Mah Two Sents, After All Ahm Just a Dum Babtist

I may as well weigh on the famous questions.

“1. Why do modern conservative Reformed Christians seem to have historical amnesia when it comes to events that transpired in church history from the death of John on the Isle of Patmos, late in the first century, until the completion of the Canon several centuries later?”

That's funny, because Tom Nettles teaches historical theology at SBTS as I recall. I'm teaching church history myself at my church in NC starting in the fall, and as I recall PRBC where James White is an elder is either presently doing or has already completed a very, very lengthy church history course for their congregation. By the way, my undergraduate degree is in modern European history, which begins ca. 1000 AD but which is predicated on a working knowledge of church history, given the fact that the early creeds themselves deeply affected the way people thought in that age. For example,working out that human nature included a rational soul in Chalcedon deeply affected European (and thus American) values on human life until very recently. As the Trinity and Christology go, so goes the church, and so goes society.

Don't forget that a great many of us are also in churches where we are often among the most educated while the flock is not, so we sometimes peg our references to where they are in their understanding, because they read the blogs. I can only speak for myself here, but I come from a part of NC where Jerry Falwell revivalism has a stranglehold on everybody. Perhaps some others are not discussing church history because their people aren't there yet themselves.

“2. Why do modern conservative Reformed Christians virtually ignore the Church Fathers as well as the catholic creeds of the Christian church?”

As I recall, our brother Jason here, as well as Brother Eric Svendsen are very, very conversant with the Early Fathers, and, this may surprise you, because I tend to hover in Baptist issues, but know my way around the ECF as well. See also the standards, LCBF and WCF. May I ask why the ECF should be considered above a modern commentary?

“3. Why do modern conservative Reformed Christians ignore the fact that John Calvin was especially influenced by the Church Fathers? For that matter why do these same conservative Reformed Christians virtually ignore other Reformed writers who relied very heavily upon the classical catholic tradition such as Thomas Cranmer, Hugh Latimer and Nicholas Ridley?”

Hmm, as I recall King and Webster deal with this in Holy Scripture: The Ground and Pillar of Our Faith. One fails to see why a person in the modern period should rely on Anglo-Catholics centuries old.

“4. Why do conservative Reformed Christians treat only certain confessional traditions, such as the Westminster Confession or its cousin the London Baptist Confession, as if only these confessions and catechisms were the proper confessional grounds for the Reformed faith and thus for contemporary understanding of the Bible and classical Christian thought, if they even care about classical thought? These important creedal standards of the 17th century are not the only standards for orthodoxy, for all time and all cultures, and few have ever treated them in this manner. Therefore, why do ordinary Christians hardly ever hear this from the many of the conservative Reformed spokesmen? (There are few if any conservative Reformed spokeswomen, which is another question for another time.)”

Perhaps you need to pay better attention. Speaking for myself, I'm in an LCBF 1 not an LCBF 2 church. Also, the WCF is the standard for evangelical Presbyterians, but their seminaires have staked out some official positions and, on top of this, some denominations have staked out positions on certain articles. How many Sabbatarians are really in the PCA? I'd add the Savoy Declaration as well, as some of us recognize this too. We refer to these a great deal, because they are the best written and well developed. I'd happily peg a reply to the Belgic Confession, and I have written on the New Hampshire Confession and the Philadelphia/Charleston Confession in the past as well. Some of us also use the Abstract of Principles. In short, perhaps you should read what we say a bit more closely. I have, in point of fact, posited the writing of a new Baptist confession for the SBC itself if not RB's as a whole in recent history on this very blog which would be drawn in part on the LCBF.

“5. Why do conservative Reformed Christians demand a kind of purity from other modern Reformed writers that allows so many of them to never actually engage the culture and do the hard work of the Kingdom in the 21st century? Why do they attack all expressions of emerging culture and church life when in fact their tradition emerged in a specific time in history too?””

Like who? Like what? Please reformulate your question. The short answer may have something to do with the perception of the EC that has to do with blurring the clear presentation of the gospel, sowing uncertainty and not certainty in the hearts of the sheep, and a type of pragmatic appeal that has more in common with IFBx / SBC revivalism in some cases. Granted, the EC isn't using confetti baptistries, but why does the gospel have to be repackaged for the culture for it to have an appeal?

“6. Why do conservative Reformed Christians identify so strongly, and often so stridently, with other non-Reformed Christians in certain area of gospel controversy, especially in advocating very narrow definitions of the gospel in an attempt to impress lay people and inadequately taught pastors that they alone are standing for the truth in this dark day? This has been done over the last ten years with the issuance of various joint statements and widely promoted conferences, as if these faithful spokesmen alone have the courage to defend the gospel and the correct understanding of what actually constitutes the gospel.”

Straight is the gate and narrow is the way to life, broad is the path to destruction. If you want this answered pointedly, then ask the question pointedly. What, by your measure, is "narrow?"

“7. Why do conservative Reformed Christians generally treat Roman Catholics (and Orthodox Christians if they bother to respond to them at all) as non-Christians, especially in their public pronouncements?”

To be a Christian is not to affirm the Trinity and some facts about Jesus and get your infusion of grace from a water ceremony and a wafer. Rather it is to cling to Christ alone through faith alone, not the merit of Christ, your merit, and the congruent merit of the saints. What is unclear about this? Maybe this will do it for you: to loosely quote Miss Lottie Moon's mother, "Any movement that substitutes the counting of beads for saying prayers has no claim to be a genuine quest for God." I have no problem saying this in light of Scripture.

That said, individual Catholics are not of the same stripe. We fully realize that there are those that reject many of Rome's dogmas, and we generally put Catholics on a sliding scale in this regard. Speaking for myself and a few folks at Pyromaniacs with whom I have interacted in the past, we are much more willing to give the average run of the mill Catholic church member a pass on this than a priest, bishop, etc., but they need to come out and be separate from their communion.

“Do these same Reformed Christians, at least on the Presbyterian side of the aisle, ever admit that their own traditions have always accepted Catholic/Orthodox baptism as valid Christian baptism?”

Can't answer, as I 'm not a Presbyterian. Speaking from my experience with the PCA presbytery where I live, this is a false assertion on its face.

“I also wonder if these conservatives, who stand should-to-shoulder with other non-Reformed fundamentalists in a type of reductionism that results from their narrow gospel definitions (as noted as in question six above),

except you didn't actually note anything at all.

really ever make these facts plain to their non-Reformed (Baptist and dispensational) allies, who I suppose would be aghast if they understood this?”

Because some of them come from traditions, viz the SBC which are quite willing to work within the framework of a broad evangelical tradition. As a matter of fact, the Founders Movement, to take just one example, is very plain with others.

“8. Why do conservative Reformed Christians rail so harshly, and react so emotionally, against liturgy in worship (a huge list could be constructed to make this point) on the one hand, while on the other they hate pop-cultural, happy-clappy, contemporary evangelical worship services with a passion?”

Because we affirm the regulative principle of worship.

“Do they realize that what they have created, in many cases, is a modern lecture hall with hymns and a collection? Do they realize that this is much more like a Plymouth Brethren gathering than a truly Reformed service, with all its variations and rich use of older liturgical tradition?”

Notice he asks questions about the TR while defining for us what TR is, so we don't measure up to his standard. To what standard is this referring?

“9. Why do conservative Reformed Christians often promote a high ecclesiology (in theory) while in practice they act much more like Southern Baptists who add presbyteries and general assemblies on to a modern form of culture religion? In practice these sorts of Reformed groups govern themselves, and do theology, less and less like historically Reformed bodies. Think populism and democractic idealism, not historic Reformed confessionalism, and you get my point.”

Wow, there's a lot here. First, the SBC is composed of independent, fully autonomous local churches. A church can be a member of an association, state convention, or the SBC, but it can also be a member of one or more but not the others. In short, you can be in the NCBSC but not the SBC and vice versa. You could, in theory, be in the Pilot Mtn. Baptist Association, but not in the NCBSC or SBC. In Convention, the messengers and only the messengers compose the Convention. The messengers are not elders in the local church, though some are. Most are laypersons. When the SBC chooses to dictate policy to a local church, you get friction. At present the IMB policy is a clear example. The SBC itself has a confessional tradition. If you would familarize yourself with the reaction to the BFM 2000 you might get a feeling for exactly what that is and how it works.

A high church ecclesiology would be Landmarkism in a Baptist context, not a plurality of elders (either elder rule or congregational rule). Most plurality churches are congregational rule, not elder rule among Baptist churches. Elder rule churches do, in point of fact, do theology very like the old confessional tradtion. However, we recognize, as Steve noted, that there is also a need to keep away from clerical elitism and we live in an age where people can get a theological education literally at home online if necessary. That's why the congregation can veto an elder rule action in many ways. It's called checks and balances. You also find us focusing a great deal on a educated congregation, so that we can actually talk about theological issues in an informed manner.

“10. Why do conservative Reformed Christians promote certain aspects of Puritanism, often without really understanding Puritanism in the way a real scholar like J. I. Packer does, while at the same time they despise the real Puritan approach to the Holy Spirit and to a practical experiential religion centered in the heart?”

Like?

“And why do these same people hate almost every type of ascetical or mystical theology while whole segments of the Reformed movement have loved these parts of the Christian tradition deeply?This is precisely why some conservative Reformed spokesmen despise Jonathan Edwards, which I discovered first-hand, to my profound surprise, about ten years ago.)””

Like? Speaking for myself, I quite enjoy Edwards. I'm also the church librarian, and I have some Edwards books in my collection, which I purchased specifically for our people. Coming from the Founders movement myself, I'm happy to lean on Edwards a great deal, through Boyce, Dagg, Mell, Winkler, Manly Sr. and Jr., etc. You're going to have to give some concrete particulars to get better answers. Let's not forget too that the entire Princetonian tradition comes from Edwards, so, in a Presybeterian context, you'd have to be asserting that they have disconnected from Edwards. The onus is on you to elucidate this in your question if not in any assertion you make.

“Separatism and fundamentalism are both alive and well among many conservative Reformed Christians in our day.

You spoke earlier of church history. I assume you are familar with Tertullian's apologetic vs. the method of say the Alexandrians. You are familar with the tensions between Antioch and Alexandria over the use of Plato or Aristotle and the proper exegetical method of Scriptuer (literal v. allegorical) for centuries. This is a tension that has been with us from the beginning.

