul of a prophet, so he was inspired. Can science disprove the soul? No. Can science disprove the Holy Spirit? No.
10.As to Gen 9:13,
i) Even if you interpret this in YEC terms, you can’t have a rainbow without sunshine or rain, so, yes, even at that level, rain and sunshine are causally (and temporally) prior to rainbows.
ii) However, the Bible often assigns a new function to a preexisting custom or entity (e.g. circumcision).
11. As to Num 21:6,
i) This refers, not to a mythological creature, but a venomous snake like a carpet viper.
ii) As Donald Wiseman explains, the Hebrew word (sarap) can either mean “fiery” or “poisonous.”
Cf. D. J. Wiseman, “Flying Serpents,” TynBul 23 (1972): 108-10
Sunday, July 20, 2008
Patristic ornithology
According to tradition, Clement of Rome knew some of the Apostles. And there’s no particular reason to doubt that he may have known one or more of the Apostles.
Now, according to Catholic and Orthodox apologetics, if a subapostolic father knew one or more of the Apostles, then this creates the presumption that his teaching preserves and passes along Apostolic doctrine. He’s a custodian and a conduit of Apostolic tradition. We may safely assume that he’s repeating what he heard from the lips of an Apostle.
But I can’t help noticing that this pious presumption comes to an abrupt and premature halt when we arrive at the science of Clementine ornithology:
“Let us consider that wonderful sign [of the resurrection] which takes place in Eastern lands, that is, in Arabia and the countries round about. There is a certain bird which is called a phoenix. This is the only one of its kind, and lives five hundred years. And when the time of its dissolution draws near that it must die, it builds itself a nest of frankincense, and myrrh, and other spices, into which, when the time is fulfilled, it enters and dies. But as the flesh decays a certain kind of worm is produced, which, being nourished by the juices of the dead bird, brings forth feathers. Then, when it has acquired strength, it takes up that nest in which are the bones of its parent, and bearing these it passes from the land of Arabia into Egypt, to the city called Heliopolis. And, in open day, flying in the sight of all men, it places them on the altar of the sun, and having done this, hastens back to its former abode. The priests then inspect the registers of the dates, and find that it has returned exactly as the five hundredth year was completed.”
http://www.earlychristianwritings.com/text/1clement-roberts.html
Now, according to Catholic and Orthodox apologetics, if a subapostolic father knew one or more of the Apostles, then this creates the presumption that his teaching preserves and passes along Apostolic doctrine. He’s a custodian and a conduit of Apostolic tradition. We may safely assume that he’s repeating what he heard from the lips of an Apostle.
But I can’t help noticing that this pious presumption comes to an abrupt and premature halt when we arrive at the science of Clementine ornithology:
“Let us consider that wonderful sign [of the resurrection] which takes place in Eastern lands, that is, in Arabia and the countries round about. There is a certain bird which is called a phoenix. This is the only one of its kind, and lives five hundred years. And when the time of its dissolution draws near that it must die, it builds itself a nest of frankincense, and myrrh, and other spices, into which, when the time is fulfilled, it enters and dies. But as the flesh decays a certain kind of worm is produced, which, being nourished by the juices of the dead bird, brings forth feathers. Then, when it has acquired strength, it takes up that nest in which are the bones of its parent, and bearing these it passes from the land of Arabia into Egypt, to the city called Heliopolis. And, in open day, flying in the sight of all men, it places them on the altar of the sun, and having done this, hastens back to its former abode. The priests then inspect the registers of the dates, and find that it has returned exactly as the five hundredth year was completed.”
http://www.earlychristianwritings.com/text/1clement-roberts.html
Heretical apostolic succession
This will consist of a two-part reply to Jnorm888. In the first part I’ll reply to what he said to me. In the second part I’ll relate that to some comments of his which Jason Engwer posted.
JNORM888 SAID:
“In order for your argument to be correct, everyone who sat at the Apostles feet had to get them wrong.”
That’s’ scarcely necessary for my argument to be correct. To the contrary, you’re the one who’s backing down from your original argument. So the real question is what it would take for your argument to be incorrect—not what it would take for my argument to be correct. Remember, I was merely responding to you on your own grounds.
You originally made sweeping, unqualified claims like the following:
“Those who came from John never held to your view of the Trinity.”
“You may claim to only use scripture, but that claim is false when your interpretation goes against the Christian interpretation of those that came from the Churches planted by the Apostles.”
“If the people who learned from the Apostles feet were wrong, then the Apostles were wrong.”
“To say that it's wrong is to say that the Apostles were in error.”
“So there are no ‘basic exegetical errors’ when the very people that came from Saint John held to that view.”
“They never sat of Saint John's feet. They never heard him speak. They never were part of the Ancient church. They don't know what was passed down. “
“So your reading of the Gospel of John is false. The Christians of the first 4 hundred years didn't hold to your interpretation of the Gospel of John in regards to these matters.”
Now, however, you’re scaling back the scope of your original claim in light of my counterexamples. Your original argument amounted to this:
Version A:
i) Steve is in error because his view of the Trinity is at odds with the early church.
ii) Due to apostolic succession, the view of the early church is traceable to the view of the apostles.
iii) If an apostle was right, then his successor is right.
iv) Conversely, if his successor is wrong, then an apostle was wrong.
(Defining “successor” as someone who knew an apostle, heard him preach and teach.)
This version of the argument is predicated on a *one-to-one* correspondence between the views an apostle and the views of his successors, from his immediate successors to distant successors—extending out hundreds of years after his death.
By this logic, if *any* successor is wrong, then the apostle he succeeded (directly or indirectly) is wrong.
By this logic, if any successor is wrong, then the appeal to apostolic succession is fallacious.
And this argument isn’t predicated on the apostles generally, but the apostles individually—for you could hear one apostle, but not another. The fact that you sat at the feet of John doesn’t mean you sat at the feet of Paul, or vice versa.
But one of the problems with Jnorm888’s argument is that he overlooked some obvious counterexamples in NT church history itself. There were false teachers who, at one time, did belong to Apostolic churches. False teachers who, at one time, did sit at the feet of one or more Apostles. Knew them, heard them. But that association didn’t prevent them from subsequently inculcating false doctrine.
So now Jnorm888 proposes a radically different argument:
Version B:
i) Steve is in error because his view of the Trinity is at odds with the early church.
ii) Due to apostolic succession, the view of the early church is *sometimes* traceable to the view of the apostles.
iii) If an apostle was right, then his successor might or might *not* be right.
iv) Conversely, even if his *successor* is wrong, an *apostle* could still be right.
This version of the argument is predicated on a *partial* correspondence between the views of the apostles and the views of their successors.
By this logic, if *every* successor is wrong, then, and only then, is the appeal to apostolic succession fallacious.
Jnorm888 has actually conceded my original argument. If succeeding an apostle doesn’t guarantee, or even presume, that a successor’s teaching is apostolic, then Jnorm888 can’t invoke apostolic succession to shoot down my position.
“The Apostles spoke to groups, so anyone who said something different.....like ‘Hymenaeus and Philetus’, would automatically stick out like a sore thumb.”
i) Even if that’s the case, you’re retreating from your original argument, viz. “If the people who learned from the Apostles feet were wrong, then the Apostles were wrong.”
Now you’ve gone from “the very people” who sat an Apostle’s feat to *some* of the people who sat at his feet.
ii) And your revised argument overlooks another fact: False teachers in the NT church did have a following. Even though they were speaking to churches planted by apostles, even though the members had heard one or more Apostles teach and preach, some of them were still succumbing to false doctrine.
So, unfortunately, the false teachers didn’t “stick out like a sore thumb.” They were winning converts to their false doctrine from churches planted by the Apostles. From church members who sat at the feet of one or more Apostles.
This is a problem when guys like Jnorm888 begin with their preconception of what the church is supposed to be like, instead of actually studying the NT church.
“You don't know what I read. Unlike many calvinists on this blog, I actually read the primary accounts.”
And how do you interpret the primary sources? Do you interpret the church fathers allegorically, or you do use the grammatico-historical method? Why not apply the same method to Scripture which you apply to the church fathers?
“I 100%ly affirm the council of Chalcedon.”
As you understand it. But Robinson operates at a more academic level than you do, and when Robinson gets into an argument with Protestants over Chalcedonian Christology, he refers us to the latest technical monograph on the subject.
Have you read everything he’s read? And even if you have, what about the average Orthodox layman? What level of historical understanding does it take to “profess” the Chalcedonian creed? Short of being a patrologist (and there are disputes between one patrologist and another), how do you know that your profession corresponds to the original intent of the framers?
For example, are you a Greek scholar? Do you read the primary sources in the original language? Even if you have a smattering of Greek, is your command of Patristic Greek right up there with G. W. H. Lampe?
“I'm admitting that your view of ‘scripture alone’ is wrong.”
So you deny that scripture alone teaches a high Christology. Is Scripture neutral on the difference between Arian Christology and Orthodox Christology?
Does this mean that Orthodox Christology is extrabiblical? That it goes beyond what God has actually revealed?
“For it is easy to have a false interpretation of scripture.”
Why is that easy? Is it easy (according to you) because Scripture alone doesn’t teach a high Christology?
Or do you admit that Scripture alone does teach a high Christology? In so, then how would a misinterpretation invalidate sola Scriptura? The correct Christology would still have to come from Scripture.
“He only changed his mind when other protestants fought him on the issue. It wasn't scripture that changed his mind. It was other protestants that changed his mind.”
That’s a false dichotomy. They challenged his interpretation with better exegesis.
Anyway, did I ever deny the value of Bible teachers? Of Bible scholars and commentators? God has gifted some Christian to teach the Bible.
That isn’t at odds with Protestant ecclesiology. But a Bible teacher can’t simply invoke tradition to defend his interpretation. He must defend his interpretation through responsible, transparent exegesis.
“My point was that Scripture is one source that the Church has in her Possesion.”
Yet you apparently think it’s an inadequate source for Orthodox Christology. So is Scripture noncommittal on Arian Christology? Is Arian Christology compatible with Scripture? Must an extrascriptural source take up the slack?
Thus far Jnorm888’s response to me. However, in his comments on premillennialism, he’s mooted his response to me. Here is what he said:
"Only the christians from Ashia Minor were mostly PM [premillennial]. Ashia minor is where Saint John mostly lived and died, and so the Apostolic Tradition that came from his region mostly held on to 'Chilism'. Justin Martyre and some others who were from that region but moved to Rome later in life spread that teaching to other parts of Christiandom....You also mentioned Justin, but like I said before. HE was from the same region, and he later moved west, and spread that form of eschatology to other parts of the christian world. the same is true with Saint Irenaeus....Most christians rejected the book of Revelations, So most christians never had a pre-mill view to begin with....If you are going to mention Historic PM then you are going to have to use the Church as being the final authority. It was the Church at a euceminical council that took a stand on the issue....You have to use the standard of the time. And at that time, the Apostolic tradition of Saint John (on this issue) was trumped by the Apostolic traditions of Mark, Andrew, Peter, and Paul.”