To creed or not to creed: that's the question

John Armstrong has two basic problems with the TR. On the one hand:

I. THE TRULY REFORMED ARE WAY TOO TRADITIONAL

“Why do conservative Reformed Christians treat only certain confessional traditions, such as the Westminster Confession or its cousin the London Baptist Confession, as if only these confessions and catechisms were the proper confessional grounds for the Reformed faith and thus for contemporary understanding of the Bible and classical Christian thought, if they even care about classical thought? These important creedal standards of the 17th century are not the only standards for orthodoxy, for all time and all cultures, and few have ever treated them in this manner. Therefore, why do ordinary Christians hardly ever hear this from the many of the conservative Reformed spokesmen? (There are few if any conservative Reformed spokeswomen, which is another question for another time.)”

“Isn’t it time to address these questions honestly so that a new generation can hear the real beauty of how Reformed theology can actually make a solid contribution to restoring classical Christian faith and holy tradition to a culture-bound church that is knee deep in compromise and confusion? I see a growing number of younger Christians who find this whole "Reformed" view completely irrelevant the more they read widely and encounter real people in real churches. One can pray that their tribe will increase as people realize that we must live in the 21st century, not the 17th.”

Yep, that’s our problem, all right. The TR are mired in the muddy hardpan of our fossilized 17C creeds.

Our partisan attachment to the sclerotic formalism of Reformed tradition has rendered us irrelevant to the younger generation.

On the other hand:

II. THE TRULY REFORMED ARE WAY TOO ICONOCLASTIC

“Why do modern conservative Reformed Christians seem to have historical amnesia when it comes to events that transpired in church history from the death of John on the Isle of Patmos, late in the first century, until the completion of the Canon several centuries later?”

“Why do modern conservative Reformed Christians virtually ignore the Church Fathers as well as the catholic creeds of the Christian church?”

“Why do modern conservative Reformed Christians ignore the fact that John Calvin was especially influenced by the Church Fathers?”

“Do they realize that what they have created, in many cases, is a modern lecture hall with hymns and a collection? Do they realize that this is much more like a Plymouth Brethren gathering than a truly Reformed service, with all its variations and rich use of older liturgical tradition?”

Yep, that’s our problem, all right. The TR are far to footloose. Slaves to every passing fad. Trendier than thou. Disrespectful of our elders and betters.

Instead of making common cause with the fundies—the Nephilimic spawn of Anabaptism—we should get back to the family business of burning or drowning pretribers and Hutterites—what with them their soul-killing heresy of believer’s baptism and other deviltry.

True confessions

I’ll take this occasion to revisit a few of John Armstrong’s questions.

http://johnharmstrong.typepad.com/john_h_armstrong_/2006/06/questions_i_pon.html


“1. Why do modern conservative Reformed Christians seem to have historical amnesia when it comes to events that transpired in church history from the death of John on the Isle of Patmos, late in the first century, until the completion of the Canon several centuries later?”

Is this what Armstrong means by an honest question?

Isn’t this simply a putdown disguised as a question?

The question is obviously too vague to be answerable. What events does Armstrong think the TR have forgotten?

If he were posing an honest question, he’d be more specific.

If he were honestly soliciting an answer, he wouldn’t go out of his way to cast the question in such an invidious vein.

“2. Why do modern conservative Reformed Christians virtually ignore the Church Fathers as well as the catholic creeds of the Christian church?”

Several answers:

i) Life is short. The Bible is our rule of faith. A good modern commentary is ordinarily a better source of information for interpreting the Bible than one of the church fathers.

There’s hardly enough time to keep up with the exegetical literature, much less the primary and secondarily literature in patristics.

ii) Why single out Reformed believers?

Is the average Calvinist more neglectful of the church fathers than many other Evangelical traditions?

iii) For that matter, is the average lay Catholic or lay Orthodox well-versed in the church fathers?

Is Michael Dukakis or George Stephanopoulos well-read in the church fathers?

Is Teddy Kennedy or John Kerry deeply-versed in the church fathers?

Why single out the Reformed on this score?

For that matter, are members of the emergent church movement immersed in patrology?

iv) Many of the church fathers were men of no great intellectual distinction. Their historical position lends them a degree of attention out of proportion to their intrinsic merit.

If they were born in the 14C rather than the 4C, many would be forgotten.

“4. Why do conservative Reformed Christians treat only certain confessional traditions, such as the Westminster Confession or its cousin the London Baptist Confession, as if only these confessions and catechisms were the proper confessional grounds for the Reformed faith and thus for contemporary understanding of the Bible and classical Christian thought, if they even care about classical thought? These important creedal standards of the 17th century are not the only standards for orthodoxy, for all time and all cultures, and few have ever treated them in this manner. Therefore, why do ordinary Christians hardly ever hear this from the many of the conservative Reformed spokesmen? (There are few if any conservative Reformed spokeswomen, which is another question for another time.)”

i) Are the Reformed any more proprietary about their own creeds than Lutherans are about Lutheran creeds, or the Orthodox are about Orthodox creeds?

ii) Why does Armstrong care? Does he think we need a new Reformed confession? Does he regard the historic Reformed confessions as deficient or defective?

Does he think we need to add something to the WCF, or subtract something from the WCF?

If he wants to have an honest discussion, why does he play his cards so close to his vest instead of laying them on the table, face up?

iii) As a practical matter, Reformed denominations and seminaries do have an informal way of amending their creeds. They do stake out official positions on a number of contemporary issues.

“(This is precisely why some conservative Reformed spokesmen despise Jonathan Edwards, which I discovered first-hand, to my profound surprise, about ten years ago.)”

Let's remember that Princeton was founded as a New Light institution, not an Old Light institution.

The Abominable Snow Job

After biding his time, Bethrick has replied to Manata and Engwer.

http://bahnsenburner.blogspot.com/2006/06/manata-overboard-adrift-and-without.html

He also quotes me in a couple of places. Although most of his fire is directed at my colleagues, I’ll horn in on this debate as well.

I’ll confined my comments to what I think are Dawson’s major arguments:

“I have pointed out before that presuppositionalism's own hallmark slogan to the effect that Christianity is true "because of the impossibility of the contrary" is incongruous with the worldview such contrivances are intended to defend; for, in a worldview which affirms that "all things are possible," it makes no sense to turn right around and start enumerating things that are impossible.”

This is sophistical and simple-minded. There are different types of possibility, impossibility, and necessity.

God is omnipotent. But omnipotence is not his only attribute. It was possible for God to refrain from making a covenant with Abraham, but having freely entered into such a covenant, it is impossible for God to go back on his word.

There is a difference between what’s morally possible and what’s metaphysically possible. God is omnipotent, but God is also wise, just, and truthful.

The Bible itself says that there are things which God cannot do (e.g. Num 23:19; 1 Sam 15:29; 2 Tim 2:13; Heb 6:18; Jas 1:13,17).

That is no infringement on divine omnipotence.

i) To begin with, God is self-identical. God cannot be less than God. God’s self-identity is a presupposition of his omnipotence and every other attribute.

If God could violate his nature, then he would be no God. In that event there would be no property-bearer in which the attribute of omnipotence inheres.

God could not be omnipotent unless he were immutable. For if he were mutable, then his omnipotence would be a mutable attribute.

ii) It is a category mistake to suppose that what is morally possible imposes a limit on what is metaphysically possible.

At a metaphysical level, God can instantiate any logically compossible state of affairs.

To say that God cannot lie, sin, change, or deny himself is not a boundary condition on divine omnipotence, for God was never the object of his own omnipotence. By definition, omnipotence is concerned with effecting a change, with making things happen. It takes the creature, and not the Creator, as its object.

To tell a lie, to go back on one’s word, is not the same type of action as performing a miracle or making the world ex nihilo.

It is not an object of omnipotence. It belongs to a different domain.

Dawson is generating an artificial dilemma. We are not the ones who rip Mt 19:26 out of context, then turn right around and start enumerating things that are impossible.

Dawson is imputing to us an initial position which we do not affirm, then accuses us of inconsistency when we modify a position we never held in the first place. He generates a false antithesis by foisting upon us a premise that we reject, then deriving a contradictory conclusion.

Dawson is simply talking to himself when he indulges in such a rhetorical ploy.

“ Similar tension arises when one wants to affirm, on the one hand that the nature of the universe is such that ‘all things are possible,’ while insisting on the other that things can only be a certain way, which just so happens to be in agreement with other affirmations dear to the confession. From here the dilemmas only succeed in multiplying themselves.”

No, not the nature of the universe, but the nature of God.

Things could have been otherwise had God willed things to be otherwise. But having willed one possibility, that excludes an opposing possibility. Not all possibilities are compossible.

“Now Paul [Manata] asks if the verse in question can ‘really mean that anything can happen, that anything is possible.’ Christianity answers this question in its characteristic yes-and-no fashion, offering no stable guide to discerning when a guarantee on either yes or no can be had. The Christian wants things both ways: he wants to say, on the one hand, that his god is all-powerful, possessing unlimited sovereignty, completely and unexceptionally in control of its creations; and yet, on the other hand, he wants to say that there are constraints in place which cannot be altered, constraints which even his god must observe (even though those constraints owe their very existence to this god).”

This is a repeat of Dawson’s straw man argument. We do not stake out the initial position that God is free to do anything whatsoever, only to immediately qualify our prior affirmation.

Dawson is imposing on us a position which is not our own position, then inferring a contradiction. He imputes to us an unqualified position, then imputes to us a qualified position, as if we began with an unqualified position, then sought to moderate the absolute force of our original position.

But this multi-stage presentation is a polemical caricature of what we believe.

And this is a tacit admission that Dawson is impotent to find a flaw in our actual position. Since he must misrepresent our position in order to refute it, our real position is irrefutable.

“Instead, we'll likely see the apologists striking out against their critics. For instance, Christians may counter saying, "But this is the Christian God! It wouldn't make sense for Him to misrepresent Himself by causing mass hallucinations to those whom He has chosen to document and deliver His message of salvation!" This kind of retort of course overlooks the fact that these are the believer's assumptions, not mine.”

Is Dawson really that dense? He is attempting to generate a dilemma. That is in the nature of an internal critique. He is trying to show that Christian theism suffers from internal tensions.

In mounting an internal critique, it is necessary for the disputant to grant the assumptions of the opposing position for the sake of argument.