“So yeah, it's a heresy, but it's not a bad bad heresy. There are different levels of heresies/sins/error.....ect....What we don't see in scripture is error from followers of the Apostles who miss heard what they said. The Apostles spoke to the masses, so in order for their followers to get them wrong is for everyone to miss understand them"
Compare this, once more, with Jnorm888’s original reply to me:
“Those who came from John never held to your view of the Trinity.”
“You may claim to only use scripture, but that claim is false when your interpretation goes against the Christian interpretation of those that came from the Churches planted by the Apostles.”
“If the people who learned from the Apostles feet were wrong, then the Apostles were wrong.”
“To say that it's wrong is to say that the Apostles were in error.”
“So there are no ‘basic exegetical errors’ when the very people that came from Saint John held to that view.”
“They never sat of Saint John's feet. They never heard him speak. They never were part of the Ancient church. They don't know what was passed down. “
“So your reading of the Gospel of John is false. The Christians of the first 4 hundred years didn't hold to your interpretation of the Gospel of John in regards to these matters.”
His original argument took the form that early church tradition was true because it went back to various apostles via their successors.
After I challenged him, he then amended his argument to claim that apostolic succession was reliable as long as *every *successor* wasn’t mistaken.
Now, however, we have yet another argument—or two:
Version C: Apostolic succession is reliable as long as *every apostle* wasn’t mistaken.
Or:
Version D: Apostles could be wrong, but ecumenical councils trump apostles.
This represents a complete reversal of his initial position. Now he takes the position that even Apostolic doctrine could be wrong.
Not just wrong, but heretical. Apostolic succession can be heretical. An apostle may be a heresiarch.
But that’s okay because an apostle is not the final authority. An ecumenical council is the final authority.
This raises several issues:
i) Jnorm888 has given us a multiple-choice argument. So which one of his arguments is the operative argument?
ii) Why can one apostle be wrong, but two apostles can’t be wrong? Or does it take three or four apostles? What’s the numerical threshold for inerrancy to kick in?
Why would an apostle teach heresy? Because he’s uninspired? But in that event, why assume that one apostle is uninspired while two apostles are inspired? Or three or four?
iii) If an ecumenical council can trump an apostle, does this mean that bishops enjoy a higher claim to inspiration than apostles? Could every apostle be wrong, but every bishop could not be wrong?
If an ecumenical council can trump an apostle, does this mean that every apostle could be wrong, but that’s okay because the episcopate is the safety-net?
iv) What does apostolic succession amount to when bishops can trump apostles? Isn’t the standard view of apostolic succession that bishops *preserve* apostolic tradition rather than opposing and supplanting apostolic tradition? Isn’t apostolic succession defined by *continuity* between apostolic doctrine and episcopal or ecclesial doctrine?
v) On this view, my interpretation of Johannine or Pauline theology could be flawless, yet my theology could still be heretical because Johannine or Pauline theology could be heretical. An inerrant interpretation of an errant teaching is still errant.
“I don't see a problem with it. The Circumcision group were trumped at the very first Church council. And they were fighting for the customs of Moses.”
Several problems:
i) Even if this were a correct interpretation of Acts 15, it still destroys any appeal to apostolic succession. You’ve gone from an appeal to isometric continuity to an allowance for a high degree of discontinuity.
ii) Why assume that Acts 15 is a reliable record of the proceedings? After all, if an apostle can be a heretic, why assume that Luke is reliable? After all, Luke is a partisan of Paul.
iii) Were some of the apostles Judaizers?
iv) Did Judaizers participate in the Council of Jerusalem?
The councilmen were debating the position of the Judaizers. But what evidence is there that any of the councilmen were Judaizers?
Acts 15 records four speakers (Peter, Paul, Barnabas, and James). Not one of them is a spokesman for the Judaizers.
iv) What was the point under dispute? Were the councilmen debating the validity of sola fide? Or were the debating the best way to promulgate sola fide without giving unnecessary offense to the Jews? Cf. Acts 15:21.
JNORM888 SAID:
“In order for your argument to be correct, everyone who sat at the Apostles feet had to get them wrong.”
That’s’ scarcely necessary for my argument to be correct. To the contrary, you’re the one who’s backing down from your original argument. So the real question is what it would take for your argument to be incorrect—not what it would take for my argument to be correct. Remember, I was merely responding to you on your own grounds.
You originally made sweeping, unqualified claims like the following:
“Those who came from John never held to your view of the Trinity.”
“You may claim to only use scripture, but that claim is false when your interpretation goes against the Christian interpretation of those that came from the Churches planted by the Apostles.”
“If the people who learned from the Apostles feet were wrong, then the Apostles were wrong.”
“To say that it's wrong is to say that the Apostles were in error.”
“So there are no ‘basic exegetical errors’ when the very people that came from Saint John held to that view.”
“They never sat of Saint John's feet. They never heard him speak. They never were part of the Ancient church. They don't know what was passed down. “
“So your reading of the Gospel of John is false. The Christians of the first 4 hundred years didn't hold to your interpretation of the Gospel of John in regards to these matters.”
Now, however, you’re scaling back the scope of your original claim in light of my counterexamples. Your original argument amounted to this:
Version A:
i) Steve is in error because his view of the Trinity is at odds with the early church.
ii) Due to apostolic succession, the view of the early church is traceable to the view of the apostles.
iii) If an apostle was right, then his successor is right.
iv) Conversely, if his successor is wrong, then an apostle was wrong.
(Defining “successor” as someone who knew an apostle, heard him preach and teach.)
This version of the argument is predicated on a *one-to-one* correspondence between the views an apostle and the views of his successors, from his immediate successors to distant successors—extending out hundreds of years after his death.
By this logic, if *any* successor is wrong, then the apostle he succeeded (directly or indirectly) is wrong.
By this logic, if any successor is wrong, then the appeal to apostolic succession is fallacious.
And this argument isn’t predicated on the apostles generally, but the apostles individually—for you could hear one apostle, but not another. The fact that you sat at the feet of John doesn’t mean you sat at the feet of Paul, or vice versa.
But one of the problems with Jnorm888’s argument is that he overlooked some obvious counterexamples in NT church history itself. There were false teachers who, at one time, did belong to Apostolic churches. False teachers who, at one time, did sit at the feet of one or more Apostles. Knew them, heard them. But that association didn’t prevent them from subsequently inculcating false doctrine.
So now Jnorm888 proposes a radically different argument:
Version B:
i) Steve is in error because his view of the Trinity is at odds with the early church.
ii) Due to apostolic succession, the view of the early church is *sometimes* traceable to the view of the apostles.
iii) If an apostle was right, then his successor might or might *not* be right.
iv) Conversely, even if his *successor* is wrong, an *apostle* could still be right.
This version of the argument is predicated on a *partial* correspondence between the views of the apostles and the views of their successors.
By this logic, if *every* successor is wrong, then, and only then, is the appeal to apostolic succession fallacious.
Jnorm888 has actually conceded my original argument. If succeeding an apostle doesn’t guarantee, or even presume, that a successor’s teaching is apostolic, then Jnorm888 can’t invoke apostolic succession to shoot down my position.
“The Apostles spoke to groups, so anyone who said something different.....like ‘Hymenaeus and Philetus’, would automatically stick out like a sore thumb.”
i) Even if that’s the case, you’re retreating from your original argument, viz. “If the people who learned from the Apostles feet were wrong, then the Apostles were wrong.”
Now you’ve gone from “the very people” who sat an Apostle’s feat to *some* of the people who sat at his feet.
ii) And your revised argument overlooks another fact: False teachers in the NT church did have a following. Even though they were speaking to churches planted by apostles, even though the members had heard one or more Apostles teach and preach, some of them were still succumbing to false doctrine.
So, unfortunately, the false teachers didn’t “stick out like a sore thumb.” They were winning converts to their false doctrine from churches planted by the Apostles. From church members who sat at the feet of one or more Apostles.
This is a problem when guys like Jnorm888 begin with their preconception of what the church is supposed to be like, instead of actually studying the NT church.
“You don't know what I read. Unlike many calvinists on this blog, I actually read the primary accounts.”
And how do you interpret the primary sources? Do you interpret the church fathers allegorically, or you do use the grammatico-historical method? Why not apply the same method to Scripture which you apply to the church fathers?
“I 100%ly affirm the council of Chalcedon.”
As you understand it. But Robinson operates at a more academic level than you do, and when Robinson gets into an argument with Protestants over Chalcedonian Christology, he refers us to the latest technical monograph on the subject.
Have you read everything he’s read? And even if you have, what about the average Orthodox layman? What level of historical understanding does it take to “profess” the Chalcedonian creed? Short of being a patrologist (and there are disputes between one patrologist and another), how do you know that your profession corresponds to the original intent of the framers?
For example, are you a Greek scholar? Do you read the primary sources in the original language? Even if you have a smattering of Greek, is your command of Patristic Greek right up there with G. W. H. Lampe?
“I'm admitting that your view of ‘scripture alone’ is wrong.”
So you deny that scripture alone teaches a high Christology. Is Scripture neutral on the difference between Arian Christology and Orthodox Christology?
Does this mean that Orthodox Christology is extrabiblical? That it goes beyond what God has actually revealed?
“For it is easy to have a false interpretation of scripture.”
Why is that easy? Is it easy (according to you) because Scripture alone doesn’t teach a high Christology?
Or do you admit that Scripture alone does teach a high Christology? In so, then how would a misinterpretation invalidate sola Scriptura? The correct Christology would still have to come from Scripture.
“He only changed his mind when other protestants fought him on the issue. It wasn't scripture that changed his mind. It was other protestants that changed his mind.”
That’s a false dichotomy. They challenged his interpretation with better exegesis.
Anyway, did I ever deny the value of Bible teachers? Of Bible scholars and commentators? God has gifted some Christian to teach the Bible.
That isn’t at odds with Protestant ecclesiology. But a Bible teacher can’t simply invoke tradition to defend his interpretation. He must defend his interpretation through responsible, transparent exegesis.
“My point was that Scripture is one source that the Church has in her Possesion.”
Yet you apparently think it’s an inadequate source for Orthodox Christology. So is Scripture noncommittal on Arian Christology? Is Arian Christology compatible with Scripture? Must an extrascriptural source take up the slack?
Thus far Jnorm888’s response to me. However, in his comments on premillennialism, he’s mooted his response to me. Here is what he said:
"Only the christians from Ashia Minor were mostly PM [premillennial]. Ashia minor is where Saint John mostly lived and died, and so the Apostolic Tradition that came from his region mostly held on to 'Chilism'. Justin Martyre and some others who were from that region but moved to Rome later in life spread that teaching to other parts of Christiandom....You also mentioned Justin, but like I said before. HE was from the same region, and he later moved west, and spread that form of eschatology to other parts of the christian world. the same is true with Saint Irenaeus....Most christians rejected the book of Revelations, So most christians never had a pre-mill view to begin with....If you are going to mention Historic PM then you are going to have to use the Church as being the final authority. It was the Church at a euceminical council that took a stand on the issue....You have to use the standard of the time. And at that time, the Apostolic tradition of Saint John (on this issue) was trumped by the Apostolic traditions of Mark, Andrew, Peter, and Paul.”