Having been answered on his own ground, Bethrick now abandons his original argument.

“If one grants validity to the notion that there is a supernatural consciousness which can coordinate human history according to its will or "plan," whose power is invincible and whose efficacy in causing desired outcomes cannot be impeded by any extraneous factor, then one erases any rational distinction between the arbitrary and the objective, the absurd and the reasonable. In effect, one admits the all-encompassing element of complete randomness (for there is nothing more difficult to judge than another mind), having no idea of what to expect to be the case from moment to moment, unless of course, at the height of his pretense, the believer in such things carelessly blurs the distinction between his mind and the mind he imaginatively attributes to the supernatural fantasy he enshrines.”

This is a completely illogical chain of reasoning:

i) As long as the supernatural consciousness is a rational agent, then the distinction between arbitrary and object, absurd and reasonable remains in force.

ii) And insofar as this supernatural consciousness has revealed his plan, then we do have a stable guide for discerning what is possible or impossible.

“Thus we continue to see how the Christian worldview works against itself: in the words of Steve Hays himself, the apologist ‘can only make his claim by burning his drawing card.’"

Those are not my words. My words did not take the Christian apologist as their object. My words took John Loftus as their object. Bethrick has reassigned my words.

In context, it was John Loftus, the secular polemicist, who had to burn his drawing card by riding on the coattails of Bill Craig while at the same time denying that an educated, scientifically literate man could believe in miracles.

“But on Christianity’s own premises, the claim in Mt. 19:26 that "all things are possible" is a divinely revealed truth which settles the question here quite explicitly. Unless Christians suppose that their god goes back on its word, then it seems that anyone confessing himself to be a Christian should accept Mt. 19:26 as a solemn and unalterable truth, and consequently have the courage to follow it to its logical conclusion, regardless of the undesirable implications it may have for other teachings (such as those biblical teachings which are in direct conflict with it).”

Once again, one wonders if Bethrick is playing dumb, or really dumb.

i) To begin with, there’s such a thing as original intent. Of what did Jesus mean it to be true?

For example, Jesus did not believe that Yahweh was a covenant-breaker. Indeed, Jesus believed in the necessity of prophetic fulfillment. He must go to the cross in fulfillment of the OT scriptures.

A phrase like Mt 19:26 was never meant to be true when it is isolated from the narrative assumptions of Matthew.

ii) If Mt 19:26 were in direct conflict with other biblical teachings, then it would not be divinely revealed truth. Bethrick is removing the preconditions under which it could be true.

All he’s done is to artificially predicate a contradictory state of affairs by simultaneously affirming and negating a necessary truth-condition for the argument to work in the first place. If you shoot out the tires, the plane will never get off the runway.

Needless to say, a Christian is not committed to Mt 19:26 on condition that Mt 19:26 is or may be in direct conflict with other teachings of Scripture.

“Because it grants metaphysical primacy to an imaginary ruling consciousness, supernaturalism (of which Christianity is only one variant-type) relinquishes its ability to provide any objective analysis of real-world proposals because of the subjective orientation inherent in its affirmation of a ruling consciousness controlling the universe of objects. Since, in such a view, all the objects in the universe owe their very existence and distinctions to the creative wishing of the ruling consciousness, the ruling subject serves as its own standard as well as the standard of everything it creates (which is said to be everything distinct from itself). In this way, the Christian effectually reduces what he might call 'objectivity' to pure self-reference by denying reference to any objects distinct from itself which exist independent of its intentions and resist conforming to its wishing. It is this paradigm of ultimate subjectivism which affirmations purported to have objective backing (such as assessments as to what is 'likely' and 'unlikely') are hired on to defend. It simply does not work.”

I’d love to respond to Bethrick—if only I knew what he meant. But trying to fix the meaning is so subjective, you know. As someone recently said, “there is nothing more difficult to judge than another mind.”

I cannot appeal to Dawson’s authorial intent, for, as reader-response theory has taught us, that would commit the intentional fallacy.

So Dawson’s objection means whatever the reader, and not the author, assigns to it. And the meaning I assign to his words is that he is offering the reader a recipe for walnut fudge brownies.

“According to Genesis, we have dust becoming a human being, and yet dust is non-moral while human beings are moral. Thus we have, according to Genesis, the non-moral becoming moral. The same with the non-rational becoming rational, since dust is also non-rational.”

What we actually have in the Biblical anthropology is a rational Creator who makes a rational soul and assigns it to a particular body. So we go from a rational cause (divine agency) to a rational effect (embodied souls).

No, you’re not going to get all of this from Gen 1-2, because there is more to the Biblical anthropology than Gen 1-2.

“What’s more is that their protestations against the hallucination theory clearly take for granted key assumptions which are disputed in the critical literature, and thus they beg the question to begin with. Not only do they assume that the New Testament documents outline uniform accounts and teachings, they also assume that the accounts are historically reliable.”

Another blunder. When a Christian apologist argues against the hallucination theory, it is the assumptions of the hallucination theorist which are at issue. It is the hallucination theorist who regards the post-Resurrection narratives as sufficiently reliable than he must posit an alternative explanation for the same recorded events.

“But if, for instance, the stories of Paul’s conversion in Acts are not historically reliable, then there’s no need to suppose that Paul was hallucinating. Time and again, such basic points seem to have escaped the wit and wisdom of Triablogue’s apologetic superstars, who are apparently so eager to rush into battle against their threatening nemeses that they don’t realize they’ve fallen over a cliff.”

To the contrary, we argue with each opponent on his own grounds—although we also reserve the right to challenge his operating assumptions.

“This statement also overlooks the facts that supernaturalism as a category is broader than just Christianity (for there are numerous versions of supernaturalism, Christianity merely numbering among them), and that supernaturalism is yet compatible with the view that the early Christians were deceived by hallucinations caused by a ruling consciousness which Christians themselves have misidentified. Christian apologists discount such proposals, even though they are equally implicit in supernaturalism as anything their theology teaches, typically by special pleading their position as they arbitrarily grant their assumptions primacy over alternatives which compete with theirs.”

i) Since this is no part of Dawson’s original argument, we did not overlook this “fact,” for this “fact” was nowhere in sight. There was nothing to look at, so there was nothing to overlook.

Dawson is now attempting to do a patch-up job on his original argument. That’s his prerogative, but if anyone was guilty of an oversight, it was Dawson, as he tries to backdate his exercise in damage control

ii) There is no onus on the Christian to disprove an “alternative” which neither the Christian nor his opponent takes seriously.

Bethrick doesn’t believe in supernaturalism, period. He doesn’t believe in some alternative supernatural explanation.

Hence, there is no burden of disproof on the Christian to rule out a hypothetical which his own opponent equally denies.

“All these wares that Paul [Manata] uses on a daily basis are ultimately a product of "naturalism," if by "naturalism" we mean that basic orientation of mind to the world which takes nature as its own authority on itself, as opposed to an orientation which takes seriously the imagination of a supernatural consciousness which is accessible by means of prayer, which controls nature at will and accomplishes its tasks by wishing. The achievements that are made not only possible but very real by naturalism, are unmatched by anything the religious mindset has ever produced.”

These examples are perfectly consonant with a doctrine of ordinary providence. In no way do they prove or even evidence the truth of naturalism. Dawson isn’t bothering to engage the argument.

“But it is interesting how theistic apologetics has no choice when the going gets rough but to resort to ultra-skepticism, which is another bait-and-switch tactic inspired by the deep confusion that Christianity introduces into one's epistemology. Questions such as ‘why trust our senses?’ can be dismissed as invalid on the basis of the fact that they commit the fallacy of the stolen concept. For how does one get to higher abstractions such as ‘trust’ if his senses did not already give him awareness of any objects in the first place?”

It is only a “stolen concept” if we assume an empiricist theory of abstraction. Obviously a rationalist would disagree.

“For Paul's question to be intelligible, the concepts he employs in forming that question would have to have objective content (otherwise he’s engaging in a purely subjective dialogue whose only point of reference is the shifting chaos of a mind that has no access to an objective reality).”

Dawson has done nothing to show how the mind can enjoy access to objective reality. To say that the alternative is pure subjectivity does nothing to disprove that alternative, but merely to draw attention to its consequences were it true.

“Thus if we doubt or dispute the validity of our senses, this can throw the question Paul asks into dire jeopardy long before we even get to it.”

Once again, this doesn’t show that we are not in dire jeopardy: merely the result if we were jeopardized by this consequence.

“Moreover, for me to acquire awareness of Paul’s question, I need to use my senses.”

i) Dawson is running into equivocations. To say that I must reply on my senses to answer Manata’s question doesn’t mean that my senses are reliable.

I may be subjectively dependent on my senses even though my senses are objectively unreliable. The word (“senses”) is defined in light of my sensory impressions, but that would still hold true in case my impressions were misimpressions.

When a man on acid jumps from the ledge of a skyscraper, he relies on his senses all the way down—including the sensation of pain when gravity catches up with him.

This doesn’t alter the fact that he was in a state of sensory impairment and fatally misperceived his environment.

ii) It is also incoherent of Bethrick to reject self-reference in connection with God (“the ruling subject serves as its own standard as well as the standard of everything it creates (which is said to be everything distinct from itself). In this way, the Christian effectually reduces what he might call 'objectivity' to pure self-reference by denying reference to any objects distinct from itself which exist independent of its intentions and resist conforming to its wishing”) only to reintroduce self-reference through the back door in defining self-referential statements regarding the senses.

“To ask 'why trust your senses?' is essentially no different from asking 'why think you are conscious?'"

To the contrary, there’s an essential distinction between the immediate, self-presenting states of consciousness and a mental representation of the external world which is mediated by our sensory processing system.

“ Such a question ignores the fact that thinking is an activity of consciousness. One would need to be conscious in order to consider the question in the first place. To ask ‘why trust your senses’ and similarly fallacious questions, suggests that the one asking it believes that consciousness needs to be validated somehow. But this would pose an insuperable problem for Paul, for he cannot validate his consciousness without assuming what he needs to validate it, thus the validity of Paul's consciousness, on his own assumptions, stands on circular argument whose premises ultimately rest in subjective paradoxes. Such is the outcome when taking stolen concepts to their conclusion.”

The analogy falls apart at the fundamental point of comparison. Where consciousness is concerned, there is no gap between appearance and reality—unlike sensory perception. Consciousness is self-validating in a way that sensation is not.