“So yeah, it's a heresy, but it's not a bad bad heresy. There are different levels of heresies/sins/error.....ect....What we don't see in scripture is error from followers of the Apostles who miss heard what they said. The Apostles spoke to the masses, so in order for their followers to get them wrong is for everyone to miss understand them"
Compare this, once more, with Jnorm888’s original reply to me:
“Those who came from John never held to your view of the Trinity.”
“You may claim to only use scripture, but that claim is false when your interpretation goes against the Christian interpretation of those that came from the Churches planted by the Apostles.”
“If the people who learned from the Apostles feet were wrong, then the Apostles were wrong.”
“To say that it's wrong is to say that the Apostles were in error.”
“So there are no ‘basic exegetical errors’ when the very people that came from Saint John held to that view.”
“They never sat of Saint John's feet. They never heard him speak. They never were part of the Ancient church. They don't know what was passed down. “
“So your reading of the Gospel of John is false. The Christians of the first 4 hundred years didn't hold to your interpretation of the Gospel of John in regards to these matters.”
His original argument took the form that early church tradition was true because it went back to various apostles via their successors.
After I challenged him, he then amended his argument to claim that apostolic succession was reliable as long as *every *successor* wasn’t mistaken.
Now, however, we have yet another argument—or two:
Version C: Apostolic succession is reliable as long as *every apostle* wasn’t mistaken.
Or:
Version D: Apostles could be wrong, but ecumenical councils trump apostles.
This represents a complete reversal of his initial position. Now he takes the position that even Apostolic doctrine could be wrong.
Not just wrong, but heretical. Apostolic succession can be heretical. An apostle may be a heresiarch.
But that’s okay because an apostle is not the final authority. An ecumenical council is the final authority.
This raises several issues:
i) Jnorm888 has given us a multiple-choice argument. So which one of his arguments is the operative argument?
ii) Why can one apostle be wrong, but two apostles can’t be wrong? Or does it take three or four apostles? What’s the numerical threshold for inerrancy to kick in?
Why would an apostle teach heresy? Because he’s uninspired? But in that event, why assume that one apostle is uninspired while two apostles are inspired? Or three or four?
iii) If an ecumenical council can trump an apostle, does this mean that bishops enjoy a higher claim to inspiration than apostles? Could every apostle be wrong, but every bishop could not be wrong?
If an ecumenical council can trump an apostle, does this mean that every apostle could be wrong, but that’s okay because the episcopate is the safety-net?
iv) What does apostolic succession amount to when bishops can trump apostles? Isn’t the standard view of apostolic succession that bishops *preserve* apostolic tradition rather than opposing and supplanting apostolic tradition? Isn’t apostolic succession defined by *continuity* between apostolic doctrine and episcopal or ecclesial doctrine?
v) On this view, my interpretation of Johannine or Pauline theology could be flawless, yet my theology could still be heretical because Johannine or Pauline theology could be heretical. An inerrant interpretation of an errant teaching is still errant.
“I don't see a problem with it. The Circumcision group were trumped at the very first Church council. And they were fighting for the customs of Moses.”
Several problems:
i) Even if this were a correct interpretation of Acts 15, it still destroys any appeal to apostolic succession. You’ve gone from an appeal to isometric continuity to an allowance for a high degree of discontinuity.
ii) Why assume that Acts 15 is a reliable record of the proceedings? After all, if an apostle can be a heretic, why assume that Luke is reliable? After all, Luke is a partisan of Paul.
iii) Were some of the apostles Judaizers?
iv) Did Judaizers participate in the Council of Jerusalem?
The councilmen were debating the position of the Judaizers. But what evidence is there that any of the councilmen were Judaizers?
Acts 15 records four speakers (Peter, Paul, Barnabas, and James). Not one of them is a spokesman for the Judaizers.
iv) What was the point under dispute? Were the councilmen debating the validity of sola fide? Or were the debating the best way to promulgate sola fide without giving unnecessary offense to the Jews? Cf. Acts 15:21.
"Extraordinary claims demand extraordinary evidence!"
This is a Humean rule of evidence which was popularized by Carl Sagan. A variant on this slogan is that “extraordinary events demand extraordinary evidence.”
It’s since been picked up by atheists generally to quash any and all reported miracles. But what does this slogan mean, and is it a sound rule of evidence?
1.What makes a claim an “extraordinary” claim? Does that simply mean the event in question is exceptional, out of the ordinary, or unusual?
But unbelievers think that many natural events are extraordinary in that weak sense. Likewise, they think that many human events or historical events are extraordinary in that weak sense. And they don’t demand extraordinary evidence (whatever that means) for such events. So they must have something stronger in mind.
2.They often appeal to the uniformity of nature. So do they define “extraordinary” in the sense that miracles don’t happen, inasmuch as that would run counter to the uniformity of nature?
But, of course, that definition begs the question. Whether miracles do or don’t happen is the very point at issue. You can’t very well presume that miracles never happen without begging the question.
Hence, reported miracles don’t have to overcome the presumption that miracles never happen. For that would assume the very thing the unbeliever must prove.
3.Perhaps, though, the unbeliever thinks the onus is on the believer. Since the believer is asserting that miracles happen, the believer assumes the burden of proof.
However, the unbeliever is asserting that miracles don’t happen, so he—in turn—shoulders a commensurate burden of proof.