“But consider: If your arm were severed, would you ‘distrust’ your experience of pain? Would you have to prove that your experience of pain is real to those who believe in invisible magic beings in order for that experience to be real? Would you suppose it is legitimate to ask whether or not you're actually experiencing pleasure instead of pain as a result of the wound?”

The location of pain is a serious philosophical issue. What about phantom limbs?

“Yes, the validity of the senses is axiomatic in that the senses do not produce contradictions, are not conceptually reducible, are not established by means of proof, are not inferred from prior truths, are implicit throughout all perception and therefore in any knowledge statement (since knowledge is knowledge of reality, and this can be acquired only by specific means). Moreover, the validity of the senses must be assumed, even if only implicitly, in the very act of denying them. Remember that consciousness is an axiom. Since man’s initial means of awareness is perceptual in nature (where perception is the automatic integration of sensory material), the validity of the senses is indeed axiomatic.”

i) To say that “man’s initial means of awareness is perceptual in nature” simply assumes the truth of empiricism.

ii) The phenomena to which Dawson appeals is equally consistent with direct realism, indirect realism, phenomenalism, and idealism.

iii) Raw sensation isn’t true or false. It is merely a source of information. In this respect, the senses never deceive us.

That, however, does nothing to delineate the relation between appearance and reality.

iv) Manata, Engwer, and I do not deny the possibility of sense knowledge.

We are happy to concede that our God-given senses are often successful in transmitting accurate information about the external world.

The question, rather, is one of reasoning back from the successful outcome to the metaphysical conditions which make successful perception and communication possible at all.

And one related question is whether evolutionary epistemology conduces to skepticism.

Dawson's Doltish Diatribe

Remember that movie "Airplane?" Remember that scene when the guy is getting his ear talked off and so tries to kill himself? Well, that was what I was like earlier tonight when I read Dawson's doltish diatribe.

As Engwer points out below, there are FAR too many errors in Bethrick's phlegmatic post that to address all of them would involve one in posting a tome; and his post his not worth the effort. Indeed, I actually dreaded responding. I don't know about you, but it is actually harder to critique and correct doltish dullards than it is to deal with someone who has a grasp on the issues of what he's talking about. I really don't feel up to this, and it's actually an offense to my time to have to respond to Bethrick. I'm responding, though, because good reasoning must exist if for no other reason than to expose bad reasoning. I will try to make my responses as short and to the point as possible.

DB = Dawson Bethrick (or, dumb bell)

PM = Paul Manata


*********


DB: This time, Paul tried to take me to task for my quotation of Matthew 19:26

PM: Not "tried," did.

DB: I pointed to this verse to remind Christian believers (so forgetful they often are) of their own 'worldview presuppositions' which commit them, like it or not, to a chaotic and unpredictable reality (or surreality) in which "all things are possible," since an omnipotent spirit is personally directing its every whip and wiggle. I have pointed out before that presuppositionalism's own hallmark slogan to the effect that Christianity is true "because of the impossibility of the contrary" is incongruous with the worldview such contrivances are intended to defend; for, in a worldview which affirms that "all things are possible," it makes no sense to turn right around and start enumerating things that are impossible.

PM: Note well, DB's entire argument here is based off his understanding of the phrase "all things are possible." His understanding will be refuted below. This is a foundational premise of his. Refuting it, refutes the other premises which are inferred from his warped, self-serving understanding.

Here's my argument:

If the all in "all things are possible" is not to be understood as a quantitative universal, then DB's inferences that anything is possible, since all is a quantitative universal, is false.

I obviously affirm the antecedent.

DB's position is that if we take the view that all things are possible, given that all is a quantitative universal, then we cannot say that anything is impossible, even God's existence, Jesus' resurrection, etc.

DB: This has apparently gotten on Paul Manata's nerves,

PM: Yes, stupid half-witted arguments get on my nerves. Apparently they don't for DB.

DB: for he has sought to undermine my understanding of this clause by suggesting that I have stretched it beyond its intended context.

PM: No, I did undermine it.

DB: For instance, he tells us that the claim that "all things can happen" applies in a very narrow scope:

1) Dawson's verse he uses to show that "anything can happen, willy-nilly" in a Christian theistic universe, is specifically talking about salvation.

PM: Now watch how DB tries to show that it cannot be talking about salvation.

DB: Coming after such a question, the statement "with God all things are possible" may seem at first blush to have relevance to salvation to a novice. But seasoned Christians should surely know better,

PM: Dawson admits Jesus says that this question is in regards to salvation, but he wants to say that this isn't what it means. But Dawson argues that when Jesus said all things are possible, we should take him at his word. Dawson can't pick and choose. So, we're agreed that the Bible (Jesus) says that "all things are possible" is referring, in this context, to salvation. DB tries to critique this, we'll address that below, though. The point here is to point out that I am correct that this phrase speaks to salvation, in this context, and, therefore, cannot be eisogetically used to talk about other things that might be possible (i.e., God causing hallucinations). So, we can agree that this verse does not mean, in context, what Dawson needs it to mean. He then goes on to show how that in salvation it is not true that "all things are possible."

I quote at length:

DB: For though the topic of the dialogue between Jesus and his disciples in Matt. 19 relates to salvation, Jesus is made to say "with God all things are possible" (v. 26) right after declaring that "a rich man shall hardly enter into the kingdom of heaven" (v. 23). Evangelists typically emphasize Christianity’s view of salvation, which is marked by its exclusiveness, and contrast it from the eastern adage that "there are many paths to the summit of a mountain." Christianity hardly promotes a soteriology in which the possibilities are endless. On the contrary, "strait is the gate" to the magic kingdom (cf. Mt. 7:13-14), and many denominations stress the teaching that there is no allowance for even minor deviation from the plan. James 2:10 tells us that "whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all." The gospel of John has its Jesus exclaim that "I am the way, the truth, and the life: no man cometh unto the Father, but by me" (14:6).

Because of its intolerance to alternatives in regard to salvation, the claim that "all things are possible" in this regard is highly misleading. For instance, Christians are not supposed to entertain the possibility that the god they worship is anything other than the god of the New Testament. Thus on their teaching it is not possible that the god with whom "all things are possible" is a god that also says "there are many paths to the top of the summit" with regard to salvation. Would Christians say that one can be saved by praying to a non-Christian god? No, it's not likely that Christians would admit this. And yet here is a possibility proposed in relation to salvation, and already the statement "all things are possible" patently does not apply. Would Christians say that it is possible for a sinner to be saved without repentance? No, I doubt many Christians would admit this. Would Christians say that it is possible for a sinner to be saved without faith? No, I doubt they would admit to this, either. Would Christians say that it is possible for a sinner to be saved on his own volitional instigation? Calvinists likely would not admit to this. Would Christians say that it is possible for a sinner to be saved without the intervention of the Holy Spirit? Many Christians would likely dismiss this as well. Perhaps the applicability of the claim that "all things are possible" is more specific to who can be saved, owing to the question this is supposed to answer. But even here we find another dry well. For what Christian would say that a sinner who refuses to repent can be saved? What Christian would say that a sinner who refuses to confess Jesus as his Lord and Savior can be saved? What Christian would say that a sinner who refuses to believe there's a god can be saved? It is highly unlikely that any doctrine-driven Christian would admit to such proposals, instead dismissing them as impossible. So, contrary to what Paul intimates, it seems that the statement "all things are possible" in fact does not apply to the issue of salvation at all. Rather, it seems that Paul is simply offering another dodge which misses Christianity's own teaching!


PM: This is utterly laughable! Dawson is truly an ignorant, imbecilic, impassive, lethargic numskull if he seriously believes the above. Above we see that DB takes it that "all things are not possible" in salvation because, say, it is impossible that an unrepentant sinner can be saved. Hence, we have something "impossible" with regards to "salvation." But this is not what I, nor Jesus meant, at all!

Jesus has just pointed out that no man can do enough to be saved. To be saved a man would have to keep the entire law, but no man can do this, it is "impossible." So then it looks as if it is "impossible" to enter heaven, since to enter it you must keep the entire law (this logically infers and refutes much of DB's points. Jesus obviously was not implying that there were many ways to be saved, but only one - keeping the law, being perfectly righteous). Jesus tells them, in effect, not to worry, that man can be saved, because what is impossible with men is possible with God. How can this be done? Jesus keeps the law in the place of the elect. This righteousness is credited to man. Thus with by the judge declaring man righteous, on the basis of Christ's righteousness, man can enter heaven, since in Christ he has kept the law.

This passage is not trying to say that anyone can be saved by any number of possible ways. DB would actually have to engage in some exegesis. He would need to grapple with the text. He needs to show how the text demands his interpretation. I mean, it's as if he thinks he can refute someone with mere conjecture. He thinks he can throw out any ole reading he chooses, whether it finds support in the text and in history. This text argues that salvation if of God's doing alone. Man cannot pull himself up by his bootstraps, for it is impossible for him to do so. The disciples recognized this.

Furthermore, what merit does DB's reading have? Would the Jewish disciples have understood Jesus as implying that he was saying that anyone could enter heaven by any number of ways? No. DB's rendering finds zero support in the broader context of the Bible as a whole. His rendition is simply uncharitable. This kind of interaction with a text would receive an -F in any textual criticism class.

DB: Since it is clear now that the statement "all things are possible" could not apply to salvation,

PM: No, it does apply to salvation. By saying that I did not mean, though, that it applied to saying that any type of salvation was possible. DB's understanding is a logically different proposition than what I had said.

DB: Even though many apologists might prefer the safety of non-commitment, it seems that some apologists are in agreement that the Christian god could cause hallucinations on a large scale basis.

PM: I agree that God could cause mass hallucinations. I never said he couldn't. I simply argued that not all things are possible, and refuted your attempt at proving that they were.

DB: But here Paul is on the verge of reducing "Scripture" to a game of "that’s what it says, but that’s not what it means."

PM: This is such an electuary linguistic blunder, it's actually making me feel sad for DB. DB's confusing sense and referent. I could say, "I have bread in my pocket." By that I might mean that I have money in my pocket. But given DB's ignorance he'd fight, come hell or high water, that I have Rye bread (or something) in my pocket. The meaning is what's important, especially since I hold to propositional revelation. All DB succeeds in doing is making the atheist community look like a bunch of hicks.

DB: We saw above that there are many hypothetical possibilities that can be conceived in regard to the salvation of man's soul, the issue to which Paul contends the meaning of the statement in Matt. 19:26 is constrained, which Christians themselves, on the basis of statements taken from the New Testament, would reject.

PM: No, there's only one possibility given the Bible's teaching on this matter: "Be ye perfect." Since no man is perfect, no man can enter heaven, it is impossible. But, this is not impossible for God.

DB: Now Paul asks if the verse in question can "really mean that anything can happen, that anything is possible." Christianity answers this question in its characteristic yes-and-no fashion,

PM: "Christianity" does? Can we get quotes rather than naked assertions?

DB: The Christian wants things both ways: he wants to say, on the one hand, that his god is all-powerful, possessing unlimited sovereignty, completely and unexceptionally in control of its creations; and yet, on the other hand, he wants to say that there are constraints in place which cannot be altered, constraints which even his god must observe (even though those constraints owe their very existence to this god).

PM: Christianity wants to argue how the Bible does. DB assumes that "all powerful" must mean "can do anything, whatever that is." But this is not the Bible's definition of omnipotent. Indeed, the Bible tells us that there are things God cannot do. God can do, as we teach our children, "All His holy will." That's what it means for God to be omnipotent. Of course DB can choose to set up the Christian doctrine of omnipotence in a way that suits his argument, but in doing so he does what he does best, knocks down straw men. The "constraints" DB speaks of are those constraints of God's character. So, yes, Christianity has always taught that God has constraints, and has never taught that God can do "just anything." Therefore, DB sets up "the Christian" as an imaginary opponent, and then beats his chest like a Neanderthal man after he knocks him down. Furthermore, can we get some quotes of "Christians" who want it both ways? This is an utterly pathetic attempt at atheology. No wonder the larger atheist community distances themselves from Bethrick's Blunders.

DB: I need to provide an argument to the effect that the words "all things are possible" mean "all things are possible"?

PM: Yes, you do. What, did you think that we here a T-blog would allow you to get away without offering an argument for your position? I mean, this is the height of irrationality. The man thinks he doesn't need to offer arguments for his understanding of certain passages.

DB: If we do not allow the words to speak for themselves, what good will it do for me to present an argument, which itself consists of words?

PM: Okay, let's let DB argue against DB. I'm, gonna take a break and let Dawson beat Dawson up. You see, we have hear an example of what I was referring to above. DB does not mean what his "words" do. I mean, I guess he does if he thinks that words have vocal cords and mouths by which they can "speak for themselves." Indeed, are words individual persons that have "selves?" This is utterly embarrassing for poor DB! So, we can conclude that if DB is going to be consistent with his argument he gives above, then we must agree that DB thinks that words are personal agents with bodies. And he thinks we have an irrational worldview!

DB: We saw above that his initial point completely misfires,

PM: No, we didn't.

DB: and even then he does not shed any light on exactly how Mt. 19:26 should be understood.

PM: Yes, I did. I just took it for granted that you wouldn't respond with the dim bulb answer you did. So, I put up, now it's your turn. Engage the text, or shut up.

DB: This is quite odd, especially coming from Paul himself. For elsewhere he has affirmed that a statement that is not qualified automatically defaults to universal scope of meaning, and yet in the present case, when the statement is in fact explicitly qualified universally, it is not to be taken as such.

PM: It is qualified (and I never said what you said I said). You see, unless you beg the question against my worldview, the same God authored the entire Bible, in which we find that some things are impossible, hence it is qualified. This is a basic and elementary blunder, Bethrick.

DB: So, is Paul saying that it is not the case that "all things are possible with God"?

PM: Yes, that should be obvious.

DB: It is limited? To what extent?

PM: To what God has revealed about himself and the nature of reality. Anyway, to disprove your claim I need only point out that God says ONE thing is impossible. God has, therefore your claim is refuted.

DB: The original issue was whether or not the Christian god could cause mass hallucinations.

PM: I grant he could.

DB: Is Paul actually trying to say that the Christian god could not cause mass hallucinations?

PM: No.

DB: What should not be overlooked is the fact that Paul's concern to tone down the scope of Mt. 19:26 by suggesting that its use of the modifier 'all' is unnecessary, can easily be taken as criticism of the bible's own wording.

PM: No it couldn't. Unless you want to defend the thesis that words are persons with mouths?! It would only criticize the Bible's own meaning if "all" always means "all." But since the Bible itself, in many places, uses the word "all" while not meaning "all" then I've not critiqued the meaning of the passage.

DB: For here he's saying that there is a better way for the bible to have stated its message (it just happens that this better way matches Paul's apologetic interpretation).

PM: No I'm not, it stated it just fine. I, and almost every other Christian (and non-Christian, for you'll be hard pressed to find any textual critic who agrees with your understanding here), have no problem understanding the meaning, given the broader context.

DB: Mt. 19:26 says "all things are possible," and yet here Paul is telling us that not "all things are possible."

PM: And you said words "speak for themselves" so I guess you'll be telling us that it is not the case that words do not really "speak for themselves." You see, I didn't even need to show up for this debate, your beating yourself up just fine without me.

DB: Contending against the bible itself, he quotes one line from a college intro text on the philosophy of language to suggest that the "all" in "all things are possible" might not really mean "all" after all, but may instead refer to "particular cases roughly presupposed in context."

PM: Juts pointing out a simple fact that all does not always mean all, and most people, except those with an axe to grind, agree with this premise.

DB: This is exegesis by retreat to the approximate. But as we saw above, if the particular case in this context is the issue of salvation, then exactly what is Matt. 19:26 saying?

PM: You already asked this question above. Your repetition is so boring and makes for poor writing.


I had written,

"c) Is there more to the story? That is, should we assume that this is not to be taken universally because of other basic presuppositions? Well, the Bible tells us that, indeed, not everything is possible. For example, God cannot lie or deny Himself (Titus 1:2; 2 Timothy 2:13). Also, it was "impossible" that death should hold Jesus (Acts 2:24)." DB responded


DB: This just demonstrates that Mt. 19:26 is in conflict with other New Testament teachings.

PM: This is question begging at its finest. It only "contradicts" other passages if the all is meant to be universal. DB would need to provide an argument for his rendition in order to draw the contradiction. But remember folks, DB has the cushy position of not having to argue for his understanding of the passage. Why? Because "words speak for themselves."

I have refuted DB's foundation premise. he writes,

DB: It does not follow from the question "does that verse really mean that anything can happen, that anything is possible?" that my "foundational premise has been refuted." In fact, what does he think my "foundational premise" was, if not Mt. 19:26? Is Paul claiming to have refuted a statement in the bible?

It does not follow from the absurd claim that I need to provide an argument to the effect that the words "all things are possible" mean "all things are possible," that my "foundational premise has been refuted."

It does not follow from the fact that there are verses within the New Testament which conflict with Matthew 19:26, that my "foundational premise has been refuted."


PM: If all does not mean all, quantitatively universally, then your argument for drawing absurd conclusions about what sort of silly things can happen in our worldview has been refuted. It does "follow" given my modus ponens argument at the beginning of this post. Now, if DB wants to deny rules of inference then I guess he can say it doesn't follow all he wants.

DB: If I did that, I never would have become a Christian myself in my early 20s

PM: How were you a Christian when you don't even understand the elementary basics of the Christian worldview, along with elementary reading principles? Heck, you don't even know what the Bible teaches on salvation.

DB: (Of course, I do not find a theory of individual rights in any of my bibles, and the concept of rights only applies in the sphere of chosen actions, and Reformed Christianity teaches that the believer does not have a choice about his beliefs since they are divinely chosen for him.)

PM: Perhaps that's because rebellious creatures have no "rights."

DB: Paul asserts that "God is the determiner of what is possible and impossible." I recall imagining things like this as well when I was a Christian. But on Christianity’s own premises, the claim in Mt. 19:26 that "all things are possible" is a divinely revealed truth which settles the question here quite explicitly.

PM: Since your take on 19:26 has been refuted, and was refuted previously, all reference to this as a premise in your argument is null -n- void.

DB: Paul should have stayed in his dinghy. For since I do not posit any gods to begin with, I cannot be charged with this modal fallacy. For I have not argued a) that there is a god, b) that this god can deceive people, or c) that it did deceive people. Naturally, both b) and c) assume a), so I'm simply being consistent in rejecting them along with a). Also, the fallacy with which I am charged presumes a), b) and c), and since these are not my premises, any fallacy here is not to be charged to my position.

PM: No, but you argued that given our worldview we should hold that because God COULD cause a hallucination this would mean that he possible WOULD have done so here, but since I'm not going to reason fallaciously I won't concede that. You ask the Christian to reason fallaciously, and then he'll find problems with his worldview.

DB: Because it grants metaphysical primacy to an imaginary ruling consciousness, supernaturalism (of which Christianity is only one variant-type) relinquishes its ability to provide any objective analysis of real-world proposals because of the subjective orientation inherent in its affirmation of a ruling consciousness controlling the universe of objects. Since, in such a view, all the objects in the universe owe their very existence and distinctions to the creative wishing of the ruling consciousness, the ruling subject serves as its own standard as well as the standard of everything it creates (which is said to be everything distinct from itself). In this way, the Christian effectually reduces what he might call 'objectivity' to pure self-reference by denying reference to any objects distinct from itself which exist independent of its intentions and resist conforming to its wishing. It is this paradigm of ultimate subjectivism which affirmations purported to have objective backing (such as assessments as to what is 'likely' and 'unlikely') are hired on to defend. It simply does not work.


PM: Bethrick spouts tired Objectivist slogans here.

The Christian position is that an eternally existing and conscious God creates everything distinct from him (including you, me, and the universe). Note that this position entails that: [a] some existence is *not* the result of consciousness (since God does not create himself). Thus, the Christian position is not metaphysical subjectivism, the idea that all existence finds its source in a form of consciousness. [b] our consciousness is a result of existence (God's existence), thus satisfying the central impulse of metaphysical objectivism.

Furthermore, my (and DB's?) consciousness creates thoughts all the time. In writing this entry my consciousness created thoughts that were not there before. Does DB want to conclude that [a] thoughts do not exist, or [b] that his thoughts are subjective and not objective?