4.Frequently, the uniformity of nature is underwritten by appeal to the laws of nature. Here we have a strong claim: miracles don’t happen because miracles can’t happen.
And why can’t they happen? Because that would violate the laws of nature.
Extraordinary events don’t demand extraordinary evidence as long as they’re the right kind of event—natural events, consistent with natural law. A miracle is the wrong kind of extraordinary event for ordinary evidence to suffice.
But there are several problems with this claim:
5.An unbeliever can’t very well presume that the laws of nature preclude miracles. For he’s making a very ambitious claim. A claim about the state of the world.
That’s something he needs to defend. He can’t merely stipulate that his view of the world is right. He must argue for his view of natural law. Therefore, it’s not as if reported miracles must overcome the presumption that natural law precludes their occurrence.
Even if natural law did preclude the miraculous, that, of itself, is a claim which demands a supporting argument.
6.Keep in mind that a natural “law” is just an anthropomorphic metaphor. Literally speaking, there are no “laws” of nature. That’s a figure of speech which is borrowed from human affairs and then projected onto nature.
7.Assuming, for the sake of argument, that we formulate the possibility of miracles within a natural law framework, what would be extraordinary about an event that “violated” the laws of nature?
That would only be extraordinary under the assumption that natural laws are the ultimate factors governing reality. An absolute limiting condition. They demarcate what is possible and impossible.
But, of course, the unbeliever cannot very well presume such a grandiose position. He needs to argue for it.
8.To see the problem with (7), ask yourself the following question: “Is there something extraordinary about the idea that God would do something contrary to the laws of nature?”
On the face of it, there’s nothing extraordinary about such an idea. If God is more ultimate than nature, then God is more ultimate than natural law. So God isn’t bound by nature law. Rather, the laws of nature depend on God.
On the face of it, there’s no presumption that God would never do something contrary to the laws of nature. That would only follow if the laws of nature are ultimate and autonomous.
9. Of course, at this point, the unbeliever will object to the introduction of God into the equation. After all, the unbeliever doesn’t believe in God.
But why doesn’t he believe in God? Does he take the position that God’s existence is an extraordinary claim demanding extraordinary evidence?
But why is God’s existence extraordinary? After all, many theologians argue that God is a necessary being. And if God is a necessary being, then it would be extraordinary if he didn’t exist. Indeed, his nonexistence would be impossible. So his existence is not extraordinary: rather, it’s inevitable.
10. Of course, an unbeliever will deny that God is a necessary being. But if a theologian must argue that God is a necessary being, then an atheologian must argue that God is not a necessary being. An atheist or agnostic can’t merely presume that God is not a necessary being. His own denial is a belief. A belief with its own burden of proof.
On the basis of 1-10, there’s no prima facie assumption that a reported miracle amounts to an extraordinary claim. If an unbeliever is going to classify a reported miracle as an extraordinary claim, then he must mount an argument for his category. It’s not something he’s entitled to take for granted.
He is making a claim about the state of the world. That’s not something he can merely stipulate to be the case—especially when his claim is controversial.
11.What about extraordinary evidence? What an unbeliever really means is that, practically speaking, no evidence will ever overcome the presumption against the occurrence of miracles.
But that, of itself, is a very ambitious claim. It’s an extraordinary claim to claim that, practically speaking, no evidence can ever overcome the presumption against the occurrence of miracles.
Indeed, it begs the question. It really boils down to supposition that since miracles either don’t occur or can’t occur, then there is no possible evidence for miracles. But that’s tendentious.
It’s since been picked up by atheists generally to quash any and all reported miracles. But what does this slogan mean, and is it a sound rule of evidence?
1.What makes a claim an “extraordinary” claim? Does that simply mean the event in question is exceptional, out of the ordinary, or unusual?
But unbelievers think that many natural events are extraordinary in that weak sense. Likewise, they think that many human events or historical events are extraordinary in that weak sense. And they don’t demand extraordinary evidence (whatever that means) for such events. So they must have something stronger in mind.
2.They often appeal to the uniformity of nature. So do they define “extraordinary” in the sense that miracles don’t happen, inasmuch as that would run counter to the uniformity of nature?
But, of course, that definition begs the question. Whether miracles do or don’t happen is the very point at issue. You can’t very well presume that miracles never happen without begging the question.
Hence, reported miracles don’t have to overcome the presumption that miracles never happen. For that would assume the very thing the unbeliever must prove.
3.Perhaps, though, the unbeliever thinks the onus is on the believer. Since the believer is asserting that miracles happen, the believer assumes the burden of proof.
However, the unbeliever is asserting that miracles don’t happen, so he—in turn—shoulders a commensurate burden of proof.
4.Frequently, the uniformity of nature is underwritten by appeal to the laws of nature. Here we have a strong claim: miracles don’t happen because miracles can’t happen.
And why can’t they happen? Because that would violate the laws of nature.
Extraordinary events don’t demand extraordinary evidence as long as they’re the right kind of event—natural events, consistent with natural law. A miracle is the wrong kind of extraordinary event for ordinary evidence to suffice.
But there are several problems with this claim:
5.An unbeliever can’t very well presume that the laws of nature preclude miracles. For he’s making a very ambitious claim. A claim about the state of the world.
That’s something he needs to defend. He can’t merely stipulate that his view of the world is right. He must argue for his view of natural law. Therefore, it’s not as if reported miracles must overcome the presumption that natural law precludes their occurrence.
Even if natural law did preclude the miraculous, that, of itself, is a claim which demands a supporting argument.
6.Keep in mind that a natural “law” is just an anthropomorphic metaphor. Literally speaking, there are no “laws” of nature. That’s a figure of speech which is borrowed from human affairs and then projected onto nature.
7.Assuming, for the sake of argument, that we formulate the possibility of miracles within a natural law framework, what would be extraordinary about an event that “violated” the laws of nature?
That would only be extraordinary under the assumption that natural laws are the ultimate factors governing reality. An absolute limiting condition. They demarcate what is possible and impossible.
But, of course, the unbeliever cannot very well presume such a grandiose position. He needs to argue for it.
8.To see the problem with (7), ask yourself the following question: “Is there something extraordinary about the idea that God would do something contrary to the laws of nature?”
On the face of it, there’s nothing extraordinary about such an idea. If God is more ultimate than nature, then God is more ultimate than natural law. So God isn’t bound by nature law. Rather, the laws of nature depend on God.
On the face of it, there’s no presumption that God would never do something contrary to the laws of nature. That would only follow if the laws of nature are ultimate and autonomous.
9. Of course, at this point, the unbeliever will object to the introduction of God into the equation. After all, the unbeliever doesn’t believe in God.
But why doesn’t he believe in God? Does he take the position that God’s existence is an extraordinary claim demanding extraordinary evidence?
But why is God’s existence extraordinary? After all, many theologians argue that God is a necessary being. And if God is a necessary being, then it would be extraordinary if he didn’t exist. Indeed, his nonexistence would be impossible. So his existence is not extraordinary: rather, it’s inevitable.
10. Of course, an unbeliever will deny that God is a necessary being. But if a theologian must argue that God is a necessary being, then an atheologian must argue that God is not a necessary being. An atheist or agnostic can’t merely presume that God is not a necessary being. His own denial is a belief. A belief with its own burden of proof.
On the basis of 1-10, there’s no prima facie assumption that a reported miracle amounts to an extraordinary claim. If an unbeliever is going to classify a reported miracle as an extraordinary claim, then he must mount an argument for his category. It’s not something he’s entitled to take for granted.
He is making a claim about the state of the world. That’s not something he can merely stipulate to be the case—especially when his claim is controversial.
11.What about extraordinary evidence? What an unbeliever really means is that, practically speaking, no evidence will ever overcome the presumption against the occurrence of miracles.
But that, of itself, is a very ambitious claim. It’s an extraordinary claim to claim that, practically speaking, no evidence can ever overcome the presumption against the occurrence of miracles.
Indeed, it begs the question. It really boils down to supposition that since miracles either don’t occur or can’t occur, then there is no possible evidence for miracles. But that’s tendentious.
An Eastern Orthodox Clarification Of Church History
In another thread, Jnorm888, an Eastern Orthodox, writes:
"But I already handled some of your arguments when dealing with a Supra - full-preterist Prespyterian."
Here's part of what Jnorm888 writes in the two articles he links us to, regarding premillennialism (here and here):
"only the christians from Ashia Minor were mostly PM [premillennial]. Ashia minor is where Saint John mostly lived and died, and so the Apostolic Tradition that came from his region mostly held on to 'Chilism'. Justin Martyre and some others who were from that region but moved to Rome later in life spread that teaching to other parts of Christiandom....You also mentioned Justin, but like I said before. HE was from the same region, and he later moved west, and spread that form of eschatology to other parts of the christian world. the same is true with Saint Irenaeus....Most christians rejected the book of Revelations, So most christians never had a pre-mill view to begin with....If you are going to mention Historic PM then you are going to have to use the Church as being the final authority. It was the Church at a euceminical council that took a stand on the issue....You have to use the standard of the time. And at that time, the Apostolic tradition of Saint John (on this issue) was trumped by the Apostolic traditions of Mark, Andrew, Peter, and Paul. The Christians in Ashia minor had a little more detail about end time views that other regions didn't have. And they lost the fight, just like they lost the fight some centuries earlyier at the council of Nicea, in regards to Pascha observance. The christians in Ashia minor were at one time called ' quartodecimans' (because they observed Pascha on the same day the Jews observed Passover, which was Nisan 14) This custom came from John, so the christians in his region did what he did. But they lost the fight at the council of Nicea, because the other Apostles (in other regions) did it differently. So they were trumped. I don't see a problem with it. The Circumcision group were trumped at the very first Church council. And they were fighting for the customs of Moses. This is what happens King Neb, and you shouldn't see a problem with it. Certain customs & beliefs/interpretations get trumped by other customs & beliefs/interpretations.....that are also ancient....Everything in ancient PM was not declared heretical. Only the literal 1,000 earthly year riegn of Christ, and their carnal view of Paradise in that 1,000 year riegn...You had two competing views. One group from Ashia minor that believed in a literal 1,000 year reign and embraced the book of Revelations. And those who either rejected Revelations, or just didn't embrace it. And these were the christians that did not believe in a literal 1,000 earthly reign of Christ....But alot of modern PMers don't know that PM was declared heretical in the 6th century, so for the most part it's a view held in ignorance. I know when I was PM, I didn't know it was heretical until some years ago....My Godfather is a PMer(ancient PM. He picked it up from some of the early fathers & nonfathers). He is not suppose to be, because he's ORthodox. But as long as he's not dogmatic about his PMism, and as long as he doesn't try to spread it to others then he is still allowed to partake of cummunion. So yeah, it's a heresy, but it's not a bad bad heresy. There are different levels of heresies/sins/error.....ect....What we don't see in scripture is error from followers of the Apostles who miss heard what they said. The Apostles spoke to the masses, so in order for their followers to get them wrong is for everyone to miss understand them"
Apparently, then, without offering much supporting argumentation or documentation, Jnorm888 wants us to believe that:
- The apostle John taught premillennialism, but he was wrong. The Christians in Asia Minor "had a little more detail about end time views that other regions didn't have. And they lost the fight". Apparently, they were mistaken because they accepted the "details" John gave them. The apostle led them astray.