This is just sophistic rhetoric intended to make the Christian position look bad. But, DB has no non-arbitrary way to tell us how his finite and fallible mind actually matches up to the world outside him. How does he know the world is the way he thinks it is? On his view, total skepticism rules. Our position is not some capricious God who creates an irrational world. We have a rational God who created a rational world, and made our minds, and made them with the aim of discovering truths about Him and how to serve and glorify Him. And God made our minds to be in contact with the world, learning how to subdue it for His glory. DB can give half the story all he wants. At the end of the day, though, he's forced in to solipsism. He's a zombie and has no rational basis to conclude that he's not a brain in a vat. He thinks he thinks with his own mind, but it might be a alien scientist who is thinking for him, how would he know otherwise? Indeed, how does he know that all that he thinks exist is not just the product of images produced from the aliens mind, and transmitted to DB brain via electrodes. For all his railing against metaphysical subjectivism, he has no epistemic basis to say he's not living in a cartoon universe.

DB: Since my worldview does not posit a supernatural ruling subject, the changes which occur in the world are, according to my worldview, not at all analogous to changes that occur in cartoon, which are directed by the designer of the cartoon.

PM: Positing a worldview, and having it actually be the case, having it marry-up to the real world, is a whole different animal. So, DB's a subjectivist. He thinks his consciousness can "posit" a world and therefore that's how the world really is. You can't escape skepticism by "positing" what you "wish" were the case.

DB: According to Genesis, we have dust becoming a human being, and yet dust is non-moral while human beings are moral. Thus we have, according to Genesis, the non-moral becoming moral.

PM: Except that pesky little fact that God also endowed Adam with a rational soul. How could you miss that part, after all, you were a "Christian" in your 20's.

DB: I remember scolding fellow Christians when I was a believer, explaining to them that they simply did not grasp Christianity at all well since they insisted that a cow becoming a whale is impossible. As a believer, I thought: "If my God can turn water into wine, who can say that He cannot turn a cow into a whale?"

PM: God certainly could. But this is a far cry from "nature" doing this through multiple mutations, which all need to be beneficial to the species, and all without aim or purpose. I mean, how did the whale sonar gradually "evolve" from a cow, all by blind and purpose-less naturalistic processes?

DB: If Paul were half as concerned with understanding his opponent's position as he is with winning debates, he might actually learn something. However, he shows not only that he does not have any actual arguments against the position he cites, but also that he's not very original, either.


PM: If Dawson were half as concerned with understanding his opponent's position as he is with winning debates, he might actually learn something. However, he shows not only that he does not have any actual arguments against the position he cites, but also that he's not very original, either.

How's that for originality?

DB: In fact, I think there are better explanations for the development of the early Christian record, namely that it developed along the lines of an evolving legend.

PM: You see, that's your problem, you're "thinking" again.

DB: As for the claim that there was an empty tomb, what proof does anyone really have that there was an empty tomb to begin with? Even the apostle Paul, the earliest Christian writer, made no mention of an "empty tomb."

PM: There goes DFB, stuck on "words" again. Paul did mention a resurrection. Since a resurrection implies one was dead, then Paul mentions an empty tomb, by logical inference. Furthermore, does this argument go like this: Paul did not mention an empty tomb, therefore they did not believe in it? This is called an argumentum ad ignorantium.

DB: For instance, he states that "Dawson needs to show now [sic] naturalism can do anything." But to whom am I supposed to show this? And why do I "need" to show this?

PM: Oh, that's right, I forgot that you don't feel the need to argue for your position.

DB: At any rate, the most concise answer to this that comes to mind is Francis Bacon's famous dictum: "Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed." That is, naturalism allows man to accomplish his goals by teaching him how to work with nature on its own terms and according to its own constraints.

PM:

i. How does an inanimate, impersonal, and mute abstraction you call "nature" command you to do anything?

ii. I know you like to focus on the "words," so.... how does an inanimate and impersonal mute, deaf and dumb at that, abstraction "teach" you?

iii. Way to reify nature.

iv. Nature teaches one man one thing and another, another thing. Hence, you have anarchy, subjectivism, and skepticism.

v. I thought what you said about how the Christian behaves very interesting, in light of your hippie-esk nature worship. You wrote,

"What I love is my life as an end in itself, and this is what Christianity resents. Steve Hays made this clear when he wrote: "we need to serve God. We are creatures. We are not our own end. We find our fulfillment in serving one greater than ourselves." The view expressed here conceives of the individual as the means to someone else's ends."

So, let me re-phrase the above in DB terminology:

"What I love is my life as an end in itself, and this is what Bethrickism resents. DB made this clear when he wrote: "we need to serve nature. We are creatures. We are not our own end. We find our fulfillment in serving one greater than ourselves." The view expressed here conceives of the individual as the means to someone/thing else's ends."


DB: Questions such as "why trust our senses?" can be dismissed as invalid on the basis of the fact that they commit the fallacy of the stolen concept.

PM: Well, I fail to see how I could "steal your concept." As a materialist you hold that concepts are neurons in your brain. Hence to "steal" one I'd have to cut your head open and rip some neurons out ( how I'd know which ones where what concepts is beyond me, though). Furthermore, you seem to think that you still have the concept I stole, but then how'd I "steal" it? Indeed, if both you and I have the SAME concept, then how can concepts be material in nature, since the SAME material particular cannot be in more than one spatio-temporal location at the SAME time. Thus it appears that the stolen concept fallacy steals concepts from a dualist position and, thus, the stolen concept fallacy rests on a stolen concept fallacy!

DB: For how does one get to higher abstractions such as ‘trust’ if his senses did not already give him awareness of any objects in the first place?

PM: Indeed! I'd love to see how the senses get you to the universal "trust." Lay it out for us all to see.

DB: Moreover, for me to acquire awareness of Paul’s question, I need to use my senses.

PM: Well this just begs the question, now doesn't it? We could be in a dream world, and therefore not using our physical senses. Nice try though.

DB: Paul did ask "why trust our reasoning?" and although I thought this point was already clear to him, I find that this too needs to be spelled out to him explicitly: I do NOT trust Paul’s reasoning.

PM: I thought this would have been obvious. Why should humans trust their reasoning? Dawson is a human. Why should he trust his reasoning. Nice dodge, though.

DB: Paul says that I "must admit that the senses do, sometimes, deceive us." But I do not accept this for the same reason that I do not accept the question "why trust our senses?" And that reason is quite simply that such a position commits the fallacy of the stolen concept. Paul has conflated sense perception and conceptual identification. There is no such thing as a "deceptive sensation." The tricky part to some things we perceive comes when we intend to identify what we have perceived, and this is a conceptual matter.

PM: This is absurd. DB could see a bent stick in the water, but he would identify it as not bent. He would know this it really was not bent. So, he identifies the situation properly, yet his senses (with the aid of refraction, ect) sends his brain false signals, even though he's not identifying them falsely.

And, assume your position. How do you know that you've ever "conceptually identified" something correctly?

DB: Paul’s apologetic is as cheap as it comes. It basically consists of asking a bunch of questions to which we’re all supposed to throw up our hands and say "Duh, I donno! Must be god did it!"


PM: Well, I stopped counting at 45 questions in DB's post (embarrassing, huh Dawson?)! He expects me to throw up my hands and say, "Duh, I donno! Must be Nature did it!"


It is most pitiable to observe an atheologian for a religious perspective, so eager to sick his naturalistic processes inside his grey matter on theist spoilsports, take a bite out of his own backside in the very trying, while haughtily congratulating himself before his peers. Even when he's fallen overboard, his colleagues do not throw him a life-preserver. Instead, he haphazardly drifts to and fro, at the mercy of torrents and eddies which carry him in no particular direction. But unlike the tale of baby Moses fortuitously caught among the reeds, Dawson is found drifting up a creek without a paddle.

Dawson Bethrick And The Legend Theory

Dawson Bethrick recently posted an article responding to Paul Manata, and the article mentions other contributors to this blog, including me. There are far too many errors in Bethrick's article for me to interact with all of them, but I will respond to some portions of the article. I expect Paul Manata and Steve Hays to be posting responses as well. A lot of what would need to be said in response to Bethrick has already been said in previous replies.

Part of the problem is that he's largely relying on sources like Earl Doherty and Richard Carrier for his information. He cites sources who are so far out of the mainstream that they deny that Jesus even existed, and the more mainstream sources he sometimes uses are being cited for arguments that have long been refuted. For Christian responses to the articles by Robert Price and Richard Carrier, for example, see J.P. Holding's web site, such as here and here.

Another problem is that Bethrick seems to be undecided on some significant issues. He'll mention an argument as one possibility among others, but he won't commit to it. He'll put arguments in the form of a question, thus planting seeds of doubt in people's minds while, at the same time, distancing himself from the argument enough to deny that he ever adopted that argument if it doesn't go well. It seems that Bethrick is still grasping for something to hold on to on a lot of significant issues. He doesn't have much stability. A lot of what he puts forward is vague and unargued. Anybody responding to him has to guess at where he's headed and draw out the implications of his arguments for him.

Much of Bethrick's article is about Matthew 19:26. On that subject he writes:

"I need to provide an argument to the effect that the words 'all things are possible' mean 'all things are possible'? If we do not allow the words to speak for themselves, what good will it do for me to present an argument, which itself consists of words?"

Part of the problem here, as Paul Manata explained in a previous response to Bethrick, is that Bethrick is ignoring the larger context of Jesus' comment. Text is important, but so is context. Bethrick's absurd reading of Matthew 19:26 is contrary to the teachings of the Old Testament Jesus believed in and the common beliefs of first century Jews, of whom Jesus was one. The issue isn't just what words Jesus used in Matthew 19, but also the immediate and larger contexts in which He used those words. Similarly, modern Americans use many figures of speech that could be portrayed as absurd if we isolated them in the manner in which Bethrick is isolating Jesus' words in Matthew 19.

Even if we gave the words the meaning Bethrick suggests, do all of his conclusions follow? He makes much of the Christian belief that there's only one way of salvation, as if the fact that all things are possible with God means that all paths should lead to salvation. But the claim that there's only one way of salvation doesn't require that God would be incapable of saving people in other ways. God can be capable of a variety of actions, yet choose one among them. Bethrick's reasoning on this issue is multiply flawed.

He continues to make much of the fact that I've acknowledged that Christianity's historical arguments are about probabilities rather than certainties:

"In fact, I think there are better explanations for the development of the early Christian record, namely that it developed along the lines of an evolving legend. This is precisely what the documents themselves suggest if we examine their content in their own right, and refrain from the ‘authorized’ habit of reading the later accounts (i.e., the gospel narratives) into the earlier epistolary strata. I mentioned some of these points under the section titled ‘The Legendary Nature of the Evidence’ in my blog, but the responses that the Triaboogers have offered to it were weak where they were not concessional. Jason, for instance, basically admits that he is not certain about the resurrection accounts (he writes: 'Historical judgments, including a historical judgment about Jesus' resurrection, are matters of probability'), and seems to concede that it is 'not impossible' that mass hallucinations helped in getting the early Christians off to a good start."

Bethrick's appeal to the legend theory has already been answered. Eyewitnesses and contemporaries of Jesus and the apostles were still alive when the New Testament books were written. Some of the authors were eyewitnesses writing on matters about which they would be unlikely to be mistaken. The gospels are of the highly historical Greco-Roman biography genre. The earliest Christian and non-Christian interpreters of the documents interpret them as attempts to convey history. The earliest enemies of Christianity acknowledge facts such as Jesus' performance of apparent miracles and His empty tomb, but offer alternative explanations for those facts. Etc. The legend theory Bethrick refers to has a lot of problems, and he still isn't interacting with some of the most significant problems that have been pointed out to him.

He comments that I'm "not certain" about the resurrection accounts. I'm also not certain about the existence of Alexander the Great and the Revolutionary War. A high probability isn't a certainty, but it's better than the highly unlikely possibilities Bethrick offers as an alternative. But he's dependent on highly unlikely possibilities to maintain his position, so he writes:

"Indeed, unusual and unlikely things do happen. But it is most ironic to say on the one hand that a 'naturalistic' explanation - i.e., one which does not point to activity said to be performed by invisible magic beings - is 'incredible,' and then turn around and affirm supernaturalistic explanations as if they were credible....Moreover, although on my view mass hallucination is unlikely, it is not patently impossible, and the unlikely does sometime happen. For instance, it is highly unlikely that a piece of music I wrote and recorded (and yet had not published) in the mid-1990s would become a primary piece of evidence in a legal suit having nothing to do with me. And yet, in spite of these unlikely circumstances, this did in fact happen."

We believe that something that seemed unlikely to happen did happen if that seemingly unlikely occurrence better explains the evidence. The problem is that Bethrick is rejecting explanations that are more consistent with the evidence, because those explanations would support Christianity. On the empty tomb, for example, Bethrick writes:

"As for the claim that there was an empty tomb, what proof does anyone really have that there was an empty tomb to begin with? Even the apostle Paul, the earliest Christian writer, made no mention of an 'empty tomb.' Nor do the other NT epistles."

Think of the absurdity of how Bethrick frames the issue. Is there anywhere in the New Testament epistles where we would expect a mention of the empty tomb? There are places where it could be mentioned, but many subjects could be mentioned, yet aren't. If historians concluded that something must be mentioned in every context in which it could be mentioned, or else it's unhistorical, our view of history would have to be radically revised.

In contrast to Bethrick's appeal to silence in some portions of the New Testament, the Christian can cite:

- The Jewish context of the resurrection claim, which would have involved the common Jewish belief that the body that dies is the body that rises. Thus, an empty tomb would have been assumed even where it wasn't mentioned. See, for example, J.P. Holding's article here.

- The statements made by Paul, John, and other New Testament authors to the effect that the resurrection they were discussing involved the transformation of the body that died. See, for example, Christopher Price's article on Paul's view of resurrection.

- The eyewitness testimony of Matthew.

- The eyewitness testimony of John.

- The testimony of Mark, who apparently had Peter as his primary source.

- The testimony of Luke, a demonstrably reliable historian (see, for example, here and here), who was in contact with men like James and Paul.

- The large amount of evidence we have for the historical genre of the gospels, which means that the writers were composing documents in a genre in which historical scrutiny was expected. See my citations of the New Testament scholar Craig Keener on this subject in my last response to Bethrick.

- The early Christian responses to a Jewish acknowledgment of the empty tomb, which would suggest that the early Jewish opponents of Christianity acknowledged that the tomb was empty. It's unlikely that men like Matthew and Justin Martyr were interacting with arguments that their enemies weren't making.

- Elements of the empty tomb accounts that would be unlikely to have been fabricated, such as having women discover the empty tomb while the male disciples are in hiding and unbelief.

- Evidence for early Christian preservation of the grave site. Craig Keener writes:

"That Jesus’ followers would forget the site of the tomb (or that officials who held the body would not think it worth the trouble to produce it after the postresurrection Jesus movement arose) is extremely improbable. James and the Jerusalem church could easily have preserved the tradition of the site in following decades (Brown 1994: 1280-81), especially given Middle Eastern traditions of pilgrimage to holy sites (though admittedly evidence for early veneration there is lacking, perhaps because the body was not there – Craig 1995: 148-49, 152)….the Catholic Holy Sepulchre and tombs in its vicinity date to the right period. The tradition of the latter vicinity [Holy Sepulcher] is as early as the second century (when Hadrian erected a pagan temple there; he defiled many Jewish holy sites in this manner – cf. Finegan 1969: 164), and probably earlier. Good evidence exists, in fact, that this site dates to within the first two decades after the resurrection. This is because (1) Christian tradition is unanimous that Jesus was buried outside the city walls, and no one would make up a site inside (cf. Heb 13:12; Jn 19:41); (2) Jewish custom made it common knowledge that burials would be outside the city walls (4 Bar. 7:13; Wilkonson 1978: 146); (3) the traditional vicinity of the Holy Sepulcher is inside Jerusalem’s walls; (4) Agrippa I expanded the walls of Jerusalem sometime in the 40s A.D." (A Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew [Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999], p. 695)

More evidence could be cited, but the points above are more than sufficient to demonstrate that the Christian has a far better case for the empty tomb than Bethrick has against it. The fact that an empty tomb isn't mentioned in a document like 1 Corinthians or James is far too inconclusive to weigh as much as or more than the data I've outlined above. To dismiss the lines of evidence I've mentioned, Bethrick could propose that Matthew didn't write the gospel attributed to him. He could suggest that Mark made up the empty tomb account independent of Peter. Perhaps the contemporaries of Jesus who would have known that there was no empty tomb account early on either didn't object to the empty tomb account or their objections didn't leave any trace in the historical record. Men like Matthew and Justin Martyr were mistaken about early Jewish acknowledgment of the empty tomb. Or maybe the early Jewish opponents decided to acknowledge the empty tomb despite having no good evidence that the tomb was empty. Etc. Bethrick could propose a long series of such speculations in an attempt to dismiss all of the evidence for the empty tomb. But then he wouldn't be appealing to the explanation that's most consistent with the evidence. Rather, he would be assuming without evidence whatever he needs to assume in order to dismiss an unwanted conclusion. The conclusion that the tomb was empty explains the evidence well. It has no significant problems. In order to defend it, we don't have to propose the sort of widespread memory losses, carelessness, etc. that Bethrick would have to propose in order to deny that the tomb was empty.

On the resurrection appearances, Bethrick once again rejects the probable in favor of the unlikely:

"But if, for instance, the stories of Paul’s conversion in Acts are not historically reliable, then there’s no need to suppose that Paul was hallucinating. Time and again, such basic points seem to have escaped the wit and wisdom of Triablogue’s apologetic superstars, who are apparently so eager to rush into battle against their threatening nemeses that they don’t realize they’ve fallen over a cliff."

The writers for this blog have repeatedly addressed the issue of Paul's conversion in Acts. As I've said before, Luke is a demonstrably reliable source, all of the Acts accounts were written by one author, they can be harmonized with each other, and the author seems to have been present on at least one occasion when Paul spoke of the events (Acts 26:12-27:1). Furthermore, the information Paul gives us in his writings is consistent with what Acts reports. Paul confirms that he had been an enemy of Christianity, he confirms that he saw the risen Jesus, and he repeatedly refers to problems he had with his eyes (Galatians 4:15, 6:11), which is consistent with the light and blindness described in Acts.

Notice that Bethrick claims that he doesn't need a hallucination theory, yet all he does is make vague references to how the resurrection accounts in the gospels and Acts allegedly are unhistorical. Not only hasn't he given us sufficient reason to agree with his dismissals, but he also fails to explain the data in Paul. Whatever we think of the Acts accounts of Paul's conversion, the fact remains that Paul claims to have seen the risen Jesus. He also mentions hundreds of other people he was familiar with who also saw the risen Jesus, including people Paul says he met (Peter, James, etc.). Bethrick needs to explain what happened with these people. If they didn't hallucinate, then what did happen?

Bethrick ignores much of the evidence he's been given on issues like these, and he doesn't seem to have much familiarity with the scholarly literature on the relevant subjects. Yet, he keeps making comments like the following:

"Even though many apologists might prefer the safety of non-commitment, it seems that some apologists are in agreement that the Christian god could cause hallucinations on a large scale basis. But couldn't also the devil? Christianity's defenders tend to shy away from discussing (yea, even acknowledging) the mischief that demons, devils and other 'bad spirits' are presumably capable of wreaking in human affairs, for doing so admits the possibility that Christians themselves have been deceived by these invisible beings. And what about other gods? Naturally, Christians discount the claim that there are other gods. But if one grants legitimacy to the notion of the supernatural to begin with, then we could only rule out such possibilities by special pleading."

Maybe the reason why Bethrick doesn't see Christians addressing such issues is because he doesn't make much of an effort to look. Christians have written on these issues at length. I posted some related material last year on the Real Clear Theology blog, for example (see here and here). What we do is look at the nature of the Christian miracles, such as fulfilled prophecy and the resurrection, and ask how plausible it would be to conclude that an entity such as a demon was responsible. We would ask, for example, whether a demon would be able to predict the future in the detail in which it's predicted in scripture. We would ask how likely it is that God would allow a demon to operate with such power while that demon claims to be God. We would compare the miracle claims of one religion to those of another. Since religions like Buddhism and Islam don't have anything comparable to the depth and breadth of supernatural power we see in Jesus' life (prophecies Jesus fulfilled, prophecies Jesus made, Jesus' power over death, etc.), why is the existence of such religions problematic for Christianity?

Notice that, once again, Bethrick acts as if Christians must show that alternatives to Christianity aren't possible. Why should we accept such a ridiculous framing of the issue? An argument for certainty wouldn't be necessary. Probabilities would be sufficient.