- The book of Revelation, which the large majority of professing Christians today accept as canonical, was rejected as uncanonical by most of the earliest Christians, and the book taught a false view of eschatology. It can be reinterpreted in an orthodox manner, but the book was initially written with the intention of conveying false eschatology.
- The reason why men like Justin Martyr and Irenaeus advocated premillennialism and spoke of it as if it was the mainstream Christian view when they were outside of Asia Minor is because they were at the forefront of spreading the belief to other regions. Apparently, men like Tertullian, Hippolytus, and Cyprian accepted premillennialism under the influence of men like Justin and Irenaeus. We aren't told why premillennialism would be so widely accepted outside of Asia Minor if it had initially been rejected in such places. We aren't told how Jnorm888 allegedly knows that the doctrine was spread in the manner he suggests.
- Premillennilaism is a heresy condemned by an ecumenical council, but "not a bad bad heresy", and it's acceptable for individuals to hold that heresy, as long as they "aren't dogmatic about it" and don't try to spread it, for example.
Etc.
"But I already handled some of your arguments when dealing with a Supra - full-preterist Prespyterian."
Here's part of what Jnorm888 writes in the two articles he links us to, regarding premillennialism (here and here):
"only the christians from Ashia Minor were mostly PM [premillennial]. Ashia minor is where Saint John mostly lived and died, and so the Apostolic Tradition that came from his region mostly held on to 'Chilism'. Justin Martyre and some others who were from that region but moved to Rome later in life spread that teaching to other parts of Christiandom....You also mentioned Justin, but like I said before. HE was from the same region, and he later moved west, and spread that form of eschatology to other parts of the christian world. the same is true with Saint Irenaeus....Most christians rejected the book of Revelations, So most christians never had a pre-mill view to begin with....If you are going to mention Historic PM then you are going to have to use the Church as being the final authority. It was the Church at a euceminical council that took a stand on the issue....You have to use the standard of the time. And at that time, the Apostolic tradition of Saint John (on this issue) was trumped by the Apostolic traditions of Mark, Andrew, Peter, and Paul. The Christians in Ashia minor had a little more detail about end time views that other regions didn't have. And they lost the fight, just like they lost the fight some centuries earlyier at the council of Nicea, in regards to Pascha observance. The christians in Ashia minor were at one time called ' quartodecimans' (because they observed Pascha on the same day the Jews observed Passover, which was Nisan 14) This custom came from John, so the christians in his region did what he did. But they lost the fight at the council of Nicea, because the other Apostles (in other regions) did it differently. So they were trumped. I don't see a problem with it. The Circumcision group were trumped at the very first Church council. And they were fighting for the customs of Moses. This is what happens King Neb, and you shouldn't see a problem with it. Certain customs & beliefs/interpretations get trumped by other customs & beliefs/interpretations.....that are also ancient....Everything in ancient PM was not declared heretical. Only the literal 1,000 earthly year riegn of Christ, and their carnal view of Paradise in that 1,000 year riegn...You had two competing views. One group from Ashia minor that believed in a literal 1,000 year reign and embraced the book of Revelations. And those who either rejected Revelations, or just didn't embrace it. And these were the christians that did not believe in a literal 1,000 earthly reign of Christ....But alot of modern PMers don't know that PM was declared heretical in the 6th century, so for the most part it's a view held in ignorance. I know when I was PM, I didn't know it was heretical until some years ago....My Godfather is a PMer(ancient PM. He picked it up from some of the early fathers & nonfathers). He is not suppose to be, because he's ORthodox. But as long as he's not dogmatic about his PMism, and as long as he doesn't try to spread it to others then he is still allowed to partake of cummunion. So yeah, it's a heresy, but it's not a bad bad heresy. There are different levels of heresies/sins/error.....ect....What we don't see in scripture is error from followers of the Apostles who miss heard what they said. The Apostles spoke to the masses, so in order for their followers to get them wrong is for everyone to miss understand them"
Apparently, then, without offering much supporting argumentation or documentation, Jnorm888 wants us to believe that:
- The apostle John taught premillennialism, but he was wrong. The Christians in Asia Minor "had a little more detail about end time views that other regions didn't have. And they lost the fight". Apparently, they were mistaken because they accepted the "details" John gave them. The apostle led them astray.
- The book of Revelation, which the large majority of professing Christians today accept as canonical, was rejected as uncanonical by most of the earliest Christians, and the book taught a false view of eschatology. It can be reinterpreted in an orthodox manner, but the book was initially written with the intention of conveying false eschatology.
- The reason why men like Justin Martyr and Irenaeus advocated premillennialism and spoke of it as if it was the mainstream Christian view when they were outside of Asia Minor is because they were at the forefront of spreading the belief to other regions. Apparently, men like Tertullian, Hippolytus, and Cyprian accepted premillennialism under the influence of men like Justin and Irenaeus. We aren't told why premillennialism would be so widely accepted outside of Asia Minor if it had initially been rejected in such places. We aren't told how Jnorm888 allegedly knows that the doctrine was spread in the manner he suggests.
- Premillennilaism is a heresy condemned by an ecumenical council, but "not a bad bad heresy", and it's acceptable for individuals to hold that heresy, as long as they "aren't dogmatic about it" and don't try to spread it, for example.
Etc.