Much of what I've said in this response to Bethrick either has already been explained to him in the past, yet he acts as if he's ignorant of it, or it's information he could easily have attained from other sources. He isn't prepared to discuss these issues in much depth, and reading sources like Earl Doherty and Richard Carrier isn't going to get him where he needs to be.

Confessions of a Reformed mobster

John Armstrong has posted a questionnaire for the Truly Reformed.

http://johnharmstrong.typepad.com/john_h_armstrong_/2006/06/questions_i_pon.html

One initial dilemma I face is that I don’t know if I’m qualified to answer these questions.

Presumably, I’d have to be a card-carrying member of the TR syndicate to answer them.

Am I one of the TR?

Short answer: we’re not allowed to tell.

The iMonk once published a contraband membership roll (recorded in the infamous Rule 40) which was smuggled out of Central Headquarters by a disaffected bookie, fingering Fide-O, Triablogue, Centuri0n, Pyromaniacs, Alpha and Omega Ministries, EmergentNo, and Doxoblogy.

I can neither confirm nor deny the authenticity of this list.

For one thing, Dr. White took my kid brother Elmer hostage and threatened to torture him (by making him listen to praise choruses from Mars Hill Church) in case I ever divulge my illiciit connections to La Calvinostra.

I once hired Jack Bauer to rescue Elmer, but Dr. White transferred him to the custody of Frank Turk, his consigliere, who—in turn—handed him over to Phil Johnson—head of black bag operations.

Rumors have it that members of the TR syndicate have a subdermal tracking device implanted at the base of the skull.

The membership is said to be subdivided into semi-autonomous cell groups so that if one member is captured by the roving death squads of Opus Dei, the syndicate will not be compromised.

So I can only answer these questions on condition of anonymity, along with an immunity deal signed by Alberto Gonzalez.

“1. Why do modern conservative Reformed Christians seem to have historical amnesia when it comes to events that transpired in church history from the death of John on the Isle of Patmos, late in the first century, until the completion of the Canon several centuries later?”

The interval between the death of John the Revelator and 95 Theses is known in Reformed theology as the Great Parenthesis.

“2. Why do modern conservative Reformed Christians virtually ignore the Church Fathers as well as the catholic creeds of the Christian church?”

Which church fathers do we ignore? Not Augustine.

As to the ancient creeds, the Christology of these creeds is incorporated into Reformed Confessions like the WCF and LBCF.

“3. Why do modern conservative Reformed Christians ignore the fact that John Calvin was especially influenced by the Church Fathers? For that matter why do these same conservative Reformed Christians virtually ignore other Reformed writers who relied very heavily upon the classical catholic tradition such as Thomas Cranmer, Hugh Latimer and Nicholas Ridley?”

i) To begin with, Calvin’s historical situation was obviously different from ours. He was a one-time Catholic debating with Catholic theologians.

So there was going to be a debate over tradition, over who was truer to early tradition, over who was the real schismatic.

ii) Anglican authors often identify themselves as English Catholics rather than as Protestants.

“4. Why do conservative Reformed Christians treat only certain confessional traditions, such as the Westminster Confession or its cousin the London Baptist Confession, as if only these confessions and catechisms were the proper confessional grounds for the Reformed faith and thus for contemporary understanding of the Bible and classical Christian thought, if they even care about classical thought? These important creedal standards of the 17th century are not the only standards for orthodoxy, for all time and all cultures, and few have ever treated them in this manner. Therefore, why do ordinary Christians hardly ever hear this from the many of the conservative Reformed spokesmen? (There are few if any conservative Reformed spokeswomen, which is another question for another time.)”

For one thing, creeds are consensus documents, and certain periods are ripe for creed-making, while others are not.

To formulate a new Reformed confession at this stage of the game would be more divisive than unitive.

“5. Why do conservative Reformed Christians demand a kind of purity from other modern Reformed writers that allows so many of them to never actually engage the culture and do the hard work of the Kingdom in the 21st century?”

This charge is too indiscriminate to be answerable.

“Why do they attack all expressions of emerging culture and church life when in fact their tradition emerged in a specific time in history too?”

Once again, Armstrong doesn’t identify the target of his attack, so the question is unanswerable.

For example, both D. A. Carson and John Frame have written critically about certain leaders of the Emergent church movement.

Is this what Armstrong has in mind? If so, what exactly does he take exception to? If not, then who does he have in mind?

“6. Why do conservative Reformed Christians identify so strongly, and often so stridently, with other non-Reformed Christians in certain area of gospel controversy, especially in advocating very narrow definitions of the gospel in an attempt to impress lay people and inadequately taught pastors that they alone are standing for the truth in this dark day? This has been done over the last ten years with the issuance of various joint statements and widely promoted conferences, as if these faithful spokesmen alone have the courage to defend the gospel and the correct understanding of what actually constitutes the gospel.”

If Armstrong wants a serious answer, he needs to ask a serious question—instead of hiding behind veiled, accusatorial questions.

How does he define a “very narrow definition of the gospel”?

“7. Why do conservative Reformed Christians generally treat Roman Catholics (and Orthodox Christians if they bother to respond to them at all) as non-Christians, especially in their public pronouncements?”

Because we don’t think that a Catholic qua Catholic can offer a credible profession of faith.

Is a divided faith a saving faith? Is faith in the merit of Christ, along with faith in my personal congruent merit, along with faith the merit of Mary and the saints to justify me before God, the way in which the Bible defines saving faith?

“Do these same Reformed Christians, at least on the Presbyterian side of the aisle, ever admit that their own traditions have always accepted Catholic/Orthodox baptism as valid Christian baptism?”

i) This is not true of the Southern Presbyterian tradition.

ii) In any case, so what? Why should there be a gentlemen’s agreement between churches to accept each others baptism when they have next to nothing else in common?

Should we have some standards for the validity of baptism?

“I also wonder if these conservatives, who stand should-to-shoulder with other non-Reformed fundamentalists in a type of reductionism that results from their narrow gospel definitions (as noted as in question six above), really ever make these facts plain to their non-Reformed (Baptist and dispensational) allies, who I suppose would be aghast if they understood this?”

First he accuses the TR of being too exclusive. Now he accuses the TR of being too inclusive because we make common cause with the fundamentalists.

By way of an answer, a fundamentalist can make a credible profession of faith in a way that a Roman Catholic cannot.

“8. Why do conservative Reformed Christians rail so harshly, and react so emotionally, against liturgy in worship (a huge list could be constructed to make this point) on the one hand, while on the other they hate pop-cultural, happy-clappy, contemporary evangelical worship services with a passion?”

I personally don’t care if a Calvinist prefers a more liturgical style of worship.

“Do they realize that what they have created, in many cases, is a modern lecture hall with hymns and a collection? Do they realize that this is much more like a Plymouth Brethren gathering than a truly Reformed service, with all its variations and rich use of older liturgical tradition?”

What Reformed liturgical tradition does he have in mind? The Westminster Directory of worship?

“9. Why do conservative Reformed Christians often promote a high ecclesiology (in theory) while in practice they act much more like Southern Baptists who add presbyteries and general assemblies on to a modern form of culture religion? In practice these sorts of Reformed groups govern themselves, and do theology, less and less like historically Reformed bodies. Think populism and democractic idealism, not historic Reformed confessionalism, and you get my point.”

Well, for one thing, high ecclesiology was formulated at a time when the clergy were among the few members of the educated class.

But nowadays, when many laymen have college degrees (often advanced degrees), when a literate layman can read whatever his pastor is reading, then some measure of populism and democratization is inevitable.

Likewise, we don’t have a national church in the US. Pastors aren’t government employees. It’s the laity who pay their salaries, not Uncle Sam. Once again, that results in a measure of populism and democratization.

It also has the advantage of limiting clerical elitism.

“10. Why do conservative Reformed Christians promote certain aspects of Puritanism, often without really understanding Puritanism in the way a real scholar like J. I. Packer does, while at the same time they despise the real Puritan approach to the Holy Spirit and to a practical experiential religion centered in the heart?”

Centered in the heart as opposed to what—the head?

Define your terms.

“And why do these same people hate almost every type of ascetical or mystical theology while whole segments of the Reformed movement have loved these parts of the Christian tradition deeply?”

“Ascetical” in what sense? Obedience, poverty, and chastity?

“Mystical” in what sense? Should we be contemplatives?

“(This is precisely why some conservative Reformed spokesmen despise Jonathan Edwards, which I discovered first-hand, to my profound surprise, about ten years ago.)”

Is Armstrong alluding to revivalism or what?

“Separatism and fundamentalism are both alive and well among many conservative Reformed Christians in our day. I wish more people understood the simple truth of this obvious fact. I also wish more spokesmen would own up to this truth and allow an honest discussion in their circles of influence. (I am not holding my breath!) To open up such circles to an honest discussion would require an open denial of the narrow use of their creedal tradition.”

Armstrong shows no real interest in an honest discussion. If he were seeking an honest discussion, he’d ask honest questions.

What he does instead is to pose snide, rhetorical, tendentious, prejudicial questions—questions that assign blame at the outset of the discussion.

He poses deliberately unanswerable questions, questions that are framed to trap the TR into a preemptive admission of guilt.

Questions that are so vague as to be unanswerable.

To judge by this performance, Armstrong is simply using the format of a questionnaire as a rhetorical ploy to vent his resentment at shadowy targets.

“Bible-belt American culture has much more to do with these questions than historical creeds and confessions, as do pride of person and place.”

There’s a consistent strain of snobbery in Armstrong’s questionnaire as he tries to drive a wedge between the TR and his Elmer Gantry image of fundamentalism.

“In a very real sense even the appellation TR (Truly Reformed, or Totally Reformed) is quite inaccurate, though I fear it is too often worn as a badge of honor by many.”

Is it worn as a badge of honor? This is not a self-appellation, but a term of derision.

“Isn’t it time to address these questions honestly so that a new generation can hear the real beauty of how Reformed theology can actually make a solid contribution to restoring classical Christian faith and holy tradition to a culture-bound church that is knee deep in compromise and confusion? I see a growing number of younger Christians who find this whole "Reformed" view completely irrelevant the more they read widely and encounter real people in real churches. One can pray that their tribe will increase as people realize that we must live in the 21st century, not the 17th.”

Before we can honestly address a set of questions, we need a set of honest questions—not a smear campaign masquerading as dialogue.